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26 October 2006
[Federal Register: October 26, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 207)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 62663-62874]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26oc06-16]
[[Page 62663]]
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Part II
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73
Power Reactor Security Requirements; Proposed Rule
[[Page 62664]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73
RIN 3150-AG63
Power Reactor Security Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
the current security regulations and add new security requirements
pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this rulemaking
includes new security requirements for Category I strategic special
nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced weapons and
firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would: Make
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during
implementation; fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of
2005; add several new requirements that resulted from insights from
implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans,
and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and
force-on-force exercises; update the regulatory framework in
preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors; and
impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can
adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security
requirements would address, in part, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-
80) that requests the establishment of regulations governing proposed
changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection
against radiological sabotage.
DATES: Submit comments by January 9, 2007. Submit comments specific to
the information collection aspects of this rule by November 27, 2006.
Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is
practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to
comments received after these dates.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include the following number ``RIN 3150-AG63'' in the subject
line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or
in electronic form will be made available for public inspection.
Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or
contact information, the NRC cautions you against including any
information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly
disclosed.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; E-mail
CAG@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal e-
Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone
(301) 415-1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
You may submit comments on the information collections by the
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR), O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. The PDR reproduction
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including
comments, may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to PDR@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Richard Rasmussen, Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone (301) 415-0610; e-
mail: RAR@nrc.gov or Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone (301) 415-1462; e-mail: TAR@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Regulations
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Language
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Public Protection Notification
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted a thorough review of security to ensure that nuclear power
plants and other licensed facilities continued to have effective
security measures in place given the changing threat environment.
Through a series of orders, the Commission specified a supplement to
the Design Basis Threat (DBT), as well as requirements for specific
training enhancements, access authorization enhancements, security
officer work hours, and enhancements to defensive strategies,
mitigative measures, and integrated response. Additionally, in generic
communications, the Commission specified expectations for enhanced
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious
activities.
Most of the requirements in this proposed rulemaking are derived
directly from, or through implementation of, the following four
security orders:
EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,''
dated February 25, 2002 (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792).
EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' dated January
7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification
Requirements (Training) Order,'' dated April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68
FR 24514), and
EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' dated
April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).
[[Page 62665]]
Nuclear power plant licensees revised their security plans,
training and qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans in
response to these orders. The NRC completed its review and approval of
all of the revised security plans, training and qualification plans,
and safeguards contingency plans on October 29, 2004. These plans
incorporated the enhancements instituted through the orders. While the
specifics of these changes are Safeguards Information, in general, the
changes resulted in enhancements such as increased patrols, augmented
security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, additional
physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater standoff distances,
enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities,
augmented security and emergency response training, equipment, and
communication, and more restrictive site access controls for personnel,
including expanded, expedited, and more thorough employee background
checks.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), signed into law on
August 8, 2005, is another source of some of the proposed requirements
reflected in this rulemaking. Section 653, for instance, allows the NRC
to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies,
an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-
automatic assault weapons. Section 653 also requires that all security
personnel with access to any weapons undergo a background check that
would include fingerprinting and a check against the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) database. These provisions of EPAct 2005 would be reflected in
the newly proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and the proposed NRC
Form 754. Though this rulemaking primarily affects power reactor
security requirements, to implement the EPAct 2005 provisions
efficiently, the NRC expanded the rulemaking's scope in newly proposed
Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19 to include facilities authorized to possess
formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material,
i.e., Category I SSNM facilities. Such facilities would include
production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel
processing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. Additionally,
Section 651 of the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to conduct security
evaluations at selected licensed facilities, including periodic force-
on-force exercises. That provision also requires the NRC to mitigate
any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of
force-on-force exercises. These provisions would be reflected in
proposed Sec. 73.55.
Through implementing the security orders, reviewing the revised
site security plans across the fleet of reactors, conducting the
enhanced baseline inspection program, and evaluating force-on-force
exercises, the NRC has identified some additional security measures
that would provide additional assurance of a licensee's capability to
protect against the DBT.
Finally, a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Union of
Concerned Scientists and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (PRM 50-80),
requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes
to facilities which could adversely affect their protection against
radiological sabotage. This petition was partially granted on November
17, 2005 (70 FR 69690). The proposed new Sec. 73.58 contains
requirements to address the remaining issues.
The proposed amendments to the security requirements for power
reactors, and for enhanced weapons requirements for power reactor and
Category I SSNM facilities, would result in changes to the following
existing sections and appendices in 10 CFR part 73:
10 CFR 73.2, Definitions.
10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage.
10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access authorization requirements
for nuclear power plants.
10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.
10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General criteria for security
personnel.
10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee safeguards contingency
plans.
10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable safeguards events.
The proposed amendments would also add three new sections to part
73:
Proposed Sec. 73.18, Firearms background checks for armed
security personnel.
Proposed Sec. 73.19, Authorization for use of enhanced
weapons.
Proposed Sec. 73.58, Safety/security interface
requirements for nuclear power reactors.
The proposed rule would also add a new NRC Form 754 under the newly
proposed Sec. 73.18.
EPAct 2005 Weapons Guidelines
In order to accomplish Sec. 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (AEA), concerning the transfer, receipt, possession,
transport, import, and use of enhanced weapons and the requirements for
firearms background checks, the NRC has engaged with representatives
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, and the U.S. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), to develop
guidelines required by Sec. 161A.d of the AEA. The provisions of
Sec.161A. of the AEA take effect upon the issuance of these guidelines
by the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General. The
Commission will publish a separate Federal Register notice on the
issuance of these guidelines. This proposed rule would not rescind the
authority of certain NRC licensees, currently possessing automatic
weapons through alternate processes, to possess such enhanced weapons;
however, these licensees would be subject to the new firearms
background check requirements of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. Information on
new provisions (Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19) that would implement Sec.
161A. may be found in Section III.
Conforming and Corrective Changes
Conforming changes to the requirements listed below are proposed in
order to ensure that cross-referencing between the various security
regulations in part 73 is preserved, and to avoid revising requirements
for licensees who are not within the scope of this proposed rule. The
following requirements contain conforming changes:
Section 50.34, ``Contents of applications; technical
information'' would be revised to align the application requirements
with the proposed revisions to appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
Section 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses'' would be revised
to conform with the proposed revisions to sections in appendix C to 10
CFR part 73.
Section 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for
operating nuclear power reactors'' would be revised to state (in
footnote 1) that immediate notification to the NRC may be required (per
the proposed Sec. 73.71 requirements) prior to the notification
requirements under the current Sec. 50.72.
Section 72.212, ``Conditions of general license issued
under Sec. 72.210'' would be revised to reference the appropriate
revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec. 73.55.
Section 73.8, ``Information collection requirements: OMB
approval'' would be revised to add the newly proposed requirements
(Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, 73.58, and NRC Form 754) to the list of
sections and forms with Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
[[Page 62666]]
information collection requirements. A corrective revision to Sec.
73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing information
collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing Sec. 73.71.
Section 73.70, ``Records'' would be revised to reference
the appropriate revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec. 73.55
regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.
Additionally, Sec. 73.81, ``Criminal penalties'' which sets forth
the sections within part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions
under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the
newly proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to
criminal sanctions.
Appendix B and appendix C to part 73 require special treatment in
this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the
current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed
rule would not apply. Accordingly, sections I through V of appendix B
would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power
reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into
two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and
Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power
reactors.
II. Rulemaking Initiation
On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled ``Status
of Security-Related Rulemaking'' (accession number ML041180532) to
inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions
and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify
physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum
described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist
activities of September 11, 2001, and summarized the security-related
actions taken following the attack. In response to this memorandum, the
Commission directed the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff Requirements
Memorandum (SRM) (COMSECY-04-0047, accession number ML042360548) to
forego the development of a rulemaking plan, and provide a schedule for
the completion of security-related rulemakings. The staff provided this
schedule to the Commission by memorandum dated November 16, 2004
(accession number ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff revised its
plans to amend the part 73 security requirements to include a
requirement for licensees to assess and manage site activities that
could compromise either safety or security (i.e., the safety/security
interface requirements). This revision is discussed in a memorandum
dated July 29, 2005 (accession number ML051800350). Finally, by
memorandum dated September 29, 2005 (COMSECY-05-0046, accession number
ML052710167), the staff discussed its plans to incorporate select
provisions of the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor security
requirements rulemaking. In COMSECY-05-0046, dated November 1, 2005
(accession number ML053050439), the Commission approved the staff's
approach in incorporating the select provisions of EPAct 2005.
III. Proposed Regulations
This section describes significant provisions of this rulemaking:
1. EPAct 2005 weapons requirements. The new Sec. Sec. 73.18 and
73.19 would contain requirements to implement provisions of section
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Section 653 of
the EPAct amended the AEA by adding section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel.'' Section 161A provides new authority to the
Commission to enhance security at certain NRC licensee and certificate
holder facilities by authorizing the security personnel of those
licensees or certificate holders to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, and use an expanded arsenal of weapons, to include:
Short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and machine guns. In
addition, section 161A also provides that NRC-designated licensees and
certificate holders may apply to the NRC for authority to preempt
local, State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations)
that prohibits the transfer, receipt, possession, transportation,
importation, or use of handguns, rifles, shotguns, short-barreled
shotguns, short-barreled rifles, machine guns, semiautomatic assault
weapons, ammunition for such guns or weapons, and large capacity
ammunition feeding devices. Prior to granting either authority,
however, the Commission must determine that the proposed use of this
authority is necessary in the discharge of official duties by security
personnel engaged in protecting: (1) Facilities owned or operated by an
NRC licensee or certificate holder and designated by the Commission, or
(2) radioactive material or other property that is owned or possessed
by an NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is being transported
to or from an NRC-regulated facility, if the Commission has determined
the radioactive material or other property to be of significance to the
common defense and security or public health and safety. Licensees and
certificate holders must receive preemption authority before receiving
NRC approval for enhanced weapons authority. Finally, the NRC may
consider making preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority
available to other types of licensees or certificate holders in future
rulemakings.
Under the provisions of section 161A.d, section 161A takes effect
on the date that implementing guidelines are issued by the Commission
after being approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Following enactment
of the EPAct 2005, NRC staff began discussions with staffs from the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its subordinate agencies the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to develop these guidelines.
Issuance of these guidelines is a prerequisite for the issuance of a
final rule on Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and the conforming changes in
Sec. 73.2. The proposed language for Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and
the conforming changes in Sec. 73.2, set forth in this proposed rule
is consistent, to the extent possible, with the discussions between NRC
and DOJ. However, because NRC and DOJ staffs continue to work to
resolve the remaining issues, the guidelines have not been finalized as
of the issuance of this notice. Once the final guidelines are issued,
the Commission will, if necessary, take the appropriate actions to
ensure that the language of proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.2,
conforms with the guidelines. The Commission is utilizing this parallel
approach to provide the most expeditious process for promulgating the
necessary regulations implementing section 161A; thereby enhancing the
security (i.e., weapons) capabilities of NRC-licensed facilities, while
being mindful of our obligations to provide stakeholders an opportunity
to comment on proposed regulations.
2. Safety/Security interface requirements. These requirements are
located in proposed Sec. 73.58. The safety/security requirements are
intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential
adverse interactions between security activities and other plant
activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety.
The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage
these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised.
These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking
(PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing
proposed changes
[[Page 62667]]
to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against
radiological sabotage.
3. EPAct 2005 additional requirements. The EPAct 2005 requirements
that would be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to
the weapons-related additions described previously, consist of new
requirements to perform force-on-force exercises, and to mitigate
potential conflicts of interest that could influence the results of
NRC-conducted force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements
would be included in proposed Sec. 73.55 and appendix C to part 73.
4. Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting
requirements. This proposed rule contains accelerated security
notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed Sec.
73.71 and appendix G to part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to
power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are
similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02,
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new
four-hour reporting requirements. The proposed rule would direct
licensees to report to the NRC information pertaining to suspicious
activities as described in the proposed requirement. The proposed rule
would also include a new four-hour reporting requirement for tampering
events that do not meet the current threshold for one-hour reporting.
5. Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel requirements. These requirements would be
incorporated into proposed Sec. 73.55 for licensees who propose to use
MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These proposed requirements are in lieu
of unnecessarily rigorous part 73 requirements (e.g., Sec. Sec. 73.45
and 73.46), which would otherwise apply because of the MOX fuel's low
plutonium content and the weight and size of the MOX fuel assemblies.
The proposed MOX fuel security requirements are intended to be
consistent with the approach implemented at Catawba Nuclear Station
through the MOX lead test assembly effort.
6. Cyber-security requirements. This proposed rule would contain
more detailed programmatic requirements for addressing cyber security
at power reactors, which build on the requirements imposed by the
February 2002 order. The proposed cyber-security requirements are
designed to be consistent with ongoing industry cyber-security efforts.
7. Mitigating strategies. The proposed rule would require licensees
to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using
existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that
can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with
the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. These
proposed requirements would be incorporated into the proposed appendix
C to part 73.
8. Access authorization enhancements. The proposed changes would
improve the integration of the access authorization requirements,
fitness-for-duty requirements, and security program requirements. The
proposed rule would include an increase in the rigor for some elements
of the access authorization program including requirements for the
conduct of psychological assessments, requirements for individuals to
report arrests to the reviewing official, and requirements to clarify
the responsibility for the acceptance of shared information. The
proposed rule would also add requirements to allow NRC inspection of
licensee information sharing records and requirements that subject
additional individuals, such as those who have electronic access via
computer systems or those who administer the access authorization
program, to the access authorization requirements.
9. Training and qualification enhancements. The proposed rule
includes modifications to the training and qualification requirements
that are based on insights from implementation of the security orders,
review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced
baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. These new
requirements would include additional physical requirements for unarmed
security personnel to assure that personnel performing these functions
meet physical requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new
requirements also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for
unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the
training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for
security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and
program requirements for on-the-job training.
10. Security Program Implementation insights. The proposed rule
would impose new enhancements identified from implementation of the
security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of
the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises.
These new requirements would include changes to specifically require
that the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS)
have functionally equivalent capabilities such that no single act can
disable the key functions of both CAS and SAS. The proposed additions
would also include requirements for new reactor licensees to position
the SAS within the protected area, add bullet resistance and limit the
visibility into SAS. Proposed additions also require uninterruptible
backup power supplies for detection and assessment equipment, ``video-
capture'' capability, and qualification requirements for drill and
exercise controllers.
11. Miscellaneous. The proposed rule would eliminate some
requirements that the staff found to be unnecessary, while still
providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. One
such requirement to be eliminated provides for guards to escort
operators of motor vehicles within the protected area if the operators
are cleared for unescorted access. The proposed rule would also add new
requirements, including predefined provisions for the suspension of
safeguards measures for severe weather conditions that could result in
life-threatening situations for security personnel (e.g., tornadoes,
floods, and hurricanes), and reduced overly-prescriptive requirements
through the inclusion of performance-based language to allow
flexibility in the methods used to accomplish requirements.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV.1. New Weapons Requirements
This proposed rulemaking would implement new weapons requirements
that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is the only portion of this
proposed rulemaking that involves facilities other than nuclear power
reactors. The newly proposed weapons requirements would apply to power
reactors and facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material whose security plans are
governed by Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. The new requirements
would be in three different sections and would include the utilization
of an NRC Form:
Revised proposed Sec. 73.2, ``Definitions''.
[[Page 62668]]
Proposed Sec. 73.18, ``Firearms background checks for
armed security personnel''.
Proposed Sec. 73.19, ``Authorization for use of enhanced
weapons''.
Proposed NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel
Background Check''.
Under proposed Sec. 73.18, after the NRC approves the licensee's
or certificate holder's application, all security personnel must have a
satisfactorily completed firearms background check to have access to
covered weapons. Licensees and certificate holders would be required
under proposed Sec. 73.19 to notify the NRC that they have
satisfactorily completed a sufficient number of firearms background
checks to staff their security organization. The firearms background
checks required by proposed Sec. 73.18 would be intended to verify
that armed security personnel are not prohibited from receiving,
possessing, transporting, or using firearms under Federal or State law.
A firearms background check would consist of two parts, a check of an
individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system and a
check of the individual's identity against the FBI's National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The NRC would propose a new
NRC Form 754 for licensee or certificate holder security personnel to
submit the necessary information to the NRC for forwarding to the FBI
to perform the NICS portion of the firearms background check. The
requirement to satisfactorily complete a firearms background check
would apply to security personnel either directly employed by the
licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor to
the licensee or certificate holder and whose official duties require
access to covered weapons (i.e., armed security personnel) [see also
new definitions for covered weapons, enhanced weapons, and standard
weapons in Sec. 73.2]. Additionally, the requirement for licensees or
certificate holders to ensure that their security personnel have
satisfactorily completed a firearms background check would apply to
licensees and certificate holders who have applied for and received NRC
approval of preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority. In
order to simplify the rule language, Sec. 73.18 would only refer to
applications for preemption authority because preemption authority
would always be a necessary prerequisite for the receipt of enhanced
weapons authority.
The NRC would propose that a licensee or certificate holder may
begin firearms background checks on armed security personnel after the
licensee or certificate holder has applied to the NRC for the
preemption authority section 161A of the AEA. Because the NRC has not
previously had the authority to require its licensees or certificate
holders to complete firearms background checks on security personnel,
in most instances these requirements would be new to licensees and
uncertainties exist over the amount of time to complete these checks.
Thus delays in completing the checks (e.g., the time necessary to
resolve any errors of fact in the FBI's NICS databases) could reduce
the number of available security officers and create fatigue or minimum
staffing level issues. Therefore, the NRC envisions working with
licensees and certificate holders on a case-by-case basis to establish
the date for NRC approval of an application for preemption authority;
and thereby ensure that the licensee's or certificate holder's security
organizations can continue to adequately protect the facility when the
approval is issued.
The Commission has not yet determined whether licensees and
certificate holders may apply for preemption authority alone or
combined preemption and enhanced-weapons authority prior to issuance of
a final rule. In anticipation that the Commission does permit
applications for section 161A authority prior to promulgation of a
final rule, the proposed rule would include language to support a
transition to these regulations from requirements imposed by Commission
orders granting section 161A authority. The proposed rule would not,
however, require a licensee or certificate holder to repeat a firearms
background check for security personnel who previously satisfactorily
completed a firearms background check that was required under
Commission order. Consequently, this approach would provide both the
Commission and industry with the maximum flexibility to expeditiously
implement the security enhancements authorized by section 161A. The
exception to this requirement would be for security personnel who have
had a break in employment with the licensee or certificate holder or
their security contractor, or who have transferred from another
licensee or certificate holder (who previously completed a firearms
background check on them). In either case these security personnel
would be treated as new security personnel and they would be subject to
a new firearms background check.
The proposed rule would also provide direction on how security
personnel who have received an adverse firearms background check (i.e.,
a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) may: (1) Obtain further
information from the FBI on the reason for the adverse response, (2)
appeal a ``denied'' response, or (3) provide additional information to
resolve a ``delayed'' response. Security personnel would be required to
apply directly to the FBI for these actions (i.e., the licensee or
certificate holder may not appeal to the FBI on behalf of the security
personnel). Only after such personnel have successfully appealed their
``denied'' response, and have subsequently received a ``proceed'' NICS
response, would they be permitted access to covered weapons.
Security personnel who receive a ``denied'' NICS response are
presumed by ATF to be prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm
under federal law (see 18 U.S.C. 922) and may not have access to
covered weapons unless they have successfully appealed the ``denied''
NICS response and received a ``proceed'' NICS response. Because of the
structure of section 161A, the proposed rule would not require
licensees or certificate holders to remove personnel with a ``denied''
response until after the NRC has approved the licensee's or certificate
holder's application for preemption authority (i.e., licensee's and
certificate holders would not be subject to the requirements of Sec.
73.18 until after the NRC's approval of their application for
preemption authority is issued). However, the NRC's expectation is that
current licensees or certificate holders who receive a ``denied''
response for current security personnel would remove those personnel
from any security duties requiring possession of firearms to comport
with applicable Federal law and ATF regulations.
The NRC would propose to charge the same fee for fingerprints
submitted for a firearms background check as is currently imposed for
fingerprints submitted for other NRC-required criminal history checks
including fingerprints (i.e., an NRC administrative fee plus the FBI's
processing fee). In addition, the NRC would charge an administrative
fee for processing the NICS check information; however, no FBI fee
would be charged for the NICS check.
The proposed Sec. 73.19 would only apply to power reactor
licensees and Category I special nuclear material licensees; therefore,
only these two classes of licensees would be subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.18. The NRC may, however,
consider making stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-
weapons authority and preemption authority available to other
[[Page 62669]]
types of licensees or certificate holders in future rulemakings.
In Sec. 73.19, the NRC would propose requirements for a licensee
or certificate holder to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or
to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority. Licensees and certificate holders who apply for enhanced-
weapons authority, must also apply for and receive NRC approval of
preemption authority as a necessary prerequisite to receiving enhanced-
weapons authority. The NRC would propose limiting either authority to
power reactor licensees and Category I SSNM licensees at this time. The
NRC may consider applying this authority to other types of licensees,
certificate holders, radioactive material, or other property (as
authorized under section 161A) in future rulemakings. Obtaining
enhanced-weapons authority from the NRC would be a necessary
prerequisite for a licensee or certificate holder to apply under ATF's
regulations for a Federal firearms license for these weapons. The NRC
would propose that licensees and certificate holders who want to apply
for enhanced-weapons authority must provide the NRC, for prior review
and approval, a new or revised security plan, training and
qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan to reflect the use
of these specific new weapons the licensee or certificate holder
intends to employ and to provide a safety assessment of the onsite and
offsite impact of these specific enhanced weapons.
The proposed rule would also provide direction on acceptable
training standards for training and qualification on enhanced weapons.
The NRC would require licensees and certificate holders to complete
training and qualification of security personnel on any enhanced
weapons, before these personnel employ those weapons to protect the
facility. The NRC would also require Commission licensees and
certificate holders to notify the NRC of any adverse ATF findings
associated with ATF's inspections, audits, or reviews of their Federal
firearms license (FFL) (i.e., an FFL held by an NRC licensee or
certificate holder).
Finally, the NRC would propose to treat enhanced weapons the same
as existing weapons for the purpose of ``use'' of these weapons; and
therefore Sec. 73.19 would cross reference to existing regulation in
Sec. Sec. 73.55 and 73.46 on the use of weapons by reactor licensees
and by Category I SSNM licensees ( i.e., the NRC is not proposing
separate requirements on enhanced weapons versus standard weapons;
rather, requirements on the use of any weaponry possessed by the
licensee or certificate holder should be appropriate for the facility).
To implement the new weapons provisions, three new terms would be
added to Sec. 73.2: covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard
weapon.
The proposed new weapons requirements and supporting discussion for
the proposed language are set forth in more detail (including the
proposed new definitions) in Table 1.
IV.2. Section 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage''
Proposed Sec. 73.55 contains security program requirements for
power reactor licensees. The security program requirements in Sec.
73.55 would apply to all nuclear power plant licensees that hold a 10
CFR part 50 license and to applicants who are applying for either a
part 50 license or a part 52 combined license. Paragraph (a) of Sec.
73.55 would identify the licensees and applicants for which the
requirements apply, and the need for submitting to NRC (for review and
approval) a ``Physical Security Plan,'' a ``Training and Qualification
Plan,'' and a ``Safeguards Contingency Plan.'' Paragraph (b) of Sec.
73.55 would set forth the performance objectives that govern power
reactor security programs. The remaining paragraphs of Sec. 73.55
would implement the detailed requirements for each of the security
plans, as well as for the various features of physical security.
This section would be extensively revised in an effort to make
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during
implementation, fulfill certain provisions of the EPAct of 2005, and
add several new requirements that resulted from evaluation insights
from implementation of the security orders, review of site security
plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program
and force-on-force exercises. The proposed regulations would require an
integrated security plan that begins at the owner controlled area
boundary and would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective
strategies based on protecting target sets from the various attributes
of the design basis threat. Notable additions to the proposed Sec.
73.55 are summarized below.
Cyber Security Requirements
The current security regulations do not contain requirements
related to cyber security. Subsequent to the events of September 11,
2001, the NRC issued orders to require power reactor licensees to
implement measures to enhance cyber security. These security measures
required an assessment of cyber systems and the implementation of
corrective measures sufficient to provide protection against the cyber
threats at the time the orders were issued.
The proposed requirements maintain the intent of the security
orders by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to
protect any system that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety,
security, or emergency preparedness.
Requirements for CAS and SAS To Have Functionally Equivalent
Capabilities Such That No Single Act Can Disable the Function of CAS
and SAS
Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have
equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do
not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation,
and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) states ``All alarms required pursuant to this part
must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located
within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned
station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the
capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an
alarm.'' The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment
capabilities, but did not require equivalent capabilities for both CAS
and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29,
2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements,
with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these
requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with
functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of
the site protective strategy.
The proposed rule would extend the requirement for no single act to
remove capabilities to the key functions of the alarm stations and
would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a
single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and
communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed
requirement would ensure continuity of response
[[Page 62670]]
operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection,
assessment, and communications functions required to effectively
implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the
loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing
the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all
licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the
licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.
The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that
a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an
enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection,
assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the
facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For
new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the
Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and
equipped with equivalent standards.
Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems
Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm
annunciation and non-portable communication equipment, but do not
require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not
specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible
power to their security systems for added reliability of these
electronic systems. However, the Commission had not required
uninterruptible power for assessment systems. For the purposes of
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed
that only a small number of licensees would require hardware
modifications to meet this proposed requirement.
Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans,
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded
that uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of
assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and
communication capabilities required to protect the facility against the
design basis threat of radiological sabotage. This new requirement
would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and
communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.
``Video-Capture'' Capability
Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit
television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not
specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video
surveillance in their site security plans. Many of the licensees have
adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and
play-back/recorded video images to assist security personnel in
determining the cause of an alarm annunciation. For the purposes of
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed
that a small percentage of licensees would require hardware
modifications to comply with this proposed requirement for advanced
video surveillance technology.
Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans,
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded
that advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of
assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation
and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility
against the threat up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage. Therefore the proposed rule would require
advanced video surveillance technology.
Implementation of Sec. 73.55 is linked principally to the
application of appendix B to part 73, ``General criteria for security
personnel,'' and appendix C to part 73, ``Licensee safeguards
contingency plans,'' both of which would be revised in this proposed
rulemaking. Proposed changes to these appendices are discussed in
Sections IV.6 and IV.7 of this document.
Table 2 sets forth the proposed Sec. 73.55 language as compared to
the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language including new definitions for security officer and
target set that would be added to Sec. 73.2. Because Sec. 73.55 would
be restructured extensively, Table 9 (See Section VIII) provides a
cross reference to locate individual requirements of the current
regulation within the proposed regulation.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the impacts and burdens for certain areas of proposed changes
to Sec. 73.55. Due to the accelerated rulemaking schedule, the NRC
staff's assessments of impacts to individual licensees as a result of
the proposed new requirements have not been informed by stakeholder
insights on potential implementation issues. Consequently, the
Commission recognizes that its views on the feasability, costs, and
time necessary to fully implement certain portions of this proposed
rule (e.g., alarm station, supporting systems, video systems, and cyber
security issues) by selected licensees may not be fully informed.
Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this
proposed rule to address the following questions:
1. What insights and estimates can stakeholders provide on the
feasability, costs, and time necessary to implement the proposed rule's
changes to existing alarm stations, supporting systems, video systems,
and cyber security?
2. Are there any actions that should be considered, such as
authorizing alternative measures, exemptions, extended implementation
schedules, etc., that would allow the NRC to mitigate any unnecessary
regulatory burden created by these requirements?
IV.3. Section 73.56, ``Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants''
This section would continue to apply to all current part 50
licensees and to all applicants who are applying for a new reactor
license under parts 50 or 52, but would be extensively revised.
Proposed Sec. 73.56 would retain the requirement for a licensee to
determine that an individual is trustworthy and reliable before
permitting the individual to have unescorted access to nuclear power
plant protected areas and vital areas. The majority of the revisions in
proposed Sec. 73.56 reflect several fundamental changes to the NRC's
approach to access authorization requirements since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NRC's concern with the threat of
an active or passive insider who may collude with adversaries to commit
radiological sabotage. These changes would include: (1) An increase in
the rigor of some elements of the access authorization program to
provide increased assurance that individuals who have unescorted access
authorization are trustworthy and reliable; (2) an elimination of
temporary unescorted access provisions [prior to the completion of the
full background check]; (3) an elimination of the provisions that
permit relaxation of the program when a reactor is in cold shutdown;
and (4) the addition of a new category of individuals who would be
subject to Sec. 73.56.
Proposed Sec. 73.56(b)(ii) would require licensees' access
authorization programs to cover individuals whose job duties and
responsibilities permit them to access or use digital computer systems
that may affect licensees' operational safety and security systems, and
emergency response capabilities. Historically digital computer systems
have played a limited role in the operation of nuclear power plants.
However, the role of computer systems
[[Page 62671]]
at nuclear power plants is increasing, as licensees take advantage of
computer technology to maximize plant productivity. In general,
licensees currently exclude from their access authorization programs,
individuals who may electronically access equipment in the protected
areas of nuclear power plants to perform their job functions, if their
duties and responsibilities do not require physical unescorted access
to the equipment located within protected or vital areas. However,
because these individuals manage and maintain the networks that connect
to equipment located within protected or vital areas and are
responsible for permitting authorized and/or trusted personnel to gain
electronic access to equipment and systems, they are often granted
greater electronic privileges than the trusted and authorized
personnel. With advancements in electronic technology and
telecommunications, differences in the potential adverse impacts of a
saboteur's actions through physical access and electronic access are
lessening. Thus, the proposed rule would require those individuals who
have authority to electronically access equipment that, if compromised,
can adversely impact operational safety, security or emergency
preparedness of the nuclear power plants, to be determined to be
trustworthy and reliable.
The proposed revisions to Sec. 73.56 would also address changes in
the nuclear industry's structure and business practices since this rule
was originally promulgated. At the time the current Sec. 73.56 was
developed, personnel transfers between licensees (i.e., leaving the
employment of one licensee to work for another licensee) with
interruptions in unescorted access authorization were less common. Most
licensees operated plants at a single site and maintained an access
authorization program that applied only to that site. When an
individual left employment at one site and began working for another
licensee, the individual was subject to a different access
authorization program that often had different requirements. Because
some licensees were reluctant to share information about previous
employees with the new employer, licensees often did not have access to
the information the previous licensee had gathered about the individual
and so were required to gather the necessary information again. The
additional effort to collect information that another licensee held
created a burden on both licensees and applicants for unescorted access
authorization. But, because few individuals transferred, the burden was
not excessive.
However, since 1991, the industry has undergone significant
consolidation and developed new business practices to use its workforce
more efficiently. Industry efforts to better use staffing resources
have resulted in the development of a transient workforce that travels
from site to site as needed, such as roving outage crews. Although the
industry has always relied on contractors and vendors (C/V) for special
expertise and staff for outages, the number of transient personnel who
work solely in the nuclear industry has increased and the length of
time they are on site has decreased. Because the current regulations
were written on the basis that the majority of nuclear personnel would
remain at one site for years, and that licensees would maintain
independent, site-specific access authorization programs and share
limited information, the current regulations do not adequately address
the transfer of personnel between sites.
In light of the NRC's increased concern with an insider threat
since September 11, 2001, the increasingly mobile nuclear industry
workforce has heightened the need for information sharing among
licensee access authorization programs, including C/V authorization
programs upon which licensees rely, to ensure that licensees have
information that is as complete as possible about an individual when
making an unescorted access authorization decision. To address this
need, the access authorization orders issued by the NRC to nuclear
power plant licensees on January 7, 2003, mandated increased sharing of
information. In addition, proposed Sec. 73.56 would require licensees
and C/V to collect and share greater amounts of information than under
the current rule, subject to the protections of individuals' privacy
that would be specified in proposed Sec. 73.56(m) [Protection of
information]. As a result, individuals who are subject to this section
would establish a detailed ``track record'' within the industry that
would potentially cover their activities over long periods of time and
would follow them if they change jobs and move to a new position that
requires them to be granted unescorted access authorization by another
licensee. The proposed requirement acknowledges the industry initiative
to develop and utilize a database to ensure accurate information
sharing between sites. This increased information sharing is necessary
to provide high assurance that individuals who are granted and maintain
unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable when
individuals move between access authorization programs. In addition,
the increased information sharing would reduce regulatory burden on
licensees when processing individuals who have had only short breaks
between periods of unescorted access authorization.
Another change in the NRC's proposed approach to access
authorization requirements is the result of a series of public meetings
that were held with stakeholders during 2001-2004 to discuss potential
revisions to 10 CFR part, 26, ``Fitness-for-Duty Programs.'' Part 26
establishes additional steps that the licensees who are subject to
Sec. 73.56 must take as part of the process of determining whether to
grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or permit an
individual to maintain unescorted access authorization. These
additional requirements focus on aspects of an individual's behavior,
character, and reputation related to substance abuse. They require the
licensee and other entities who are subject to part 26 to conduct drug
and alcohol testing of individuals and an inquiry into the individual's
past behavior with respect to illegal drug use or consumption of
alcohol to excess, as part of determining whether the individual may be
granted unescorted access authorization. However, historically there
have been some inconsistencies and redundancies between the Sec. 73.56
access authorization requirements and the related requirements in part
26. These inconsistencies have led to implementation questions from
licensees, as well as inconsistencies in how licensees have implemented
the requirements. The redundancies have, in other cases, imposed an
unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees.
During public meetings held to discuss potential changes to part
26, the stakeholders pointed out ambiguities in the terms used in both
part 26 and Sec. 73.56, apparent inconsistencies and redundancies in
the related requirements, and reported many experiences in which the
ambiguities and lack of specificity and clarity in current Sec. 73.56
had resulted in unintended consequences. Although these meetings did
not focus on Sec. 73.56, many of the stakeholders' comments directly
resulted in some of the proposed changes to Sec. 73.56. (Summaries of
these meetings, and any comments provided through the Web site, are
available at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=Part26_risk&st=risk.
) In response to stakeholder requests, the
[[Page 62672]]
NRC has proposed language changes to improve the clarity and
specificity of the requirements in proposed Sec. 73.56 and
substantially reorganized the section to present the requirements
generally in the order in which they would apply to licensees' access
authorization processes. The proposed changes are expected to result in
more uniform implementation of the requirements, and, consequently,
greater consistency in achieving the goals of Sec. 73.56. Table 3 sets
forth the proposed Sec. 73.56 language as compared to the current
language, and discusses the proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the following two issues:
1. The Commission requests public comment specific to the
appropriateness of the framework for the Insider Mitigation Program as
specified by the proposed 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)(i) and 73.55(b)(7)(ii).
The proposed rule specifies that the Insider Mitigation Program include
elements of the access authorization program, fitness-for-duty program,
behavioral observation program, and various physical security measures
for the purpose of providing assurance that insider activities would be
detected before adverse affects could be realized.
2. The Commission requests public comment on the feasibility of
adding a requirement to the proposed rule to require a modified
escorted visitor access provision which would allow site visits by
members of the public to limited areas of the facility for the purpose
of enhancing public education and awareness through informational
briefings and tours at the facility.
IV.4. Section 73.58 ``Safety/Security Interface Requirements for
Nuclear Power Reactors''
The NRC is proposing to add a new requirement to part 73 addressing
the safety/security interface for nuclear power reactor licensees. The
need for the proposed new requirement is based upon the NRC's
experience in reviewing licensees' implementation of a significant
number of new security requirements since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Licensees have always been required to ensure that
any changes to safety functions, systems, programs, and activities do
not have unintended consequences on other facility safety functions,
systems, programs, and activities. Likewise, licensees have been
required to ensure that any changes to security functions, systems,
programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other
facility security functions, systems, programs, and activities.
However, the Commission has concluded that the pace, number, and
complexity of these security changes warrant the establishment of a
more formal program to ensure licensees properly assess the safety/
security interface in implementing these changes.
On April 28, 2003, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the San
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a petition for rulemaking (PRM-
50-80) requesting that, in part, the NRC's regulations establishing
conditions of licenses and requirements for evaluating proposed
changes, tests, and experiments for nuclear power plants be amended to
require licensee evaluation of whether the proposed changes, tests, and
experiments cause protection against radiological sabotage to be
decreased and, if so, that the changes, tests, and experiments only be
conducted with prior NRC approval. In SECY-05-0048, dated March 28,
2005, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission approve rulemaking
for the requested action, but did not necessarily endorse the specific
amendments suggested by the petition. In SECY-05-0048, dated June 28,
2005, the Commission directed the staff to develop the technical basis
for such a rule and to incorporate its provisions within the ongoing
power reactor security requirements rulemaking. This proposed rule
addresses, in part, the petitioner's request by incorporating proposed
Sec. 73.58 within this rulemaking.
The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security
interface rule requirements are necessary because the current
regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of
plant changes on security or the effects of security changes on plant
safety. Further, current regulations do not require communication about
the implementation and timing of changes, which would promote awareness
of the effects of changing facility conditions and result in
appropriate assessment and response.
The NRC is aware of a number of occurrences of adverse safety/
security interactions at nuclear power plants over the years to justify
consideration of a new rule. Examples of adverse interactions include:
(1) Inadvertent security barrier breaches while performing maintenance
activities (e.g., cutting of pipes that provided uncontrolled access to
vital areas, removing ventilation fans or other equipment from vital
area boundary walls without taking compensatory measures to prevent
uncontrolled access into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet resisting
enclosure's (or other defensive firing position's) fields of fire; (3)
Erection of scaffolding and other equipment without due consideration
of its impact on the site's applicable physical protection strategy;
and (4) Staging of temporary equipment within security isolation zones.
Security could also adversely affect operations because of
inadequate staffing of security force personnel on backshifts,
weekends, and holidays, to support operations during emergencies (e.g.,
opening and securing vital area access doors to allow operations
personnel timely access to safety-related equipment). Also, security
structures, such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, rerouted
isolation zones, or defensive shields could adversely affect plant
equipment such as valve pits, fire stations, other prepositioned
emergency equipment, blowout panels, or otherwise interfere with
operators responding to plant events.
The NRC considered many factors in developing this proposed new
requirement. One of the factors considered is that existing change
processes are focused on specific areas of plant activities, and that
implementation of these processes is generally well understood by
licensees. An example is found in Sec. 50.54(p), which provides that a
reactor licensee may make changes to its safeguards contingency plans
without Commission approval provided that the changes do not decrease
the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, Sec. 50.65(a)(4)
provides that a reactor licensee shall assess and manage the increase
in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. However,
neither Sec. Sec. 50.54(p) (security) nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require
that an assessment for potential adverse impacts on safety/security
interface be made before the proposed changes are implemented. The
proposed Sec. 73.58 would address this gap by requiring that, before
implementing allowed changes, licensees must assess the changes with
respect to the safety/security interface and, if potential adverse
interactions are identified, take appropriate compensatory and/or
mitigative action before making the changes.
The proposed rule reflects a performance-based approach and
language which is sufficiently broad that, in addition to operating
power reactors, it could be applied to other classes of licensees in
separate rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In addition to the
requirements in proposed Sec. 73.58, a new definition for
[[Page 62673]]
safety/security interface would be added to Sec. 73.2.
Table 4 sets forth the proposed Sec. 73.58 language and provides
the supporting discussion for the proposed language, including a new
definition for safety/security interface that would be added to Sec.
73.2.
IV.5. Section 73.71 ``Reporting of Safeguards Events''
The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for the
capability to respond to coordinated attacks that could pose an
imminent threat to national infrastructure such as nuclear power
reactor sites. Prompt licensee notification to the NRC of a security
event involving an actual or imminent threat would initiate the NRC's
alerting mechanism for other nuclear facilities in recognition that an
attack or threat against a single facility may be the prelude to
attacks or threats against multiple facilities. In either case, timely
communication of this event to the NRC, and the NRC's communication of
the threat or attack to other licensees could reduce the adversaries'
ability to engage in coordinated attacks and would strengthen the
licensees' response posture. NRC would also initiate notifications to
the Homeland Security/Federal response networks for an ``Incident of
National Significance,'' as defined by the National Response Plan
(NRP).
Currently, Sec. 73.71(b)(1) requires power reactor licensees to
notify the NRC within one hour of discovery, as described in Paragraph
I of appendix G to 10 CFR part 73, ``Reportable safeguards events.'' In
addition, Sec. 50.72 establishes reporting requirements for events
requiring an emergency declaration in accordance with a licensee's
emergency plan. Licensee notification under Sec. 50.72(a)(3) is
required only after the threat is assessed, an ``Emergency Class'' is
declared, and initial notification of appropriate State and local
agencies are completed first (i.e., not upon discovery). The current
timing of requirements of this notification would not allow the NRC to
warn other licensees of a potential threat to their facilities in a
prompt manner to allow other licensees to change their security posture
in advance of a threat or potential attack. The Commission has
previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial
notification to the NRC. The proposed accelerated notification
requirements are similar to those provided to licensees in NRC Bulletin
2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-
Based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005.
The proposed amendments to Sec. 73.71 would add a new expedited
notification requirement for licensees subject to the provisions of
Sec. 73.55 to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible
after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the
facility as described in appendix G to part 73, but not later than 15
minutes after discovery. The proposed amendments to Sec. 73.71 and
appendix G to part 73 would also add two additional four-hour
notification requirements for suspicious events and tampering events
not otherwise covered under appendix G to part 73. The proposed Sec.
73.71 would retain the requirement for the licensee to maintain a
continuous communications channel for one-hour notifications upon
request of the NRC. The proposed rule would not require a continuous
communications channel for four-hour notifications, because of the
lesser degree of urgency of these events. For 15-minute notifications,
the NRC may request the licensee establish a continuous communications
channel after the licensee has made any emergency notifications to
State officials or local law enforcement and if the licensee has taken
action to stabilize the plant following any transient [associated with
the 15-minute notification]. In NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated
July 18, 2005, the NRC had indicated a continuous communications
channel was not necessary for the new 15-minute notifications. However,
in developing this proposed rule the Commission has evaluated the need
to promptly obtain information of an unfolding event versus imposing an
unreasonable burden on licensees in the midst of a rapidly unfolding
event and possible plant transient. The Commission considers that the
proposed regulation would provide a reasonable balance between these
two objectives. Table 5 sets forth the proposed amendments to Sec.
73.71 language as compared to the current language, and provides the
supporting discussion for the proposed language. Table 8 sets forth the
proposed amendments to the appendix G to part 73 language as compared
to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the proposed changes to Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to part 73
. Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this
proposed rule to address the following question:
1. For the types of events covered by the proposed four-hour
notification requirements in Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to part 73,
should the notification time interval of all or some of these
notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 2-hour, 8-hour, 24-hour
notification)? If so, what notification time interval is appropriate?
``Notification time interval'' is meant to be the time from when a
licensee recognizes that an event has occurred or is occurring to the
time that the licensee reports the event to the NRC.
IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, ``General Criteria for Security
Personnel''
Appendix B to part 73 provides requirements for the training and
qualification of security personnel to ensure that security personnel
can execute their duties. Following the events of September 11, 2001,
the Commission determined that tactical proficiency and physical
fitness requirements governing licensees' armed security force
personnel needed to be enhanced. The proposed amendments to appendix B
to part 73 make generically applicable security requirements imposed by
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission
during implementation and add several new requirements that resulted
from evaluation insights from force-on-force exercises.
Notable additions to the proposed appendix B to part 73
requirements are summarized as follows:
Additional Physical Requirements and Minimum Age Requirements for
Unarmed Members of the Security Organization
Unarmed security personnel perform duties similar to armed security
personnel, such as detection, assessment, vehicle and personnel escort,
and vital area controls. The current requirements for unarmed members
of the security organization state, in part, that these individuals
shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would affect
their performance of assigned duties. However, the current rule does
not require unarmed personnel to pass a physical examination to verify
that they meet standards for vision, hearing, or some portions of
psychological qualifications. The proposed rule would include a
requirement to assure that unarmed security personnel are physically
capable of performing their assigned duties.
Additionally, the current rule specifies a minimum age of 21 years
old
[[Page 62674]]
for armed security personnel, but does not specify a minimum age
requirement for unarmed security personnel. The proposed rule would
require that unarmed members attain the age of 18 prior to assignment
to establish a minimum age requirement for unarmed members of the
security organization at a power reactor facility.
These proposed additional requirements would assure that personnel
performing security functions, whether armed or unarmed, meet
appropriate age, vision, hearing and psychological requirements
commensurate with their assigned security duties.
Qualification Scores for Program Elements Required by the Training and
Qualification Plan
The current rule includes daylight qualification scores of 70
percent for handguns, 80 percent for semiautomatic rifles, 50 percent
for shotguns and a requirement for night fire familiarization with
assigned weapons. The April 29, 2003, Training Order imposed new
requirements for the firearms training and qualification programs at
power reactor licensees. The Training Order retained the current
daylight qualification scores of 70 percent for handguns, 80 percent
for semiautomatic rifles and superceded the daylight qualification
score of 50 percent for the shotgun. The order did not specify a
qualification score for the daylight course of fire for the shotgun,
only an acceptable level of proficiency. The order superceded the
current rule for night fire familiarization and added courses of fire
for night fire and tactical training with assigned weapons.
The proposed rule would retain the qualification scores of the
existing regulations and add specific qualification scores for the
daylight course of fire for the shotgun and/or enhanced weapons, the
night fire qualification for shotguns, handguns, semiautomatic rifles
and/or enhanced weapons and the tactical course of fire for all
assigned weapons to remain consistent with the qualification scoring
methodology contained in the current rule. The scoring methodology for
the current rule and the proposed rule is consistent with the scoring
methodology used for firearms programs at the local, State and Federal
levels and is consistent with approved courses of fire from the law
enforcement community and recognized national entities.
The proposed rule would also include a requirement for a
qualification score of 80 percent for the annual written exam. The
current rule does not provide a requirement for an annual written exam
score. Likewise, the April 29, 2003, Training Order that required
licensees to develop and implement an annual written exam also did not
specify a qualification score. The Commission has determined that a
score of 80 percent demonstrates a minimum level of understanding and
familiarity of the material necessary to adequately perform security-
related tasks. The 80-percent score would be consistent with minimum
scores commonly utilized throughout the nuclear industry.
Qualification Requirements for Security Trainers, Personnel Assessing
Psychological Qualifications and Armorer Certifications
The current rule and the security orders do not specifically
address the qualification or certification of instructors, or other
personnel that have assigned duties and responsibilities for
implementation of training and qualification programs of power reactor
licensees.
The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel that
have assigned duties and responsibilities for implementation of
training and qualification programs to ensure these persons are
qualified and/or certified to make determinations of security personnel
suitability, working condition of security equipment, and overall
determinations that security personnel are trained and qualified to
execute their assigned duties.
On-the-Job Training
The current rule states in part that each individual who requires
training to perform assigned security duties shall, prior to
assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties. Each
individual shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill and ability
in accordance with specific standards of each task.
The proposed rule would specify the new requirement that the
licensee include on-the-job training as part of the training and
qualification program prior to assigning an individual to an
unsupervised security position. This requirement is in addition to
formal and informal classroom training. The on-the-job training program
would provide the licensee the ability to assess an individual's
knowledge, skill and ability to effectively carry-out assigned duties,
in a supervised manner, within the actual work environment, before
assignment, to an unsupervised position.
The proposed revision to appendix B of part 73 required special
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, Section I through V of
appendix B to part 73 would remain unchanged, and the proposed new
language for power reactors would be added as Section VI.
Table 6 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix B to part 73
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 10 (See
Section VIII) provides a cross-reference to locate individual
requirements of the current regulation within the proposed regulation.
IV.7. Appendix C to Part 73, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans''
Appendix C to part 73 provides requirements that govern the
development of safeguards contingency plans. Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a thorough review of
security to continue to ensure that nuclear power plants had effective
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. The
proposed appendix C would increase the information required in the
safeguards contingency plans for responses to threats, up to and
including, design basis threats, as described in Sec. 73.1. Notable
additions to the proposed appendix C to part 73 requirements are
summarized below:
Mitigating Strategies
Current regulations do not include requirements to develop
mitigating strategies for events beyond the scope of the design basis
threat. The orders issued after September 11, 2001, included a
requirement to preplan strategies for coping with such events. The
proposed appendix C to part 73 would contain this element of the orders
to require that licensees preplan strategies to respond to and mitigate
the consequences of potential events, including those that may result
in the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.
Qualification Requirements for Drill and Exercise Controllers
The current rule and the security orders do not specifically
address the qualification of personnel that are assigned duties and
responsibilities for implementation of training and qualification
drills and exercises at power reactor licensees.
The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel who
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are
trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills
[[Page 62675]]
and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the
licensee security force and must be conducted in a manner that
demonstrates the licensee's ability to execute the protective strategy
as described in the site security plans. Additionally, drills and
exercises must be performed properly to assure they do not negatively
impact personnel or plant safety.
The proposed revision to appendix C of part 73 required special
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, appendix C to part 73
would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all
current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed
requirements related to nuclear power reactors.
Table 7 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix C to part 73
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 11 (See
Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual
requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed
regulation.
IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, ``Reportable Safeguards Events''
Proposed appendix G to part 73 provides requirements regarding the
reporting of safeguards events. Proposed appendix G would contain
changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements
which would be incorporated into this rulemaking. Proposed appendix G
to part 73 would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements
that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of
suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other
similar information as addressed in Appendix G, section III (a)(1) and
(2). Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting
that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to
allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The
proposed new reporting requirement would clarify this expectation to
assure consistent reporting of this important information.
Additionally, the proposed rule would contain an additional four-hour
reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the
threshold for reporting under the current one-hour requirements. The
proposed reporting requirements for tampering events would allow NRC
assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments
to appendix G to part 73 and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the following issue:
1. The Commission requests public comment on the need to establish
an additional requirement for licensees to establish and maintain
predetermined communication protocols, such as passwords, with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to verify the authenticity of
communications during a security event, to include requirements for
uniform protocols to verify the authenticity of reports required under
this proposed rule.
IV.9. Conforming and Corrective Changes
The following conforming changes would also be made: Sec. Sec.
50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised
appendix C of part 73), Sec. 50.72 (changes to Sec. 73.71 reports),
Sec. Sec. 72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due
to renumbering of Sec. 73.55), and Sec. 73.8 (adding Sec. 73.18,
Sec. 73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to reflect
recordkeeping or reporting burden). A corrective change would also be
made to Sec. 73.8 to reflect an existing recordkeeping or reporting
burden for NRC Form 366 under Sec. 73.71. However, no changes would be
made to Sec. 73.81(b) (due to the new Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and
73.58), because willful violations of Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and
73.58 may be subject to criminal penalties.
Table 1.--Proposed Part 73.18 and 73.19 and Conforming Changes to Part
73.2
[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and
authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced
weapons]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.18 Firearms background checks This new section would
for armed security personnel. implement the firearms
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth background check requirements
the requirements for completion of of new section 161A of the
firearms background checks on armed Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
security personnel at selected NRC- amended. Section 161A was
regulated facilities. Firearms added by section 653 of the
background checks are intended to Energy Policy Act of 2005.
verify that security personnel whose The proposed rule language in
duties require access to covered Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19,
weapons are not prohibited from and conforming changes to Sec.
receiving, possessing, transporting, 73.2 would be consistent
importing, or using such weapons under with the guidelines required
applicable Federal or State law. by section 161A.d to implement
Licensees and certificate holders the provisions of section
listed under paragraph (c) of this 161A. Section 161A.d requires
section who have applied for the Commission to issue
preemption authority under Sec. guidelines, with the approval
73.19 (i.e., Sec. 73.19 authority), of the Attorney General, for
or who have been granted preemption section 161A to take effect.
authority by Commission order, are In parallel and separate from
subject to the requirements of this this rulemaking effort,
section. guidelines are being developed
by staffs from the NRC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ),
[including staffs from the FBI
and ATF].
During development of these
guidelines, the DOJ indicated
that the firearms background
check provisions of section
161A only take effect if a
triggering event occurs. A
triggering event would occur
when a licensee or certificate
holder applies to the NRC to
use the stand-alone preemption
authority or the combined
enhanced-weapons and
preemption authority of
section 161A. Therefore, armed
security personnel of both
current and future licensees
and certificate holders would
not be subject to the firearms
background check provisions of
the proposed Sec. 73.18,
unless their employing
licensee or certificate holder
applies for and receives Sec.
73.19 authority from the NRC.
[[Page 62676]]
Sec. 73.18(b) General Requirements. Paragraph (b)(1) would require
(1) Licensees and certificate holders current and future licensees
listed in paragraph (c) of this and certificate holders who
section who have received NRC approval have received NRC approval of
of their application for preemption their application for
authority shall ensure that a firearms preemption authority to ensure
background check has been that all security personnel
satisfactorily completed for all whose official duties require
security personnel requiring access to access to covered weapons
covered weapons as part of their satisfactorily complete a
official security duties prior to firearms background check. The
granting access to any covered weapons firearms background check must
to those personnel. Security personnel be satisfactorily completed to
who have satisfactorily completed a permit access to covered
firearms background check, but who weapons. The Commission
have had a break in employment with intends for duties ``requiring
the licensee, certificate holder, or access to a covered weapon''
their security contractor of greater to include such duties as:
than one (1) week subsequent to their Security operations
most recent firearms background check, activities; training and
or who have transferred from a qualification activities; and
different licensee or certificate weapons' maintenance,
holder (even though the other licensee handling, accountability,
or certificate holder satisfactorily transport, and use activities.
completed a firearms background check [See also new definitions for
on such individuals), are not excepted covered weapons, enhanced
from the requirements of this section. weapons, and standard weapons
in Sec. 73.2 at the end of
Table 1]. A new firearms
background check would be
required for security
personnel who have a break in
employment or who have
transferred from another
licensee or certificate holder
irrespective of whether the
individual previously
satisfactorily completed a
firearms background check
(i.e., such individuals would
be treated as new security
personnel and subject to a new
firearms background check).
Sec. 73.18(b)(2) Security personnel The NRC staff recognizes that
who have satisfactorily completed a the Commission has not yet
firearms background check pursuant to made a final decision on
Commission orders are not subject to a whether licensees and
further firearms background check certificate holders may apply
under this section, unless these for preemption authority alone
personnel have a break in service or or combined preemption and
transfer as set forth in paragraph enhanced-weapons authority
(b)(1) of this section. prior to issuance of a final
rule; however, the proposed
rule would include language to
support a transfer from any
orders associated with such
applications for section 161A
authority to regulations and
thereby provide both the
Commission and industry with
the maximum flexibility to
expeditiously implement the
security enhancements of
section 161A.
Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt
previously checked personnel
from a recheck, except in the
case of a break in service or
transfer [as in paragraph
(b)(1)].
Sec. 73.18(b)(3) A change in the Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
licensee, certificate holder, or that changes in the security
ownership of a facility, radioactive contractor or ownership of the
material, or other property designated licensee or certificate holder
under Sec. 73.19, or a change in the are not triggering events that
security contractor that provides require a new firearms
security personnel responsible for background check.
protecting such facilities, Paragraph (b)(4) would indicate
radioactive material, or other that Licensee and certificate
property, shall not constitute `a holders may begin submitting
break in service' or `transfer,' as their security personnel for
those terms are used in paragraph firearms background checks
(b)(2) of this section. after the licensee or
(4) Licensees and certificate holders certificate holder has applied
listed in paragraph (c) of this to the NRC for preemption
section may begin the application authority alone or combined
process for firearms background checks preemption and enhanced
under this section for security weapons authority (i.e., Sec.
personnel whose duties require access 73.19 authority).
to covered weapons immediately on Paragraph (b)(5) would indicate
application to the NRC for preemption that firearms background
authority. checks are in addition to
(5) Firearms background checks do not access authorization or
replace any other background checks or security clearance checks that
criminal history checks required for security personnel currently
the licensee's or certificate holder's undergo under other NRC
security personnel under this chapter. regulations (e.g., Sec. Sec.
11.15, 25.17 or 73.57). The
NRC expects licensees and
certificate holders who become
aware of any new potentially
derogatory information on
current security personnel
(through the completion of a
firearms background check), to
evaluate any such information
for applicability as required
by the licensee's or
certificate holder's access
authorization or security
clearance programs.
Sec. 73.18(c) Applicability. This Paragraph (c) would define the
section applies to licensees or applicability of Sec. 73.18
certificate holders who have applied to licensees or certificate
for or received NRC approval of their holders who have applied for
application for Sec. 73.19 authority or received Commission
or were issued Commission orders approval of stand-alone
requiring firearms background checks. preemption authority or
combined enhanced-weapons and
preemption authority [see
considerations below for Sec.
73.19(c) on the applicability
of licensee and certificate
holder under this proposed
rule].
Note: portions of this section
would apply to licensee or
certificate holder who has
applied for, but not yet
received preemption authority
(e.g., requirements for
submission of fingerprints) or
those portions that would only
apply to licensees or
certificate holders who have
received NRC approval of their
application (e.g.,
requirements for removal of
security personnel who have
not yet satisfactorily
completed a firearms
background check). This
section would also apply to
power reactor and Category I
SSNM licensees or certificate
holders issued Commission
orders requiring completion of
firearms background checks
[see consideration for
paragraph (b)(2) above].
Sec. 73.18(d) Firearms background Paragraph (d) would identify
check requirements. A firearms the two components of a
background check for security firearms background check that
personnel must include-- are required by section 161A
(1) A check of the individual's (i.e., a fingerprint check and
fingerprints against the Federal a NICS check).
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) The NICS was established
fingerprint system; and pursuant to section 103.(b) of
(2) A check of the individual's the Brady Handgun Violence
identifying information against the Prevention Act (Pub. L. 103-
FBI's National Instant Criminal 159) and is maintained by the
Background Check System (NICS). FBI.
[[Page 62677]]
Sec. 73.18(e) Firearms background Paragraph (e) would indicate
check submittals. the process for submitting to
(1) Licensees and certificate holders the NRC the two components of
shall submit to the NRC, in accordance the firearms background check.
with Sec. 73.4, for all security Accomplishment of the NICS
personnel requiring a firearms check would be based upon
background check under this section-- information submitted by the
(i) A set of fingerprints, in licensee or certificate holder
accordance with paragraph (n) of this to the NRC under new NRC Form
section, and 754 (see Section VIII of this
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754. notice for further information
on this NRC Form).
Sec. 73.18(e)(2) Licensees and Paragraph (e)(2) would
certificate holders shall retain a establish the records
copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to retention requirements for
the NRC for a period of one (1) year submitted NRC Forms 754.
subsequent to the termination of an
individual's access to covered weapons
or to the denial of an individual's
access to covered weapons.
Sec. 73.18(f) NICS portion of a Paragraph (f) would indicate
firearms background check. The NRC that the NRC is forwarding the
will forward the information contained information from submitted NRC
in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the Forms 754 to the FBI for
FBI for evaluation against the NICS. evaluation against the NICS.
Upon completion of the NICS check, the The FBI will return one of the
FBI will inform the NRC of the results three results from the NICS
with one of three responses under 28 check (per the FBI's
CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``denied,'' regulations) and a NICS
or ``delayed,'' and the associated transaction number. The NRC
NICS transaction number. The NRC will will forward this returned
forward these results and the information to the submitting
associated NICS transaction number to licensee or certificate holder
the submitting licensee or certificate for forwarding to the
holder. The licensee or certificate individual security officer.
holder shall provide these results to The NICS transaction number is
the individual who completed the NRC necessary for any future
Form 754. communications with the FBI on
the NICS check (e.g., an
individual's appeal of a
``denied'' NICS response).
Sec. 73.18(g) Satisfactory and Paragraph (g) would set forth
adverse firearms background checks. the criteria for a
(1) A satisfactorily completed firearms satisfactory firearms
background check means a ``proceed'' background check based upon
response for the individual from the the specific NICS response.
NICS. The fingerprint checks
(2) An adversely completed firearms mandated by section 161A
background check means a ``denied'' or support the accomplishment of
``delayed'' response from the NICS. the NICS check and resolution
of any adverse NICS records;
therefore, the NRC would not
specify a [satisfactory or
adverse] completion criteria
for the fingerprint portion of
the firearms background check.
Sec. 73.18(h) Removal from access to Paragraph (h) would require the
covered weapons. Licensees or licensee or certificate holder
certificate holders who have received to remove personnel who are
NRC approval of their application for prohibited from possessing or
Sec. 73.19 authority shall ensure receiving firearms from duties
security personnel are removed from requiring access to covered
duties requiring access to covered weapons. Disqualifying status
weapons upon the licensee's or or occurrences are found under
certificate holder's knowledge of any the United States Code, Title
disqualifying status or the occurrence 18, Section 922 and ATF's
of any disqualifying events under 18 implementing regulations (see
U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's 27 CFR 478.32 and 478.11). See
implementing regulations in 27 CFR also considerations for Sec.
part 478. 73.18(b)(5).
Sec. 73.18(i) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (i) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec. 73.18(j) Security personnel Paragraph (j) would require
responsibilities. Security personnel security personnel who become
assigned duties requiring access to prohibited from possessing or
covered weapons shall promptly [within receiving firearms due to a
three (3) working days] notify their disqualifying status or
employing licensee's or certificate occurrence of a disqualifying
holder's security management (whether event to notify their licensee
directly employed by the licensee or or certificate holder within
certificate holder or employed by a three (3) days of this fact.
security contractor to the licensee or This paragraph would work in
certificate holder) of the existence conjunction with the
of any disqualifying status or upon requirements of paragraphs
the occurrence of any disqualifying (k), (m), and (n) and would
events listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) require security personnel to
or (n), and the ATF's implementing self report the occurrence of
regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that any disqualifying status or
would prohibit them from possessing or events.
receiving a covered weapon.
Sec. 73.18(k) Awareness of Paragraph (k) would require
disqualifying events. Licensees and licensees and certificate
certificate holders who have received holders to train security
NRC approval of Sec. 73.19 authority personnel on disqualifying
shall include within their NRC- status or events to facilitate
approved security training and self reporting of such status
qualification plans instruction on-- or events by security
(1) Disqualifying status or events personnel under paragraph (j).
specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n), And to train security
and ATF's implementing regulations in personnel on their ongoing
27 CFR part 478 (including any responsibility to report
applicable definitions) identifying disqualifying status or events
categories of persons who are to their licensee or
prohibited from possessing or certificate holder.
receiving any covered weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of
security personnel assigned duties
requiring access to covered weapons to
promptly notify their employing
licensee or certificate holder of the
occurrence of any disqualifying
events.
Sec. 73.18(l) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (l) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-paragraph (1) [see
also paragraph (i) above].
[[Page 62678]]
Sec. 73.18(m) Notification of Paragraph (m) would require
removal. Within 72 hours after taking licensees or certificate
action to remove security personnel holders to report instances
from duties requiring access to where security personnel (with
covered weapons, because of the current access to weapons) are
existence of any disqualifying status removed from armed duties
or the occurrence of any disqualifying because of the occurrence of
event--other than due to the prompt any disqualifying status or
notification by the security officer event. The timeliness of this
under paragraph (j) of this section-- notification would be based
licensees and certificate holders who upon the need for appropriate
have received NRC approval of Sec. NRC followup of a potential
73.19 authority shall notify the NRC criminal violation, rather
Operations Center of such removal than the followup necessary
actions, in accordance with appendix A for an ongoing security event
of this part. (i.e., the individual no
longer has access to covered
weapons). Appendix A provides
contact information for the
NRC Operations Center.
Sec. 73.18(n) Reporting violations of Paragraph (n) would indicate
law. The NRC will promptly report that if the NRC becomes aware
suspected violations of Federal law to of suspected violations of
the appropriate Federal agency or criminal law (e.g., a
suspected violations of State law to prohibited person actually
the appropriate State agency. possessing weapons as a
security officer) it is
obligated to report suspected
violations of Federal or State
law to the appropriate
government agency or agencies.
Sec. 73.18(o) Procedures for Paragraph (o) would prescribe
processing of fingerprint checks. (1) the location, method, and
Licensees and certificate holders who requirements for submission of
have applied for Sec. 73.19 fingerprints to the NRC as
authority, using an appropriate method part of a firearms background
listed in Sec. 73.4, shall submit to check.
the NRC's Division of Facilities and The proposed language would be
Security one (1) completed, legible essentially identical to that
standard fingerprint card (Form FD- contained to the current
258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where fingerprint submission
practicable, other fingerprint record requirements under the current
for each individual requiring a access authorization
firearms background check, to the regulations in Sec.
NRC's Director, Division of Facilities 73.57(d).
and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN:
Criminal History Check. Copies of this
form may be obtained by writing the
Office of Information Services, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling
(301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to
FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what
alternative formats, including
electronic submissions, may be
practicable are referenced in Sec.
73.4.
Sec. 73.18(o)(2) Licensees and See considerations for Sec.
certificate holders shall indicate on 73.18(o). This provision will
the fingerprint card or other permit proper internal routing
fingerprint record that the purpose of fingerprints within the
for this fingerprint check is the FBI's Criminal Justice
accomplishment of a firearms Information Services Division
background check. to support the NICS checks.
Sec. 73.18(o)(3) Licensees and See considerations for Sec.
certificate holders shall establish 73.18(o).
procedures to ensure that the quality
of the fingerprints taken results in
minimizing the rejection rate of
fingerprint cards or records due to
illegible or incomplete information.
Sec. 73.18(o)(4) The Commission will See considerations for Sec.
review fingerprints for firearms 73.18(o).
background checks for completeness.
Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint
record containing omissions or evident
errors will be returned to the
licensee or certificate holder for
corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one (1)
free re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI
because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one (1) free
re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected
on the re-submission. If additional
submissions are necessary, they will
be treated as an initial submittal and
require a second payment of the
processing fee. The payment of a new
processing fee entitles the submitter
to an additional free re-submittal, if
necessary. Previously rejected
submissions may not be included with
the third submission because the
submittal will be rejected
automatically. Licensees and
certificate holders may wish to
consider using different methods for
recording fingerprints for
resubmissions, if difficulty occurs
with obtaining a legible set of
impressions.
Sec. 73.18(o)(5)(i) Fees for the See considerations for Sec.
processing of fingerprint checks are 73.18(o).
due upon application. Licensees and
certificate holders shall submit
payment with the application for the
processing of fingerprints, and
payment must be made by corporate
check, certified check, cashier's
check, money order, or electronic
payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.''
a Combined payment for multiple
applications is acceptable.
(ii) The application fee is the sum of
the user fee charged by the FBI for
each fingerprint card or other
fingerprint record submitted by the
NRC on behalf of a licensee or
certificate holder, and an
administrative processing fee assessed
by the NRC. The NRC processing fee
covers administrative costs associated
with NRC handling of licensee and
certificate holder fingerprint
submissions. The Commission publishes
the amount of the fingerprint check
application fee on the NRC's public
Web site.b The Commission will
directly notify licensees and
certificate holders who are subject to
this regulation of any fee changes.
[[Page 62679]]
Footnotes:
a For guidance on making electronic
payments, contact the NRC's Security
Branch, Division of Facilities and
Security, Office of Administration at
(301) 415-7404.
b For information on the current fee
amount, refer to the Electronic
Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/eie.html and select the link
for the Criminal History Program.
Sec. 73.18(o)(6) The Commission will See considerations for Sec.
forward to the submitting licensee or 73.18(o).
certificate holder all data received
from the FBI as a result of the
licensee's or certificate holder's
application(s) for fingerprint
background checks, including the FBI's
fingerprint record.
Sec. 73.18(p) Appeals and correction Paragraph (p)(1) would indicate
of erroneous system information. that individuals who have
(1) Individuals who require a firearms received a ``denied'' response
background check under this section or a ``delayed'' response may
and who receive a ``denied'' NICS not be assigned duties
response or a ``delayed'' NICS requiring access to covered
response may not be assigned duties weapons during their appeal of
requiring access to covered weapons the denial or resolution of
during the pendency of an appeal of the delay.
the results of the check or during the Paragraph (p)(2) would indicate
pendency of providing and evaluating that the licensee or
any necessary additional information certificate holder will
to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed'' provide information on the
response, respectively. FBI's appeals process to the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders denied individual. The NRC and
shall provide information on the FBI's FBI are considering creating a
procedures for appealing a ``denied'' brochure describing the
response to the denied individual or appeals process or resolution
on providing additional information to process that would be similar
the FBI to resolve a ``delayed'' to the FBI's current brochure
response. [describing the NICS appeals
(3) An individual who receives a process] provided by federal
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS firearms licensees to
response to a firearms background individuals receiving a
check under this section may request ``denied'' NICS response (see
the reason for the response from the example at the FBI's NICS
FBI. The licensee or certificate information website at http://
holder shall provide to the individual www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/
who has received the ``denied'' or index.htm).
``delayed'' response the unique NICS Paragraph (p)(3) would indicate
transaction number associated with the that the individual who
specific firearms background check. receives a ``denied'' or
(4) These requests for the reason for a ``delayed'' response must
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS personally make any requests
response must be made in writing, and to the FBI on the reason for
must include the NICS transaction the NICS response; and the
number. The request must be sent to licensee or certificate holder
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; may not make such requests
NICS Section; Appeals Service Team, upon the individual's behalf.
Module A-1; PO Box 4278; Clarksburg, Paragraph (p)(4) would provide
WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide the FBI's address for
the individual with the reasons for correspondence. Additionally,
the ``denied'' response or ``delayed'' in response to the
response. The FBI will also indicate individual's request the FBI
whether additional information or would provide the person the
documents are required to support an reason for the denial or the
appeal or resolution, for example, delay to facilitate any
where there is a claim that the record appeals or to facilitate
in question does not pertain to the providing supplemental
individual who was denied. information to resolve a
``delayed'' response.
Sec. 73.18(p)(5) If the individual Paragraph (p)(5) would set a
wishes to challenge the accuracy of time limit for filing an
the record upon which the ``denied'' initial appeal of a ``denied''
or ``delayed'' response is based, or response or to request
if the individual wishes to assert resolution of a ``delayed''
that his or her rights to possess or response to encourage timely
receive a firearm have been restored resolution of such cases and
by lawful process, he or she may make facilitate FBI disposition of
application first to the FBI. The interim records. The
individual shall file an appeal of a individual filing the appeal
``denied'' response or file a request would be required to set forth
to resolve a ``delayed'' response the basis for the appeal and
within 45 calender days of the date provide information supporting
the NRC forwards the results of the their claim. Copies of records
firearms background check to the would be required to be true
licensee or certificate holder. The copies (i.e., certified by a
appeal or request must include court or other government
appropriate documentation or record(s) entity). Because some
establishing the legal and/or factual supplemental information may
basis for the challenge. Any record or take longer than 45 days to
document of a court or other obtain, individuals filling an
government entity or official appeal or requesting
furnished in support of an appeal must resolution should not delay
be certified by the court or other their filing in order to
government entity or official as a gather all necessary
true copy. The individual may information, but would
supplement their initial appeal or indicate that additional
request--subsequent to the 45 day supporting information will be
filing deadline--with additional forthcoming.
information as it becomes available, Paragraph (p)(6) would indicate
for example, where obtaining a true that if an individual cannot
copy of a court transcript may take resolve a record with the FBI,
longer than 45 days. The individual the individual may apply to
should note in their appeal or request the originating agency to
any information or records that are correct the record and notify
being obtained, but are not yet the FBI of those results.
available. The originating agency may
(6) If the individual is notified that respond to the individual's
the FBI is unable to resolve the application by addressing the
appeal, the individual may then apply individual's specific reasons
for correction of the record directly for the challenge, and by
to the agency from which the indicating whether additional
information forming the basis of the information or documents are
denial was originated. If the required. If the record is
individual is notified by the corrected as a result of the
originating agency, that additional appeal to the originating
information or documents are required agency, the individual may so
the individual may provide them to the notify the FBI, which would,
originating agency. If the record is in turn, verify the record
corrected as a result of the appeal to correction with the
the originating agency, the individual originating agency (assuming
may so notify the FBI and submit the originating agency has not
written proof of the correction. already notified the FBI of
the correction) and take all
necessary steps to correct the
record in the NICS system.
[[Page 62680]]
Sec. 73.18(p)(7) An individual who Paragraph (p)(7) would indicate
has satisfactorily appealed a that an individual who has
``denied'' response or resolved a successfully resolved a
``delayed'' response may provide ``denied'' or ``delayed''
written consent to the FBI to maintain response may consent to the
information about himself or herself FBI maintaining information
in a Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be about himself or herself in
established by the FBI and checked by the FBI's VAF (i.e., the basis
the NICS for the purpose of preventing for the successful
the erroneous denial or extended delay resolution). The FBI will
by the NICS of any future NICS checks. issue such individuals a VAF
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied'' number that can be entered on
response or resolving a ``delayed'' an NRC Form 754 or ATF Form
response are responsible for providing 4417 to prevent repetition of
the FBI any additional information the excessive delays in completing
FBI requires to resolve the any future NICS checks (both
``delayed'' response. for checks as security
personnel and for checks of
individuals engaging in a
firearms transaction as a
private person).
A VAF file would be used only
by the NICS for this purpose.
The FBI would remove all
information in the VAF
pertaining to an individual
upon receipt of a written
request by that individual.
However, the FBI may retain
such information contained in
the VAF as long as needed to
pursue cases of identified
misuse of the system. If the
FBI finds a disqualifying
record on the individual after
his or her entry into the VAF,
the FBI may remove the
individual's information from
the file. Paragraph (p)(8)
would indicate that the
responsibility for providing
any necessary additional
information to the FBI to
appeal the ``denied'' response
or resolve the ``delayed''
rests with the individual, not
with the FBI.
Sec. 73.19 Authorization for This new section would
preemption of firearms laws and use of implement the provisions of
enhanced weapons. new section 161A of the AEA
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth with respect to preemption
the requirements for licensees and authority alone or combined
certificate holders to obtain NRC enhanced-weapons authority and
approval to use the expanded preemption authority. This
authorities provided under section section would permit, but not
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, require, selected classes of
as amended (AEA), in protecting NRC- licensees and certificate
designated facilities, radioactive holders to apply to the NRC
material, or other property. These for these authorities.
authorities include ``preemption Paragraph (a) would provide the
authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons overall purpose and indicate
authority.'' that this section applies to
defending NRC-designated
facilities, radioactive
material, or other property.
Sec. 73.19(b) General Requirements. Paragraph (b) would contain
Licensees and certificate holders general requirements and
listed in paragraph (c) of this overview of the advantages of
section may apply to the NRC, in these two authorities. The
accordance with the provisions of this ability of licensees and
section, to receive stand-alone certificate holders to apply
preemption authority or combined to the NRC for stand-alone
enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or
preemption authority. combined enhanced-weapons
(1) Preemption authority, as provided authority and preemption
in section 161A of the AEA, means the authority would be limited to
authority of the Commission to permit the classes of licensees set
licensees or certificate holders, or forth in paragraph (c) of this
the designated security personnel of section.
the licensee or certificate holder, to Licensees and certificate
transfer, receive, possess, transport, holders may apply for
import, or use one (1) or more preemption authority alone.
category of standard and enhanced However, licensees and
weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, certificate holders who apply
notwithstanding any local, State, or for enhanced-weapons authority
certain Federal firearms laws would also be required to
(including regulations). apply for preemption
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as authority, because of
provided in section 161A of the AEA, restrictions on the possession
means the authority of the Commission of enhanced weapons require
to permit licensees or certificate the preemption of certain
holders, or the designated security regulations. The NRC would
personnel of the licensee or create this separate, but
certificate holder, to transfer, parallel, structure to provide
receive, possess, transport, import, licensees with flexibility in
and use one (1) or more category of choosing security capabilities
enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec. versus security costs.
73.2, notwithstanding any local, Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2)
State, or certain Federal firearms provide definitions of these
laws (including regulations). two authorities.
Sec. 73.19(b)(3) Prior to receiving Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
NRC approval of enhanced-weapons that to receive enhanced-
authority, the licensee or certificate weapons authority, a licensee
holder must have applied for and or certificate holder must
received NRC approval for preemption also have received preemption
authority, in accordance with this authority.
section or under Commission orders. Paragraph (b)(4) would describe
(4) Prior to granting either authority the criteria of section 161A
the NRC must determine that the the Commission must determine
proposed use of this authority is are present for a licensee or
necessary in the discharge of official certificate holder to apply to
duties by security personnel engaged the NRC for stand-alone
in protecting--. preemption authority or
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a combined enhanced-weapons
licensee or certificate holder and authority and preemption
designated by the Commission under authority for other types of
paragraph (c) of this section, or. facilities, radioactive
(ii) Radioactive material or other material, or other property.
property that is owned or possessed by
a licensee or certificate holder, or
that is being transported to or from
an NRC-regulated facility. Before
granting such approval, the Commission
must determined that the radioactive
material or other property is of
significance to the common defense and
security or public health and safety
and has designated such radioactive
material or other property under
paragraph (c) of this section.
[[Page 62681]]
Sec. 73.19(c) Applicability. (1) The Paragraph (c)(1) would limit
following classes of licensees or the types of licensees who
certificate holders may apply for could apply for stand-alone
stand-alone preemption authority-- preemption authority alone to
(i) Power reactor facilities; and two classes of NRC-regulated
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a facilities--power reactor
formula quantity or greater of facilities and fuel cycle
strategic special nuclear material facilities authorized to
with security plans subject to Sec. possess Category I quantities
Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. of SSNM. Such SSNM fuel cycle
(2) The following classes of licensees facilities would include:
or certificate holders may apply for production facilities, spent
combined enhanced-weapons authority fuel reprocessing facilities,
and preemption authority-- fuel fabrication facilities,
(i) Power reactor facilities; and and uranium enrichment
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a facilities. However, they
formula quantity or greater of would not include hot cell
strategic special nuclear material facilities, independent spent
with security plans subject to Sec. fuel storage installations,
Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. monitored retrievable storage
installations, geologic
repository operations areas,
non-power reactors, byproduct
material facilities, and the
transportation of spent fuel,
high level waste, and special
nuclear material.
Paragraph (c)(2) would also
limit the types of licensees
who could apply for combined
enhanced-weapons authority and
preemption authority to these
same two classes of licensed
facilities.
The Commission is proposing
under this rulemaking to limit
the range of facilities,
radioactive material, or other
property [for which these
authorities are appropriate]
to power reactor facilities
and fuel cycle facilities
authorized to possess Category
I quantities of strategic
special nuclear material. The
Commission would take this
approach to be consistent with
the scope of this rulemaking.
The Commission may consider
other types of facilities,
radioactive material, or other
property as appropriate for
these authorities in future
rulemakings. Additionally, the
Commission would use the
parallel structure in
paragraph (c) to facilitate
future rulemakings.
Specifically, the Commission
recognizes that enhanced-
weapons authority may not be
appropriate for all present
and future classes of
licensees with armed security
programs; whereas the
applicability of preemption
authority to all present and
future classes of licensees
with armed security programs
may be much broader.
Sec. 73.19(c)(3) With respect to the Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
possession and use of firearms by all that the provisions of this
other NRC licensees or certificate section do not supersede
holders, the Commission's requirements existing Commission
in effect before [effective date of regulations or orders for non-
final rule] remain applicable, except power reactor and non-Category
to the extent those requirements are I SSNM licensees, unless
modified by Commission order or specifically indicated.
regulations applicable to such
licensees and certificate holders.
Sec. 73.19(d) Authorization for stand- Paragraph (d)(1) would describe
alone preemption of firearms laws. (1) the process for a licensee or
Licensees and certificate holders certificate holder to apply
listed in paragraph (c) of this for preemption authority. This
section may apply to the NRC for the would be a voluntary action.
preemption authority described in Based upon the Commission's
paragraph (b)(1) of this section. conclusion that the classes of
Licensees and certificate holders facilities listed under
seeking such authority shall submit an paragraph (c) are appropriate
application to the NRC in writing, in for the use of such preemption
accordance with Sec. 73.4, and authority, no additional
indicate that the licensee or documentation or supporting
certificate holder is requesting information would be required
preemption authority under section by a licensee or certificate
161A of the AEA. holder to apply for preemption
(2) Licensees and certificate holders authority other than the
who have applied for preemption licensee or certificate holder
authority under this section may begin is included within the list of
firearms background checks under Sec. licenses and certificate
73.18 for their armed security holders in paragraph (c).
personnel. Paragraph (d)(2) would permit
(3) Licensees and certificate holders licensees and certificate
who have applied for preemption holders who have applied for
authority under this section and who preemption authority to begin
have satisfactorily completed firearms submitting their security
background checks for a sufficient personnel for firearms
number of security personnel (to background checks under Sec.
implement their security plan while 73.18.
meeting security personnel fatigue Paragraph (c)(3) would require
requirements of this chapter or licensees and certificate
Commission order) shall notify the holders who applied for
NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, preemption authority to
of their readiness to receive NRC subsequently notify the NRC of
approval of preemption authority and their readiness to fully
implement all the provisions of Sec. implement Sec. 73.18 without
73.18. adverse impact on the security
organization (i.e., the
provisions in Sec. 73.18
requiring removal from armed
duties of personnel with a
``denied'' or ``delayed''
response would not adversely
affect the licensee's or
certificate holder's security
organization).
Sec. 73.19(d)(4) Based upon the Paragraph (d)(4) would indicate
licensee's or certificate holder's that the NRC will rely upon
readiness notification and any the licensee's or certificate
discussions with the licensee or holder's determination that
certificate holder, the NRC will sufficient numbers of its
document in writing to the licensee or security personnel have
certificate holder that the Commission satisfactorily passed the
has approved or disapproved the firearms background check to
licensee's or certificate holder's fully implement the provisions
application for preemption authority. of Sec. 73.18. The NRC would
document in writing its
approval or disapproval of the
licensee's or certificate
holder's application for
preemption authority. The NRC
may also rely upon discussions
with the licensee or
certificate holder to reach a
conclusion.
[[Page 62682]]
Sec. 73.19(e) Authorization for use Paragraph (e)(1) would describe
of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees and the process for a licensee or
certificate holders listed in certificate holder to apply
paragraph (c)(2) of this section may for combined enhanced-weapons
apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority described in paragraph authority. A licensee or
(a)(2) of this section. Licensees and certificate holder would be
certificate holders applying for permitted to apply for
enhanced-weapons authority shall have preemption authority in
also applied for preemption authority. conjunction with an
Licensees and certificate holders may application for enhanced-
make these applications concurrently. weapons authority, or the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders licensee or certificate holder
seeking enhanced-weapons authority may apply for preemption
shall submit an application to the authority first. Only the
NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, classes of licensees and
indicating that the licensee or certificate holders listed
certificate holder is requesting under paragraph (c)(2) would
enhanced-weapons authority under be permitted to apply for
section 161A of the AEA. Licensees and combined enhanced-weapons
certificate holders shall also include authority and preemption
with their application--. authority.
(i) The additional information required Paragraph (e)(2) would require
by paragraph (f) of this section;. a licensee or certificate
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC holder to include specific
for preemption authority (if not information with their
concurrent with the application for application as set forth in
enhanced weapons authority); and. Sec. 73.19(f). The licensee
(iii) If applicable, the date when the or certificate holder would
licensee or certificate holder also be required to include
received NRC approval of their information on the date they
application for preemption authority applied for, and/or received
under this section or via Commission NRC approval of their
order.. application for preemption
authority under Sec. 73.19,
or under Commission order
prior to the effective date of
a final rule.
Sec. 73.19(e)(3) The NRC will Paragraph (e)(3) would indicate
document in writing to the licensee or that the NRC would document in
certificate holder that the Commission writing the approval or
has approved or disapproved the disapproval of an application
licensee's or certificate holder's for combined enhanced-weapons
application for enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority. The NRC must approve, or authority. The NRC's approval
have previously approved, a licensee's would also indicate the total
or certificate holder's application numbers, types, and calibers
for preemption authority under of enhanced weapons that are
paragraph (d) of this section, or via approved for a specific
Commission order, to approve the licensee or certificate
application for enhanced weapons holder.
authority.
Sec. 73.19(e)(4) Licensees and Paragraph (e)(4) would indicate
certificate holders who have applied that after the licensee or
to the NRC for and received enhanced- certificate holder has
weapons authority shall then apply to received NRC approval of its
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, application to use enhanced
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a weapons, it must then apply to
federal firearms license (FFL) and ATF to obtain a FFL and also
also register under the National register under the NFA to
Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with obtain these weapons. Because
ATF regulations under 27 CFR parts 478 ATF has indicated it would
and 479 to obtain the enhanced rely upon the NRC's technical
weapons. Licensees and certificate evaluation [on whether the
holders shall include a copy of the specific weapons listed in the
NRC's written approval with their NFA NRC's approval are appropriate
registration application. for the licensee or
certificate holder] in
processing the licensee's or
certificate holder's NFA
registration application,
licensees and certificate
holders would include a copy
of the NRC's approval with
their NFA registration
application.
This paragraph would require
licensees to obtain a FFL in
addition to registering under
the NFA. Based upon
conversations with ATF, the
NRC understands that while
ATF's regulations do not
mandate that persons who
obtain NFA weapons also have
an FFL, NRC licensees and
certificate holders desiring
to obtain enhanced weapons
would benefit from status an
ATF FFL. Advantages would
include reduced time to
process requests to transfer
NFA weapons to or from the
licensee or certificate holder
(e.g., initial receipt,
repair, or disposition),
simplification of the ATF's
review of an NFA registration
application, and elimination
of transfer taxes for NFA-
weapons transactions. The NRC
also understands that status
as an FFL would create
obligations for such
licensee's and certificate
holders. Obligations would
include payment of an annual
special occupational tax,
additional recordkeeping
requirements, and a
requirement to permit ATF
inspectors access to the
licensee's or certificate
holder's facilities possessing
enhanced weapons to inspect
ATF-licensed weapons and
corresponding records.
Sec. 73.19(f) Application for Paragraph (f)(1) would describe
enhanced-weapons authority additional the additional information a
information. (1) Licensees and licensee or certificate holder
certificate holders applying to the would be required to submit
Commission for enhanced-weapons along with their application
authority under paragraph (e) of this for preemption and enhanced-
section shall also submit to the NRC weapons authority. This
for prior review and written approval information would be submitted
new, or revised, physical security to the NRC for prior review
plans, security personnel training and and approval and would
qualification plans, safeguards describe and address the
contingency plans, and safety specific weapons to be
assessments incorporating the use of employed. In addition to
the specific enhanced weapons the addressing the enhanced
licensee or certificate holder intends weapons in the security,
to use. These plans and assessments training and qualification,
must be specific to the facility, and safeguards contingency
radioactive material, or other plans, a licensee or
property being protected. certificate holder would also
provide a safety assessment on
the use of the specific
enhanced weapons to be
employed. Licensees and
certificate holders who apply
for authority alone under
paragraph (d) would not be
subject to the requirements of
paragraph (f).
[[Page 62683]]
Sec. 73.19(f)(2) In addition to other Paragraph (e)(2) would describe
requirements set forth in this part, specific information the
these plans and assessments must-- license or certificate holder
(i) For the physical security plan, would include in the plans and
identify the specific types or models, assessments accompanying the
calibers, and numbers of enhanced application for enhanced-
weapons to be used; weapons authority. The
(ii) For the training and qualification paragraph would also describe
plan, address the training and the scope of the safety
qualification requirements to use assessments and would require
these specific enhanced weapons; and evaluation of both onsite and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency offsite impacts from the use
plan, address how these enhanced and of the specific enhanced
any standard weapons will be employed weapons to be employed. The
by the licensee's or certificate safety assessment would be
holder's security personnel in meeting required to only address the
the NRC-required protective strategy, enhanced weapons the license
including tactical approaches and or certificate holder intends
maneuvers. to employ.
Sec. 73.19(f)(2)(iv) For the safety See considerations for Sec.
assessment-- 73.19(f)(2).
(A) Assess any potential safety impact
on the facility, radioactive material,
or other property from the use of
these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact
on public or private facilities,
public or private property, or on
members of the public in areas outside
of the site boundary from the use of
these enhanced weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact
on public or private facilities,
public or private property, or on
members of the public from the use of
these enhanced weapons at training
facilities intended for proficiency
demonstration and qualification
purposes.
Sec. 73.19(f)(3) The licensee's or Paragraph (f)(3) would specify
certificate holder's training and acceptable standards for the
qualification plan on possessing, licensee or certificate holder
storing, maintaining, qualifying on, to use in creating a training
and using enhanced weapons must and qualification plan for
include information from applicable enhanced weapons. This
firearms standards developed by paragraph would not create any
nationally-recognized firearms new requirements for training
organizations or standard setting standards for standard
bodies or standards developed by weapons.
Federal agencies, such as: the U.S. Paragraph (f)(4) would require
Department of Homeland Security's the submission of revised
Federal Law Enforcement Training plans for prior NRC review and
Center, the U.S. Department of approval, irrespective of
Energy's National Training Center, and whether the licensee or
the U.S. Department of Defense. certificate holder concludes
(4) Licensees or certificate holders that the use of these enhanced
shall submit any new or revised plans weapons would not cause ``a
and assessments for prior NRC review decrease in security
and written approval notwithstanding effectiveness'' under the
the provisions of Sec. Sec. applicable NRC regulation.
50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of this
chapter which otherwise permit a
license or certificate holder to make
changes to such plans ``that would not
decrease their effectiveness'' without
prior NRC review.
Sec. 73.19(g) Completion of training Paragraph (g) would require
and qualification prior to use of licensees and certificate
enhanced weapons. holders to ensure security
Licensees and certificate holders who personnel are trained and
have applied for and received enhanced- qualified on the use and
weapons authority under paragraph (e) employment of enhanced weapons
of this section shall ensure security before the licensee or
personnel complete required firearms certificate holder deploys
training and qualification in these enhanced weapons to
accordance with the licensee's or defend the facility,
certificate holder's NRC-approved radioactive material, or other
training and qualification plan. Such property.
training must be completed prior to Documentation of completion of
security personnel's use of enhanced this training would be
weapons to protect NRC-designated consistent with the licensee's
facilities, radioactive material, or or certificate holder's
other property and must be documented approved training and
in accordance with the requirements of qualification plan.
the licensee's or certificate holder's
training and qualification plan.
Sec. 73.19(h) Use of enhanced Paragraph (h) would indicate
weapons. Requirements regarding the that Sec. 73.19 does not
use of enhanced weapons by security supercede requirements on the
personnel in the performance of their use of weapons under the power
official duties are contained in Sec. reactor and Category I fuel
Sec. 73.46 and 73.55 and in cycle facility security
appendices B and C of this part, as regulations found in Part 73.
applicable.
Sec. 73.19(i) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (i) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec. 73.19(j) Notification of adverse Paragraph (j) would require NRC
ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees licensees or certificate
and certificate holders with an ATF holders to notify NRC, should
federal firearms license (FFL) and/or the licensee or certificate
enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC, holder receive any adverse
in accordance with Sec. 73.4, of findings based upon an ATF
instances involving any adverse ATF inspection, audit, or review
findings or ATF notices related to of the enhanced weapons
their FFL or such weapons. possessed by the licensee or
certificate holder under an
ATF FFL. This would allow the
NRC to appropriately respond
to any public or media
inquiries associated with such
findings in a timely manner.
Sec. 73.2 Definitions................ Three new definitions would be
added to this section as
conforming changes supporting
the new Sec. Sec. 73.18 and
73.19 that would include:
covered weapon, enhanced
weapon, and standard weapon.
The NRC would use these three
terms to envelope the weapons,
ammunition, and devices listed
under section 161A of the AEA.
[[Page 62684]]
Other new definitions that
would be added as conforming
changes to this section in
support of other regulations
(e.g., safety/security
interface and target set) are
discussed in other tables in
this proposed rule.
Covered weapon means any handgun, A definition for covered weapon
rifle, shotgun, short-barreled would be used as an overall
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi- term to encompass the firearms
automatic assault weapon, machinegun, (weapons), ammunition, and
ammunition for any such gun or weapon, devices listed in section
or large capacity ammunition feeding 161A. The meanings of the
device as specified under section 161A specific terms for the
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as firearms, ammunition, or
amended. As used here, the terms devices encompassed within
``handgun, rifle, shotgun, short- this definition would have the
barreled shotgun, short-barreled same meaning for those terms
rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon, as is those found under Title
machinegun, ammunition, or large 18 of the United States Code,
capacity ammunition feeding device'' Section 921(a) [18 U.S.C.
have the same meaning as set forth for 921(a)].
those terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
Covered weapons include both enhanced
weapons and standard weapons. However,
enhanced weapons do not include
standard weapons.
Enhanced weapon means any short- Definitions for enhanced weapon
barreled shotgun, short-barreled and standard weapon would be
rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons added to support the differing
do not include destructive devices, scope of these new sections.
including explosives or weapons The relationship between
greater than 50 caliber (i.e., weapons covered weapon, enhanced
with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5 weapon, and standard weapon
in] diameter). would be explained.
Standard weapon means any handgun, Also, the definition for
rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic assault enhanced weapons would not
weapon, or a large capacity ammunition include destructive devices as
feeding device. defined under ATF's
regulations, since the NRC's
authority under section 161A
of the AEA does not permit
licensees or certificate
holders to possess destructive
devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Part 73 Section 73.55
[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
power reactors against radiological sabotage]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for physical Requirements for This title would be
protection of licensed physical protection retained.
activities in nuclear power of licensed
reactors against activities in
radiological sabotage. nuclear power
reactors against
radiological
sabotage.
(a) Introduction.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55 By December 2, (a)(1) By [date--180 This requirement
1986, each licensee, as days--after the would be added to
appropriate, shall submit effective date of discuss the types
proposed amendments to its the final rule of Commission
security plan which define published in the licensees to whom
how the amended Federal Register], the proposed
requirements of Paragraphs each nuclear power requirements of
(a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and reactor licensee, this section would
(e)(1) will be met. licensed under 10 apply and the
CFR part 50, shall schedule for
incorporate the submitting the
revised amended security
requirements of plans. The
this section Commission intends
through amendments to delete the
to its Commission- current language,
approved Physical because it applies
Security Plan, only to a past rule
Training and change that is
Qualification Plan, completed. The
and Safeguards proposed
Contingency Plan, requirements of
referred to this section would
collectively as be applicable to
``approved security decommissioned/ing
plans,'' and shall reactors unless
submit the amended otherwise exempted.
security plans to
the Commission for
review and approval.
Sec. 73.55 Each submittal (a)(2) The amended This requirement
must include a proposed security plans must would be added to
implementation schedule for be submitted as provide a reference
Commission approval. specified in Sec. to the current Sec.
50.4 of this 50.4(b)(4) which
chapter and must describes
describe how the procedural details
revised relative to the
requirements of proposed security
this section will plan submission
be implemented by requirement.
the licensee, to
include a proposed
implementation
schedule.
Sec. 73.55 The amended (a)(3) The licensee This requirement
safeguards requirements of shall implement the would be added to
these paragraphs must be existing approved clarify that the
implemented by the licensee security plans and licensee must
within 180 days after associated continue to
Commission approval of the Commission orders implement the
proposed security plan in until Commission current Commission-
accordance with the approval of the approved security
approved schedule. amended security plans until the
plans, unless Commission approves
otherwise the amended plans.
authorized by the The phrase ``unless
Commission. otherwise
authorized by the
Commission'' would
provide flexibility
to account for
unanticipated
situations that may
affect the
licensee's ability
to comply with this
proposed
requirement.
[[Page 62685]]
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(i) The (a)(4) The licensee This requirement
licensee is responsible to is responsible for would retain the
the Commission for maintaining the current requirement
maintaining safeguards in onsite physical that the licensee
accordance with Commission protection program is responsible for
regulations and the in accordance with meeting Commission
licensee's security plan. Commission regulations and the
regulations and approved security
related Commission- plans. The phrase
directed orders ``through the
through the implementation of
implementation of the approved
the approved security plans and
security plans and site implementing
site implementing procedures'' would
procedures. be added to
describe the
relationship
between Commission
regulations, the
approved security
plans, and
implementing
procedures. The
word ``safeguards''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``physical
protection
program'' to more
accurately focus
this requirement to
the security
program rather than
the broad
``safeguards''
which includes
safety.
The Commission views
the approved
security plans as
the mechanism
through which the
licensee meets
Commission
requirements
through
implementation,
therefore, the
licensee is
responsible to the
Commission for this
performance.
(a)(5) Applicants This requirement
for an operating would be added to
license under the describe the
provisions of part proposed
50 of this chapter, requirements for
or holders of a applicants and to
combined license specify that these
under the proposed
provisions of part requirements must
52 of this chapter, be met before an
shall satisfy the applicant's receipt
requirements of of special nuclear
this section before material in the
the receipt of form of fuel
special nuclear assemblies.
material in the
form of fuel
assemblies.
(a)(6) For licenses This requirement
issued after would be added to
[effective date of describe the
this rule], Commission
licensees shall expectations for
design, construct, new reactors. Based
and equip the on changes to the
central alarm threat environment
station and the Commission has
secondary alarm determined that the
station to functions required
equivalent to be performed by
standards. the central alarm
station are a
critical element of
the licensee
capability to
satisfy the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Therefore, to ensure
that these critical
capabilities are
maintained, the
Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement would
be a prudent and
necessary measure
to ensure the
licensee's ability
to summon
assistance or
otherwise respond
to an alarm as is
currently required
by Sec.
73.55(e)(1) and
therefore satisfy
the performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(a)(6)(i) Licensees This requirement
shall apply the would be added for
requirements for consistency with
the central alarm and clarification
station listed in of the proposed
paragraphs requirement of
(e)(6)(v), paragraph (a)(6) of
(e)(7)(iii), and this section. The
(i)(8)(ii) of this Commission has
section to the determined that
secondary alarm these construction
station as well as standards that were
the central alarm previously applied
station. to only the central
alarm station
should also be
built into the
secondary alarm
station for new
reactor licensees.
(a)(6)(ii) Licensees This requirement
shall comply with would be added for
the requirements of consistency with
paragraph (i)(4) of and clarification
this section such of the proposed
that both alarm requirement of
stations are paragraph (i)(4) of
provided with this section and to
equivalent clarify that for
capabilities for new reactors, both
detection, the central and
assessment, secondary alarm
monitoring, stations must be
observation, provided
surveillance, and ``equivalent
communications. capabilities'' and
not simply
equivalent
``functional''
capabilities as is
stated in the
proposed paragraph
(i)(4) of this
section. The
Commission has
determined that
these capabilities
must be equivalent
for new reactors to
ensure that the
secondary alarm
station is
redundant to the
central alarm
station.
[[Page 62686]]
Sec. 73.55(a) General (b) General This header would be
performance objective and performance retained. The
requirements. objective and proposed
requirements. requirements of
this section are
intended to
represent the
general outline for
a physical
protection program
that would provide
an acceptable level
of protection if
effectively
implemented. The
proposed actions,
standards,
criteria, and
requirements of
this section are
intended to be
bounded by the
description of the
design basis threat
identified by the
Commission in Sec.
73.1.
Sec. 73.55(a) The licensee (b)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and shall establish and would retain the
maintain an onsite physical maintain a physical current performance
protection system and protection program, objective of Sec.
security organization which to include a 73.55(a) with two
will have as its objective security minor changes.
to provide high assurance organization which First, the phrase
that activities involving will have as its ``an onsite
special nuclear material objective to physical protection
are not inimical to the provide high system'' would be
common defense and security assurance that replaced with the
and do not constitute an activities phrase ``a physical
unreasonable risk to the involving special protection
public health and safety. nuclear material program'' to more
are not inimical to clearly state the
the common defense Commission's view
and security and do that the physical
not constitute an protection system
unreasonable risk elements described
to the public in this proposed
health and safety. rule combine to
make the licensee
physical protection
program. Second,
the word ``and''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``to include a'' to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the security
organization is not
considered to be
independent of the
licensee physical
protection program
but rather, is a
component of that
program.
Sec. 73.55(a) The physical (b)(2) The physical This requirement
protection system shall be protection program would contain a
designed to protect against must be designed to substantial
the design basis threat of detect, assess, revision to provide
radiological sabotage as intercept, a more detailed and
stated in Sec. 73.1(a). challenge, delay, performance based
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) and neutralize requirement for the
Requiring responding guards threats up to and design of the
or other armed response including the licensee physical
personnel to interpose design basis threat protection program.
themselves * * *.. of radiological Most significantly,
sabotage as stated the word
in Sec. 73.1(a), ``interpose'' would
at all times. be replaced with
the words ``detect,
assess, intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize''.
The current
requirement of Sec.
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
requires the
licensee to
``interpose'' for
the purpose of
preventing
radiological
sabotage, however,
the definition of
``radiological
sabotage'' stated
in Sec. 73.2 does
not contain a
performance based
element by which
the Commission can
measure this
capability and
therefore, this
proposed
requirement would
provide the six
performance based
elements or
capabilities
``detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize.''
The first element,
``detect'', would
be provided through
the use of
detection
equipment, patrols,
access controls,
and other program
elements required
by this proposed
rule and would
provide
notification to the
licensee that a
potential threat is
present and where
the threat is
located.
[[Page 62687]]
The second element,
``assess'', would
provide a mechanism
through which the
licensee would
identify the nature
of the threat
detected. This
would be
accomplished
through the use of
video equipment,
patrols, and other
program elements
that would be
required by this
proposed rule and
would provide the
licensee with
information about
the threat upon
which the licensee
would determine how
to respond. The
third, fourth, and
fifth elements
would comprise the
component actions
of response and
would be provided
by personnel
trained and
equipped in
accordance with a
response strategy.
The third element
``intercept'' would
be the act of
placing a person at
an intersecting
defensive position
directly in the
path of advancement
taken by the
threat, and between
the threat and the
protected target or
target set element.
The fourth element
``challenge'' would
be to verbally or
physically confront
the threat to
impede, halt, or
otherwise interact
with the threat
with the intent of
preventing further
advancement of the
threat towards the
protected target or
target set element.
The fifth element
``delay'' would be
to take necessary
actions to counter
any attempt by the
threat to advance
towards the
protected target or
target set element.
The sixth element
``neutralize''
would be to place
the threat in a
condition from
which the threat no
longer has the
potential to, or
capability of,
doing harm to the
protected item. The
Commission does not
intend to suggest
that the action,
``neutralize'',
would require the
application of
``deadly force'' in
all instances. The
phrase ``threat of
radiological
sabotage'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``threats up
to and including
the design basis
threat of
radiological
sabotage'' to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must provide
protection against
any element of the
design basis
threat, to include
those that do not
rise to the full
capability of the
design basis
threat.
[[Page 62688]]
Sec. 73.55(a) To achieve (b)(3) The licensee This requirement
this general performance physical protection would retain and
objective, the onsite program must be revise two current
physical protection system designed and requirements to
and security organization implemented to provide a
must include, but not satisfy the performance based
necessarily be limited to, requirements of requirement for the
the capabilities to meet this section and design of the
the specific requirements ensure that no physical protection
contained in paragraphs (b) single act, as program. The first
through (h) of this section. bounded by the significant
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) * * * so design basis revision would
that a single act cannot threat, can disable expand the current
remove the capability of the personnel, requirement for
calling for assistance or equipment, or alarm stations to
otherwise responding to an systems necessary be protected
alarm.. to prevent against a single
significant core act, and would
damage and spent require that the
fuel sabotage. licensee physical
protection program
be designed to
ensure that a
single act can not
disable the
personnel,
equipment, or
systems necessary
to prevent
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage which
would result in the
loss of the
capability to
prevent
radiological
sabotage. The
Commission's view
is that because of
changes to the
threat environment,
it is necessary to
emphasize the
``remove the
capability''
requirement of the
current Sec.
73.55(e)(1) such
that the single act
protection
requirement would
apply to personnel,
equipment, and
systems required to
perform specific
functions that if
disabled would
remove the licensee
capability to
prevent
radiological
sabotage. The
second significant
revision would
provide a
measurable and
performance based
requirement against
which the
Commission would
measure the
effectiveness of
the licensee's
physical protection
program to prevent
radiological
sabotage.
The Commission's
view is that the
goal of the
licensee's physical
protection program
must include an
acceptable safety
margin to assure
that the
performance
objective of public
health and safety
is met. This safety
margin would be
established by
designing and
implementing a
physical protection
program that
protects against
radiological
sabotage by
preventing
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage which
describes the
undesirable
consequences that
could result from
the destruction of
a target set or all
elements of a
target set and
would be a
precursor to
radiological
sabotage. The
Commission's view
is that significant
damage to the core
or sabotage to
spent fuel would
result in a
condition in which
the performance
objective of ``High
Assurance'' could
no longer be
provided and
therefore,
prevention of
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage are a
measurable
performance
criteria against
which the
Commission would
evaluate the
effectiveness of
the licensee
physical protection
program.
[[Page 62689]]
The phrase ``as
bounded by the
design basis
threat'' would be
used to clarify the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must ensure that
the physical
protection program
is designed to
protect against the
design basis threat
and all other
threats that do not
rise to the level
of the design basis
threat. The phrase
``the capabilities
to meet the
specific
requirements
contained in
paragraphs (b)
through (h) of this
section'' would be
replaced by the
phase ``implemented
to satisfy the
requirements of
this section'' to
account for the
reformatting of
this proposed rule
and to describe the
Commission view
that the licensee
is responsible to
implement
Commission
requirements
through the
approved security
plans and
procedures.
(b)(4) The physical This requirement
protection program would be added to
must include apply defense-in-
diverse and depth concepts as
redundant part of the
equipment, systems, physical protection
technology, program to ensure
programs, the capability to
supporting meet the
processes, and performance
implementing objective of the
procedures. proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section is
maintained in the
changing threat
environment. The
terms ``diverse and
redundant'' are
intended to
describe defense-in-
depth in a
performance based
manner and would be
a critical element
for meeting the
proposed
requirement for
protection against
a single act
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b)(3) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon (b)(5) Upon the This requirement
the request of an request of an would retain the
authorized representative authorized current requirement
of the Commission, the representative of for demonstration
licensee shall demonstrate the Commission, the and would contain
the ability of the physical licensee shall minor revisions to
security personnel to carry demonstrate the apply this
out their assigned duties ability to meet requirement to the
and responsibilities. Commission licensee's ability
requirements to implement the
through the physical protection
implementation of program and not be
the physical limited to only the
protection program, ability of security
including the personnel to carry
ability of armed out their duties.
and unarmed This proposed
personnel to requirement would
perform assigned clarify the
duties and Commission's view
responsibilities that the licensee
required by the must also
approved security demonstrate the
plans and licensee effectiveness of
procedures. plans, procedures,
and equipment to
accomplish their
intended function
within the physical
protection program.
(b)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added to
maintain a written specify that this
performance performance
evaluation program evaluation program
in accordance with would be the
appendix B and mechanism by which
appendix C to this the licensee would
part, to demonstrate the
demonstrate and capabilities
assess the described by the
effectiveness of performance based
armed responders requirements of the
and armed security proposed paragraphs
officers to perform (b)(2) through (4)
their assigned of this section.
duties and The phrase ``target
responsibilities to sets'' would be
protect target sets used consistent
described in with the proposed
paragraph (f) of (b)(3) of this
this section and section to describe
appendix C to this the combination of
part, through equipment and
implementation of operator actions
the licensee which, if all are
protective strategy. prevented from
performing their
intended safety
function or
prevented from
being accomplished,
would likely result
in significant core
damage (e.g., non-
incipient, non-
localized fuel
melting, and/or
core disruption)
barring
extraordinary
action by plant
operators.
A target set with
respect to spent
fuel sabotage is
draining the spent
fuel pool leaving
the spent fuel
uncovered for a
period of time,
allowing spent fuel
heat up and the
associated
potential for
release of fission
products.
[[Page 62690]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(7) The (b)(7) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall: shall establish, would be retained
(i) Establish an access maintain, and and revised to
authorization system * * *. follow an access require the
authorization licensee to provide
program in an Access
accordance with Authorization
Sec. 73.56. Program.
(b)(7)(i) In This proposed
addition to the requirement would
access be added to
authorization establish the
program required insider mitigation
above, and the program (IMP). The
fitness-for-duty licensee's IMP
program required in should integrate
part 26 of this specific elements
chapter, each of the licensee AA
licensee shall and FFD programs to
develop, implement, focus those
and maintain an elements on
insider mitigation identifying
program. potential insider
threats and denying
the opportunity for
an insider to gain
or retain access at
an NRC licensed
facility.
(b)(7)(ii) The This proposed
insider mitigation requirement would
program must be be added to provide
designed to oversee a performance based
and monitor the requirement for the
initial and design and content
continuing of the IMP. The
trustworthiness and Commission has
reliability of concluded that, by
individuals granted itself, the initial
or retaining determination of
unescorted access trustworthiness and
authorization to a reliability is not
protected or vital adequate to
area and implement minimize the
defense-in-depth potential
methodologies to opportunity for an
minimize the insider to gain or
potential for an retain access, and
insider to that only through
adversely affect, continual re-
either directly or evaluation of the
indirectly, the information
licensee capability obtained through
to prevent these processes can
significant core the licensee
damage or spent provide the level
fuel sabotage. of assurance
necessary. The
Commission has also
determined that
defense-in-depth
would be provided
through the
integration of
physical protection
measures with
access
authorization and
fitness-for-duty
program elements,
to ensure the
licensee capability
to identify and
mitigate the
potential
activities of an
insider, such as,
but not limited to,
tampering. The
Commission does not
intend that a
licensee would
limit the IMP to
any one or more
elements, but
rather that the
licensee would
identify and add
additional elements
as necessary to
ensure the site's
IMP satisfies the
performance
requirements
specified by the
Commission.
The Commission has
determined that no
one element of the
physical protection
program, access
authorization
program, or fitness-
for-duty program
would, by itself,
provide the level
of protection
against the insider
necessary to meet
the performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) and therefore,
the effective
integration of
these three
programs is a
necessary
requirement to
achieve defense-in-
depth against the
potential insider.
(b)(8) The licensee This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
its corrective provide a
action program performance based
assures that requirement to
failures, ensure that the
malfunctions, licensee implements
deficiencies, and completes the
deviations, required corrective
defective equipment actions in a timely
and nonconformances manner and that
in security program actions would be
components, taken to correct
functions, or the cause of the
personnel are problem to ensure
promptly identified that the problem
and corrected. would not be
Measures shall repeated.
ensure that the
cause of any of
these conditions is
determined and that
corrective action
is taken to
preclude repetition.
(c) Security plans.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(c)(1) Licensee This requirement
security plans. would be added to
Licensee security describe the
plans must purpose of the
implement licensee Physical
Commission Security Plan,
requirements and Training and
must describe: Qualification Plan,
and Safeguards
Contingency Plan in
a performance based
requirement and to
introduce the
general types of
information to be
discussed.
[[Page 62691]]
(c)(1)(i) How the This requirement
physical protection would be added to
program will describe the
prevent significant performance based
core damage and requirement to be
spent fuel sabotage met by the physical
through the protection program
establishment and and the basic
maintenance of a elements of the
security system that must be
organization, the described in the
use of security security plans.
equipment and
technology, the
training and
qualification of
security personnel,
and the
implementation of
predetermined
response plans and
strategies; and
(c)(1)(ii) Site- This requirement
specific conditions would be added to
that affect reflect the
implementation of Commission's view
Commission that licensees must
requirements. focus attention on
site-specific
conditions in the
development and
implementation of
site plans,
procedures,
processes, response
strategies, and
ultimately, the
licensee capability
to achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section.
(c)(2) Protection of This requirement
security plans. The would be added to
licensee shall emphasize the
protect the requirements for
approved security the protection of
plans and other safeguards
related safeguards information in
information against accordance with the
unauthorized requirements of
disclosure in Sec. 73.21.
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(c)(3) Physical This header would be
security plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
(c)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
establish, specify the
maintain, and requirement for a
implement a physical security
Commission-approved plan.
physical security
plan that describes
how the performance
objective and
requirements set
forth in this
section will be
implemented.
(c)(3)(ii) The This requirement
physical security would be added to
plan must describe describe the
the facility general content of
location and the physical
layout, the security plan and
security specify the general
organization and types of
structure, duties information to be
and addressed. Because
responsibilities of the specifics of
personnel, defense- defense-in-depth
in-depth required by the
implementation that proposed Sec.
describes 73.55(b)(4) would
components, vary from site-to-
equipment and site, the terms
technology used. ``components,''
``equipment'' and
``technology''
would be used to
provide
flexibility.
(c)(4) Training and This header would be
qualification plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each (c)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall establish, licensee shall would retain and
maintain, and follow an NRC- establish, separate two
approved training and maintain, and current
qualifications plan * * *. follow a Commission- requirements of
approved training Sec.
and qualification 73.55(b)(4)(ii).
plan that describes This proposed
how the criteria requirement would
set forth in require the
appendix B licensee to provide
``General Criteria a training and
for Security qualification plan.
Personnel,'' to
this part will be
implemented.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(ii) * * * (c)(4)(ii) The This requirement
outlining the processes by training and would retain the
which guards, watchmen, qualification plan requirement for the
armed response persons, and must describe the licensee to outline
other members of the process by which the processes in
security organization will armed and unarmed this plan with
be selected, trained, security personnel, minor revisions.
equipped, tested, and watchpersons, and The phrase
qualified to ensure that other members of ``guards, watchmen,
these individuals meet the the security armed response
requirements of this organization will persons'' would be
paragraph. be selected, replaced by the
trained, equipped, phrase ``armed and
tested, qualified, unarmed security
and re-qualified to personnel,
ensure that these watchpersons'' to
individuals possess generically
and maintain the identify all
knowledge, skills, members of the
and abilities security
required to carry organization. The
out their assigned Commission does not
duties and intend that
responsibilities administrative
effectively. staff be included
except as these
personnel would be
used to perform
duties required to
detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize a
threat, to include
compensatory
measures used to
maintain these
capabilities in the
event of a failed
component.
[[Page 62692]]
The phrase ``meet
the requirements of
this paragraph''
would be replaced
by the phrase
``possess the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
required to
effectively carry
out their assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to clarify that the
focus of this
proposed
requirement would
be to ensure these
individuals possess
these capabilities.
(c)(5) Safeguards This header would be
contingency plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(h)(1) (c)(5)(i) The This requirement
Safeguards contingency licensee shall would retain the
plans must be in accordance establish, current requirement
with the criteria in maintain, and of Sec.
appendix C to this part, implement a 73.55(h)(1) to
``Licensee Safeguards Commission-approved provide a
Contingency Plans''. safeguards safeguards
contingency plan contingency plan
that describes how with minor
the criteria set revisions. Most
forth in section II significantly, the
of appendix C, reference to
``Licensee appendix C to part
Safeguards 73 would be revised
Contingency to reflect the
Plans,'' to this reformatting of the
part will be proposed appendix C
implemented. to part 73 which
would have a
section II that
applies only to
power reactors.
(c)(5)(ii) The This requirement
safeguards would be added to
contingency plan generally describe
must describe the content of the
predetermined Safeguards
actions, plans, and Contingency Plan.
strategies designed
to intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize
threats up to and
including the
design basis threat
of radiological
sabotage.
(c)(6) Implementing This header would be
procedures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i) (c)(6)(i) The This requirement
Written security procedures licensee shall would retain the
that document the structure establish, requirement for
of the security maintain, and written security
organization and detail the implement written procedures with
duties of guards, watchmen, procedures that minor revisions.
and other individuals document the The phrase ``and
responsible for security. structure of the implement
security Commission
organization, requirements
detail the specific through the
duties and approved security
responsibilities of plans'' would be
each position, and added to clarify
implement the requirement
Commission that the licensee
requirements implements
through the Commission
approved security requirements
plans. through procedures
as well as the
approved security
plans.
(c)(6)(ii) This requirement
Implementing would be added to
procedures need not address the current
be submitted to the and proposed
Commission for procedural details
prior approval, but for implementing
are subject to procedures.
inspection by the
Commission.
(c)(6)(iii) This requirement
Implementing would be added to
procedures must describe the
detail the specific content of
actions to be taken implementing
and decisions to be procedures to
made by each clarify the current
position of the requirement
security ``detail the duties
organization to of guards,
implement the watchmen, and other
approved security individuals
plans. responsible for
security.''
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (c)(6)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall have a licensee shall: would be retained
management system to and would separate
provide for * * *. the two current
requirements of
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)
with minor
revisions. The
phrase ``management
system'' would be
replaced with the
word ``process.''
The current
requirement to have
a management system
would be addressed
in the proposed
Sec. 73.55(d)(2).
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) * * * the (c)(6)(iv)(A) This requirement
development, revision, Develop, maintain, would retain the
implementation, and enforce, review, requirement to
enforcement of security and revise security develop, revise,
procedures. implementing implement, and
procedures. enforce security
procedures. The
words ``maintenance
and review'' would
be added to clarify
these tasks as
necessary
functions. The word
``implementation''
would be deleted
because
implementation is
addressed in the
proposed paragraphs
(c)(6)(i) through
(iii) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(ii) (c)(6)(iv)(B) This requirement
Provision for written Provide a process would retain the
approval of these for the written current requirement
procedures and any approval of for written
revisions to the procedures implementing approval with minor
by the individual with procedures and revisions.
overall responsibility for revisions by the
the security functions. individual with
overall
responsibility for
the security
functions.
[[Page 62693]]
(c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure This requirement
that changes made would be added to
to implementing ensure that the
procedures do not licensee process
decrease the for making changes
effectiveness of to implementing
any procedure to procedures includes
implement and a process to ensure
satisfy Commission that changes do not
requirements. result in a
reduction of
effectiveness or
result in a
conflict with other
site procedures.
(c)(7) Plan This requirement
revisions. The would be added to
licensee shall outline the three
revise approved methodologies for
security plans as making changes to
necessary to ensure the Commission-
the effective approved security
implementation of plans and clarify
Commission that the licensee
regulations and the would make
licensee's necessary plan
protective changes to account
strategy. for changes to site
Commission approval specific conditions
of revisions made and lessons learned
pursuant to this from implementing
paragraph is not the approved
required, provided security plans.
that revisions meet
the requirements of
Sec. 50.54(p) of
this chapter.
Changes that are
beyond the scope
allowed per Sec.
50.54(p) of this
chapter shall be
submitted as
required by Sec.
Sec. 50.90 of
this chapter or
Sec. 73.5.
Sec. 73.55(b) Physical (d) Security This header would be
Security Organization. organization. retained with a
minor revision.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1) The (d)(1) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall establish a shall establish and would retain the
security organization, maintain a security current requirement
including guards, to organization for a security
protect his facility designed, staffed, organization to
against radiological trained, and protect against
sabotage. equipped to provide radiological
early detection, sabotage. This
assessment, and proposed
response to requirement would
unauthorized be revised to
activities within describe a more
any area of the performance based
facility. requirement
consistent with the
proposed paragraphs
(b)(2) through (4)
of this section.
The phrase
``including guards,
to protect his
facility against
radiological
sabotage'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``designed,
staffed, trained,
and equipped to
provide early
detection,
assessment, and
response to
unauthorized
activities'' to
describe those
elements of the
security
organization needed
to provide the
capabilities
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b). The phrase
``within any area
of the facility''
would be added to
clarify the
Commission's
expectation that
the licensee must
implement measures
consistent with
site security
assessments and the
licensee response
strategy, to
facilitate the
identification of a
threat before an
attempt to
penetrate the
protected area
would be made.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (d)(2) The security This requirement
system shall include: organization must would be retained
include: with minor
revisions. The word
``system'' would be
replaced by the
phrase ``security
organization.''
Although, the
security ``system''
would include the
security
organization, this
proposed
requirement focuses
only on the
security
organization.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (d)(2)(i) A This requirement
licensee shall have a management system would retain the
management system * * *. that provides requirement for a
oversight of the management system
onsite physical with minor
protection program. revisions. Most
significantly this
proposed
requirement would
not limit the
licensee management
system to only
provide for the
development,
revision,
implementation, and
enforcement of
security procedures
which are addressed
in the proposed
paragraph
(c)(6)(iv) of this
section. The
Commission
expectation would
be that the
licensee management
system oversees all
aspects of the
onsite physical
protection program
to ensure the
effective
implementation of
Commission
requirements
through the
approved security
plans and
implementing
procedures.
[[Page 62694]]
Sec. 73.55(b)(2) At least (d)(2)(ii) At least This requirement
one full time member of the one member, onsite would be retained
security organization who and available at with minor
has the authority to direct all times, who has revisions. The
the physical protection the authority to phrase ``who is
activities of the security direct the assigned no other
organization shall be activities of the duties which would
onsite at all times. security interfere with''
organization and would be added to
who is assigned no ensure that the
other duties that designated
would interfere individual would
with this not be assigned any
individual's duties that would
ability to perform prevent or
these duties in interfere with the
accordance with the ability to direct
approved security these activities
plans and licensee when needed.
protective strategy.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The (d)(3) The licensee This requirement
licensee may not permit an may not permit any would be retained
individual to act as a individual to act with minor
guard, watchman, armed as a member of the revisions.
response person, or other security
member of the security organization unless
organization unless the the individual has
individual has been been trained,
trained, equipped, and equipped, and
qualified to perform each qualified to
assigned security job duty perform assigned
in accordance with appendix duties and
B, ``General Criteria for responsibilities in
Security Personnel,'' to accordance with the
this part. requirements of
appendix B to part
73 and the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
(d)(4) The licensee This requirement
may not assign an would be added to
individual to any clarify the
position involving prerequisite
detection, qualifications for
assessment, or assignment to any
response to position involving
unauthorized a function upon
activities unless which detection,
that individual has assessment, or
satisfied the response
requirements of capabilities
Sec. 73.56. depend.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1) If a (d)(5) If a This requirement
contract guard force is contracted security would be retained
utilized for site security, force is used to with minor
the licensee's written implement the revision. The
agreement with the onsite physical phrase ``utilized
contractor that must be protection program, for site security''
retained by the licensee as the licensee's would be replaced
a record for the duration written agreement with the phrase
of the contract will with the contractor ``used to implement
clearly show that: must be retained by the onsite physical
the licensee as a protection
record for the program'' to focus
duration of the on the
contract and must implementation of
clearly state the the onsite physical
following protection program.
conditions:
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(i) The (d)(5)(i) The This requirement
licensee is responsible to licensee is would be retained
the Commission for responsible for with minor
maintaining safeguards in maintaining the revisions. Most
accordance with Commission onsite physical significantly, the
regulations and the protection program word ``safeguards''
licensee's security plan. in accordance with would be replaced
Commission orders, with the phrase''
Commission onsite physical
regulations, and protection
the approved program'' to more
security plans. accurately describe
the focus of this
requirement.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The (d)(5)(ii) The This requirement
NRC may inspect, copy, and Commission may would be retained
take away copies of all inspect, copy, with minor
reports and documents retain, and remove revisions.
required to be kept by all reports and
Commission regulations, documents required
orders, or applicable to be kept by
license conditions whether Commission
the reports and documents regulations,
are kept by the licensee or orders, or
the contractor. applicable license
conditions whether
the reports and
documents are kept
by the licensee or
the contractor.
(d)(5)(iii) An This requirement
individual may not would be added for
be assigned to any consistency with
position involving the proposed
detection, requirements of the
assessment, or proposed paragraph
response to (d)(4) of this
unauthorized section. This
activities unless proposed
that individual has requirement would
satisfied the be stipulated in a
requirements of contract because it
Sec. 73.56. relates to a
function of the
contract.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(iv) The (d)(5)(iv) An This requirement
contractor will not assign individual may not would retain and
any personnel to the site be assigned duties combine two current
who have not first been and requirements of
made aware of these responsibilities Sec.
responsibilities. required to 73.55(b)(1)(iv) and
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The implement the Sec.
licensee may not permit an approved security 73.55(b)(4)(i) with
individual to act as a plans or licensee minor revisions
guard, watchman, armed protective strategy necessary for
response person, or other unless that consistency with
member of the security individual has been the proposed rule.
organization unless the properly trained,
individual has been equipped, and
trained, equipped, and qualified to
qualified to perform each perform their
assigned security job duty assigned duties and
in accordance with appendix responsibilities in
B * * *.. accordance with
appendix B to part
73 and the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(iii) The (d)(5)(v) Upon the This requirement
requirement in paragraph request of an would be retained
(b)(4) of this section that authorized to describe the
the licensee demonstrate representative of current requirement
the ability of physical the Commission, the for demonstration
security personnel to contractor security by contract
perform their assigned employees shall security personnel.
duties and responsibilities demonstrate the The language of
includes demonstration of ability to perform this current
the ability of the their assigned requirement would
contractor's physical duties and be deleted and
security personnel to responsibilities replaced by the
perform their assigned effectively. proposed language
duties and responsibilities of the proposed
in carrying out the Sec. 73.55(b)(5).
provisions of the Security
Plan and these regulations,
and * * *.
[[Page 62695]]
(d)(5)(vi) Any This requirement
license for would be added to
possession and implement
ownership of applicable portions
enhanced weapons of the EPAct 2005,
will reside with and to require any
the licensee. security force
contract to include
a statement that
would ensure that
all licenses
relative to
firearms and
enhanced weapons
reside with the
licensee, not the
contractor.
Sec. 73.55(c) Physical (e) Physical This requirement
barriers. barriers. Based would be added to
upon the licensee's provide a
protective performance based
strategy, analyses, requirement for
and site conditions determining the use
that affect the use and placement of
and placement of physical barriers
physical barriers, required for
the licensee shall protection of
install and personnel,
maintain physical equipment, and
barriers that are systems, the
designed and failure of which
constructed as could directly or
necessary to deter, indirectly endanger
delay, and prevent public health and
the introduction of safety.
unauthorized
personnel,
vehicles, or
materials into
areas for which
access must be
controlled or
restricted.
The phrase ``Based
upon the licensee
protective
strategy, analyses,
and site specific
conditions'', would
be used to ensure
that licensees
consider protective
strategy
requirements and
needs, as well as
any analyses
conducted by the
licensee or
required by the
Commission to
determine the
effects the design
basis threat could
have on personnel,
equipment, and
systems, and any
site specific
condition that
could have an
impact on the
capability to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage. The
Commission
considers these
factors to be
necessary
considerations when
determining the
appropriate use and
placement of
barriers in any
area.
(e)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall describe in would be added to
the approved provide a mechanism
security plans, the by which the
design, licensee would
construction, and confirm information
function of regarding the use,
physical barriers placement, and
and barrier systems construction of
used and shall barriers to include
ensure that each the intended
barrier and barrier function of
system is designed specific barriers
and constructed to as they relate to
satisfy the stated satisfying the
function of the proposed
barrier and barrier requirements of
system. this section.
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(iii) (e)(2) The licensee This requirement
Protect as Safeguards shall retain in would retain and
Information, information accordance with combine the current
required by the Commission Sec. 73.70, all requirements of
pursuant to Sec. analyses, Sec.
73.55(c)(8) and (9). comparisons, and 73.55(c)(9)(iii)
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(iv) descriptions of the and (9)(iv) with
Retain, in accordance with physical barriers minor revisions.
Sec. 73.70, all and barrier systems
comparisons and analyses used to satisfy the
prepared pursuant to Sec. requirements of
73.55(c)(7) and (8).. this section, and
shall protect these
records as
safeguards
information in
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(e)(3) Physical This header would be
barriers must: added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(3)(i) Clearly This requirement
delineate the would be added to
boundaries of the provide a
area(s) for which performance based
the physical requirement for the
barrier provides use of barriers.
protection or a
function, such as
protected and vital
area boundaries and
stand-off distance.
Sec. 73.55(c)(8) Each (e)(3)(ii) Be This requirement
licensee shall compare the designed and would be added to
vehicle control measures constructed to apply the current
established in accordance protect against the requirement of Sec.
with Sec. 73.55(c)(7) to design basis threat 73.55(c)(8) to
the Commission's design commensurate to the compare vehicle
goals (i.e., to protect required function control measures
equipment, systems, of each barrier and against Commission
devices, or material, the in support of the design goals, to
failure of which could licensee protective all barriers, such
directly or indirectly strategy. as but not limited
endanger public health and to, channeling
safety by exposure to barriers, delay
radiation) and criteria for barriers, and
protection against a land bullet resisting
vehicle bomb. enclosures, and not
limit this
comparison to only
vehicle barriers.
The Commission's
view is that the
physical
construction,
materials, and
design of any
barrier must be
sufficient to
perform the
intended function
and therefore, the
licensee must meet
these standards.
[[Page 62696]]
(e)(3)(iii) Provide This requirement
visual deterrence, would be added to
delay, and support provide a
access control performance based
measures. requirement for
physical barriers.
Because of changes
to the threat
environment the
Commission believes
emphasis on the use
of physical
barriers would be
appropriate.
(e)(3)(iv) Support This requirement
effective would be added to
implementation of provide a
the licensee's performance based
protective strategy. requirement for
physical barriers.
Because of changes
to the threat
environment the use
of physical
barriers within the
licensee protective
strategy would be
considered
essential.
(e)(4) Owner This requirement
controlled area. would be added to
The licensee shall provide a
establish and performance based
maintain physical requirement to
barriers in the provide enhanced
owner controlled protection outside
area to deter, the protected area
delay, or prevent relative to
unauthorized detecting and
access, facilitate delaying a threat
the early detection before reaching any
of unauthorized area from which the
activities, and threat could
control approach disable the
routes to the personnel,
facility. equipment, or
systems required to
meet the
performance
objective and
requirements
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(e)(5) Isolation This header would be
zone. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) Isolation (e)(5)(i) An This requirement
zones shall be maintained isolation zone must would retain the
in outdoor areas adjacent be maintained in current requirement
to the physical barrier at outdoor areas for an isolation
the perimeter of the adjacent to the zone.
protected area * * *. protected area
perimeter barrier.
The isolation zone
shall be:
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) Isolation (e)(5)(i)(A) This requirement
zones * * * and shall be of Designed and of would retain and
sufficient size to permit sufficient size to revise the current
observation of the permit unobstructed requirement for
activities of people on observation and isolation zone
either side of that barrier assessment of design to provide
in the event of its activities on observation. Most
penetration. either side of the significantly, the
protected area words ``designed''
barrier. and
``unobstructed''
would be added to
provide a more
performance based
requirement. The
phrase ``of
people'' would be
deleted to focus
the proposed
requirement on
``activities''.
Sec. 73.55(c)(4) Detection (e)(5)(i)(B) This requirement
of penetration or attempted Equipped with would be retained
penetration of the intrusion detection and revised to
protected area or the equipment capable require intrusion
isolation zone adjacent to of detecting both detection equipment
the protected area barrier attempted and within an isolation
shall assure that adequate actual penetration zone and provide a
response by the security of the protected performance based
organization can be area perimeter requirement for
initiated. barrier and that equipment. The
assessment phrase ``shall
equipment capable assure that
of facilitating adequate response
timely evaluation by the security
of the detected organization can be
unauthorized initiated'' would
activities before be moved from this
completed proposed
penetration of the requirement to the
protected area proposed Sec.
perimeter barrier. 73.55(i)(9)(v).
(e)(5)(ii) This requirement
Assessment would be added to
equipment in the provide a
isolation zone must performance based
provide real-time requirement for
and play-back/ assessment
recorded video equipment utilized
images in a manner for the isolation
that allows timely zone. The
evaluation of the Commission has
detected determined that
unauthorized based on changes to
activities before threat environment
and after each the use of
alarm annunciation. technology that
allows for the
assessment of
activities before
and after an alarm
annunciation is
necessary to
facilitate a
determination of
the level of
response needed to
satisfy the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section. The
Commission believes
the application of
this commonly used
technology would be
an appropriate use
of technological
advancements that
would effectively
enhance licensee
capabilities to
achieve the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
[[Page 62697]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) If (e)(5)(iii) Parking This requirement
parking facilities are facilities, storage would be retained
provided for employees or areas, or other and revised to
visitors, they shall be obstructions that provide a
located outside the could provide performance based
isolation zone and exterior concealment or requirement for the
to the protected area otherwise interfere areas outside the
barrier. with the licensee's isolation zone.
capability to meet Most significantly,
the requirements of the phrase
paragraphs ``storage areas, or
(e)(5)(i)(A) and other obstructions
(B) of this which could provide
section, must be concealment or
located outside of otherwise
the isolation zone. interfere'' would
be added to ensure
that areas inside,
outside, and
adjacent to the
protected area
barrier would be
maintained clear of
obstructions to
ensure observation
and assessment
capabilities.
(e)(6) Protected This header would be
area. added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(6)(i) The This requirement
protected area would be added to
perimeter must be provide a
protected by performance based
physical barriers requirement for
designed and physical barriers
constructed to meet and penetrations
Commission though the
requirements and protected area
all penetrations barrier to be
through this secured to prevent
barrier must be and detect
secured in a manner attempted or actual
that prevents or exploitation of the
delays, and detects penetration. The
the exploitation of Commission's view
any penetration. is that
penetrations must
be secured equal to
the strength of the
barrier of which it
is a part and that
attempts to exploit
a penetration must
be detected and
response initiated.
Sec. 73.55(c)(2) The (e)(6)(ii) The This requirement
physical barriers at the protected area would be retained
perimeter of the protected perimeter physical with minor
area shall be separated barriers must be revision. The
from any other barrier separated from any phrase ``unless
designated as a physical other barrier otherwise
barrier for a vital area designated as a identified in the
within the protected area. vital area physical approved physical
barrier, unless security plan''
otherwise would be added to
identified in the provide flexibility
approved physical for an alternate
security plan. methodology to be
described in the
Commission-approved
security plans.
Sec. 73.55(e)(3) All (e)(6)(iii) All This requirement
emergency exits in each emergency exits in would retain and
protected area and each the protected area separate the two
vital area shall be alarmed. must be secured by current
locking devices requirements with
that allow exit minor revision. The
only and alarmed. phrase ``secured by
locking devices
which allow exit
only'' would be
added to provide a
performance based
requirement
relative to the
function of locking
devices with
emergency exit
design to prevent
entry. Vital areas
would be addressed
in the proposed
Sec.
73.55(e)(8)(vii).
(e)(6)(iv) Where This requirement
building walls, would be added to
roofs, or provide a
penetrations performance based
comprise a portion requirement for
of the protected instances where
area perimeter this site condition
barrier, an would exist.
isolation zone is
not necessary,
provided that the
detection,
assessment,
observation,
monitoring, and
surveillance
requirements of
this section are
met, appropriately
designed and
constructed
barriers are
installed, and the
area is described
in the approved
security plans.
Sec. 73.55(c)(6) The (e)(6)(v) The This requirement
walls, doors, ceiling, reactor control would retain the
floor, and any windows in room, the central locations
the walls and in the doors alarm station, and identified in the
of the reactor control room the location within current Sec.
shall be bullet-resisting. which the last 73.55(c)(6),
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The access control (d)(1), and (e)(1).
individual responsible for function for access Specific reference
the last access control to the protected to walls, doors,
function (controlling area is performed, ceiling, floor, and
admission to the protected must be bullet- any windows in the
area) must be isolated resisting. walls, doors,
within a bullet-resisting ceiling, and floor
structure as described in would be deleted to
Paragraph (c)(6) of this clarify that all
section to assure his or construction
her ability to respond or features would be
summon assistance. required to meet
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The the bullet
onsite central alarm resisting
station must be considered requirement, and
a vital area and its walls, therefore remove
doors, ceiling, floor, and the potential for
any windows in the walls confusion where a
and in the doors must be structural feature
bullet-resisting.. such as sky-lights
would not be
listed. The
Commission does not
intend to suggest
that penetrations,
such as heating/
cooling ducts be
made bullet-
resistant, but
rather that the
licensee implement
appropriate
measures to prevent
the exploitation of
such features in a
manner consistent
with the intent of
the bullet-
resisting
requirement to
ensure the required
functions performed
in these locations
are protected and
maintained.
[[Page 62698]]
(e)(6)(vi) All This requirement
exterior areas would be added to
within the provide a
protected area must performance based
be periodically requirement for
checked to detect monitoring exterior
and deter areas of the
unauthorized protected area to
activities, facilitate
personnel, achievement of the
vehicles, and requirements
materials. described by the
proposed paragraph
(b).
(e)(7) Vital areas.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(c)(1) The (e)(7)(i) Vital This requirement
licensee shall locate vital equipment must be would be retained
equipment only within a located only within with minor
vital area, which in turn, vital areas, which revision. The
shall be located within a in turn must be phrase ``of
protected area such that located within sufficient strength
access to vital equipment protected areas so to meet the
requires passage through at that access to performance
least two physical barriers vital equipment requirements of
of sufficient strength to requires passage paragraph (a) of
meet the performance through at least this section''
requirements of paragraph two physical would be replaced
(a) of this section. barriers designed with the phrase
and constructed to ``designed and
perform the constructed to
required function, perform the
except as otherwise required function''
approved by the for consistency
Commission in with the proposed
accordance with requirements for
paragraph (f)(2) of physical barriers
this section. discussed
throughout this
proposed Sec.
73.55(e). The
phrase ``except as
otherwise approved
by the Commission
in accordance with
paragraph (f)(2) of
this section''
would be added to
account for the
condition addressed
by paragraph
(f)(2).
Sec. 73.55(c)(1) More than (e)(7)(ii) More than This requirement
one vital area may be one vital area may would be retained.
located within a single be located within a
protected area. single protected
area.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The (e)(7)(iii) The This requirement
onsite central alarm reactor control would retain and
station must be considered room, the spent combine two current
a vital area and * * *. fuel pool, requirements from
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) Onsite secondary power 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1),
secondary power supply supply systems for for protecting
systems for alarm intrusion detection these areas
annunciator equipment and and assessment equivalent to a
non-portable communications equipment, non- vital area. The
equipment as required in portable Commission added
paragraph (f) of this communications the ``spent fuel
section must be located equipment, and the pool'' to emphasize
within vital areas.. central alarm the Commission view
station, must be that because of
provided protection changes to the
equivalent to vital threat environment
equipment located the spent fuel pool
within a vital area. must also be
provided this
protection. The
phrase ``alarm
annunciator'' would
be replaced with
``intrusion
detection and
assessment'' to
clarify the
application of this
proposed
requirement to
intrusion detection
sensors and video
assessment
equipment as well
as the alarm
annunciation
equipment.
(e)(7)(iv) Vital This requirement
equipment that is would be added to
undergoing provide a
maintenance or is performance based
out of service, or requirement
any other change to consistent with the
site conditions proposed Sec.
that could 73.58 Safety/
adversely affect Security Program.
plant safety or
security, must be
identified in
accordance with
Sec. 73.58, and
adjustments must be
made to the site
protective
strategy, site
procedures, and
approved security
plans, as necessary.
Sec. 73.55(e)(3) All (e)(7)(v) The This requirement
emergency exits in each licensee shall would retain and
protected area and each protect all vital combine two current
vital area shall be alarmed. areas, vital area requirements 10 CFR
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock access portals, and 73.55(e)(3) and
and protect by an activated vital area (d)(7)(D) with
intrusion alarm system all emergency exits minor revision for
unoccupied vital areas.. with intrusion formatting
detection equipment purposes. The
and locking phrase ``Emergency
devices. Emergency exit locking
exit locking devices shall be
devices shall be designed to permit
designed to permit exit only'' would
exit only. be added to provide
a performance based
requirement to
describe the
function to be
provided by
emergency exit
locking devices.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock (e)(7)(vi) This requirement
and protect by an activated Unoccupied vital would retain the
intrusion alarm system all areas must be current requirement
unoccupied vital areas. locked. to lock unoccupied
vital areas with
minor revision for
formatting
purposes. The
current requirement
to alarm all vital
areas would be
moved to the
proposed paragraph
(e)(7)(v) of this
section.
(e)(8) Vehicle This header would be
barrier system. The added for
licensee must: formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62699]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(7) Vehicle (e)(8)(i) Prevent This requirement
control measures, including unauthorized would be retained
vehicle barrier systems, vehicle access or and revised to
must be established to proximity to any provide a
protect against use of a area from which any requirement for
land vehicle, as specified vehicle, its protection against
by the Commission, as a personnel, or its any vehicle within
means of transportation to contents could the context of the
gain unauthorized proximity disable the design basis threat
to vital areas. personnel, described in Sec.
equipment, or 73.1. Because of
systems necessary changes to the
to meet the threat environment,
performance the meaning of the
objective and word ``proximity''
requirements remains the same
described in but is applied to
paragraph (b) of include all
this section. locations from
which the design
basis threat could
disable the
personnel,
equipment, or
systems required to
prevent
radiological
sabotage.
(e)(8)(ii) Limit and This requirement
control all vehicle would be added to
approach routes. provide a
requirement for
limiting and
controlling vehicle
access routes to
the site for the
purpose of
protecting the
facility against
vehicle bomb
attacks and the use
of vehicles as a
means of
transporting
personnel and
materials that
would be considered
a threat. Because
of changes to the
threat environment
the Commission has
determined that
control of all
vehicle approach
routes is a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program.
(e)(8)(iii) Design This requirement
and install a would be added to
vehicle barrier require the
system, to include licensee to
passive and active determine the
barriers, at a potential effects a
stand-off distance vehicle bomb could
adequate to protect have on the
personnel, facility and to
equipment, and establish a barrier
systems against the system at a stand-
design basis threat. off distance
sufficient to
protect personnel,
equipment and
systems. Because of
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission
views stand-off
distances to be a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program
and which require
continuing analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
(e)(8)(iv) Deter, This requirement
detect, delay, or would be added to
prevent vehicle use ensure the licensee
as a means of maintains the
transporting capability to
unauthorized deter, detect,
personnel or delay, or prevent
materials to gain unauthorized access
unauthorized access beyond a vehicle
beyond a vehicle barrier system.
barrier system, Because of changes
gain proximity to a to the threat
protected area or environment, the
vital area, or Commission views
otherwise penetrate the vehicle threat
the protected area to be a critical
perimeter. element of the
onsite physical
protection program
that requires
continual analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness. This
proposed
requirement would
include vehicles
that do not reach
the full capability
of the design basis
threat.
(e)(8)(v) This requirement
Periodically check would be added
the operation of consistent with the
active vehicle current requirement
barriers and of Sec.
provide a secondary 73.55(g)(1) and
power source or a would apply to the
means of mechanical operation of active
or manual vehicle barriers
operation, in the within time lines
event of a power required to prevent
failure to ensure unauthorized
that the active vehicle access,
barrier can be despite the loss of
placed in the the primary power
denial position source. The term
within the time ``periodically''
line required to would be intended
prevent to allow the
unauthorized licensees to
vehicle access establish checks at
beyond the required a frequency
standoff distance. necessary to ensure
active barriers
remain effective
for both denial and
non-denial
operation.
(e)(8)(vi) Provide This requirement
surveillance and would be added to
observation of provide a
vehicle barriers requirement for the
and barrier systems licensee to monitor
to detect the integrity of
unauthorized barriers to verify
activities and to availability when
ensure the needed and to
integrity of each prevent or detect
vehicle barrier and tampering. Because
barrier system. of changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission
views the vehicle
bomb consideration
to be a critical
element of the
onsite physical
protection program
which requires
continuing analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
[[Page 62700]]
(e)(9) Waterways.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(9)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
control waterway provide a
approach routes or requirement for
proximity to any controlling
area from which a waterway approach
waterborne vehicle, routes consistent
its personnel, or with the
its contents could requirement of the
disable the proposed paragraph
personnel, (e)(9)(ii) of this
equipment, or section. Because of
systems necessary changes to the
to meet the threat environment,
performance the Commission
objective and views waterway
requirements approach routes and
described in control measures to
paragraph (b) of be a critical
this section. element of the
onsite physical
protection program
and one that
requires continual
analysis and
evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
(e)(9)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
delineate areas provide a
from which a requirement for
waterborne vehicle notifying
must be restricted unauthorized
and install individuals that
waterborne vehicle access is not
control measures, permitted, and the
where applicable. installation of
barriers where
appropriate.
(e)(9)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
monitor waterway provide a
approaches and requirement for
adjacent areas to monitoring waterway
ensure early approaches
detection, consistent with
assessment, and other monitoring
response to and surveillance
unauthorized requirements of
activity or this proposed
proximity, and to section.
ensure the
integrity of
installed
waterborne vehicle
control measures.
(e)(9)(iv) Where This requirement
necessary to meet would be added to
the requirements of provide a
this section, requirement to
licensees shall coordinate where
coordinate with necessary with
local, State, and other agencies
Federal agencies having
having jurisdiction jurisdictional
over waterway authority over
approaches. waterways to ensure
that the proposed
requirements of
this section would
be met.
(e)(10) Unattended This requirement
openings in any would be added to
barrier established provide a
to meet the requirement for all
requirements of openings in any
this section that OCA, PA, or VA
are 620 cm\2\ (96.1 barrier to ensure
in\2\) or greater that the intended
in total area and function of the
have a smallest barrier is met. The
dimension of 15 cm phrase ``consistent
(5.9 in) or with the intended
greater, must be function of each
secured and barrier'' would
monitored at a describe the
frequency that criteria for making
would prevent a determination to
exploitation of the secure or monitor
opening consistent openings of this
with the intended size where the
function of each intended function
barrier. of the barrier
would be
compromised if the
opening is not
secured or
monitored. The size
of the opening
described is a
commonly accepted
standard throughout
the security
profession for
application to any
security program
and one that
represents an
opening large
enough for a person
to exploit.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
openings meeting
the stated criteria
require measures to
prevent
exploitation.
(f) Target sets..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(f)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall document in would be added to
site procedures the provide a
process used to performance based
develop and requirement for the
identify target licensee to
sets, to include document how each
analyses and target set was
methodologies used developed to
to determine and facilitate review
group the target of the licensee
set equipment or methodology by the
elements. Commission. The
Commission has
determined that
because of changes
to the threat
environment the
identification and
protection of all
target sets would
be a critical
component for the
development and
implementation of
the licensee
protective strategy
and the capability
of the licensee to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage,
therefore,
providing
protection against
radiological
sabotage and
satisfying the
performance
objective and
requirements stated
in the proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section.
[[Page 62701]]
(f)(2) The licensee This requirement
shall consider the would be added to
effects that cyber ensure cyber
attacks may have attacks associated
upon individual with advancements
equipment or in the area of
elements of each automated computer
target set or technology are
grouping. considered and the
affects that such
attacks may have on
the integrity of
individual target
set equipment and
elements is
accounted for in
the licensee
protective
strategy.
(f)(3) Target set This requirement
equipment or would be added to
elements that are provide a
not contained performance based
within a protected requirement to
or vital area must identify and
be explicitly account for this
identified in the condition in the
approved security approved security
plans and plans, if it exists
protective measures at a site.
for such equipment
or elements must be
addressed by the
licensee's
protective strategy
in accordance with
appendix C to this
part.
(f)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall implement a would be added to
program for the require the
oversight of plant licensee to
equipment and establish and
systems documented implement a program
as part of the that focuses on
licensee protective ensuring that
strategy to ensure certain plant
that changes to the equipment and
configuration of systems are
the identified periodically
equipment and checked to ensure
systems do not that unauthorized
compromise the configuration
licensee's changes or
capability to tampering would be
prevent significant identified and an
core damage and appropriate
spent fuel sabotage. response initiated.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment, the
Commission has
determined this
would be an
appropriate
enhancement to the
licensee onsite
physical protection
program.
(g) Access control.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(g)(1) The licensee This header would be
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(1)(i) Control This requirement
licensee shall control all all points of would be retained
points of personnel and personnel, vehicle, and revised with
vehicle access into a and material access minor revisions.
protected area. into any area, or Most significantly,
beyond any physical the phrase ``a
barrier or barrier protected area''
system, established would be replaced
to meet the by the phrase ``any
requirements of area, or beyond any
this section. physical barrier or
barrier system,
established to meet
the requirements of
this section'' to
clarify that the
focus of this
proposed
requirement would
not be limited to
only protected area
access but would
apply to any area
for which access
must be controlled
to meet
complimentary
requirements
addressed in this
proposed rule. In
addition, the word
``material'' would
be added to
emphasize that the
control of material
into these areas
would also be a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program
to facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) (g)(1)(ii) Control This requirement
Positively control, in all points of would be retained
accordance with the access personnel and with minor
list established pursuant vehicle access into revisions.
to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of vital areas in
this section, all points of accordance with
personnel and vehicle access
access to vital areas. authorization lists.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i) * * * (g)(1)(iii) During This requirement
limit unescorted access to non-emergency would be retained
vital areas during conditions, limit and revised with
nonemergency conditions to unescorted access minor revisions.
individuals who require to the protected Most significantly,
access in order to perform area and vital the phrase
their duties. To achieve areas to only those ``protected area''
this, the licensee shall: individuals who would be added to
require unescorted emphasize that the
access to perform same ``assigned
assigned duties and duties and
responsibilities. responsibilities''
criteria apply to
both vital and
protected areas.
[[Page 62702]]
(g)(1)(iv) Monitor This requirement
and ensure the would be added to
integrity of access provide a
control systems. requirement for
ensuring the
integrity of the
access control
system and prevent
its unauthorized
bypass. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
emphasis would be
necessary to ensure
that the integrity
of the access
control system is
maintained through
oversight and that
attempts to
circumvent or
bypass the
established process
will be detected
and access denied.
(g)(1)(v) Provide This requirement
supervision and would be added to
control over the provide a
badging process to requirement for
prevent ensuring the
unauthorized bypass integrity of the
of access control access control
equipment located process. Based on
at or outside of changes to the
the protected area. threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
specific emphasis
on access control
equipment outside
the protected area
would be necessary
to ensure that the
integrity of the
access control
system is
maintained for
those process
elements that are
not contained
within the
protected area.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(1)(vi) Isolate This requirement
individual responsible for the individual would be retained
the last access control responsible for the and revised with
function (controlling last access control minor revisions.
admission to the protected function Most significantly,
area) must be isolated (controlling the phrase ``as
within a bullet-resisting admission to the described in
structure as described in protected area) paragraph (c)(6) of
paragraph (c)(6) of this within a bullet- this section''
section to assure his or resisting structure would be deleted
her ability to respond or to assure the because the
to summon assistance. ability to respond specific criteria
or to summon for bullet-
assistance in resisting would no
response to longer be addressed
unauthorized in the referenced
activities. paragraph. Specific
criteria would be
addressed in
standards published
by the Underwriters
Laboratory (UL).
(g)(1)(vii) In This requirement
response to would be added to
specific threat and require two
security specific actions to
information, be taken by the
implement a two- licensee where
person (line-of- credible threat
sight) rule for all information is
personnel in vital provided. This
areas so that no proposed
one individual is requirement would
permitted first require that
unescorted access the two-person rule
to vital areas. be implemented, and
Under these second, that
conditions the measures be
licensee shall implemented to
implement measures verify that the two-
to verify that the person rule is met
two person rule has when access to a
been met when a vital area is
vital area is gained. This
accessed. proposed
requirement would
include those areas
identified in the
proposed (e)(8)(iv)
of this section to
be protected as
vital areas. Based
on changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that the
proposed
requirement is
necessary to
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(g)(2) In accordance This requirement
with the approved would be added to
security plans and specify the basic
before granting functions that must
unescorted access be satisfied to
through an access meet the current
control point, the and proposed
licensee shall: requirements for
controlling access
into any area for
which access
controls are
implemented.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) (g)(2)(i) Confirm This requirement
Identification * * * of all the identity of would retain the
individuals unless individuals. current requirement
otherwise provided herein with minor
must be made and * * *. revisions for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (g)(2)(ii) Verify This requirement
authorization must be the authorization would retain the
checked at these points. for access of current requirement
individuals, with minor
vehicles, and revisions for
materials. formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (g)(2)(iii) Search This requirement
search of all individuals individuals, would retain the
unless otherwise provided vehicles, packages, current requirement
herein must be made and * * deliveries, and with minor
*. materials in revisions for
accordance with formatting
paragraph (h) of purposes.
this section.
[[Page 62703]]
(g)(2)(iv) Confirm, This requirement
in accordance with would be added to
industry shared describe an
lists and acceptable
databases, that information sharing
individuals have mechanism used by
not been denied licensees to share
access to another information about
licensed facility. visitors and
employees who have
requested either
escorted or
unescorted access
to at least one
site. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement would
be a prudent
enhancement to the
licensee
capabilities.
(g)(3) Access This header would be
control points must added for
be: formatting
purposes.
(g)(3)(i) Equipped This requirement
with locking would be added to
devices, intrusion describe the types
detection of equipment
equipment, and determined to be
monitoring, acceptable to
observation, and satisfy the desired
surveillance level of
equipment, as performance
appropriate. intended by the
proposed
requirements of
this section. The
phrase ``as
appropriate'' would
be used to provide
the flexibility
needed to provide
only that equipment
that is required to
accomplish the
desired function of
the specific access
control point.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(3)(ii) Located This requirement
licensee shall control all outside or would be added to
points of personnel and concurrent with, clarify the
vehicle access into a the physical location of access
protected area. barrier system control points to
through which it ensure personnel
controls access. and vehicles do not
gain access beyond
a barrier (i.e.,
stand-off distance)
before being
searched.
(g)(4) Emergency This header would be
conditions. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii) (g)(4)(i) The This requirement
Design the access licensee shall would be retained
authorization system to design the access with minor
accommodate the potential control system to revision. Most
need for rapid ingress or accommodate the significantly, the
egress of individuals potential need for phrase ``access
during emergency conditions rapid ingress or authorization
or situations that could egress of system'' would be
lead to emergency authorized replaced with the
conditions. To help assure individuals during phrase ``access
this, the licensee shall: emergency control system'' to
conditions or clarify that the
situations that focus of this
could lead to proposed
emergency requirement is on
conditions. controlling access
during emergency
conditions. The
need for rapid
ingress and egress
is a physical
action and would
more appropriately
be addressed
through access
controls.
Also, the phrase
``authorized
individuals'' would
be added to
indicate that
access
authorization
requirements are
satisfied by the
individual in
advance of the need
for access. In
addition, the
phrase ``To help
assure this, the
licensee shall:''
would be deleted
because it would no
longer be needed.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(A) (g)(4)(ii) Under This requirement
Ensure prompt access to emergency would be retained
vital equipment. conditions, the and revised to add
licensee shall a performance based
implement requirement that
procedures to the licensee
ensure that: develop and
(g)(4)(ii)(A) maintain a process
Authorized by which prompt
emergency personnel access to vital
are provided prompt equipment is
access to affected assured while at
areas and the same time
equipment.. ensuring the
(g)(4)(ii)(B) detection of
Attempted or actual unauthorized entry,
unauthorized entry and that this
to vital equipment process would be
is detected.. implemented in a
(g)(4)(ii)(C) The manner that is
capability to consistent with the
prevent significant proposed
core damage and requirements of
spent fuel sabotage this section and
is maintained.. ensures the
licensee capability
to satisfy the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
[[Page 62704]]
(g)(4)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that provide a
restrictions for performance based
site access and requirement for
egress during coordination of
emergency security access
conditions are controls during
coordinated with emergencies with
responses by the access needs of
offsite emergency emergency response
support agencies personnel. This
identified in the proposed
site emergency requirement is
plans. intended to provide
the necessary level
of flexibility to
the licensee to
ensure access by
appropriate
personnel while
maintaining the
necessary security
posture for
controlling access
to areas where
dangerous
conditions exist,
such as violent
conflict involving
weapons.
(g)(5) Vehicles..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) The (g)(5)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall exercise licensee shall would be retained
positive control over all exercise control and revised to
such designated vehicles to over all vehicles apply to all
assure that they are used while inside the vehicles and not be
only by authorized persons protected area and limited to only
and for authorized purposes. vital areas to designated
ensure they are vehicles. Most
used only by significantly, the
authorized persons phrase ``all such
and for authorized designated
purposes. vehicles'' would be
deleted to remove
this limitation and
clarify that the
proposed
requirement applies
to any vehicle
granted access. The
word ``positive''
would be deleted to
remove
uncertainties
regarding the
meaning of this
word.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) All (g)(5)(ii) Vehicles This requirement
vehicles, except designated inside the would be retained
licensee vehicles, protected area or and would contain a
requiring entry into the vital areas must be significant
protected area shall be operated by an revision to relieve
escorted by a member of the individual the licensee from
security organization while authorized the current
within the protected area, unescorted access requirement to
and * * *. to the area, or escort a vehicle
must be escorted by operated by an
an individual individual who
trained, qualified, otherwise has
and equipped to unescorted access
perform vehicle and relief from the
escort duties, requirement that a
while inside the member of the
area. security
organization must
escort vehicles.
The phrase
``escorted by a
member of the
security
organization''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``operated by an
individual
authorized
unescorted access
to the area, or
must be escorted
while inside the
area'' to allow
personnel
authorized
unescorted access,
to operate the
vehicle without
escort and to allow
a vehicle to be
escorted by an
individual other
than a member of
the security
organization if the
operator is not
authorized
unescorted access.
Training and
qualification
requirements for
escorts would be
addressed in the
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(7) and
(g)(8).
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) (g)(5)(iii) Vehicles This requirement
Designated licensee inside the would be retained
vehicles shall be limited protected area must and revised. Most
in their use to onsite be limited to plant significantly, the
plant functions and shall functions or phrase ``Designated
remain in the protected emergencies, and licensee'' would be
area except for must be disabled deleted to broaden
operational, maintenance, when not in use. the scope of this
repair security and proposed
emergency purposes. requirement to all
vehicles. Also, the
phrase ``shall
remain in the
protected area
except for
operational,
maintenance, repair
security and
emergency
purposes'' would be
deleted because it
would no longer be
needed. The word
``disabled'' would
be added to specify
that when not in
use all vehicles
must be rendered
non-operational
such that the
vehicle would not
be in a ready-to-
use configuration.
(g)(5)(iv) Vehicles This requirement
transporting would be added to
hazardous materials ensure the control
inside the of hazardous
protected area must material
be escorted by an deliveries. The
armed member of the Commission has
security determined that the
organization. level of control
described by this
proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary to
satisfy the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(g)(6) Access This header would be
control devices. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62705]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(5) A (g)(6)(i) This requirement
numbered picture badge Identification would be retained
identification system shall badges. The and revised with
be used for all individuals licensee shall minor revisions.
who are authorized access implement a Most significantly,
to protected areas without numbered photo the phrase ``and
escort. identification vital areas'' is
badge/key-card added to provide
system for all necessary focus
individuals that badges apply
authorized to both the
unescorted access protected area and
to the protected vital areas. Access
area and vital to the protected
areas. area does not
include access to a
vital area except
as required to
perform duties.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(ii) (g)(6)(i)(A) This requirement
Badges may be removed from Identification would be retained
the protected area when badges may be and revised with
measures are in place to removed from the minor revisions.
confirm the true identity protected area only Most significantly,
and authorization for when measures are the phrase ``upon
access of the badge holder in place to confirm entry to the
upon entry to the protected the true identity protected area''
area. and authorization would be replaced
for unescorted with the phrase
access of the badge ``before allowing
holder before unescorted access
allowing unescorted to the protected
access to the area'' to clarify
protected area. that the
performance to be
achieved would be
to confirm and
verify access
authorization
before granting
access to any
individual.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(ii) (g)(6)(i)(B) Except This requirement
Badges shall be displayed where operational would retain the
by all individuals while safety concerns current requirement
inside the protected area. require otherwise, to display badges
identification at all times and
badges must be would be revised to
clearly displayed address the
by all individuals exception to this
while inside the proposed
protected area and requirement. The
vital areas. phrase ``Except
where operational
safety concerns
require
otherwise,'' would
be added to account
for considerations
such as
radiological
control
requirements or
foreign material
exclusion
requirements, that
may preclude this
requirement. In
addition, the word
``clearly'' would
be added to
describe the
expected
performance that
badges would be
visible to provide
an indication of
authorization to be
in the area.
(g)(6)(i)(C) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
maintain a record, account for
to include the name technological
and areas to which advancements
unescorted access commonly associated
is granted, of all with electronically
individuals to whom based badging
photo systems used by
identification licensees. The
badge/key-cards Commission has
have been issued. determined that
this proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary because
such a record would
be automatically
made as a standard
function and intent
of this type of
system. In
addition, badging
systems commonly
used by licensees
include the ability
to program remote
card-readers which
are designed to
grant or deny
access to specific
areas based upon
the information
electronically
associated with
specific badges/key-
cards. This
proposed
requirement would
not specify the
media in which this
record must be
maintained to allow
for electronic
storage.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) All keys, (g)(6)(ii) Keys, This requirement
locks, combinations, and locks, would be retained
related access control combinations, and and revised with
devices used to control passwords. All minor revisions.
access to protected areas keys, locks, Most significantly,
and vital areas must be combinations, the word
controlled to reduce the passwords, and ``passwords'' would
probability of compromise. related access be added to account
control devices for technological
used to control advancements
access to protected associated with the
areas, vital areas, use of computers.
security systems, The phrase
and safeguards ``security systems,
information must be and safeguards
controlled and information'' would
accounted for to be added to
reduce the emphasize the need
probability of to control access
compromise. The to these items. The
licensee shall: phrase ``and
accounted for''
would be added to
confirm possession
by the individual
to whom the access
control device has
been issued.
[[Page 62706]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) The (g)(6)(ii)(A) Issue This requirement
licensee shall issue keys, access control would be retained
locks, combinations, and devices only to and revised with
other access control individuals who minor revisions.
devices to protected areas require unescorted Most significantly,
and vital areas only to access to perform the phrase
persons granted unescorted official duties and ``protected areas
facility access. responsibilities. and vital areas''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``to perform
official duties and
responsibilities''
to account for
access control
devices to items or
systems that may be
located outside of
protected and vital
areas, such as to
computer systems
and safeguards
information storage
cabinets. The
phrase ``keys,
locks,
combinations, and
other access
control devices''
would be replaced
by the phrase
``access control
devices'' to
generically
describe these
items and account
for other
technological
advancements that
may occur in the
future.
(g)(6)(ii)(B) This requirement
Maintain a record, would be added to
to include name and facilitate
affiliation, of all achievement of the
individuals to whom current requirement
access control to control access
devices have been control devices to
issued, and reduce the
implement a process probability of
to account for compromise. The use
access control of key control logs
devices at least and annual
annually. inventories is a
commonly used
mechanism for any
security system and
therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is a
prudent and
necessary
enhancement to
facilitate the
licensee's
capability to
achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever (g)(6)(ii)(C) This requirement
there is evidence or Implement would be retained
suspicion that any key, compensatory and revised to
lock, combination, or measures upon provide a
related access control discovery or performance based
device may have been suspicion that any requirement for
compromised, it must be access control compensatory
changed or rotated. device may have measures taken in
been compromised. response to
Compensatory compromise. Most
measures must significantly, the
remain in effect phrase ``it must be
until the changed or
compromise is rotated'' would be
corrected. captured in the
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(6)(ii) (D)
and (E). The phrase
``Compensatory
Measures must
remain in effect
until the
compromise is
corrected'' would
be added to provide
focus specific to
when compensatory
measures would no
longer apply.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever (g)(6)(ii)(D) This requirement
there is evidence or Retrieve, change, would be retained
suspicion that any key, rotate, deactivate, and revised with
lock, combination, or or otherwise minor revisions.
related access control disable access Most significantly,
devices may have been control devices the words
compromised, it must be that have been, or ``retrieve'',
changed or rotated. may have been ``deactivate'', and
compromised. ``disable'' would
be added to ensure
focus is provided
on these actions
relative to
ensuring control of
access control
devices and to
account for
electronic devices.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(C) (g)(6)(ii)(E) This requirement
Revoke, in the case of an Retrieve, change, would retain and
individual's involuntary rotate, deactivate, combine two current
termination for cause, the or otherwise requirements to
individual's unescorted disable all access specify the actions
facility access and control devices required to control
retrieve his or her issued to access control
identification badge and individuals who no devices issued to
other entry devices, as longer require personnel who no
applicable, prior to or unescorted access longer possess a
simultaneously with to the areas for need for access.
notifying this individual which the devices The Commission has
of his or her termination. were designed. determined that the
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever cause for
an individual's unescorted revocation of
access is revoked due to unescorted access
his or her lack of authorization does
trustworthiness, not effect the
reliability, or inadequate actions needed to
work performance, keys, reduce the
locks, combinations, and probability of
related access control compromise.
devices to which that Therefore, the same
person had access must be actions are
changed or rotated. necessary whether
access is revoked
under favorable or
unfavorable
conditions.
Whenever an
individual no
longer requires
access to an area
the access control
devices issued to
that individual
would be retrieved,
changed, rotated,
deactivated, or
otherwise disabled
to provide high
assurance that the
individual would
not continue to
have access to the
item or location.
(g)(7) Visitors..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62707]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i) The This requirement
Individuals not authorized licensee may permit would retain the
by the licensee to enter escorted access to current requirement
protected areas without the protected area to provide escorted
escort shall be escorted by to individuals who access with minor
a watchman or other do not have revisions. This
individual designated by unescorted access proposed
the licensee while in a authorization in requirement would
protected area and shall be accordance with the address visitor
badged to indicate that an requirements of access and would
escort is required. Sec. 73.56 and specify that anyone
part 26 of this who has not
chapter. The satisfied the
licensee shall: requirements of
Sec. 73.56 and
part 26 of this
chapter would be
considered to be a
visitor. The
current requirement
for escorts would
be addressed in
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(8).
(g)(7)(i)(A) This requirement
Implement would be added to
procedures for require
processing, implementing
escorting, and procedures that
controlling describe how
visitors. visitors would be
processed,
escorted, and
controlled.
(g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm This requirement
the identity of would be added to
each visitor require the
through physical verification of the
presentation of a true identity of
recognized non-employee
identification card individuals through
issued by a local, the presentation of
State, or Federal photographic
Government agency government issued
that includes a identification
photo or contains (i.e., driver's
physical license) which
characteristics of provides physical
the individual characteristics
requesting escorted that can be
access. compared to the
holder. The word
``recognized''
would be used to
provide flexibility
for other types of
identification that
may be issued by
local, State or
Federal
Governments.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) In (g)(7)(i)(C) This requirement
addition, the licensee Maintain a visitor would be retained
shall require that each control register in with minor
individual register his or which all visitors revision.
her name, date, time, shall register
purpose of visit, their name, date,
employment affiliation, time, purpose of
citizenship, and name of visit, employment
the individual to be affiliation,
visited. citizenship, and
name of the
individual to be
visited before
being escorted into
any protected or
vital area.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i)(D) Issue a This requirement
Individuals not authorized visitor badge to would be retained
by the licensee to enter all visitors that with minor revision
protected areas without clearly indicates for formatting
escort shall * * * be that an escort is purposes. Most
badged to indicate that an required. significantly, the
escort is required. word ``clearly''
would be added to
focus on display of
the badge in a
manner that easily
identifies the
individual as
requiring an
escort.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i)(E) Escort This requirement
Individuals not authorized all visitors, at would retain the
by the licensee to enter all times, while requirement for
protected areas without inside the escort with minor
escort shall be escorted by protected area and revision for
a watchman or other vital areas. formatting
individual designated by purposes. Most
the licensee while in a significantly, the
protected area and * * *. requirement for who
performs these
escort duties is
moved to the
proposed paragraph
(g)(8) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i) An (g)(7)(ii) This requirement
individual not employed by Individuals not would be retained
the licensee but who employed by the with minor
requires frequent and licensee but who revisions. Most
extended access to require frequent significantly, the
protected and vital areas and extended phrase ``shall
may be authorized access to unescorted access satisfy the access
such areas without escort to the protected authorization
provided that he receives a area and vital requirements of
picture badge upon entrance areas shall satisfy Sec. 73.56 and
into the protected area the access part 26 of this
which must be returned upon authorization chapter'' would be
exit from the protected requirements of added to clarify
area and which indicates: Sec. 73.56 and the requirement
part 26 of this that these
chapter and shall individual's
be issued a non- satisfy the same
employee photo background check
identification requirements and
badge that is Behavior
easily Observation Program
distinguished from participation that
other would be applied to
identification any other licensee
badges before being employee for
allowed unescorted unescorted access
access to the authorization. In
protected area. Non- addition, the
employee photo phrase ``which must
identification be returned upon
badges must exit from the
indicate: protected area''
would be deleted
because removal of
badges from the
protected area
would be addressed
in the proposed
paragraph
(g)(6)(i)(A).
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(A) Non- (g)(7)(ii)(A) Non- This requirement
employee, no escort employee, no escort would be retained
required; required. with minor revision
for formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(B) (g)(7)(ii)(B) Areas This requirement
Areas to which access is to which access is would be retained
authorized; and authorized. with minor revision
for formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(c) The (g)(7)(ii)(C) The This requirement
period for which access has period for which would be retained
been authorized. access is with minor revision
authorized. for formatting
purposes.
(g)(7)(ii)(D) The This requirement
individual's would be added to
employer. facilitate
identification of
this type of non-
employee and the
type of activities
this individual
should be
performing.
[[Page 62708]]
(g)(7)(ii)(E) A This requirement
means to determine would be added for
the individual's emergency planning
emergency plan purposes.
assembly area.
(g)(8) Escorts. The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provided
escorts are trained performance based
in accordance with requirements for
appendix B to this satisfying the
part, the approved escort requirements
training and of this proposed
qualification plan, rule and would
and licensee provide regulatory
policies and stability through
procedures. the consistent
application of
visitor controls at
all sites. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
emphasis on the
identification and
control of visitors
is a prudent and
necessary
enhancement to
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
performance basis
of the proposed
paragraph (b)(1) of
this section.
(g)(8)(i) Escorts This requirement
shall be authorized would be added to
unescorted access establish a basic
to all areas in qualification
which they will criteria for
perform escort individuals
duties. performing escort
duties. Individuals
not authorized
unescorted access
to an area must be
escorted and
therefore, would
not be qualified to
perform escort
duties in that
area.
(g)(8)(ii) This requirement
Individuals would be added to
assigned to escort establish a basic
visitors shall be qualification
provided a means of criteria for
timely individuals
communication with performing escort
both alarm stations duties. The phrase
in a manner that ``timely
ensures the ability communication''
to summon would mean the
assistance when ability to call for
needed. assistance before
that ability can be
taken away.
(g)(8)(iii) This requirement
Individuals would be added to
assigned to vehicle establish a basic
escort duties shall qualification
be provided a means criteria for
of continuous individuals
communication with performing escort
both alarm stations duties. The word
to ensure the ``continuous
ability to summon communication''
assistance when would mean
needed. possession of a
direct line of
communication for
immediate
notification, such
as a radio.
(g)(8)(iv) Escorts This requirement
shall be would be added to
knowledgeable of establish a basic
those activities qualification
that are authorized criteria for
to be performed individuals
within the areas performing escort
for which they are duties. The primary
assigned to perform responsibility of
escort duties and an escort would be
must also be the identification
knowledgeable of and reporting of
those activities unauthorized
that are authorized activities,
to be performed by therefore, to
any individual for perform escort
which the escort is duties the
assigned individual must
responsibility. possess this
knowledge in order
to be an effective
escort and
recognize an event
involving an
unauthorized
activity.
(g)(8)(v) Visitor to This requirement
escort ratios shall would be added to
be limited to 10 to establish a basic
1 in the protected restriction to
area and 5 to 1 in ensure that
vital areas, individuals
provided that the performing escort
necessary duties are able to
observation and maintain control
control over the personnel
requirements of being escorted. The
this section can be phrase ``provided
maintained by the that the necessary
assigned escort observation and
over all visitor control
activities. requirements of
this section can be
maintained'' would
provide flexibility
for the licensee to
reduce the
specified ratios to
facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b).
(h) Search programs. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(2) At the (h)(1) At each This requirement
point of personnel and designated access would be retained
vehicle access into a control point into with minor
protected area, all hand- the owner revisions. Most
carried packages shall be controlled area and significantly, the
searched for devices such protected area, the phrase ``for
as firearms, explosives, licensee shall devices such as
and incendiary devices, or search individuals, firearms,
other items which could be vehicles, packages, explosives, and
used for radiological deliveries, and incendiary devices,
sabotage. materials in or other items
accordance with the which could be used
requirements of for radiological
this section and sabotage'' would be
the approved replaced with the
security plans, phrase ``in
before granting accordance with the
access. requirements of
this section and
the approved
security plans'' to
provide language
that would make
this proposed
requirement
generically
applicable to all
searches.
[[Page 62709]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(2) At the (h)(1)(i) The This requirement
point of personnel and objective of the would be retained
vehicle access into a search program must and revised to
protected area, all hand- be to deter, focus this proposed
carried packages shall be detect, and prevent requirement on the
searched for devices such the introduction of objective of the
as firearms, explosives, unauthorized search program for
and incendiary devices, or firearms, all areas and not
other items which could be explosives, limit the search
used for radiological incendiary devices, function to only
sabotage. or other protected and vital
unauthorized areas. The
materials and Commission has
devices into determined that
designated areas in because of changes
which the to the threat
unauthorized items environment, the
could be used to focus of protective
disable personnel, measures must be to
equipment, and protect any area
systems necessary from which the
to meet the licensee capability
performance to meet the
objective and performance
requirements of objective and
paragraph (b) of requirements of the
this section. proposed paragraph
(b) of this section
could be disabled
or destroyed.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (h)(1)(ii) The This requirement
search function for search requirements would be retained
detection of firearms, for unauthorized with minor
explosives, and incendiary firearms, revisions. The
devices must be explosives, phrase ``or other
accomplished through the incendiary devices, unauthorized
use of both firearms and or other materials and
explosive detection unauthorized devices'' would be
equipment capable of materials and added to account
detecting those devices. devices must be for future
accomplished technological
through the use of advancements. The
equipment capable phrase ``and
of detecting these through visual and
unauthorized items hands-on physical
and through visual searches'' would be
and hands-on added to ensure
physical searches, these aspects of
as needed to ensure the search process
all items are are considered and
identified before applied when
granting access. needed.
(h)(1)(iii) Only This requirement
trained and would be added for
qualified members consistency with
of the security the current Sec.
organization, and 73.55(b)(4)(i), and
other trained and clarification for
qualified personnel ``observation'' of
designated by the search activities
licensee, shall by personnel. The
perform search phrase ``other
activities or be trained and
assigned duties and qualified personnel
responsibilities designated by the
required to satisfy licensee'' would be
observation used to account for
requirements for non-security
the search personnel who would
activities. be assigned search
duties relative to
supply or warehouse
functions or other
types of bulk
shipments.
(h)(2) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added for
implement written consistency with
search procedures the current Sec.
for all access 73.55(b)(3)(i).
control points
before granting
access to any
individual,
vehicle, package,
delivery, or
material.
(h)(2)(i) Search This requirement
procedures must would be added for
ensure that items consistency with
possessed by an the current Sec.
individual, or 73.55(d)(1)
contained within a relative to the use
vehicle or package, of search equipment
must be clearly and to specify a
identified as not requirement for the
being a prohibited licensee to
item before identify items that
granting access may be obscured
beyond the access from observation by
control point for equipment such as X-
which the search is ray equipment. This
conducted. requirement would
ensure that human
interaction with
search equipment is
effective and that
assigned personnel
are aware of all
items observed or
are not identified
by search
equipment.
(h)(2)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
visually and consistency with
physically hand the current Sec.
search all 73.55(d)(1),
individuals, relative to the
vehicles, and purpose of the
packages containing search function to
items that cannot identify items that
be or are not may be obscured
clearly identified from observation by
by search equipment. equipment such as X-
ray equipment. This
proposed
requirement intends
to ensure that the
licensee take
appropriate actions
to ensure all items
granted access to
the PA would be
identified before
granting access.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) Whenever (h)(3) Whenever This requirement
firearms or explosives search equipment is would be retained
detection equipment at a out of service or with minor
portal is out of service or is not operating revisions. The
not operating satisfactorily, phrase ``firearms
satisfactorily, the trained and or explosives
licensee shall conduct a qualified members detection equipment
physical pat-down search of of the security at a portal'' would
all persons who would organization shall be replaced with
otherwise have been subject conduct a hands-on the phrase ``search
to equipment searches. physical search of equipment `` to
all individuals, generically
vehicles, packages, describe this
deliveries, and equipment. The
materials that phrase ``a physical
would otherwise pat-down search''
have been subject would be replaced
to equipment with the phrase ``a
searches. hands-on physical
search'' to update
the language
commonly used to
describe this
activity.
[[Page 62710]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) When the (h)(4) When an This requirement
licensee has cause to attempt to would be retained
suspect that an individual introduce with minor
is attempting to introduce unauthorized items revisions to
firearms, explosives, or has occurred or is provide additional
incendiary devices into suspected, the performance based
protected areas, the licensee shall requirements
licensee shall conduct a implement actions relative to
physical pat-down search of to ensure that the achieving the
that individual. suspect desired results.
individuals,
vehicles, packages,
deliveries, and
materials are
denied access and
shall perform a
visual and hands-on
physical search to
determine the
absence or
existence of a
threat.
(h)(5) Vehicle This requirement
search procedures would be added to
must be performed provide a
by at least two (2) performance based
properly trained requirement for
and equipped performing vehicle
security personnel, searches. This
at least one of proposed
whom is positioned requirement would
to observe the ensure that
search process and unauthorized
provide a timely activities would be
response to identified and a
unauthorized timely response
activities if would be initiated
necessary. at a vehicle search
area, to include an
armed response.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment, the
Commission has
determined that
this requirement
would facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) Vehicle (h)(6) Vehicle areas This requirement
areas to be searched shall to be searched must would be retained
include the cab, engine include, but are with minor
compartment, undercarriage, not limited to, the revisions.
and cargo area. cab, engine
compartment,
undercarriage, and
cargo area.
(h)(7) Vehicle This requirement
search checkpoints would be added to
must be equipped provide additional
with video performance based
surveillance requirements
equipment that must relative to
be monitored by an achieving the
individual capable desired results for
of initiating and vehicle searches at
directing a timely any location
response to designated for the
unauthorized performance of
activity. vehicle searches.
To satisfy this
proposed
requirement, the
individual assigned
to monitor search
activities need not
be located in the
CAS or SAS, but
rather may be
located in any
position from which
the monitoring and
notification
requirements of
this section could
be assured.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (h)(8) Exceptions to This requirement
except bona fide Federal, the search would retain,
State, and local law requirements of combine, and revise
enforcement personnel on this section must two current
official duty to these be submitted to the requirements Sec.
equipment searches upon Commission for 73.55(d)(1) and (4)
entry into a protected area. prior review and to generically
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) * * * approval and must account for those
except under emergency be identified in instances where
conditions, shall be the approved search requirements
searched for items which security plans. would not be met
could be used for sabotage before granting
purposes prior to entry access beyond a
into the protected area. physical barrier.
This proposed
requirement would
require that the
licensee specify in
the approved plans
the specific
circumstances under
which search
requirements would
not be satisfied.
Sec. 73.55(d)(3) * * * (h)(8)(i) Vehicles This requirement
except those Commission and items that may would be retained
approved delivery and be excepted from and revised. Most
inspection activities the search significantly, this
specifically designated by requirements of requirement would
the licensee to be carried this section must be revised to
out within vital or be escorted by an ensure that
protected areas for reasons armed individual vehicles and items
of safety, security or who is trained and excepted from
operational necessity. equipped to observe search requirements
offloading and before entry into
perform search the protected area
activities at the are escorted by an
final destination armed individual
within the and searched when
protected area. offloaded to
provide assurance
that unauthorized
personnel and items
would be detected
and reported.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) * * * to (h)(8)(ii) To the This requirement
the extent practicable, extent practicable, would be retained
shall be off loaded in the items excepted from with minor
protected area at a search must be off revision.
specific designated loaded only at
materials receiving area specified receiving
that is not adjacent to a areas that are not
vital area. adjacent to a vital
area.
(h)(8)(iii) The This requirement
excepted items must would be added to
be searched at the provide a
receiving area and performance based
opened at the final requirement that
destination by an would ensure that
individual familiar the proposed
with the items. requirement for
search is met at
the receiving area.
Sec. 73.55(i) This header would be
Detection and added for
assessment systems.. formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62711]]
(i)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added for
maintain an consistency with
intrusion detection the current
and assessment requirement of 10
system that must CFR 73.55(e)(1) and
provide, at all the proposed Sec.
times, the 73.55(b)(2) through
capability for (4). The phrase
early detection and ``intrusion
assessment of detection and
unauthorized assessment system''
persons and would be intended
activities. to describe all
components (i.e.,
personnel,
procedures, and
equipment)
designated by the
licensee as
performing a
function(s)
required to detect
or assess
unauthorized
activities in any
area to which
access must be
controlled to meet
Commission
requirements. The
term ``system''
refers to how these
components interact
to satisfy
Commission
requirements. This
proposed
requirement does
not mandate
specific intrusion
detection equipment
for any specific
area, but rather
requires that the
system provide
detection and
assessment
capabilities that
meet Commission
requirements. The
phrase ``at all
times'' is used to
describe the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must have in place
and operational a
mechanism by which
all threats will be
detected and an
appropriate
response initiated,
at any time.
The Commission does
not mean to suggest
that a failure of
any component of a
system would
constitute an
automatic non-
compliance with
this proposed
requirement
provided the
failure is
identified and
compensatory
measures are
implemented within
a time frame
consistent with the
time lines
necessary to
prevent
exploitation of the
failure, beginning
at the time of the
failure.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) All (i)(2) Intrusion This requirement
alarms required pursuant to detection equipment would be retained
this part must annunciate must annunciate, with three
in a continuously manned and video significant
central alarm station assessment revisions. The most
located within the equipment images significant
protected area and in at shall display, revision would be
least one other concurrently in at the deletion of the
continuously manned station least two current language
not necessarily onsite, so continuously that describes
that a single act cannot staffed onsite where the secondary
remove the capability of alarm stations, at alarm station may
calling for assistance or least one of which be located. Because
otherwise responding to an must be protected of changes to the
alarm. in accordance with threat environment
the requirements of the Commission has
paragraphs determined that to
(e)(6)(v), ensure the
(e)(7)(iii), and functions required
(i)(8)(ii) of this to be performed by
section. the central alarm
are maintained,
both alarm stations
must be located
onsite. As all
current licensees
have their
secondary alarm
station onsite, the
Commission has
determined that
deletion of the
``not necessarily
onsite'' provision,
would have no
impact.
The second
significant
revision is the
addition of the
word
``concurrently'' to
provide a
performance based
requirement that
focuses on the need
to ensure that both
alarm station
operators are
notified of a
potential threat,
are capable of
making a timely and
independent
assessment, and
have equal
capabilities to
ensure that a
timely response is
made. This proposed
requirement would
be necessary for
consistency with
the current
requirement to
protect against a
single act. The
third significant
revision would be
the addition of the
phrase ``and video
assessment
equipment images
shall display'' to
add a performance
based requirement
that focuses on the
relationship
between detection
and assessment.
[[Page 62712]]
(i)(3) The This requirement
licensee's would be added to
intrusion detection provide performance
system must be based requirements
designed to ensure consistent with the
that both alarm current Sec.
station operators: 73.55(e)(1), and
(i)(3)(i) Are the proposed
concurrently requirements of
notified of the this proposed
alarm annunciation. section. The
(i)(3)(ii) Are proposed
capable of making a requirement for
timely assessment dual knowledge and
of the cause of dual capability
each alarm within both alarm
annunciation. stations provides a
(i)(3)(iii) Possess defense-in-depth
the capability to component
initiate a timely consistent with the
response in proposed
accordance with the requirement for
approved security protection against
plans, licensee a single act.
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment the
Commission has
determined this
proposed
requirement is a
prudent
clarification of
current
requirements
necessary to
facilitate the
licensee capability
to achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section.
(i)(4) Both alarm This requirement
stations must be would be added for
equipped with consistency with
equivalent the current Sec.
capabilities for 73.55(e)(1) and the
detection and proposed
communication, and requirements for
must be equipped defense-in-depth
with functionally and protection
equivalent against a single
assessment, act. The word
monitoring, ``equivalent''
observation, and would require the
surveillance licensee to provide
capabilities to both alarm stations
support the with detection and
effective communication
implementation of equipment that
the approved ensures each alarm
security plans and station operator is
the licensee knowledgeable of an
protective strategy alarm annunciation
in the event that at each alarm point
either alarm and zone, and can
station is disabled. communicate the
initiation of an
appropriate
response to include
the disposition of
each alarm. The
phrase
``functionally
equivalent'' would
require that both
alarm stations be
equally equipped to
perform those
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
functions needed to
support the
effective
implementation of
the licensee
protective
strategy.
This proposed
requirement would
clarify the
Commission
expectation that
those video
technologies and
capabilities used
to support the
effective
implementation of
the approved
security plans and
the licensee
protective strategy
are equally
available for use
by both alarm
station operators
to ensure that the
functions of
detection,
assessment, and
communications can
be effectively
maintained and
utilized in the
event that one or
the other alarm
station is
disabled. Based on
changes to the
threat environment
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is a
prudent and
necessary
clarification of
current
requirements and
Commission Orders
necessary to ensure
the performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this section
are met.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) * * * so (i)(4)(i) The This requirement
that a single act cannot licensee shall would be retained
remove the capability of ensure that a and revised to
calling for assistance or single act cannot provide additional
otherwise responding to an remove the clarification
alarm. capability of both regarding the
alarm stations to critical functions
detect and assess determined
unauthorized essential and which
activities, respond must be maintained
to an alarm, summon to carry out an
offsite assistance, effective response
implement the to threats
protective consistent with the
strategy, provide proposed
command and performance
control, or objective and
otherwise prevent requirements of
significant core paragraph (b) of
damage and spent this section.
fuel sabotage.
[[Continued on page 62713]]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
]
[[pp. 62713-62762]] Power Reactor Security Requirements
[[Continued from page 62712]]
[[Page 62713]]
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) Onsite (i)(4)(ii) The alarm This requirement
secondary power supply station functions would retain the
systems for alarm in paragraph (i)(4) current requirement
annunciator equipment * * *. of this section for secondary power
must remain with two
operable from an significant
uninterruptible revisions. First,
backup power supply the phrase
in the event of the ``annunciator
loss of normal equipment'' would
power. be replaced with
the phrase ``alarm
station functions''
to ensure that the
equipment required
by each alarm
station to fulfill
its assigned
functions, are
available and
operational without
interruption due to
a loss of normal
power. Second, the
word
``uninterruptible''
would be added to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the operation
of detection and
assessment
equipment must be
maintained without
interruption, in
the event of a loss
of normal power.
Backup power supply
for non-portable
communication
equipment is
addressed in the
proposed paragraph
(j)(5) of this
section. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary to
facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(i)(5) Detection. This requirement
Detection would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and performance based
intrusion detection requirement for
equipment, and detection equipment
shall be defined in to be capable of
implementing operating under
procedures. known/normal site
Intrusion detection conditions such as
equipment must be heat, wind,
capable of humidity, fog,
operating as cold, snowfall,
intended under the etc. Equipment
conditions failure and
encountered at the abnormal or severe
facility. weather cannot
always be predicted
but compensatory
measures would be
required in
accordance with the
proposed
requirements of
this section to
ensure compliance.
(i)(6) Assessment. This requirement
Assessment would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and video performance based
assessment requirement for
equipment, and assessment
shall be described equipment to be
in implementing capable of
procedures. Video operating under
assessment known/normal site
equipment must be conditions such as
capable of heat, wind,
operating as humidity, fog,
intended under the cold, snowfall,
conditions etc. Equipment
encountered at the failure and
facility and must abnormal or severe
provide video weather cannot
images from which always be predicted
accurate and timely but compensatory
assessments can be measures would be
made in response to required in
an alarm accordance with the
annunciation or proposed
other notification requirements of
of unauthorized this section to
activity. ensure compliance.
(i)(7) The licensee This requirement
intrusion detection would be added for
and assessment formatting
system must: purposes.
(i)(7)(i) Ensure This requirement
that the duties and would be added to
responsibilities provide a
assigned to performance based
personnel, the use requirement
of equipment, and relative to the
the implementation design of the
of procedures licensee detection
provides the and assessment
detection and system and to
assessment clarify that this
capabilities system would
necessary to meet include all three
the requirements of components.
paragraph (b) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) The (i)(7)(ii) Ensure This requirement
annunciation of an alarm at that annunciation would be retained
the alarm stations shall of an alarm with minor
indicate the type of alarm indicates the type revision. The
(e.g., intrusion alarms, and location of the phrase ``at the
emergency exit alarm, etc.) alarm. alarm stations''
and location. and the listed
examples would be
deleted because
they would no
longer be needed.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) All alarm (i)(7)(iii) Ensure This requirement
devices including that alarm devices, would be retained
transmission lines to to include with minor revision
annunciators shall be transmission lines for formatting
tamper indicating and self- to annunciators, purposes.
checking. are tamper
indicating and self-
checking.
[[Page 62714]]
(i)(7)(iv) Provide This requirement
visual and audible would be added for
alarm annunciation consistency with
and concurrent the proposed
video assessment requirement for
capability to both equivalent
alarm stations in a capabilities in
manner that ensures both alarm
timely recognition, stations. The
acknowledgment and phrase ``visual and
response by each audible'' would
alarm station provide redundancy
operator in to ensure that each
accordance with alarm would be
written response recognized and
procedures. acknowledged when
received.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) * * * (i)(7)(v) Provide an This requirement
e.g., an automatic automatic would be retained
indication is provided when indication when the with minor revision
failure of the alarm system alarm system or a for formatting
or a component occurs, or component of the purposes.
when the system is on alarm system fails,
standby power. or when the system
is operating on the
backup power supply.
Sec. 73.70(f) A record at (i)(7)(vi) Maintain This requirement
each onsite alarm a record of all would be added for
annunciation location of alarm consistency with
each alarm, false alarm, annunciations, the Sec. 73.70(f).
alarm check, and tamper cause of each The Commission
indication that identifies alarm, and the expects that this
the type of alarm, disposition of each record would be a
location, circuit, date, alarm. commonly maintained
and time. In addition, record in
details of response by electronic form
facility guards and which is generated
watchmen to each alarm, as an automatic
intrusion, or other function of the
incident shall be recorded. intrusion detection
system.
(i)(8) Alarm This header would be
stations. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) All (i)(8)(i) Both alarm This requirement
alarms required pursuant to stations must be would retain the
this part must annunciate continuously current requirement
in a continuously manned staffed by at least Sec. 73.55(e)(1)
central alarm station one trained and for continuously
located within the qualified member of staffed alarm
protected area and in at the security stations and would
least one other organization. be revised to
continuously manned station describe the
* * *. necessary
qualifications that
would be required
of the assigned
individuals.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The (i)(8)(ii) The This requirement
onsite central alarm interior of the would be retained
station must be located central alarm with minor
within a building in such a station must not be revision. Most
manner that the interior of visible from the significantly, the
the central alarm station perimeter of the phrase ``located
is not visible from the protected area. within a building''
perimeter of the protected would be deleted
area. because it would be
considered
unnecessary.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) This (i)(8)(iii) The This requirement
station must not contain licensee may not would be retained
any operational activities permit any with minor
that would interfere with activities to be revisions to
the execution of the alarm performed within provide a
response function. either alarm performance based
station that would requirement
interfere with an regarding the
alarm station primary duties
operator's ability required to satisfy
to effectively the current
execute assigned requirement
detection, ``execution of the
assessment, alarm response
surveillance, and function.''
communication
duties and
responsibilities.
(i)(8)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
assess and respond consistency with
to all alarms and current
other indications requirements. The
of unauthorized specific
activities in requirements of the
accordance with the current Sec.
approved security 73.55(h)(4) are
plans and retained in detail
implementing in the proposed
procedures. appendix C to part
73.
(i)(8)(v) The This requirement
licensee would be added for
implementing consistency with
procedures must related
ensure that both requirements of
alarm station this proposed
operators are section and to
knowledgeable of ensure that the
all alarm licensee provides a
annunciations, process by which
assessments, and both alarm station
final disposition operators are
of all alarms, to concurrently made
include but not aware of each alarm
limited to a and are
prohibition from knowledgeable of
changing the status how each alarm is
of a detection resolved and that
point or no one alarm
deactivating a station operator
locking or access can manipulate
control device at a alarm station
protected or vital equipment,
area portal, communications, or
without the procedures without
knowledge and the knowledge and
concurrence of the concurrence of the
other alarm station other.
operator.
(i)(9) Surveillance, This header would be
observation, and added for
monitoring. formatting
purposes.
(i)(9)(i) The onsite This requirement
physical protection would be added to
program must provide a
include the performance based
capability for requirement for
surveillance, ensuring
observation, and surveillance,
monitoring in a observation, and
manner that monitoring
provides early capabilities in any
detection and area for which
assessment of these measures are
unauthorized necessary to meet
activities. the requirements of
this proposed
section.
[[Page 62715]]
(i)(9)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide continual provide a
surveillance, performance based
observation, and requirement for
monitoring of all ensuring
areas identified in surveillance,
the approved observation, and
security plans as monitoring
requiring capabilities in any
surveillance, area for which
observation, and these measures are
monitoring to necessary to meet
ensure early the requirements of
detection of this proposed
unauthorized section. The word
activities and to ``continual'' would
ensure the mean regularly
integrity of recurring actions
physical barriers such that
or other components designated areas
of the onsite would be checked at
physical protection intervals
program. sufficient to
ensure the
detection of
unauthorized
activities.
(i)(9)(ii)(A) This requirement
Continual would be added to
surveillance, provide necessary
observation, and qualifying
monitoring requirements for
responsibilities performance of
must be performed observation and
by security monitoring
personnel during activities. The
routine patrols or word ``continual''
by other trained would mean the same
and equipped as used in the
personnel proposed paragraph
designated as a (i)(9)(ii) of this
component of the section.
protective strategy.
(i)(9)(ii)(B) This requirement
Surveillance, would be added to
observation, and provide a
monitoring performance based
requirements may be requirement for
accomplished by ensuring that
direct observation surveillance,
or video technology. observation, and
monitoring
capabilities that
may be met through
the use of video
technology or
direct human
observation.
(i)(9)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide random focus a performance
patrols of all based requirement
accessible areas on the protection
containing target of target set
set equipment. equipment. Target
set equipment would
be addressed in
detail in the
proposed paragraph
(f) of this
section. The term
``random'' provides
flexibility to the
licensee and
requires patrols at
unpredictable times
within
predetermined
intervals to deter
exploitation of
periods between
patrols. The phrase
``accessible
areas'' would
exclude areas such
as locked high
radiation areas or
other such areas
containing a
significant safety
concern that would
preclude the
conduct of the
patrol function.
(i)(9)(iii)(A) Armed This requirement
security patrols would be added to
shall periodically focus on the items
check designated that, because of
areas and shall changes to the
inspect vital area threat environment,
entrances, portals, the Commission has
and external determined would
barriers. require focus by
armed security
patrols. The term
``periodically''
provides
flexibility to the
licensee. The
phrase ``designated
areas'' means any
area identified by
the licensee as
requiring an action
to meet the
proposed
requirements of
this section.
(i)(9)(iii)(B) This requirement
Physical barriers would be added for
must be inspected consistency with
at random intervals the current
to identify requirement Sec.
tampering and 73.55(g)(1) and to
degradation. focus on verifying
the integrity of
physical barriers
to ensure that the
barrier would
perform as
expected. The word
``random'' would
mean that the
required inspection
would be performed
at unpredictable
times to deter
exploitation of
periods between
inspections.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The (i)(9)(iii)(C) This requirement
licensee may not permit an Security personnel would be added for
individual to act as a shall be trained to consistency with
guard, watchman, armed recognize the current
response person, or other indications of requirement Sec.
member of the security tampering as 73.55(b)(4)(i) to
organization unless the necessary to provide necessary
individual has been perform assigned focus on the threat
trained, equipped, and duties and of tampering and
qualified to perform each responsibilities as the need to ensure
assigned security job duty. they relate to that personnel are
safety and security trained to
systems and recognize it.
equipment.
(i)(9)(iv) This requirement
Unattended openings would be added to
that are not provide a
monitored by performance based
intrusion detection requirement to
equipment must be ensure that
observed by unattended openings
security personnel that cross a
at a frequency that security boundary
would prevent established to meet
exploitation of the proposed
that opening. requirements of
this section would
not be exploited by
the design basis
threat of
radiological
sabotage to include
the use of tools to
enlarge the
opening.
[[Page 62716]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (i)(9)(v) Upon This requirement
detection of abnormal detection of would be retained
presence or activity of unauthorized with minor revision
persons or vehicles * * *, activities, to provide
the licensee security tampering, or other flexibility for the
organization shall * * *. threats, the licensee to
licensee shall determine if all or
initiate actions only part of the
consistent with the protective strategy
approved security capabilities would
plans, the licensee be needed for a
protective specific event. The
strategy, and phrase ``abnormal
implementing presence or
procedures. activity of persons
or vehicles'' would
be replaced with
the phrase
``unauthorized
activities,
tampering, or other
threats'' to
clarify the types
of activities that
would be expected
to warrant a
response by the
licensee.
(i)(10) Video This header would be
technology. added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
maintain in consistency with
operable condition the current
all video requirement Sec.
technology used to 73.55(g)(1) and
satisfy the would provide a
monitoring, performance based
observation, requirement for
surveillance, and ensuring video
assessment technology is
requirements of operating and
this section. available when
needed.
(i)(10)(ii) Video This header would be
technology must be: added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(ii)(A) This requirement
Displayed would be added for
concurrently at consistency with
both alarm stations. the other proposed
requirements for
dual alarm stations
and would focus on
the need for video
technology to be
provided to both
alarm stations at
the same time to
ensure that an
assessment would be
made and a timely
response would be
initiated.
(i)(10)(ii)(B) This requirement
Designed to provide would be added for
concurrent consistency with
observation, the other proposed
monitoring, and requirements for
surveillance of dual alarm stations
designated areas and would focus on
from which an alarm the need for the
annunciation or a same capabilities
notification of to be provided to
unauthorized both to ensure
activity is observation,
received. monitoring, and
surveillance
requirements are
met.
(i)(10)(ii)(C) This requirement
Capable of would be added to
providing a timely provide a
visual display from performance based
which positive requirement for
recognition and video technology
assessment of the which focuses on
detected activity the need for clear
can be made and a visual images from
timely response which accurate and
initiated. timely assessment
can be made in
response to alarm
annunciations.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (i)(10)(ii)(D) Used This requirement
facilitate initial response to supplement and would retain the
to detection of penetration limit the exposure current requirement
* * * preferably by means of security to use video
of closed circuit personnel to technology to limit
television or by other possible attack. the exposure of
suitable means which limit security personnel
exposure of responding while performing
personnel to possible security duties
attack. with minor revision
to add patrols.
(i)(10)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement controls provide a
for personnel performance based
assigned to monitor requirement
video technology to relative to
ensure that controlling
assigned personnel personnel fatigue
maintain the level related to extended
of alertness periods of
required to monitoring video
effectively perform technology. The
the assigned duties Commission has
and determined that
responsibilities. each individual's
alertness is
critical to the
effective use of
video technology
and the licensee
capability to
achieve the
performance
objective of this
proposed section.
Therefore, licensee
work hour controls
should ensure that
assigned personnel
are relieved of
these duties and
assigned other
duties at intervals
sufficient to
ensure the
individual's
ability to
effectively carry
out assigned duties
and
responsibilities.
(i)(11) Illumination This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62717]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(i) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected ensure that all and revised. Most
area shall be provided with areas of the significantly, this
illumination sufficient for facility, to proposed
the monitoring and include appropriate requirement would
observation requirements of portions of the expand a
paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), owner controlled performance based
and (h)(4) of this section, area, are provided lighting
but * * *. with illumination requirement to all
necessary to areas designated by
satisfy the the licensee as
requirements of having a need for
this section. detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities in
support of the
protective strategy
and not limit it to
only the isolation
zone and all
exterior areas
within the
protected area.
This requirement
would not require
deterministic
illumination levels
but rather would
require that
illumination levels
be sufficient to
provide the
detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities
described by the
licensee in the
approved security
plans. This
description would
be required to
consider the
requirements of the
proposed
(i)(11)(ii) and
(iii).
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(ii) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected provide a minimum and revised to
area shall be provided with illumination level provide a
illumination * * * not less of 0.2 footcandle performance based
than 0.2 footcandle measured requirement for
measured horizontally at horizontally at illumination. Most
ground level. ground level, in significantly, this
the isolation zones proposed
and all exterior requirement would
areas within the maintain the
protected area, or current 0.2
may augment the footcandle lighting
facility requirement but
illumination would also provide
system, to include flexibility to a
patrols, licensee to provide
responders, and less than the 0.2
video technology footcandle where
with low-light low-light
technology capable technology would be
of meeting the used to maintain
detection, the capability to
assessment, meet the
surveillance, performance level
observation, for detection,
monitoring, and assessment,
response surveillance,
requirements of observation,
this section. monitoring, and
response. The word
``or'' would be
used specifically
to mean that the
licensee need
satisfy only one of
the two options
such that the 0.2
footcandle
requirement must be
met in the
isolation zone and
all exterior areas
within the
protected area
unless low-light
technology is used.
However, the word
``augment'' would
be used to
represent the
Commission's view
that sole use of
low-light
technology is not
authorized as this
approach would be
contrary to defense-
in-depth and could
be susceptible to
single failure
where a counter
technology is
developed or used.
(i)(11)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the clarify the need
approved security for lighting to be
plans how the described in the
lighting approved security
requirements of plans and how the
this section are lighting ``system''
met and, if used, would be used to
the type(s) and achieve the
application of low- performance
light technology objective.
used.
Sec. 73.55(f) (j) Communication This header would be
Communication requirements. requirements. retained. The
current
requirements under
this header are
retained and
reformatted to
individually
address each
current
requirement.
Significant
revisions would be
specifically
identified as each
current requirement
is addressed.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(1) The licensee This requirement
guard, watchman or armed shall establish and would be retained
response individual on duty maintain, with minor
shall be capable of continuous revision. Most
maintaining continuous communication significantly, the
communication with an capability with specific language
individual in each onsite and offsite of the current
continuously manned alarm resources to ensure requirement would
station required by effective command be revised to a
paragraph (e)(1) of this and control during more performance
section * * *. both normal and based requirement.
emergency The word
situations. ``continuous''
would be used to
mean that a
communication
method would be
available and
operating any time
it would be needed
to communicate
information.
[[Page 62718]]
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) * * * who (j)(2) Individuals This requirement
shall be capable of calling assigned to each would be retained
for assistance from other alarm station shall with minor
guards, watchmen, and armed be capable of revision. Most
response personnel and from calling for significantly, in
local law enforcement assistance in order to provide
authorities. accordance with the flexibility and to
approved security capture the
plans, licensee proposed
integrated response requirements of
plan, and licensee appendix C to part
procedures. 73 for an
Integrated Response
Plan, this proposed
requirement
replaces the
specific list of
support entities to
be called with a
performance based
requirement to
follow
predetermined
actions.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(3) Each on-duty This requirement
guard, watchman or armed security officer, would be retained
response individual on duty watchperson, with minor
shall be capable of vehicle escort, and revisions. Most
maintaining continuous armed response significantly, this
communication with an force member shall proposed
individual in each be capable of requirement would
continuously manned alarm maintaining update the titles
station required by continuous used to identify
paragraph (e)(1) of this communication with the listed
section * * *. an individual in positions and would
each alarm station. add ``vehicle
escorts'' for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraph (g)(8) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4) The following This requirement
provide the capability of continuous would be retained
continuous communication * communication with minor revision
* * and shall terminate in capabilities must for formatting
each continuously manned terminate in both purposes.
alarm station required by alarm stations
paragraph (e)(1) of this required by this
section. section:
Sec. 73.55(f)(2) The alarm (j)(4)(i) This requirement
stations required by Conventional would be retained
paragraph (e)(1) of this telephone service. with minor
section shall have revision. Most
conventional telephone significantly, the
service for communication phrase ``with the
with the law enforcement law enforcement
authorities as described in authorities as
paragraph (f)(1) of this described in
section. paragraph (f)(1) of
this section''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4)(ii) Radio or This requirement
provide the capability of microwave would be retained
continuous communication, transmitted two-way with minor
radio or microwave voice revision. Most
transmitted two-way voice communication, significantly, the
communication, either either directly or phrase ``shall be
directly or through an through an established, in
intermediary, shall be intermediary. addition to
established, in addition to conventional
conventional telephone telephone service,
service, between local law between local law
enforcement authorities and enforcement
the facility and * * *. authorities and the
facility and''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
(j)(4)(iii) A system This requirement
for communication would be added for
with all control consistency with
rooms, on-duty the proposed
operations requirements of
personnel, escorts, this section and to
local, State, and provide a
Federal law performance based
enforcement requirement for
agencies, and all communications
other personnel consistent with the
necessary to proposed Integrated
coordinate both Response Plan
onsite and offsite addressed in the
responses. proposed appendix C
to part 73.
Sec. 73.55(f)(4) Non- (j)(5) Non-portable This requirement
portable communications communications would be retained
equipment controlled by the equipment must with minor
licensee and required by remain operable revision. Most
this section shall remain from independent significantly, the
operable from independent power sources in phrase ``controlled
power sources in the event the event of the by the licensee and
of the loss of normal power. loss of normal required by this
power. section'' would be
deleted because
there would be no
requirement for non-
portable
communications
equipment that is
not under licensee
control or not
required by this
section.
(j)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall identify site would be added to
areas where ensure the
communication could capability to
be interrupted or communicate during
cannot be both normal and
maintained and emergency
shall establish conditions, and to
alternative focus attention on
communication the requirement
measures for these that the licensee
areas in must identify site
implementing areas in which
procedures. communications
could be lost and
account for those
areas in their
procedures.
73.55(h) Response (k) Response This header would be
requirement. requirements. retained.
(k)(1) Personnel and This header would be
equipment. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62719]]
(k)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
establish and provide a
maintain, at all performance based
times, the minimum requirement for
number of properly determining the
trained and minimum number of
equipped personnel armed responders
required to needed to protect
intercept, the facility
challenge, delay, against the full
and neutralize capability of the
threats up to and design basis
including the threat. The phrase
design basis threat ``to intercept,
of radiological challenge, delay,
sabotage as defined and neutralize
in Sec. 73.1, to threats up to and
prevent significant including the
core damage and design basis threat
spent fuel sabotage. of radiological
sabotage as defined
in Sec. 73.1, to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage'' would be
used for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraphs (b)(2)
through (4) of this
section.
(k)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide and provide a
maintain firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment capable ensure that the
of performing licensee provides
functions weapons that are
commensurate to the capable of
needs of each armed performing the
member of the functions required
security for each armed
organization to individual to
carry out their fulfill their
assigned duties and assigned duties per
responsibilities in the licensee
accordance with the protective
approved security strategy. For
plans, the licensee example, if an
protective individual is
strategy, assigned to a
implementing position for which
procedures, and the the protective
site specific strategy requires
conditions under weapons use at 200
which the firearms, meters, then the
ammunition, and assigned weapon
equipment will be must be capable of
used. that performance as
well as the
individual.
(k)(1)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee provides,
plans, all firearms in the approved
and equipment to be security plans, a
possessed by and description of the
readily available weapons to be used
to, armed personnel and those equipment
to implement the designated as
protective strategy readily available.
and carry out all
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
This description
must include the
general
distribution and
assignment of
firearms,
ammunition, body
armor, and other
equipment used.
(k)(1)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment required ensure the
by the protective availability and
strategy are in operability of
sufficient supply, equipment needed to
are in working accomplish response
condition, and are goals and
readily available objectives during
for use in postulated events.
accordance with the The term ``readily
licensee protective available'' would
strategy and mean that required
predetermined time firearms and
lines. equipment are
either in the
individuals
possession or at
pre-staged
locations such that
required response
time lines are met.
(k)(1)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
armed members of performance based
the security requirement to
organization are ensure that all
trained in the armed personnel
proper use and meet standard
maintenance of training program
assigned weapons requirements and
and equipment in specific training
accordance with requirements
appendix B to part applicable to the
73. specific weapons
they are assigned,
to include the
maintenance
required for each
to ensure
operability. The
ability for armed
personnel to
trouble-shoot a
problem, such as a
jammed round during
an actual event,
would be considered
a critical function
necessary to
achieve the
performance
objective.
[[Page 62720]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(5) The (k)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall instruct shall instruct each would be retained
every guard and all armed armed response with some revision.
response personnel to person to prevent The term ``guard''
prevent or impede attempted or impede attempted was removed as the
acts of theft or acts of theft or term is no longer
radiological sabotage by radiological used. The phrase
using force sufficient to sabotage by using ``or any other
counter the force directed force sufficient to circumstances as
at him including the use of counter the force authorized by
deadly force when the guard directed at that applicable state
or other armed response person including law'' would be
person has a reasonable the use of deadly added to clarify
belief it is necessary in force when the that applicable
self-defense or in the armed response state law specifies
defense of others. person has a the conditions
reasonable belief under which deadly
that the use of force may be
deadly force is applied. It is
necessary in self- important to note
defense or in the that the use of
defense of others, deadly force should
or any other be a last resort
circumstances as when all other
authorized by lesser measures to
applicable state neutralize the
law. threat have failed.
The conditions
under which deadly
force would be
authorized are
governed by state
laws and nothing in
this proposed rule
should be
interpreted to mean
or require anything
that would
contradict such
state law. The term
``it'' is replaced
with the phrase
``deadly force'' to
more clearly
describe the
action.
(k)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall provide an would be added to
armed response team provide a
consisting of both performance based
armed responders requirement that
and armed security would retain the
officers to carry current requirement
out response for armed
duties, within responders and add
predetermined time a category of armed
lines. security officer to
clarify the
division of types
of armed response
personnel and their
roles.
(k)(3)(i) Armed This header would be
responders. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(A) The This requirement
number of guards, and licensee shall would be retained
armed, trained personnel determine the and revised to
immediately available at minimum number of remove the specific
the facility to fulfill armed responders minimum numbers of
these response requirements necessary to 10, but no less
shall nominally be ten protect against the than 5, to provide
(10), unless specifically design basis threat a performance based
required otherwise on a described in Sec. requirement that
case by case basis by the 73.1(a), subject to meets the proposed
Commission; however, this Commission requirement of
number may not be reduced approval, and shall paragraph (k)(1)(i)
to less than five (5) document this of this section.
guards. number in the This proposed
approved security requirement would
plans. ensure that the
licensee would
provide the
requisite number of
armed responders
needed to carry-out
the protective
strategy, the
effectiveness of
which would be
evaluated through
annual exercises
and triennial
exercises observed
by the Commission.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(B) Armed This requirement
number of guards, and responders shall be would be retained
armed, trained personnel available at all and revised. Most
immediately available at times inside the significantly, this
the facility to fulfill protected area and proposed
these response requirements may not be assigned requirement would
* * *. any other duties or specify the
responsibilities conditions that
that could must be met to
interfere with satisfy the meaning
assigned response of the word
duties. ``available'' as
used.
(k)(3)(ii) Armed This header would be
security officers. added for
formatting
purposes.
(k)(3)(ii)(A) Armed This requirement
security officers would be added to
designated to provide a
strengthen response performance based
capabilities shall requirement for the
be onsite and licensee to
available at all identify a new
times to carry out category of armed
assigned response personnel to be
duties. used to supplement
and support the
armed responders
identified in the
proposed paragraph
(k)(3)(ii)(A) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(ii)(B) The This requirement
number of guards, and minimum number of would be added to
armed, trained personnel armed security require licensees
immediately available at officers must be to document the
the facility to fulfill documented in the number of armed
these response requirements approved security security officers
shall nominally be * * *. plans. to be used.
(k)(3)((iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that consistency with
training and the current
qualification requirement Sec.
requirements 73.55(b)(4)(ii) for
accurately reflect an approved T&Q
the duties and plan and the
responsibilities to current requirement
be performed. for licensees to
document how these
personnel are to be
trained and
qualified.
[[Page 62721]]
(k)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that all consistency with
firearms, the current Sec.
ammunition, and 73.55(g)(1) to
equipment needed ensure that all
for completing the firearms and
actions described equipment required
in the approved by each member of
security plans and the armed response
licensee protective team would be
strategy are operable and in the
readily available possession of or
and in working available at pre-
condition. staged locations,
to ensure that each
individual is able
to meet the time
lines specified by
the protective
strategy. This
includes those
equipment
designated as
readily available.
(k)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall describe in would be added to
the approved provide regulatory
security plans, consistency for the
procedures for period of time a
responding to an licensee may not
unplanned incident meet the minimum
that reduces the numbers stated in
number of available the approved plans
armed response team because of illness
members below the or injury to an
minimum number assigned individual
documented by the or individuals
licensee in the while on-duty.
approved security
plans.
(k)(5) Protective This requirement
Strategy. Licensees would be added to
shall develop, provide a
maintain, and performance based
implement a written requirement for the
protective strategy development of a
in accordance with protective strategy
the requirements of that specifies how
this section and the licensee will
appendix C to this utilize onsite and
part. offsite, the
resources to ensure
the performance
objective of how
the proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section is
met.
(k)(6) The licensee This proposed
shall ensure that requirement would
all personnel be added to ensure
authorized that both security
unescorted access and non-security
to the protected organization
area are trained personnel are
and understand trained to
their roles and recognize and
responsibilities respond to hostage
during security and duress
incidents, to situations. This
include hostage and proposed training
duress situations. would also include
the specific
actions to be
performed during
these postulated
security events.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (k)(7) Upon receipt This requirement
detection of abnormal of an alarm or would be retained
presence or activity of other indication of and revised for
persons or vehicles within threat, the consistency with
an isolation zone, a licensee shall: the proposed
protected area, material requirements of
access area, or a vital this section.
area; or upon evidence or Reference to the
indication of intrusion specific site areas
into a protected area, a would be deleted
material access area, or a because the
vital area, the licensee performance based
security organization requirements of
shall: this proposed
section would be
applicable to all
facility areas, and
therefore such
reference would not
be needed.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(i) (k)(7)(i) Determine This requirement
Determine whether or not a the existence of a would be retained
threat exists, threat in with minor
accordance with revision.
assessment
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(ii) (k)(7)(ii) Identify This requirement
Assess the extent of the the level of threat would be retained
threat, if any, present through the with minor
use of assessment revision.
methodologies and
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (k)(7)(iii) This requirement
Requiring responding guards Determine the would be retained
or other armed response response necessary with revision for
personnel to interpose to intercept, consistency with
themselves * * *. challenge, delay, the proposed
and neutralize the paragraph (b) of
threat in this section.
accordance with the
requirements of
appendix C to part
73, the Commission-
approved safeguards
contingency plan,
and the licensee
response strategy.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(B) (k)(7)(iv) Notify This requirement
Informing local law offsite support would be retained
enforcement agencies of the agencies such as with revision for
threat and requesting local law consistency with
assistance. enforcement, in the Integrated
accordance with Response Plan.
site procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(2) The (k)(8) Law This requirement
licensee shall establish enforcement would be retained
and document liaison with liaison. The with minor
local law enforcement licensee shall revision. Most
authorities. document and significantly, this
maintain current proposed
agreements with requirement
local, state, and addresses the need
Federal law to identify the
enforcement resources and
agencies, to response times to
include estimated be expected in
response times and order to facilitate
capabilities. planning
development.
[[Page 62722]]
(l) Facilities using This paragraph would
mixed-oxide (MOX) be added to provide
fuel assemblies. In general provisions
addition to the for the onsite
requirements physical protection
described in this of unirradiated
section for mixed oxide (MOX)
protection against fuel assemblies in
radiological recognition of the
sabotage, operating fact that some
commercial nuclear nuclear power
power reactors reactor facilities
licensed under 10 currently have
CFR parts 50 or 52 chosen or may
and using special choose to possess
nuclear material in and utilize this
the form of MOX type of special
fuel assemblies nuclear material at
shall protect their sites.
unirradiated MOX Because weapons
fuel assemblies grade plutonium is
against theft or utilized in the
diversion. fabrication of MOX
fuel assemblies,
the Commission has
determined that a
threat of theft
applies and that it
is prudent and
necessary to apply
certain security
measures for MOX
fuel that are in
addition to those
that are currently
required at other
nuclear power
reactor facilities.
Therefore, the
requirements
proposed in this
paragraph are
provided to ensure
that these
additional
requirements are
identified and met
by those licensees
who have chosen or
may choose to
utilize MOX fuel.
(l)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall protect the would be added to
unirradiated MOX identify
fuel assemblies applicability of
against theft or this paragraph.
diversion in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section and
the approved
security plans.
(l)(2) Commercial This requirement
nuclear power would be added
reactors using MOX because the
fuel assemblies are Commission has
exempt from the determined that due
requirements of to the low
Sec. Sec. 73.20, plutonium
73.45, and 73.46 concentration,
for the onsite composition of the
physical protection MOX fuel, and
of unirradiated MOX configuration (size
fuel assemblies. and weight) of the
assemblies, the
physical security
protection measures
identified in the
listed regulations
are superceded by
those requirements
addressed in this
proposed section
for unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
at nuclear power
reactor facilities.
(l)(3) This header would be
Administrative added for
controls. formatting
purposes.
(l)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee describes
plans, the the onsite physical
operational and protection measures
administrative in the approved
controls to be security plans.
implemented for the
receipt,
inspection,
movement, storage,
and protection of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement the use provide assurance
of tamper- that the
indicating devices unirradiated fuel
for unirradiated assemblies were not
MOX fuel assembly accessed during
transport and shall transport.
verify their use
and integrity
before receipt.
(l)(3)(iii) Upon This requirement
delivery of would be added for
unirradiated MOX formatting
fuel assemblies, purposes.
the licensee shall:
(l)(3)(iii)(A) This requirement
Inspect would be added to
unirradiated MOX ensure that
fuel assemblies for unirradiated MOX
damage. fuel assemblies are
in an acceptable
condition before
use or storage.
(l)(3)(iii)(B) This requirement
Search unirradiated would be added to
MOX fuel assemblies ensure that no
for unauthorized unauthorized
materials. materials were
introduced within
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assembly
during transport.
(l)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee may would be added to
conduct the provide a
required inspection performance based
and search requirement that
functions provides
simultaneously. flexibility for
accomplishment of
the proposed
requirements.
(l)(3)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure the proper formatting
placement and purposes.
control of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies as
follows:
[[Page 62723]]
(l)(3)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer, provide deterrence
in addition to the and immediate armed
armed response team response to
required by attempts of theft
paragraphs (h)(4) or tampering. This
and (h)(5) of proposed armed
appendix C to part responder's duty
73, shall be would be solely to
present during the observe and protect
receipt and the unirradiated
inspection of MOX fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX upon receipt and
fuel assemblies. before storage.
(l)(3)(v)(B) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
store unirradiated reduce the risk of
MOX fuel assemblies theft by providing
only within a spent three delay
fuel pool, located barriers before
within a vital gaining
area, so that unauthorized access
access to the to the MOX fuel
unirradiated MOX assembles while in
fuel assemblies storage.
requires passage
through at least
three physical
barriers.
(l)(3)(vi) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a ensure that a
material control material control
and accountability and accountability
program for the program would be
unirradiated MOX established and
fuel assemblies implemented and
that includes a would focus on
predetermined and recordkeeping which
documented storage describes the
location for each inventory and
unirradiated MOX location of the
fuel assembly. SSNM within the
assemblies.
(l)(3)(vii) Records This requirement
that identify the would be added to
storage locations ensure restricted
of unirradiated MOX access to records
fuel assemblies are which describe or
considered identify the
safeguards location of
information and unirradiated MOX
must be protected fuel assemblies
and stored in within the spent
accordance with fuel pool.
Sec. 73.21.
(l)(4) Physical This header would be
controls. added for
formatting
purposes.
(l)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall lock would be added to
or disable all provide a
equipment and power performance based
supplies to requirement for
equipment required administrative
for the movement controls over
and handling of equipment and power
unirradiated MOX supplies to
fuel assemblies. equipment required
to physically move
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
to ensure that at
least two security
measures must be
disabled before
this equipment
could be used.
(l)(4)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a two- provide an
person line-of- administrative
sight rule whenever control to reduce
control systems or the risk of the
equipment required insider threat and
for the movement or theft.
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be accessed.
(l)(4)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
conduct random provide
patrols of areas surveillance
containing activities for the
unirradiated MOX detection of
fuel assemblies to unauthorized
ensure the activities that
integrity of would pose a threat
barriers and locks, to MOX fuel
deter unauthorized assemblies in
activities, and to addition to any
identify similar
indications of requirements of
tampering. this proposed
section.
(l)(4)(iv) Locks, This requirement
keys, and any other would be added to
access control ensure that the
device used to security
secure equipment organization would
and power sources be responsible for
required for the the administrative
movement of controls over
unirradiated MOX access control
fuel assemblies or devices.
openings to areas
containing
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be controlled
by the security
organization.
(l)(4)(v) Removal of This requirement
locks used to would be added to
secure equipment ensure that both
and power sources the licensee
required for the security and
movement of operations
unirradiated MOX management level
fuel assemblies or personnel would be
openings to areas responsible for the
containing removal of locks
unirradiated MOX securing MOX fuel
fuel assemblies assemblies.
must require
approval by both
the on-duty
security shift
supervisor and the
operations shift
manager.
(l)(4)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present to immediate armed
observe activities response capability
involving the is provided before
movement of accessing equipment
unirradiated MOX used to move
fuel assemblies unirradiated MOX
before the removal fuel assemblies.
of the locks and
providing power to
equipment required
for the movement or
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
[[Page 62724]]
(l)(4)(v)(B) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present at immediate armed
all times until response capability
power is removed is provided during
from equipment and any activity
locks are secured. involving the use
of equipment used
to move
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(4)(v)(C) This requirement
Security officers would be added to
shall be trained ensure that
and knowledgeable assigned security
of authorized and officers possess
unauthorized the capability to
activities immediately
involving recognize, report,
unirradiated MOX and respond to
fuel assemblies. unauthorized
activities
involving
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(5) At least one This requirement
armed security would be added to
officer shall be ensure physical
present and shall protection of
maintain constant unirradiated MOX
surveillance of fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX when not located
fuel assemblies within an area that
when the assemblies meets the three
are not located in barrier requirement
the spent fuel pool of this proposed
or reactor. rule.
(l)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall maintain at would be added for
all times the consistency with
capability to the proposed
detect, assess, paragraph (b) of
intercept, this section.
challenge, delay,
and neutralize
threats to
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section.
(m) Digital computer This header would be
and communication added for
networks. formatting
purposes.
(m)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall implement a would be to ensure
cyber-security that nuclear power
program that plants are
provides high protected from
assurance that cyber attacks via
computer systems, minimizing the
which if potential attack
compromised would pathway and the
likely adversely consequences
impact safety, arising from a
security, and successful cyber
emergency attack.
preparedness, are
protected from
cyber attacks.
(m)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe the cyber- ensure licensees
security program have a
requirements in the comprehensive
approved security security plan by
plans. integrating cyber-
security into the
overall onsite
physical protection
program. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
incorporation of a
cyber-security
program into the
Commission-approved
security plans
would be a prudent
and necessary
security
enhancement.
(m)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
incorporate the ensure that the
cyber-security computer systems
program into the used in onsite
onsite physical physical protection
protection program. systems are
protected from
cyber attacks. With
advancements in
computer
technology, many
systems in nuclear
power plants rely
on computers to
perform their
functions,
including some
security functions.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that the
integration of
security measures
covering these
systems would be a
prudent and
necessary action.
(m)(1)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
program must be ensure licensees
designed to detect actively and
and prevent cyber proactively secure
attacks on their plants from
protected computer cyber attacks. The
systems. Commission has
determined that
because specific
cyber threats and
the people who seek
unauthorized access
to, or use of
computers are
constantly
changing, protected
computer systems
must be protected
against these
attacks and
mitigation measures
implemented.
(m)(2) Cyber- This requirement
security would be added to
assessment. The require licensees
licensee shall to systematically
implement a cyber- determine the
security assessment status of their
program to plant's cyber risks
systematically and identify
assess and manage vulnerabilities
cyber risks. that need to be
mitigated to reduce
risks to acceptable
levels.
(m)(3) Policies, This header would be
requirements, and added for
procedures. formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62725]]
(m)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
apply cyber- create a computer
security security program
requirements and that establishes
policies that specific goals and
identify management assigns
expectations and responsibilities to
requirements for employees to meet
the protection of those goals.
computer systems.
(m)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
develop and ensure the licensee
maintain develops,
implementing implements, and
procedures to enforces, detailed
ensure cyber- guidance documents
security that licensee
requirements and employees would be
policies are required to follow
implemented to meet the stated
effectively. security goals.
(m)(4) Incident This header would be
response and added for
recovery. formatting
purposes.
(m)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure that each
security incident licensee would be
response and prepared to respond
recovery plan to to computer
minimize the security incidents
adverse impact of a in a manner that
cyber-security ensures that plants
incident on safety, are safe and
security, or secure. A computer
emergency security incident
preparedness could result from a
systems. computer virus,
other malicious
code, or a system
intruder, either an
insider or as a
result of an
external attack and
could adversely
impact the
licensee's ability
to effectively
maintain safety,
security, or
emergency
preparedness.
Without an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to a
computer security
incident in an ad
hoc manner. However
with an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to an
incident in a quick
and organized
manner. This would
minimize the
adverse impact
caused by a
computer security
incident.
(m)(4)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security incident would be added to
response and ensure licensees
recovery plan must have a
be described in the comprehensive
integrated response incident response
plan required by plan by integrating
appendix C to this cyber-security into
part. the overall
security of their
plants. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing as well
as the possibility
for adverse impact
from a computer
mishap. Therefore,
the Commission has
determined that it
would be a prudent
and necessary
action for
licensees to
develop and
implement a
comprehensive
response plan that
includes a cyber
incident response
and recovery plan.
(m)(4)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
incident response ensure that
and recovery plan licensees acquire
must ensure the the capability to
capability to respond to cyber
respond to cyber- incidents in a
security incidents, manner that
minimize loss and contains and
destruction, repairs damage from
mitigate and incidents, and
correct the prevents future
weaknesses that damage. An incident
were exploited, and handling capability
restore systems and/ provides a way for
or equipment plant personnel to
affected by a cyber- report incidents
security incident. and the appropriate
response and
assistance to be
provided to aid in
recovery.
(m)(5) Protective This requirement
strategies. The would be added to
licensee shall incorporate the
implement defense- approach of delay,
in-depth protective detect, and
strategies to respond. The use of
protect computer multiple and
systems from cyber diverse layers of
attacks, detecting, defense would delay
isolating, and the threat from
neutralizing reaching those
unauthorized systems that, if
activities in a compromised, can
timely manner. adversely impact
safety, security,
or emergency
preparedness of the
nuclear power
plants. This delay
in attack would
allow more time to
detect the attack
and would allow
time to respond.
[[Page 62726]]
(m)(6) Configuration This requirement
and control would be added to
management program. implement
The licensee shall configuration
implement a management to
configuration and ensure that the
control management system in operation
program, to include is the correct
cyber risk version
analysis, to ensure (configuration) of
that modifications the system and that
to computer system any changes to be
designs, access made are reviewed
control measures, for security
configuration, implications.
operational Configuration
integrity, and management can be
management process used to help ensure
do not adversely that changes take
impact facility place in an
safety, security, identifiable and
and emergency controlled
preparedness environment and
systems before that they do not
implementation of unintentionally
those modifications. harm any of the
system's
properties,
including its
security.
(m)(7) Cyber- This header would be
security awareness added for
and training.. formatting
purposes.
(m)(7)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure licensees
security awareness implement cyber-
and training security awareness
program. and training
programs to ensure
that appropriate
personnel are aware
of cyber-security
requirements and
have the cyber-
security skills and
competencies
necessary to secure
affected plant
systems and
equipment.
(m)(7)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security awareness would be added to
and training implement a cyber-
program must ensure security awareness
that appropriate and training
plant personnel, program to:
including 1. Improve employee
contractors, are awareness of the
aware of cyber- need to protect
security computer systems;
requirements and 2. Develop employee
that they receive skills and
the training knowledge so
required to computer users can
effectively perform perform their jobs
their assigned more securely; and
duties and 3. Build in-depth
responsibilities. knowledge, as
needed, to design,
implement, or
operate security
programs for
organizations and
systems.
(n) Security program This header would be
reviews and audits. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(A) At (n)(1) The licensee This requirement
intervals not to exceed 12 shall review the would be retained
months or * * *. onsite physical with minor revision
protection program for formatting
at intervals not to purposes.
exceed 12 months,
or
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) As (n)(1)(i) As This requirement
necessary, based on an necessary based would be retained
assessment by the licensee upon assessments or with minor
against performance other performance revision.
indicators * * *. indicators.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) * * (n)(1)(ii) Within 12 This requirement
* as soon as reasonably months after a would be retained
practicable after a change change occurs in and revised. Most
occurs in personnel, personnel, significantly, the
procedures, equipment, or procedures, phrase ``as soon as
facilities that potentially equipment, or reasonably
could adversely affect facilities that practicable'' would
security but no longer than potentially could be deleted and the
12 months after the change. adversely affect current requirement
security. ``12 months'' would
be moved to the
beginning of the
sentence to
eliminate potential
for
misunderstanding
and improve
consistency.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) In (n)(2) As a minimum, This requirement
any case, each element of each element of the would be retained
the security program must onsite physical with minor
be reviewed at least every protection program revision.
24 months. must be reviewed at
least every twenty-
four (24) months.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i) The (n)(2)(i) The onsite This requirement
licensee shall review physical protection would be retained
implementation of the program review must and revised to
security program by be documented and combine two current
individuals who have no performed by requirements. Most
direct responsibility for individuals significantly, the
the security program independent of word ``documented''
either: those personnel would be added for
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The responsible for consistency with
results and recommendations program management the current Sec.
of the security program and any individual 73.55(g)(4)(ii).
review * * * must be who has direct The phrase
documented * * *. responsibility for ``security
implementing the program'' would be
onsite physical replaced with the
protection program. phrase ``program''
for consistency
with use of the
phrase ``onsite
physical protection
program''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(2)(ii) Onsite This requirement
security program review physical protection would be retained
must include an audit of program reviews and and revised to
security procedures and audits must provide additional
practices, an evaluation of include, but not be examples. Most
the effectiveness of the limited to, an significantly, the
physical protection system, evaluation of the phrase ``but not be
an audit of the physical effectiveness of limited to'' would
protection system testing the approved be added to clarify
and maintenance program, security plans, that the proposed
and an audit of commitments implementing examples are not
established for response by procedures, all inclusive.
local law enforcement response
authorities. commitments by
local, State, and
Federal law
enforcement
authorities, cyber-
security programs,
safety/security
interface, and the
testing,
maintenance, and
calibration program.
[[Page 62727]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) (n)(3) The licensee This requirement
Periodically review shall periodically would be retained
physical security plans and review the approved with minor
contingency plans and security plans, the revision. The
procedures to evaluate integrated response phrase ``Integrated
their potential impact on plan, the licensee Response Plan''
plant and personnel safety. protective would be added to
strategy, and emphasize the
licensee importance of this
implementing proposed plan and
procedures to to emphasize its
evaluate their relationship to
effectiveness and other site plans.
potential impact on The term
plant and personnel ``implementing''
safety. procedures would be
added for
consistency with
this proposed
section.
(n)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall periodically would be added to
evaluate the cyber- account for the use
security program of computers and
for effectiveness the need to ensure
and shall update that required
the cyber-security protective measures
program as needed are being met and
to ensure to evaluate the
protection against effects that
changes to internal changes or other
and external technological
threats. advancements would
have on systems
used at nuclear
power plants.
(n)(5) The licensee This requirement
shall conduct would be added to
quarterly drills provide a
and annual force-on- performance based
force exercises in requirement for the
accordance with conduct of force-on-
appendix C to part force drills and
73 and the licensee exercises.
performance
evaluation program.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(6) The results This requirement
results and recommendations and recommendations would be retained
of the security program of the onsite with minor
review, management's physical protection revision. The
findings on whether the program reviews and phrase ``security
security program is audits, program review''
currently effective, and management's would be replaced
any actions taken as a findings regarding with the phrase''
result of recommendations program onsite physical
from prior program reviews effectiveness, and protection program
must be documented in a any actions taken reviews and
report to the licensee's as a result of audits'' for
plant manager and to recommendations consistency with
corporate management at from prior program the format of the
least one level higher than reviews, must be proposed rule. The
that having responsibility documented in a phrase ``on whether
for the day-to-day plant report to the the security
operation. licensee's plant program is
manager and to currently
corporate effective'' would
management at least be replaced with
one level higher the phrase
than that having ``regarding program
responsibility for effectiveness'' for
day-to-day plant plain language
operation. purposes.
(n)(7) Findings from This requirement
onsite physical would be added to
protection program ensure that
reviews, audits, security
and assessments deficiencies and
must be entered findings would be
into the site tracked through the
corrective action site corrective
program and action program
protected as until corrected,
safeguards and information
information, if regarding specific
applicable. findings would be
protected in
accordance with the
sensitivity and
potential for
exploitation of the
information.
(n)(8) The licensee This requirement
shall make changes would be added to
to the approved provide a
security plans and performance based
implementing requirement for the
procedures as a revision of
result of findings approved security
from security plans where plan
program reviews, changes are
audits, and necessary to
assessments, where account for
necessary to ensure implementation
the effective problems, changes
implementation of to site conditions,
Commission or other problems
regulations and the that adversely
licensee protective affect the licensee
strategy. capability to
effectively
implement
Commission
requirements.
(n)(9) Unless This requirement
otherwise specified would be added to
by the Commission, provide necessary
onsite physical flexibility to
protection program allow licensees to
reviews, audits, conduct audits/
and assessments may reviews within a
be conducted up to specified time
thirty days prior period without
to, but no later changing future
than thirty days scheduled audit/
after the scheduled review dates. This
date without requirement
adverse impact upon provides regulatory
the next scheduled stability and
annual audit date. flexibility to
account for
unforseen
circumstances that
may interfere with
regularly scheduled
dates, such as
forced outages.
Sec. 73.55(g) Testing and (o) Maintenance, This header would be
maintenance. testing, and retained and
calibration. revised to include
``calibration'' of
equipment to ensure
the accuracy of
readings provided
from such
equipment.
(o)(1) The licensee This header would be
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
(o)(1)(i) Implement This requirement
a maintenance, would be added to
testing and comprehensively
calibration program address all
to ensure that security equipment
security systems in consistent
and equipment are terms. This
tested for proposed
operability and requirement would
performance at clarify the current
predetermined requirement for
intervals, are ensuring that
maintained in security equipment
operable condition, operates and
and are capable of performs as stated
performing their in the approved
intended function security plans.
when needed.
[[Page 62728]]
(o)(1)(ii) Describe This requirement
the maintenance, would be added to
testing and address the
calibration program maintenance,
in the approved testing and
physical security calibration of
plan. Implementing security equipment
procedures must in non-specific
specify operational terms and describe
and technical the types of
details required to documentation and
perform level of detail
maintenance, needed.
testing, and
calibration
activities to
include, but not
limited to, purpose
of activity,
actions to be
taken, acceptance
criteria, the
intervals or
frequency at which
the activity will
be performed, and
compensatory
actions required.
(o)(1)(iii) Document This requirement
problems, failures, would be added for
deficiencies, and consistency with
other findings, to the proposed
include the cause requirement for
of each, and enter addressing findings
each into the site from security
corrective action program reviews and
program. The audits and how
licensee shall specific
protect this information
information as concerning security
safeguards deficiencies and
information, if findings must be
applicable. protected so that
noted deficiencies
could not be
exploited.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (o)(1)(iv) Implement This requirement
licensee shall develop and compensatory would be retained
employ compensatory measures in a with minor
measures including timely manner to revision.
equipment, additional ensure that the
security personnel and effectiveness of
specific procedures to the onsite physical
assure that the protection program
effectiveness of the is not reduced by
security system is not failure or degraded
reduced by failure or other operation of
contingencies affecting the security-related
operation of the security components or
related equipment or equipment.
structures.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(2) Each This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be intrusion alarm would be retained
tested for performance at must be tested for and revised to
the beginning and end of operability at the correct the use of
any period that it is used beginning and end the phrase ``tested
for security. If the period of any period that for performance'',
of continuous use is longer it is used for as stated in the
than seven days, the security, or if the current Sec.
intrusion alarm shall also period of 73.55(g)(2). The
be tested at least once continuous use testing performed
every seven (7) days. exceeds seven (7) at the beginning
days, the intrusion and end of any
alarm must be period is intended
tested at least to be a ``go, no-
once every seven go'' test or
(7) days. operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli. A
performance test is
a more elaborate
test that would
test a system
through the entire
range of its
intended function
or stimuli.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(3) Intrusion This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be detection and would be retained
tested for performance at access control and revised to
the beginning and end of equipment must be correct the
any period that it is used performance tested periodicity of
for security. in accordance with performance testing
the approved stated in the
security plans. current Sec.
73.55(g)(2) and to
add ``access
control equipment''
due to the
widespread use of
access control
technologies and to
focus on the need
to ensure that this
equipment is
functioning as
intended in
response to the
predetermined
stimuli (e.g.,
biometrics). The
phrase ``each
intrusion alarm''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Intrusion
detection and
access control
equipment'' to more
accurately describe
the equipment to be
performance tested.
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(4) Equipment This proposed
Communications equipment required for requirement would
required for communications communications be retained and
onsite shall be tested for onsite must be revised to correct
performance not less tested for the use of the
frequently than once at the operability not phrase ``tested for
beginning of each security less frequently performance'', as
personnel work shift. than once at the stated in the
beginning of each current Sec.
security personnel 73.55(g)(3). The
work shift. testing performed
at the beginning
and end of any
period is intended
to be a ``go, no-
go'' test or
operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli.
[[Page 62729]]
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(5) Communication This requirement
Communications equipment systems between the would be retained
required for communications alarm stations and and revised to
offsite shall be tested for each control room, include both
performance not less than and between the ``onsite'' and
once a day. alarm stations and offsite
offsite support communication
agencies, to equipment
include back-up associated with
communication integrated response
equipment, must be and to correct the
tested for use of the term
operability at ``performance
least once each day. test,'' as stated
in the current Sec.
73.55(g)(3). The
testing performed
at least once each
day is intended to
be a ``go, no-go''
test or operational
test that is used
to simply indicate
that the equipment
functions.
(o)(6) Search This requirement
equipment must be would be added to
tested for ensure that search
operability at equipment is tested
least once each day for operability and
and tested for performance at
performance at intervals that
least once during provide assurance
each seven (7) day that unauthorized
period and before items would be
being placed back detected as
in service after required. This
each repair or proposed
inoperative state. requirement is
added to address
the widespread use
of search equipment
technologies, such
as explosives and
metal detectors,
and x-ray equipment
and to provide a
performance based
requirement that
focuses on the
importance for
accurate
performance of this
equipment.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) All (o)(7) All intrusion This requirement
alarms, communication detection would be retained
equipment, physical equipment, with minor
barriers, and other communication revision. Most
security related devices or equipment, physical significantly, back-
equipment shall be barriers, and other up power supplies
maintained in operable security-related are added to ensure
condition. devices or this critical
equipment, to element is
include back-up maintained in
power supplies must operable condition.
be maintained in
operable condition.
(o)(8) A program for This requirement
testing or would be added to
verifying the account for those
operability of circumstances when
devices or a licensee cannot
equipment located satisfy testing
in hazardous areas requirements due to
must be specified safety hazards or
in the approved radiation
security plans and restrictions. Vital
must define component area
alternate measures portals located
to be taken to within facility
ensure the timely radiological
completion of controlled areas
testing or that are
maintenance when inaccessible due to
the hazardous safety hazards or
condition or established
radiation radiation
restrictions are no restrictions may be
longer applicable. excluded from the
testing
requirements of
this section.
(p) Compensatory This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(1) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall develop and shall identify would be retained
employ compensatory measures and with minor
measures * * *. criteria needed to revision. The word
compensate for the ``compensate'' is
loss or reduced used to provide a
performance of performance based
personnel, requirement that
equipment, systems, requires the
and components, identified
that are required compensatory
to meet the measure to be
requirements of ``developed and
this section. employed''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(2) Compensatory This requirement
licensee shall develop and measures must be would be retained
employ compensatory designed and and revised to
measures including implemented to focus on the
equipment, additional provide a level of Commission's view
security personnel and protection that is that compensatory
specific procedures to equivalent to the measures must
assure that the protection that was provide a level of
effectiveness of the provided by the protection that
security system is not degraded or satisfies the
reduced by failure or other inoperable Commission
contingencies affecting the personnel, requirement which
operation of the security equipment, system, was otherwise
related equipment or or components. satisfied through
structures. use or
implementation of
the failed
component of the
onsite physical
protection program.
(p)(3) Compensatory This requirement
measures must be would be added to
implemented within provide a
specific time lines performance based
necessary to meet requirement for
the requirements timely
stated in paragraph implementation of
(b) of this section compensatory
and described in measures. The
the approved phrase ``within
security plans. specific time lines
necessary to meet
the requirements
stated in paragraph
(b)'' would provide
qualifying details
against which
specific time lines
would be developed.
(q) Suspension of This header would be
safeguards measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
(q)(1) The licensee This requirement
may suspend would be added for
implementation of formatting
affected purposes. The
requirements of phrase
this section under ``implementation of
the following affected
conditions: requirements''
would be used to
ensure the licensee
only suspends those
measures that
cannot be met as a
direct result of
the condition.
[[Page 62730]]
Sec. 73.55(a) In (q)(1)(i) In This requirement
accordance with Sec. Sec. accordance with would be retained
50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of Sec. Sec. with minor
this chapter, the licensee 50.54(x) and revision.
may suspend any safeguards 50.54(y) of this
measures pursuant to Sec. chapter, the
73.55 in an emergency when licensee may
this action is immediately suspend any
needed to protect the safeguards measures
public health and safety pursuant to this
and no action consistent section in an
with license conditions and emergency when this
technical specification action is
that can provide adequate immediately needed
or equivalent protection is to protect the
immediately apparent. public health and
safety and no
action consistent
with license
conditions and
technical
specifications that
can provide
adequate or
equivalent
protection is
immediately
apparent.
Sec. 73.55(a) This This suspension of This requirement
suspension must be approved safeguards measures would be retained
as a minimum by a licensed must be approved as with minor revision
senior operator prior to a minimum by a to report this
taking the action. licensed senior information to the
operator prior to control room. This
taking this action. proposed
requirement is
intended to ensure
that at least one
onsite, licensee
management level
person who is
knowledgeable and
aware of reactor
operations and
reactor status at
the time, is the
individual who
would approve the
suspension and has
the knowledge to
determine and the
authority to direct
appropriate
compensatory
measures to
include, but not
limited to,
modifications to
the licensee
protective strategy
during the
suspension period.
(q)(1)(ii) During This requirement
severe weather when would be added to
the suspension is provide a
immediately needed performance based
to protect requirement that
personnel whose accounts for the
assigned duties and suspension of
responsibilities in safeguards measures
meeting the during severe
requirements of weather conditions
this section would that could result
otherwise in life threatening
constitute a life situations such as
threatening tornadoes, floods,
situation and no hurricanes, etc.,
action consistent for those
with the individuals
requirements of assigned to carry
this section that out certain duties
can provide and
equivalent responsibilities
protection is required by
immediately Commission
apparent. regulations, and
the approved
security plans and
procedures.
Suspension of This requirement
safeguards due to would be added to
severe weather must provide a
be initiated by the requirement for who
security supervisor is authorized to
and approved by a approve suspensions
licensed senior under severe
operator prior to weather conditions.
taking this action.
(q)(2) Suspended This requirement
security measures would be added to
must be provide a
reimplemented as performance based
soon as conditions requirement for
permit. reimplementing
suspended security
measures.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (q)(3) The This requirement
suspension of safeguards suspension of would be retained
measures must be reported safeguards measures with minor revision
in accordance with the must be reported for documenting
provisions of Sec. 73.71. and documented in suspended security
accordance with the measures.
provisions of Sec.
73.71.
Sec. 73.55(a) Reports made (q)(4) Reports made This requirement
under Section Sec. 50.72 under Sec. 50.72 would be retained.
need not be duplicated of this chapter
under Sec. 73.71. need not be
duplicated under
Sec. 73.71.
(r) Records......... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The (r)(1) The This requirement
NRC may inspect, copy, and Commission may would be retained
take away copies of all inspect, copy, with minor
reports and documents retain, and remove revision. The
required to be kept by copies of all phrase ``reports
Commission regulations, records required to and documents''
orders, or applicable be kept by would be replaced
license conditions whether Commission with the word
the reports and documents regulations, ``records'' to
are kept by the licensee or orders, or license account for all
the contractor. conditions whether information
the records are collection
kept by the requirements
licensee or a regardless of
contractor. media, to include
electronic record
keeping systems.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4) These (r)(2) The licensee This requirement
reports must be maintained shall maintain all would be retained
in an auditable form, records required to and revised to
available for inspection, be kept by consolidate
for a period of 3 years. Commission multiple current
regulations, records retention
orders, or license requirements rather
conditions, as a than state the same
record until the requirement
Commission multiple times for
terminates the each record
license for which throughout this
the records were rule. The phrase
developed and shall ``unless otherwise
maintain superceded specified by the
portions of these Commission'' would
records for at be used to address
least three (3) any conflict that
years after the may arise between
record is other records
superseded, unless retention
otherwise specified requirements such
by the Commission. that the more
restrictive
requirement would
take precedence.
[[Page 62731]]
(s) Safety/security This requirement
interface. In would be added to
accordance with the provide specific
requirements of reference to the
Sec. 73.58, the proposed Sec.
licensee shall 73.58 for Safety
develop and and Security
implement a process Interface
to inform and requirements.
coordinate safety
and security
activities to
ensure that these
activities do not
adversely affect
the capabilities of
the security
organization to
satisfy the
requirements of
this section, or
overall plant
safety.
(t) Alternative This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (t)(1) The This requirement
Commission may authorize an Commission may would be retained
applicant or licensee to authorize an and revised to
provide measures for applicant or provide a
protection against licensee to provide performance based
radiological sabotage other a measure for requirement for
than those required by this protection against alternative
section if the applicant or radiological measures that focus
licensee demonstrates that sabotage other than attention on the
the measures have the same one required by Commission's view
high assurance objective as this section if the that an alternative
specified in this paragraph applicant or measure is an
and that the overall level licensee unanalyzed
of system performance demonstrates that: substitute for a
provides protection against (i) The measure specific Commission
radiological sabotage meets the same requirement of this
equivalent to that which performance proposed section
would be provided by objective and and therefore, must
Paragraphs (b) through (h) requirements as be individually and
of this section and meets specified in knowingly reviewed
the general performance paragraph (b) of and approved by the
requirements of this this section, and. Commission before
section. (ii) The proposed implementation to
alternative measure ensure consistency
provides protection with these proposed
against Commission
radiological regulations. The
sabotage or theft Commission has
of unirradiated MOX determined that the
fuel assemblies, requirements
equivalent to that described in this
which would be proposed section
provided by the have been carefully
specific analyzed by the
requirement for Commission and
which it would therefore, an
substitute. alternative measure
to a proposed
requirement of this
section must also
be carefully
analyzed through
the process
addressed in 10 CFR
50.90 before
implementation.
Specifically, the
language used by
this proposed
requirement
addresses
alternative
measures
``individually''
rather than
collectively to
clarify that each
proposed
alternative measure
is unique by itself
and must be
analyzed as such.
In addition, the
phrase ``have the
same high assurance
objective'' is
replaced with the
phrase ``meets the
same performance
objective and
requirements as
specified in
paragraph (b) of
this section''.
The proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section
retains the same
``high assurance
objective''
referred to by the
current requirement
and incorporates by
reference the
performance based
requirements of
this proposed
section that
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
intended high
assurance
objective.
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(i) For (t)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensees who choose to shall submit each would be retained
propose alternative proposed and revised to
measures as provided for in alternative measure expand the
10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the to the Commission application of the
proposal must be submitted for review and current provision
in accordance with 10 CFR approval in for alternative
50.90 and include the accordance with measures to all
analysis and justification Sec. Sec. 50.4 proposed
for the proposed and 50.90 of this requirements of
alternatives. chapter before this section and
implementation. would provide the
process by which
alternative
measures would be
submitted for
Commission review
and approval.
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) (t)(3) The licensee This requirement
Propose alternative shall submit a would be retained
measures, in addition to technical basis for and revised to
the measures established in each proposed expand the
accordance with 10 CFR alternative application of the
73.55(c)(7), describe the measure, to include current provision
level of protection that any analysis or for alternative
these measures would assessment measures to all
provide against a land conducted in proposed
vehicle bomb, and compare support of a requirements of
the costs of the determination that this section and to
alternative measures with the proposed provide a
the costs of measures alternative measure description of the
necessary to fully meet the provides a level of detailed
design goals and criteria. protection that is information needed
at least equal to to support the
that which would technical basis for
otherwise be a request for
provided by the Commission approval
specific of an alternative
requirement of this measure.
section.
[[Page 62732]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) The (t)(4) Alternative This requirement
Commission will approve the vehicle barrier would be retained
proposed alternative systems. In the with minor
measures if they provide case of alternative revision. The
substantial protection vehicle barrier phrase ``The
against a land vehicle systems required by Commission will
bomb, and it is determined Sec. 73.55(e)(8), approve the
by an analysis, using the the licensee shall proposed
essential elements of 10 demonstrate that: alternative
CFR 50.109, that the costs (i) The alternative measures'' would be
of fully meeting the design measure provides deleted because
goals and criteria are not substantial approval would be
justified by the added protection against based on NRC
protection that would be a vehicle bomb, and. review. The
provided. (ii) Based on proposed language
comparison of the clearly stipulates
costs of the that alternative
alternative measures will be
measures to the reviewed by the
costs of meeting staff and approval
the Commission's would be contingent
requirements using upon the
the essential justification
elements of 10 CFR provided by the
50.109, the costs licensee to include
of fully meeting an analysis that
the Commission's examines the costs
requirements are and benefits of the
not justified by alternative measure
the protection that consistent with 10
would be provided. CFR 50.109.
Sec. 73.55 This requirement
Definitions. would be added to
clarify the use of
the listed terms
used in this
proposed rule.
Security Officer This definition
means a uniformed would be added to
individual, either clarify what is
armed with a meant by the term
covered weapon or ``Security
unarmed, whose Officer'' as used
primary duty is the in this document.
protection of a
facility, of
radioactive
material, or of
other property
against theft or
diversion or
against
radiological
sabotage.
Target Set means the This definition
combination of would be added to
equipment or clarify what is
operator actions meant by the term
which, if all are ``Target Set'' as
prevented from used in this
performing their document.
intended safety
function or
prevented from
being accomplished,
would likely result
in significant core
damage (e.g., non-
incipient, non-
localized fuel
melting, and/or
core disruption)
barring
extraordinary
action by plant
operators. A target
set with respect to
spent fuel sabotage
is draining the
spent fuel pool
leaving the spent
fuel uncovered for
a period of time,
allowing spent fuel
heat-up and the
associated
potential for
release of fission
products.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.56
[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.56(a) General..... (a) Introduction.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes. This
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
amend and
reorganize current
Sec. 73.56(a)
[General]. The
current Sec.
73.56(a) required
licensees to
develop and
implement access
authorization (AA)
programs. The
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
update these
requirements. The
title of this
paragraph would be
revised to more
accurately capture
the topics
addressed in the
proposed Sec.
73.56(a), which
would include a
description of the
NRC-regulated
entities who would
be subject to the
section and the
methods by which
the NRC intends
that licensees
would implement the
amended AA
programs. These
proposed changes to
the language and
organization of
current Sec.
73.56(a) would be
made to enhance the
clarity of the
requirements in
this section, for
the reasons
discussed in
Section IV.
[[Page 62733]]
Sec. 73.56(a) General. (1) (a)(1) By [date--180 This requirement
Each licensee who is days--after the would be added to
authorized on April 25, effective date of discuss the types
1991, to operate a nuclear the final rule of Commission
power reactor pursuant to published in the licensees to whom
Sec. Sec. 50.21(b) or Federal Register], the proposed
50.22 of this chapter shall each nuclear power requirements of
comply with the reactor licensee, this section would
requirements of this licensed under 10 apply and the
section. By April 27, 1992, CFR part 50, shall schedule for
the required access incorporate the submitting the
authorization program must revised amended access
be incorporated into the requirements of authorization
site Physical Security Plan this section program. The
as provided for by 10 CFR through amendments Commission intends
50.54(p)(2) and to its Commission- to delete the
implemented. By April 27, approved access current language,
1992, each licensee shall authorization because it applies
certify to the NRC that it program and shall only to a past rule
has implemented an access submit the amended change that is
authorization program that program to the completed. The
meets the requirements of Commission for proposed
this part. review and approval. requirements of
this section would
be applicable to
decommissioned/ing
reactors unless
otherwise approved
by the Commission.
This proposed
requirement would
add a requirement
for Commission
review and approval
of the amended
access
authorization
program to ensure
that access
authorization
programs meet the
objective of
providing high
assurance that
individuals who are
subject to the
requirements of
this section are
trustworthy and
reliable, and do
not constitute an
unreasonable risk
to public health
and safety or the
common defense and
security, including
the potential to
commit radiological
sabotage.
(a)(2) The amended This requirement
program must be would be added to
submitted as provide a reference
specified in Sec. to the current Sec.
50.4 and must 50.4(b)(4) which
describe how the describes
revised procedural details
requirements of relative to the
this section will proposed security
be implemented by plan submission
the licensee, to requirement.
include a proposed
implementation
schedule.
(a)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall implement the would be added to
existing approved clarify that the
access licensee must
authorization continue to
program and implement the
associated current Commission-
Commission orders approved security
until Commission plans until the
approval of the Commission approves
amended program, the amended plans.
unless otherwise The phrase ``unless
authorized by the otherwise
Commission. authorized by the
Commission'' would
provide flexibility
to account for
unanticipated
situations that may
affect the
licensee's ability
to comply with this
proposed
requirement.
(a)(4) The licensee This requirement
is responsible to would be added to
the Commission for clarify that the
maintaining the licensee is
authorization responsible for
program in meeting Commission
accordance with regulations and the
Commission approved security
regulations and plans. The phrase
related Commission- ``through the
directed orders implementation of
through the the approved
implementation of program and site
the approved implementing
program and site procedures'' would
implementing be added to
procedures. describe the
relationship
between Commission
regulations, the
approved
authorization
program, and
implementing
procedures. The
Commission views
the approved
security plans as
the mechanism
through which the
licensee implements
Commission
requirements.
[[Page 62734]]
Sec. 73.56(a)(2) Each (a)(5) Applicants This requirement
applicant for a license to for an operating would be added to
operate a nuclear power license under the describe the
reactor pursuant to Sec. provisions of part proposed
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of 50 of this chapter, requirements for
this chapter, whose or holders of a applicants and to
application was submitted combined license specify that the
prior to April 25, 1991, under the proposed
shall either by April 27, provisions of part requirements of
1992, or the date of 52 of this chapter, this section must
receipt of the operating shall satisfy the be met upon receipt
license, whichever is requirements of of an operating
later, incorporate the this section upon license or upon
required access receipt of an notice of the
authorization program into operating license Commission's
the site Physical Security or upon notice of finding under Sec.
Plan and implement it. the Commission's 52.103(g) of this
Sec. 73.56(a)(3) Each finding under Sec. chapter. This
applicant for a license to 52.103(g) of this proposed
operate a nuclear power chapter. requirement would
reactor pursuant to Sec. retain the meaning
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of of the current Sec.
this chapter and each 73.56(a)(3),
applicant for a combined which requires
construction permit and applicants for a
operating license pursuant license to operate
to part 52 of this chapter, a nuclear power
whose application is plant to
submitted after April 25, incorporate an
1991, shall include the access
required access authorization
authorization program as program in their
part of its Physical Physical Security
Security Plan. The Plan and implement
applicant, upon receipt of the approved access
an operating license or authorization
upon receipt of operating program when
authorization, shall approval to begin
implement the required operating is
access authorization received. This
program as part of its site proposed
Physical Security Plan.. requirement would
also add a
requirement for
Commission review
and approval of an
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan incorporating
the requirements of
this proposed
section for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(a)(1). The
Commission intends
to delete the
current Sec.
73.56(a)(2) because
there are no
remaining
applicants for an
operating license
under Sec. Sec.
50.21(b) or 50.22
of this chapter who
have not
implemented an AA
program under the
current
requirements.
Therefore, the
current paragraph
is no longer
necessary.
The proposed
paragraph would
retain the current
requirement for
licensees and
applicants to
implement access
authorization
programs upon
receipt of an
operating license
or operating
authorization,
respectively, and
add a requirement
for these entities
to maintain their
access
authorization
programs. The
requirement to
maintain AA
programs would be
added to convey
more accurately
that Sec. 73.56
includes
requirements for
maintaining AA
programs, in
addition to
requirements for
implementing them.
Sec. 73.56(a)(4) The (a)(6) Contractors Proposed Sec.
licensee may accept part of and vendors (C/Vs) 73.56(a)(6) would
an access authorization who implement amend current Sec.
program used by its authorization 73.56(a)(4), which
contractors, vendors, or programs or program permits licensees
other affected elements shall to accept a C/V
organizations and develop, implement, authorization
substitute, supplement, or and maintain program to meet the
duplicate any portion of authorization standards of this
the program as necessary to programs or program section. The
meet the requirements of elements that meet proposed paragraph
this section. In any case, the requirements of would retain the
the licensee is responsible this section, to current permission
for granting, denying, or the extent that the for licensees to
revoking unescorted access licensees and accept C/V
authorization to any applicants authorization
contractor, vendor, or specified in programs, in full
other affected organization paragraphs (a)(1) or in part, but
employee. and (a)(5) of this would also add C/Vs
section rely upon to the list of
those C/V entities who are
authorization subject to proposed
programs or program Sec. 73.56 in
elements to meet order to convey
the requirements of more clearly that C/
this section. In Vs may be directly
any case, only a subject to NRC
licensee or inspection and
applicant shall enforcement actions
grant or permit an than the current
individual to rule language
maintain unescorted implies.
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
[[Page 62735]]
This change is
necessary to
clarify the
applicability of
the rule's
requirements to a C/
V's authorization
program because
several
requirements in the
current section
could be
interpreted as
implying that a C/V
is accountable to
the licensee but
not to the NRC,
should significant
weaknesses be
identified in the C/
V's authorization
program upon which
one or more
licensees rely.
However, this
interpretation
would be incorrect.
Therefore, proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
would include C/V
authorization
programs and
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants rely
within the scope of
this section to
convey more
accurately that
these C/Vs are
directly
accountable to the
NRC for meeting the
applicable
requirements of
Sec. 73.56. This
clarification is
also necessary to
maintain the
internal
consistency of the
proposed rule
because some
provisions of the
proposed section
apply only to C/Vs,
including, but not
limited to, the
second sentence of
proposed Sec.
73.56(n)(7). The
proposed paragraph
would also retain
the intent of the
current requirement
that only licensees
and applicants have
the authority to
grant or permit an
individual to
maintain unescorted
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
The phrases,
``program
elements'' and ``to
the extent that * *
*,'' would replace
the second sentence
of current Sec.
73.56(a)(4), which
permits licensees
to accept part of
an authorization
program used by its
contractors,
vendors, or other
affected
organizations and
substitute,
supplement, or
duplicate any
portion of the
program as
necessary to meet
the requirements of
this section. The
proposed change
would retain the
meaning of the
current provision,
but would clarify
the intent of the
provision in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees. The
phrase, ``program
elements,'' would
replace ``part of
an access
authorization
program,'' to more
clearly convey that
the parts of an
authorization
program to which
this provision
refers are the
program elements
that are required
under current and
proposed Sec.
73.56, including a
background
investigation;
psychological
assessment;
behavioral
observation; a
review procedure
for adverse
determinations
regarding an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability;
audits; the
protection of
information; and
retaining and
sharing records.
[[Page 62736]]
The phrase, ``to the
extent that the
licensees and
applicants rely
upon C/V
authorization
programs or program
elements,'' would
be used in proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
to clarify that C/
Vs need only meet
the requirements of
this section for
those authorization
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely. This
change would be
made to address two
issues. First, ``to
the extent that''
would be used to
indicate that C/Vs
need not implement
every element of an
AA program in order
for licensees to
rely on the program
elements that a C/V
does implement in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section. For
example, if a C/V
conducts background
investigations upon
which licensees
rely in making
unescorted access
authorization
determinations, the
background
investigations must
meet the
requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)]. However,
the C/V need not
also perform
psychological
assessments or any
other services for
licensees in order
for licensees to
rely on the
background
investigations that
the C/V performs.
Second, the phrase,
``to the extent
that,'' would also
indicate that any
elements of an
authorization
program that a C/V
implements that are
not relied upon by
licensees need not
meet the
requirements of
this section.
For example, if the
same C/V in the
previous example
also offers
psychological
assessment
services, in
addition to
conducting
background
investigations for
licensees, but no
licensees or
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely on
those psychological
assessment services
to make unescorted
access
authorization
decisions, then the
C/V need not meet
the requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(e)] for
conducting those
psychological
assessments. These
proposed changes to
the terms used in
current Sec.
73.56(a)(4) would
be made for
increased clarity
in the language of
the rule.
(b) Individuals who A new Sec.
are subject to an 73.56(b)
authorization [Individuals who
program. are subject to an
(b)(1) The following AA program] would
individuals shall specify the
be subject to an individuals who
authorization must be subject to
program:. an AA program,
based on their job
duties and
responsibilities.
Current Sec.
73.56 requires only
that individuals
who have unescorted
access to protected
and vital areas
shall be subject to
an AA program. The
proposed rule would
add several
categories of
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed AA
program, for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
each paragraph that
addresses the
additional
categories of
individuals who
would be covered.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(b) would be
added for clarity
in the organization
of the proposed
section by grouping
together in one
list the
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed
regulations.
[[Page 62737]]
Sec. 73.56(b) General (b)(1)(i) Any Proposed Sec.
performance objective and individual to whom 73.56(b)(1)(i)
requirements. (1) The a licensee or would retain the
licensee shall establish applicant grants current requirement
and maintain an access unescorted access that any individual
authorization program to nuclear power who has unescorted
granting individuals plant protected and access to nuclear
unescorted access to vital areas. power plant
protected and vital areas * protected and vital
* *. areas shall be
subject to an AA
program that meets
the requirements of
this section. The
current requirement
is embedded in the
first sentence of
current Sec.
73.56(b) [General
performance
objective and
requirements]. The
proposed paragraph
would list this
category of
individuals
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule.
(b)(1)(ii) Any A new Sec.
individual whose 73.56(b)(1)(ii)
assigned duties and would require that
responsibilities individuals who are
permit the assigned duties and
individual to take responsibilities
actions by that permit them to
electronic means, take actions by
either onsite or electronic means
remotely, that that could
could adversely adversely impact a
impact a licensee's licensee's or
or applicant's applicant's
operational safety, operational safety,
security, or security, or
emergency response emergency response
capabilities; and capabilities would
be subject to an AA
program.
The proposed
provision would be
consistent with the
intent of current
Sec. 73.56, which
is to ensure that
anyone who has
unescorted access
to equipment that
is important to the
operational safety
and security of
plant operations
must be trustworthy
and reliable. As
discussed in
Section IV.3,
because of the
increased use of
digital systems and
advanced
communications
technologies in
nuclear power
plants, the current
regulations, which
focus on
individuals who
have physical
access to equipment
within protected
and vital areas, do
not provide
adequate assurance
of the
trustworthiness and
reliability of
persons whose job
duties and
responsibilities
permit them to take
actions through
electronic means
that can affect
operational safety,
security, and
emergency response
capabilities, but
who, because of
advances in
electronic
communications, may
not require
physical access to
protected and vital
areas. For example,
some licensees have
installed systems
that permit
engineers or
information
technology
technicians to take
actions from remote
locations that may
affect the
operability of
safety-related
components, or
affect the
functionality of
operating systems.
Because the
potential impact of
actions taken
through electronic
means may be as
serious as actions
taken by an
individual who is
physically present
within a protected
or vital area, the
NRC has determined
that subjecting
this additional
category of
individuals to the
AA program is
necessary.
[[Page 62738]]
(b)(1)(iii) Any Proposed Sec.
individual who has 73.56(b)(1)(iii)
responsibilities would require that
for implementing a certain individuals
licensee's or who are members of
applicant's the licensee's or
protective applicant's
strategy, security
including, but not organization shall
limited to, armed be subject to an AA
security force program, based on
officers, alarm their
station operators, responsibilities
and tactical for implementing a
response team licensee's
leaders; and protective
strategy. Current
Sec. 73.55
requires that any
armed members of
the security
organization must
be subject to an AA
program, but the
proposed rule would
also list them here
for clarity and
completeness in the
requirements of
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would also include
any individual who
has
responsibilities
for implementing
the licensee's
protective
strategy, which may
include individuals
who are not armed.
In practice, the
NRC is not aware of
any licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
who do not subject
this broader
category of
individuals to an
AA program.
However, the
proposed rule would
specify that these
individuals shall
be subject to an AA
program because of
their critical
responsibilities
with respect to
plant security and,
therefore, the need
for high assurance
that they are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(b)(1)(iv) The Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(1)(iv)
applicant's, or C/ would introduce a
V's reviewing new term,
official. ``reviewing
official,'' to Sec.
73.56 to refer to
an individual who
is designated by a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to be responsible
for reviewing and
evaluating
information about
persons who are
applying for
unescorted access
authorization and
determining whether
to grant, deny,
maintain, or
unfavorably
terminate
unescorted access
authorization. The
proposed paragraph
would require
reviewing officials
to be subject to
the AA program
because of the key
role these
individuals play in
providing high
assurance that
persons who are
granted unescorted
access to protected
areas and
electronic access
to operational
safety, security,
or emergency
response systems
within protected or
vital areas are
trustworthy and
reliable.
In addition,
reviewing
officials' actions
affect the
confidence that the
public, management,
the NRC, and
individuals who are
subject to the AA
program have in the
integrity of the
program and the
accuracy and
reliability of the
authorization
decisions that are
made under the
program. Therefore,
the NRC believes
that reviewing
officials must meet
the highest
standards for
trustworthiness and
reliability,
including the
requirements of an
AA program.
[[Page 62739]]
(b)(2) At the Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(2) would
applicant's, or C/ recognize the long-
V's discretion, standing industry
other individuals practice, which has
who are designated been endorsed by
in access the NRC, of
authorization subjecting
program procedures additional
may be subject to individuals to
an authorization authorization
program that meets requirements during
the requirements of periods when those
this section. individuals do not
require and have
not been granted
unescorted access
to protected or
vital areas. For
example, some C/Vs,
whose personnel may
be called upon by a
licensee to work at
a licensee's site
under contract,
implement full
authorization
programs to cover
those personnel.
Similarly, some
licensees require
employees who are
normally stationed
at their corporate
headquarters to be
subject to an
authorization
program, for such
access, is referred
to as having
``unescorted
access'' (UA).
The proposed
paragraph would be
added to give
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who implement
authorization
programs that meet
the requirements of
this part the
authority to do so
under the proposed
rule.
Sec. 73.56(b) General (c) General Proposed Sec.
performance objective and performance 73.56(c) would
requirements. (1) The objective. Access retain the meaning
licensee shall establish authorization of the current
and maintain an access programs must program performance
authorization program provide high objective, which is
granting individuals assurance that the embedded in current
unescorted access to individuals who are Sec. 73.56(b),
protected and vital areas specified in but would separate
with the objective of paragraph (b)(1) of it from the
providing high assurance this section, and, requirement in the
that individuals granted if applicable, current paragraph
unescorted access are (b)(2) of this for licensees to
trustworthy and reliable, section are establish and
and do not constitute an trustworthy and maintain an AA
unreasonable risk to the reliable, such that program. The
health and safety of the they do not requirement to
public including a constitute an establish and
potential to commit unreasonable risk maintain AA
radiological sabotage. to public health programs would be
and safety or the moved to proposed
common defense and Sec. 73.56(a),
security, including where it would be
the potential to imposed on each
commit radiological entity who would be
sabotage. subject to the
section, for
organizational
clarity. The
performance
objective would be
revised to add
cross-references to
the categories of
individuals who
must be subject to
an authorization
program, as
specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(b), because
the proposed rule
would require that
certain
individuals, in
addition to those
who have unescorted
physical access to
protected and vital
areas of a nuclear
power plant, would
be subject to the
AA program, as
discussed with
respect to Sec.
73.56(b).
In addition, the
phrase, ``common
defense and
security,'' would
be added to the
proposed paragraph
to convey the
purpose of
authorization
programs more
specifically, which
would include
protection of the
public from the
potential insider
activities defined
in current Sec.
73.1(a)(1)(B) and
(a)(2)(B).
[[Page 62740]]
Sec. 73.56(2) Except as (d) Background Proposed Sec.
provided for in paragraphs investigation. In 73.56(d) would
(c) and (d) of this order to grant amend current Sec.
section, the unescorted unescorted access 73.56(b)(2)(i),
access authorization authorization to an which requires
program must include the individual, the authorization
following: (i) A background licensees, programs to include
investigation designed to applicants and C/Vs a background
identify past actions which specified in investigation and
are indicative of an paragraph (a) of describes the
individual's future this section shall aspects of an
reliability within a ensure that the individual's
protected or vital area of individual has been background to be
a nuclear power reactor. As subject to a investigated.
a minimum, the background background Proposed Sec.
investigation must verify investigation. The 73.56(d) would
an individual's * * *. background retain the
investigation must requirements of the
include, but is not current paragraph,
limited to, the but increase the
following elements: level of detail
with which they are
specified in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees and in
order to increase
consistency among
authorization
programs, as
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Because the
requirements in the
proposed rule would
be more detailed,
the current
paragraph would be
restructured and
subdivided to
present
requirements for
each element of the
background
investigation in a
separate paragraph.
This change would
be made for
increased clarity
in the organization
of the rule. The
cross-references to
paragraphs (c) and
(d) in the current
provision would be
deleted because
they would no
longer apply in the
reorganized
section.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
individual has been
subject to a
background
investigation,''
because completion
of every element of
a background
investigation may
not be required
each time an
individual applies
for UAA. As
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.46(h)(1)
and (h)(2), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, in order to
meet the
requirements of
this section, to
accept and rely on
certain background
investigation
elements,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who are subject
this section. This
permission would
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
by eliminating
redundancies in
authorization
program elements
that cover the same
subject matter and
periods of time.
However, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
paragraphs (h) and
(i)(1) of this
section, the
proposed rule would
establish time
limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
authorization
program elements to
which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation
element,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training was
conducted.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them.
[[Page 62741]]
(d)(1) Informed Proposed Sec.
consent. The 73.56(d)(1) would
licensees, require the
applicants, and C/ entities who are
Vs specified in subject to this
paragraph (a) of section to obtain
this section may written consent
not initiate any from any individual
element of a who is applying for
background UAA before the
investigation licensee,
without the applicant, or C/V
knowledge and initiates any
written consent of element of the
the subject background
individual. investigation that
Licensees, is required in this
applicants, and C/ section. The
Vs shall inform the practice of
individual of his obtaining the
or her right to individual's
review information written consent for
collected to assure the background
its accuracy and investigation has
provide the been endorsed by
individual with an the NRC and
opportunity to incorporated into
correct any licensees' Physical
inaccurate or Security Plans
incomplete since Sec. 73.56
information that is was first
developed by promulgated. It is
licensees, necessary to
applicants, and C/ protect the privacy
Vs about the rights of
individual. individuals who are
applying for UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to inform the
individual of his
or her right to
review information
that is developed
by the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to verify its
accuracy, and have
the opportunity to
correct any
misinformation.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6) would
further require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to ensure that any
necessary
corrections are
made to information
about the
individual that has
been recorded in
the information-
sharing mechanism
that would be
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), as
discussed with
respect to that
paragraph. These
are also industry
practices that have
been endorsed by
the NRC and
incorporated into
licensees' Physical
Security Plans.
Permitting the
individual to
review and have the
opportunity to
correct personal
information that is
collected about him
or her is necessary
to maintain
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of
authorization
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may result
from an inability
to gain unescorted
access to protected
areas, based upon
incorrect
information.
Requiring the
entities who are
subject to this
section to correct
information
contained in the
information-sharing
mechanism, as would
be required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), is
necessary to
maintain the
integrity of the
personal
information shared
among the entities
who would be
subject to the
proposed section,
and the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62742]]
(d)(1)(i) The Proposed Sec.
subject individual 73.56(d)(1)(i)
may withdraw his or would specify that
her consent at any an individual who
time. The licensee, has given his or
applicant or C/V to her written consent
whom the individual for a background
has applied for investigation under
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization shall 73.56(d)(1) may
inform the withdraw that
individual that-- consent at any
(A) Withdrawal of time. However,
his or her consent because a
will withdraw the background
individual's investigation is
current application one of the
for access requirements for
authorization under granting UAA, and
the licensee's, because the
applicant's or C/ background
V's authorization investigation
program; and. cannot be completed
(B) Other licensees, without the subject
applicants and C/Vs individual's
will have access to consent, proposed
information Sec.
documenting the 73.56(d)(1)(i)(A)
withdrawal through would specify that
the information- the licensee,
sharing mechanism applicant, or C/V
required under to whom the
paragraph (o)(6) of individual has
this section.. applied for UAA
must inform the
individual who has
withdrawn consent
that withdrawal of
consent will
terminate the
individual's
current application
for UAA. In
addition, the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
by proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B)
to notify the
individual that
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs will have access
to information
documenting the
withdrawal through
the information-
sharing mechanism
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6). That
proposed paragraph
would require that
information
specified in the
licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA, must be
recorded and
retained in a
database that is
administered as an
information-sharing
mechanism by
licensees and
applicants subject
to Sec. 73.56.
(d)(1)(ii) If an Proposed Sec.
individual 73.56(d)(1)(ii)
withdraws his or would establish
her consent, the several
licensees, requirements
applicants and C/Vs related to a
specified in withdrawal of
paragraph (a) of consent by an
this section may individual who has
not initiate any applied for UAA.
elements of the The proposed
background paragraph would
investigation that require the
were not in entities who are
progress at the subject to this
time the individual section to document
withdrew his or her the individual's
consent, but shall withdrawal of
complete any consent, and
background complete and
investigation document any
elements that are elements of the
in progress at the background
time consent is investigation that
withdrawn. In the had been initiated
information-sharing before the time at
mechanism required which an individual
under paragraph withdraws his or
(o)(6) of this her consent, and
section, the would prohibit the
licensee, initiation of any
applicant, or C/V element that was
shall record the not in progress.
individual's For example, if a
application for licensee had
unescorted access submitted a request
authorization; his to a credit history
or her withdrawal reporting agency
of consent for the before an
background individual withdrew
investigation; the his or her consent,
reason given by the the proposed
individual for the paragraph would
withdrawal, if any; require the
and any pertinent licensee to
information document the credit
collected from the history information
background that is obtained
investigation about the
elements that were individual, even if
completed. the licensee
receives the credit
history report
after the date on
which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent.
However, if the
licensee had not
yet requested
information about
the individual's
military service
history at the time
the individual
withdraws consent,
the proposed
provision would
prohibit the
licensee from
initiating a
request for
military service
history
information. There
are many reasons
that an individual
may withdraw his or
her consent for the
background
investigation.
[[Page 62743]]
In most instances,
the reason that an
individual
withdraws his or
her consent is
legitimate, such as
a change in the
individual's work
assignment.
However, in some
instances, the NRC
is aware that
individuals have
withdrawn consent
for the background
investigation in
order to attempt to
prevent the
discovery of
adverse information
or the sharing of
adverse information
already discovered
about the
individual by the
licensee with other
licensees. If the
licensee were to
stop all
information
gathering at the
time at which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent,
the likelihood that
the adverse
information would
be discovered would
be reduced. As a
result, the
individual could be
afforded an
opportunity to
create a risk to
public health and
safety and the
common defense and
security by having
physical access to
a protected or
vital area, and
most importantly,
be in a position to
observe the
licensee's security
posture by
obtaining access to
a licensee facility
under escort,
because a rigorous
background
investigation is
not required for
individuals who
``visit'' a nuclear
power plant under
escort.
Similarly, if
information that
had been requested
by the licensee,
such as a criminal
history report
under proposed Sec.
73.57
[Requirements for
criminal history
checks of
individuals granted
unescorted access
to a nuclear power
facility or access
to safeguards
information by
power reactor
licensees] of this
chapter or the
credit history
report under
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(5), was
received by the
licensee after the
time the individual
withdrew consent
and contained
adverse
information, but
that adverse
information was not
documented in the
information-sharing
mechanism required
under proposed
paragraph (o)(6) of
this section, the
individual also
could be
inappropriately
permitted to visit
under escort the
same or another
site because the
adverse information
would not be
available for
review. Therefore,
the proposed
provisions would be
necessary to
maintain the
effectiveness of AA
programs in
protecting public
health and safety
and the common
defense and
security by
ensuring that all
available
information about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA is documented
and shared, while
also protecting the
privacy rights of
individuals by
initiating no
further elements of
the background
investigation when
an individual
withdraws his or
her consent.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to create a
record, accessible
to other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, of the fact
that an individual
withdrew his or her
consent to the
background
investigation and
the reason for the
withdrawal. This
record would need
to be created in
the information-
sharing mechanism
required by
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), in
order for
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to carry out the
notice requirement
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B).
[[Page 62744]]
Sec. 73.56(4) Failure by (d)(1)(iii) The
an individual to report any licensees,
previous suspension, applicants, and C/
revocation, or denial of Vs specified in
unescorted access to paragraph (a) of
nuclear power reactors is this section shall
considered sufficient cause inform, in writing,
for denial of unescorted any individual who
access authorization. is applying for
unescorted access
authorization that
the following
actions related to
providing and
sharing the
personal
information under
this section are
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization:
(A) Refusal to
provide written
consent for the
background
investigation;.
(B) Refusal to
provide or the
falsification of
any personal
history information
required under this
section, including
the failure to
report any previous
denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization;
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(iii)
would replace
current Sec.
73.56(b)(4). The
proposed paragraph
would retain the
intent of the
current provision
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), but
would add other
actions related to
providing and
sharing personal
information that
would be sufficient
cause for a
reviewing official
to deny or
unfavorably
terminate an
individual's UAA.
Proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(B) of
this section would
add falsification
of any personal
history information
as a sufficient
reason to deny or
unfavorably
terminate UAA in
order to deter
falsification
attempts..
(C) Refusal to Proposed paragraph
provide written (d)(1)(iii)(D) of
consent for the this section would
sharing of personal add failure to
information with comply with the
other licensees, arrest-reporting
applicants, or C/Vs requirements of
required under proposed paragraph
paragraph (d)(4)(v) (g) of this section
of this section; as a sufficient
and reason to deny or
(D) Failure to unfavorably
report any arrests terminate UAA in
or formal actions order to deter
specified in individuals from
paragraph (g) of delaying or failing
this section.. to report such
incidents. The
additional actions
that would be
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination would
include: refusing
to provide written
consent for the
background
investigation that
would be required
under proposed
paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(A) of
this section;
refusing to provide
personal history
information
required under
paragraph (d)(2) of
this section, in
proposed
(d)(1)(iii)(B); and
refusing to provide
written consent for
the individual's
personal
information to be
shared among the
entities who would
be subject to this
section that would
be required under
paragraph (d)(4)(v)
of this section, in
proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(C).
[[Page 62745]]
The proposed rule
would specify these
requirements for
the disclosure and
sharing of personal
information because
implementation of
the AA programs
required under this
section requires
individuals to
disclose and permit
the sharing of such
personal
information,
subject to the
protections of such
information that
would be provided
in proposed Sec.
73.56(m). The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to inform
individuals of the
potential
consequences of
these actions so
that individuals
understand the
requirements to
which they are
subject and,
therefore, would be
more likely to
comply with them.
The proposed
paragraph would
delete the terms,
``suspension'' and
``revocation,'' and
replace them with
the term,
``unfavorable
termination.''
Historically, there
have been some
inconsistencies
between Sec.
73.56 access
authorization
requirements and
related
requirements in 10
CFR part 26 that
have led to
implementation
questions from
licensees, as well
as inconsistencies
in how the
licensees have
implemented the
requirements.
During the public
meetings discussed
in Section IV.3,
the stakeholders
provided examples
of ambiguities in
the terms used in
Sec. 73.56 and
how these
ambiguities and
lack of clarity in
Sec. 73.56 had
resulted in
unintended
consequences.
Therefore, to
address stakeholder
requests for
clarity and
consistently
describe the
actions of denying
UAA to an
individual and
terminating an
individual's UAA
for cause in
proposed Sec.
73.56, only the
terms, ``deny or
denial'' and
``unfavorably
terminate or
unfavorable
termination,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph and
throughout the
proposed section.
(d)(2) Personal Proposed Sec.
history disclosure. 73.56(d)(2) would
(i) Any individual require an
who is applying for individual who is
unescorted access applying for UAA to
authorization shall provide the
disclose the personal
personal history information that is
information that is required under the
required by the licensee's,
licensee's, applicant's, or C/
applicant's, or C/ V's authorization
V's authorization program, and any
program and any information that
information that may be necessary
may be necessary for the reviewing
for the reviewing official to
official to make a evaluate the
determination of individual's
the individual's trustworthiness and
trustworthiness and reliability. The
reliability.. proposed provision
would be added to
impose a
requirement on
individuals to
divulge personal
information in
order to be granted
UAA, in response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62746]]
The proposed
paragraph would not
specify the nature
of the information
that individuals
may be required to
disclose because
the information may
vary widely,
depending upon a
number of factors,
including, but not
limited to, whether
or not the
individual has
previously held
UAA; the length of
time that has
elapsed since his
or her last period
of UAA was
terminated; the job
duties and
responsibilities
that the individual
would perform for
which UAA is
required; and
whether any adverse
information about
the individual is
disclosed or
discovered as a
result of the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, or the
suitable inquiry
and drug and
alcohol testing
required under part
26 of this chapter.
Although the amount
and nature of
information to be
disclosed would
vary depending on
the factors
described,
individuals
applying for UAA
would be required
to disclose some
personal history
information each
time he or she
applies for UAA, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
[Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
(d)(2)(ii) Proposed Sec.
Licensees, 73.56(d)(2)(ii)
applicants, and C/ would prohibit a
Vs may not require licensee,
an individual to applicant, or C/V
disclose an from requiring an
administrative individual to
withdrawal of report an
unescorted access administrative
authorization under withdrawal of UAA
the requirements of that may be
paragraphs (g), required under
(h)(7), or proposed Sec.
(i)(1)(v) of this 73.56(g), (h)(7),
section, if the or (i)(1)(v),
individual's except if the
unescorted access information
authorization was developed or
not subsequently discovered about
denied or the individual
terminated during the period
unfavorably by a of the
licensee, administrative
applicant, or C/V. withdrawal resulted
in a denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
ensure that a
temporary
administrative
withdrawal of an
individual's UAA,
caused by an
administrative
delay in completing
an evaluation of
any formal legal
action, or any
portion of a
background
investigation, re-
investigation, or
psychological
assessment or re-
assessment that is
not under the
individual's
control, would not
be treated as an
unfavorable
termination, except
if the reviewing
official determines
that the delayed
information
requires denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
This proposed
provision would be
necessary to
maintain the
public's and
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of AA
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may be based
upon administrative
delays for which
they are not
responsible.
[[Page 62747]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(3) Verification Proposed Sec.
true identity, and develop of true identity. 73.56(d)(3) would
information concerning an Licensees, expand on the
individual's employment applicants, and C/ portion of current
history, education history, Vs shall verify the Sec.
credit history, criminal true identity of an 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
history, military service, individual who is requires licensees
and verify an individual's applying for to verify an
character and reputation. unescorted access individual's true
authorization in identity. The
order to ensure proposed paragraph
that the applicant would require the
is the person that entities who are
he or she has subject to this
claimed to be. At a section, at a
minimum, licensees, minimum, to
applicants, and C/ validate the social
Vs shall validate security number, or
the social security in the case of
number that the foreign nationals,
individual has the alien
provided, and, in registration
the case of foreign number, that the
nationals, the individual has
alien registration provided to the
number that the licensee, applicant
individual or C/V. The term,
provides. In ``validation,''
addition, would be used in
licensees, the proposed
applicants, and C/ paragraph to
Vs shall also indicate that
determine whether licensees,
the results of the applicants and C/Vs
fingerprinting would be required
required under Sec. to take steps to
73.21 confirm the access information
individual's in addition to that
claimed identity, provided by the
if such results are individual from
available. other reliable
sources to ensure
that the personal
identifying
information the
individual has
provided to the
licensee is
authentic. This
validation could be
achieved through a
variety of means,
including, but not
limited to,
accessing
information from
databases that are
maintained by the
Federal Government,
or evaluating an
accumulation of
information, such
as comparing the
social security
number the
individual provided
to the social
security number(s)
included in a
credit history
report and
information
obtained from other
sources.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require using
the information
obtained from
fingerprinting
individuals, as
required under
proposed Sec.
73.21, to confirm
an individual's
identity, if that
information is
available. The
proposed
requirement
clarifies the NRC's
intent with respect
to this portion of
the background
investigation.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4) Employment Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(4) would
concerning an individual's Licensees, amend the portion
employment history * * *. applicants, and C/ of current Sec.
Vs shall ensure 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
that an employment requires licensees
history evaluation to develop
has been completed, information
by questioning the concerning an
individual's individual's
present and former employment history,
employers, and by education history,
determining the and military
activities of service. This
individuals while paragraph would be
unemployed. added in response
to many
implementation
questions about
these requirements
from licensees.
Because the
proposed paragraph
would add several
clarifications of
the current
requirements, it
would be subdivided
to present each
requirement
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule. Considered
together, the
requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
clarify the NRC's
intent that periods
of unemployment,
education, and
military service
must be evaluated
only if the
individual claims
them instead of
typical civilian
employment.
[[Page 62748]]
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
require licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to demonstrate a
best effort to
complete the
employment history
evaluation. The
term, ``best
effort,'' would be
added to clarify
the requirements
and increase
consistency between
Sec. 73.56 and
related
requirements in 10
CFR 26.27(a). The
best effort
criterion
recognizes
licensees',
applicants', and C/
Vs' status as
commercial entities
with no legal
authority to
require the release
of the information
from other private
employers and
educational
institutions.
Because of privacy
and potential
litigation
concerns, some
private employers
and educational
institutions may be
unable or unwilling
to release
qualitative
information about a
former employee or
student. Therefore,
the best effort
criterion would
first require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to seek
employment
information from
the primary source
(e.g. a company,
private employer,
or educational
institution that
the applicant has
listed on his or
her employment
history), but
recognizes that it
may not be
forthcoming. In
this case a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
to seek information
from an alternate,
secondary source
when the
information from
the primary source
is unavailable.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
employment history
evaluation has been
completed,''
because a licensee,
applicant, or C/V
may not be required
to conduct an
employment history
evaluation for
every individual
who applies for
UAA. As discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(3) and
(h)(4), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to accept and
rely on elements of
the background
investigations,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other entities
who are subject to
this section to
meet the
requirements of
this section.
Therefore, the need
for and extent of
the employment
history evaluation
would vary,
depending upon how
much recent
information was
available to the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from any previous
periods during
which the
individual may have
held UAA. In the
case of individuals
whose UAA has been
interrupted for 30
or fewer days,
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) would not
require an
employment history
evaluation for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
that paragraph.
[[Page 62749]]
However, proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
would establish
time limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
AA program elements
to which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training elements
were completed.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them. The proposed
provision would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to determine the
activities of
individuals during
periods in which
the individual was
unemployed. The
proposed rule would
add this
requirement to make
certain that,
during the periods
that individuals
claim to have been
unemployed, (1)
they were not
engaged in
activities that may
reflect adversely
on their
trustworthiness and
reliability, such
as confinement for
periods of
incarceration or in-
patient drug or
alcohol treatment,
or (2) they
intentionally
failed to disclose
periods of
employment that
were ended
unfavorably.
(d)(4)(i) For the A new Sec.
claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(i)
period, the would specify the
employment history purpose of the
evaluation must employment history
ascertain the evaluation, which
reason for would be to
termination, ascertain
eligibility for information about
rehire, and other the individual's
information that trustworthiness and
could reflect on reliability, and
the individual's the types of
trustworthiness and information that
reliability. the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would seek from
employers regarding
an individual who
is applying for
UAA. The proposed
paragraph would
require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to
ascertain,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion
established in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), the
reason that the
individual's
employment was
terminated, his or
her eligibility for
rehire, and other
information that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
term,
``ascertain,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph because
it is consistent
with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
conducting the
employment history
evaluation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
may be instances in
which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
employment history
evaluation, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
because proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(2)
would permit the
entities who
implement
authorization
programs to rely on
employment history
evaluations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was developed
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
employment history
by reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The
proposed
requirement would
be added in
response to
implementation
questions that have
arisen about the
employment history
check that is
required in current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i).
[[Page 62750]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(ii) If the Proposed Sec.
the background claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(ii)
investigation must * * * was military would amend the
develop information service, the portion of current
concerning an individual's licensee, Sec. 73.56(2)(i)
* * * military service * * applicant, or C/V that requires
*. who is conducting licensees to
the employment develop information
history evaluation about an
shall request a individual's
characterization of military service.
service, reason for The proposed
separation, and any paragraph would
disciplinary clarify the NRC's
actions that could intent that
affect a verification and
trustworthiness and characterization of
reliability the individual's
determination. military service
would be required
only if the
individual claims
military service as
employment within
the periods during
which the
individual would be
required to
disclose his or her
employment history,
as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) [Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
This clarification
would respond to
implementation
questions from
licensees and
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(iii) Periods Proposed Sec.
and develop information of self-employment 73.56(d)(4)(iii)
concerning an individual's or unemployment may would be added at
* * * education history, * be verified by any the request of
* *. reasonable method. stakeholders at the
If education is public meetings
claimed in lieu of discussed in
employment, the Section IV.3 to
licensee, clarify the NRC's
applicant, or C/V intent with respect
shall request to periods of self-
information that employment,
could reflect on unemployment, or
the individual's education, if the
trustworthiness and individual claims
reliability and, at such activities
a minimum, verify within the periods
that the individual during which the
was actively individual would be
participating in required to
the educational disclose his or her
process during the employment history,
claimed period. as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h).
The proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to use any
reasonable means,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), to
verify the
individual's
activities during
claimed periods of
self-employment and
unemployment.
Reasonable means to
verify the
individual's
activities may
include, but would
not be limited to,
a review of
business or tax
records documenting
the individual's
self-employment,
copies of
unemployment
compensation
checks, or
interviews with
business associates
or acquaintances.
To verify education
in lieu of
employment, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to request
information from
the claimed
educational
institution that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
However, for
reasons that are
similar to those
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
the NRC recognizes
that it may be
difficult to obtain
information from an
educational
institution about
the individual's
behavior while a
student. Therefore,
the proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to verify, at a
minimum, that the
applicant was
attending and
actively
participating in
school during the
claimed period(s).
[[Page 62751]]
(d)(4)(iv) If a Proposed Sec.
company, previous 73.56(d)(4)(iv)
employer, or would further
educational clarify the NRC's
institution to whom intent with respect
the licensee, to the actions that
applicant, or C/V licensees,
has directed a applicants, and C/
request for Vs would take to
information refuses meet the best
to provide effort criterion in
information or proposed Sec.
indicates an 73.56(d)(4), in
inability or response to many
unwillingness to implementation
provide information questions received
within 3 business from licensees. The
days of the proposed paragraph
request, the would address
licensee, circumstances in
applicant, or C/V which a primary
shall document this source of
refusal, inability, information refuses
or unwillingness in to provide
the licensee's, employment
applicant's, or C/ information or
V's record of the indicates an
investigation, and inability or
obtain a unwillingness to
confirmation of provide it within 3
employment or days of the
educational request. Licensees
enrollment and and other entities
attendance from at would be required
least one alternate to document that
source, with the request for
questions answered information was
to the best of the directed to the
alternate source's primary source and
ability. This the nature of the
alternate source response (i.e., a
may not have been refusal, inability,
previously used by or unwillingness).
the licensee, If a licensee,
applicant, or C/V applicant, or C/V
to obtain encounters such
information about circumstances, the
the individual's proposed paragraph
character and would require the
reputation. If the licensee,
licensee, applicant, permit,
applicant, or C/V or C/V to seek
uses an alternate employment history
source because information from an
employment alternate source,
information is not to the extent of
forthcoming within the alternate
3 business days of source's ability to
the request, the provide the
licensee, information. An
applicant, or C/V alternate source
need not delay may include, but
granting unescorted would not be
access limited to, a co-
authorization to worker or
wait for any supervisor at the
employer response, same company who
but shall evaluate had personal
and document the knowledge of the
response if it is applicant, if such
received. an individual could
be located.
However, the
proposed rule would
prohibit the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from using the
alternate source of
employment
information to meet
the requirements in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(6) for a
character
reference, in order
to ensure that the
scope of the
background
investigation is
sufficiently broad
to provide high
assurance that
individuals who are
granted UAA are
trustworthy and
reliable. The
proposed paragraph
would permit
licensees and other
entities to grant
UAA, if warranted,
when a response has
been obtained from
an alternate
source, without
waiting more than 3
days after the
request for
information was
directed to a
primary source. The
3-day period would
be established
because industry
and NRC experience
in implementing
current Sec.
73.56 has shown
that if an employer
or educational
institution intends
to respond to the
request for
information, the
response will be
forthcoming within
this period.
Therefore, there is
no added benefit to
public health and
safety or the
common defense and
security in
requiring
licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
to wait longer than
3 days before
implementing the
alternative methods
of meeting the
employment history
evaluation
requirements that
would be permitted
in the proposed
paragraph.
[[Page 62752]]
However, should the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
receive an employer
response to the
request for
information after
the 3-day period,
the proposed
paragraph would
require that the
implications of the
information must be
evaluated with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability and the
information
documented, so that
it is available to
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs. These changes
would be made to
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
while maintaining
high assurance that
individuals who are
subject to an AA
program are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(d)(4)(v) When any Proposed Sec.
licensee, 73.56(d)(v) would
applicant, or C/V require licensees,
specified in applicants, and C/
paragraph (a) of Vs who are subject
this section is to this section to
legitimately share employment
seeking the history information
information that they have
required for an collected, if
unescorted access contacted by
authorization another licensee,
decision under this applicant, or C/V
section and has who has a release
obtained a signed signed by the
release from the individual who is
subject individual applying for UAA
authorizing the that would permit
disclosure of such the sharing of that
information, a information. This
licensee, proposed provision
applicant, or C/V would amend the
who is subject to requirement to
this section shall release employment
disclose whether history information
the subject in current Sec.
individual's 73.56(f)(2) and
unescorted access would be consistent
authorization was with related
denied or requirements in 10
terminated CFR part 26. The
unfavorably. The proposed provision
licensee, would also clarify
applicant, or C/V that the
who receives the information must
request for also be released to
information shall C/Vs who have
make available the authorization to
information upon programs when the C/
which the denial or V has obtained the
unfavorable required signed
termination of release from the
unescorted access applicant. This
authorization was proposed
based. clarification is
necessary because
some licensees have
misinterpreted
current Sec.
73.56(f)(2) as
prohibiting the
release of
employment history
information to C/Vs
who administer
authorization
programs under this
section. These
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that adequate
information to
serve as a basis
for UAA decisions
can be obtained by
a licensee,
applicant, or C/V.
(d)(4)(vi) In Proposed Sec.
conducting an 73.56(d)(4)(vi)
employment history would permit
evaluation, the licensees,
licensee, applicants, and C/
applicant, or C/V Vs to use
may obtain electronic means of
information and obtaining the
documents by employment history
electronic means, information to
including, but not increase the
limited to, efficiency with
telephone, which licensees,
facsimile, or applicants, and C/V
email. The could obtain the
licensee, employment history
applicant, or C/V information. The
shall make a record proposed paragraph
of the contents of would be added in
the telephone call response to
and shall retain stakeholder
that record, and requests at the
any documents or public meetings
files obtained discussed in
electronically, in Section IV.3, and
accordance with would be consistent
paragraph (o) of with related
this section. requirements in 10
CFR part 26. The
proposed paragraph
would also add a
cross-reference to
the applicable
records retention
requirement in
proposed Sec.
73.56(o) [Records]
to ensure that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs are aware of the
applicability of
these requirements
to the employment
history information
obtained
electronically.
[[Page 62753]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(5) Credit Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(5) would
concerning an individual's The licensees, retain the
* * * credit history, * * *. applicants, and C/ requirement for a
Vs specified in credit history
paragraph (a) of evaluation that is
this section shall embedded in current
ensure that the Sec.
full credit history 73.56(b)(2)(i) and
of any individual provide more
who is applying for detailed
unescorted access requirements, in
authorization has response to
been evaluated. A stakeholder
full credit history requests at the
evaluation must public meetings
include, but would discussed in
not be limited to, Section IV.3. The
an inquiry to proposed paragraph
detect potential would require the
fraud or misuse of credit history
social security evaluation to
numbers or other include an inquiry
financial to detect any past
identifiers, and a instances of fraud
review and or misuse of social
evaluation of all security numbers or
of the information other financial
that is provided by identifiers. This
a national credit- requirement would
reporting agency be added because
about the most credit-
individual's credit reporting agencies
history. require a specific
request for this
information before
they report it, and
the NRC has
determined that
instances of fraud
or misuse of
financial
identifiers, such
as social security
numbers or the
names that an
individual has
used, may provide
important
information about
an individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to review
all of the
information that is
provided by the
national credit-
reporting agency,
as part of the
background
investigation
process.
The proposed
paragraph would use
the term, ``full''
to convey that
there is no time
limit on the number
of years of credit
history information
that the reviewing
official would
consider or other
limitations on
using information
contained in the
credit history
report to assist in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. In the
past, licensees' AA
program procedures
limited the number
of years of the
individual's credit
history that
reviewing officials
were required to
consider in
determining an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. As a
result, some
reviewing officials
may not have
considered credit
history information
for several years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it. As a
result, individuals
who were subject to
different
authorization
programs were
evaluated
inconsistently.
Furthermore, credit
history reporting
agencies also
provide employment
data that can be
compared to the
information
disclosed by the
applicant for UAA
to validate the
individual's
disclosure.
However, some AA
program procedures
did not require the
reviewing official
to make this
comparison.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to consider the
``full'' credit
history report, in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the credit
history evaluation
element of AA
programs and
increase the
consistency with
which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would conduct
the credit history
evaluation.
[[Page 62754]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(6) Character and Proposed Sec.
and develop information reputation. The 73.56(d)(6) would
concerning an individual's licensees, expand on the
* * * character and applicants, and C/ requirement in
reputation. Vs specified in current Sec.
paragraph (a) of 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
this section shall licensees to verify
ascertain the an individual's
character and character and
reputation of an reputation. The
individual who has proposed provision
applied for would require the
unescorted access entities who
authorization by implement AA
conducting programs to develop
reference checks. information about
Reference checks an individual's
may not be trustworthiness and
conducted with any reliability by
person who is known contacting and
to be a close interviewing
member of the associates of the
individual's individual who
family, including would have
but not limited to, knowledge of his or
the individual's her character and
spouse, parents, reputation, but who
siblings, or would not be a
children, or any member of the
individual who individual's
resides in the immediate family or
individual's reside in his or
permanent her household.
household. The Family and
reference checks household members
must focus on the would be excluded
individual's because these
reputation for individuals are
trustworthiness and typically reluctant
reliability. to reveal any
adverse
information, if it
exists. The term,
``ascertain,''
would replace
``verify,'' in the
proposed paragraph
because it is
consistent with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
determining an
individual's
character and
reputation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
would be instances
in which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
character and
reputation
evaluation because
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(4) would
permit the entities
who implement AA
programs to rely on
the background
investigations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was collected
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
character and
reputation by
reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The last
sentence of the
proposed paragraph
would clarify that
the scope of the
reference checks
would be limited to
developing
information that
would be useful to
the reviewing
official in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability for the
UAA decision. This
requirement would
be added in
response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3 for
increased clarity
and specificity in
the regulation's
requirements.
[[Page 62755]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(7) Criminal Proposed Sec.
and develop information history review. The 73.56(d)(7) would
concerning an individual's licensee's, amend the
* * * criminal history * * applicant's, or C/ requirement in
*. V's reviewing current Sec.
official shall 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
evaluate the entire licensees to
criminal history develop information
record of an about an
individual who is individual's
applying for criminal history.
unescorted access The proposed
authorization to provision would
assist in eliminate the
determining whether current requirement
the individual has to develop criminal
a record of history information
criminal activity because proposed
that may adversely Sec. 73.57
impact his or her [Requirements for
trustworthiness and criminal history
reliability. The checks of
criminal history individuals granted
record must be unescorted access
obtained in to a nuclear power
accordance with the facility or access
requirements of to Safeguards
Sec. 73.57. Information by
power reactor
licensees] would
establish the
methods by which
criminal history
information about
individuals who are
applying for UAA
would be obtained
and it is
unnecessary to
repeat those
requirements in
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to review the
individual's entire
criminal history
record. This
requirement would
be necessary
because, in the
past, some
licensees limited
the criminal
history review to
the individual's
history over the
past 5 or fewer
years, but did not
consider criminal
history information
from earlier years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it.
However, the NRC
has determined that
a review of all of
the criminal
history information
that is provided in
a criminal history
record provides
higher assurance
that any instances
or patterns of
lawlessness are
considered when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
incorporate this
requirement in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of AA programs.
Sec. 73.56(d) Requirements Deleted............. Current Sec.
during cold shutdown. (1) 73.56(d)
The licensee may grant [Requirements
unescorted access during during cold
cold shutdown to an shutdown] would be
individual who does not eliminated from the
possess an access proposed rule.
authorization granted in Because of an
accordance with paragraph increased concern
(b) of this section with a potential
provided the licensee insider threat, as
develops and incorporates discussed in
into its Physical Security Section IV.3, the
Plan measures to be taken NRC has determined
to ensure that the that the relaxation
functional capability of of UAA requirements
equipment in areas for permitted in the
which the access current provision
authorization requirement does not meet the
has been relaxed has not Commission's
been impaired by relaxation objective of
of that requirement. (2) providing high
Prior to incorporating such assurance that
measures into its Physical individuals who
Security Plan the licensee have unescorted
shall submit those plan access to protected
changes to the NRC for areas in nuclear
review and approval power plants are
pursuant to Sec. 50.90. trustworthy and
(3) Any provisions in reliable.
licensees' security plans Therefore, the
that allow for relaxation current permission
of access authorization to grant unescorted
requirements during cold access to an
shutdown are superseded by individual without
this rule. Provisions in meeting all of the
licensees' Physical requirements of
Security Plans on April 25, proposed Sec.
1991 that provide for 73.56 would be
devitalization (that is, a eliminated from the
change from vital to proposed rule.
protected area status) Licensees and
during cold shutdown are applicants would
not affected. continue to be
permitted to seek
an exemption from
the requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56 under current
Sec. 73.5
[Specific
exemptions].
[[Page 62756]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(ii) A (e) Psychological Proposed Sec.
psychological assessment assessment. In 73.56(e) would
designed to evaluate the order to assist in amend current Sec.
possible impact of any determining an 73.56(b)(2)(ii),
noted psychological individual's which requires AA
characteristics which may trustworthiness and programs to include
have a bearing on reliability, the a psychological
trustworthiness and licensees, assessment, by
reliability. applicants, and C/ adding several
Vs specified in requirements to the
paragraph (a) of current rule.
this section shall Because the
ensure that a requirements in the
psychological proposed rule would
assessment has been be more detailed,
completed of the the current
individual who is paragraph would be
applying for restructured and
unescorted access subdivided to
authorization. The present the new
psychological requirements in
assessment must be separate
designed to paragraphs. This
evaluate the change would be
possible adverse made for increased
impact of any noted clarity in the
psychological organization of the
characteristics on rule. The proposed
the individual's paragraph would
trustworthiness and retain the current
reliability. requirement for the
psychological
assessment to be
designed to
evaluate the
implications of the
individual's
psychological
characteristics on
his or her
trustworthiness and
reliability in a
separate sentence
for clarity. For
the same reason,
``adverse'' would
be added to more
clearly describe
the intended
purpose of the
psychological
assessment. The
proposed provision
would retain the
intent of the
current requirement
for AA programs to
include a
psychological
assessment, but
would use the
phrase, ``has been
completed,''
because licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs may not be
required to
complete the
psychological
assessment each
time that an
individual applies
for UAA.
As discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(1),
AA programs would
be permitted to
rely on
psychological
assessments that
were completed by
other AA programs.
Individuals who
have been subject
to a psychological
assessment, which
was conducted in
accordance with
requirements of
this proposed
section and
resulted in the
granting of UAA,
within the time
period specified in
the licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan [as discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)],
would not be
required to be
assessed again in
order to be granted
UAA.
(e)(1) A licensed Proposed Sec.
clinical 73.56(e)(1) would
psychologist or establish minimum
psychiatrist shall requirements for
conduct the the credentials of
psychological individuals who
assessment. perform the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii),
which are not
addressed in the
current rule. The
proposed provision
would require a
licensed clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist to
conduct the
psychological
assessment, because
the extensive
education,
training, and
supervised clinical
experience that
these professionals
must possess in
order to be
licensed under
State laws would
provide high
assurance that they
are qualified to
conduct the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
the rule.
The proposed rule
would impose this
new requirement
because of the key
role that the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs
plays in assuring
the public health
and safety and
common defense and
security when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed provision
would be added to
strengthen the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62757]]
(e)(2) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(2) would
assessment must be require
conducted in psychological
accordance with the assessments to be
applicable ethical conducted in
principles for accordance with
conducting such ethical principles
assessments for conducting such
established by the assessments that
American are established by
Psychological the American
Association or Psychological
American Association or the
Psychiatric American
Association. Psychiatric
Association, as
applicable. In
order to meet State
licensure
requirements,
clinical
psychologists and
psychiatrists are
required to
practice in
accordance with the
applicable
professional
standards. However,
the proposed rule
would add a
reference to these
professional
standards to
emphasize the
importance that the
NRC places on the
proper conduct of
psychological
assessments, in
order to ensure the
rights of
individuals,
consistent
treatment, and the
effectiveness of
the psychological
assessment
component of AA
programs.
(e)(3) At a minimum, Proposed Sec.
the psychological 73.56(e)(3) would
assessment must establish new
include the requirements for
administration and the psychological
interpretation of a testing that
standardized, licensees,
objective, applicants, and C/
professionally Vs would conduct as
accepted part of the
psychological test psychological
that provides assessment. The
information to proposed paragraph
identify would require the
indications of administration and
disturbances in interpretation of
personality or an objective
psychopathology psychological test
that may have that provides
implications for an information to aid
individual's in identifying
trustworthiness and personality
reliability. disturbances and
Predetermined psychopathology.
thresholds must be The proposed rule
applied in would specify
interpreting the psychological tests
results of the that are designed
psychological test, to identify
to determine indications of
whether an personality
individual shall be disturbances and
interviewed by a psychopathology
psychiatrist or because some of
licensed clinical these conditions
psychologist under may reflect
paragraph (e)(4)(i) adversely on an
of this section. individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed rule would
not prohibit the
use of other types
of psychological
tests, such as
personality
inventories and
tests of abilities,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
test that
identifies
indications of
personality
disturbances and
psychopathology
because the
identification of
these conditions is
most relevant to
the purpose of the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs. The
proposed provision
would also require
the use of
standardized,
objective
psychological tests
to reduce potential
variability in the
testing that is
conducted under
this section.
[[Page 62758]]
Decreasing potential
variability in
testing is
important to
provide greater
assurance than in
the past that
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA are
treated
consistently under
the proposed rule.
The proposed rule
would not prohibit
the use of other
types of
psychological
tests, such as
projective tests,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
standardized,
objective test to
facilitate the
psychological re-
assessments that
would be required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
Comparing scores on
a standardized,
objective test to
identify
indications of any
adverse changes in
the individual's
psychological
status is
simplified when the
testing that is
performed for a re-
assessment is
similar to or the
same as previous
testing that was
conducted under
this section,
particularly when
the clinician who
conducts the re-
assessment did not
conduct the
previous testing.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to establish
thresholds in
interpreting the
results of the
psychological test,
to aid in
determining whether
an individual would
be required to be
interviewed by a
psychiatrist or
licensed clinical
psychologist under
proposed paragraph
(e)(4)(ii) of this
section.
The NRC is aware of
substantial
variability in the
thresholds used by
authorization
programs in the
past to determine
whether an
individual's test
results provided
indications of
personality
disturbances or
psychopathology.
Different clinical
psychologists
providing services
to the same or
different AA
programs would vary
in the thresholds
they applied in
determining whether
an individual's
test results
indicated the need
for further
evaluation in a
clinical interview.
As a consequence,
whether or not
individuals who had
the same patterns
of scores on the
psychological test
would be subject to
a clinical
interview would
vary both within
and between AA
programs. The
proposed rule would
add a requirement
for predetermined
thresholds to
reduce this
variability in
order to protect
the rights of
individuals who are
subject to AA
programs to fair
and consistent
treatment.
[[Page 62759]]
(e)(4) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(4) would
assessment must establish
include a clinical requirements for
interview-- the conditions
(i) If an under which the
individual's scores psychological
on the assessment must
psychological test include a clinical
in paragraph (e)(3) interview. Proposed
of this section Sec.
identify 73.56(e)(4)(i)
indications of would require a
disturbances in clinical interview
personality or if an individual's
psychopathology scores on the
that may have psychological test
implications for an identified
individual's indications of
trustworthiness and disturbances in
reliability; or. personality or
(ii) If the psychopathology
licensee's or that would
applicant's necessitate further
Physical Security assessment. The
Plan requires a clinical interview
clinical interview would be performed
based on job by a licensed
assignments.. clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist,
consistent with the
ethical principles
for conducting
psychological
assessments that
are established by
the American
Psychological
Association or the
American
Psychiatric
Association. The
purposes of the
clinical interview
would include, but
would not be
limited to,
validating the test
results and
assessing their
implications for
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(e)(4)(ii)
would also require
a clinical
interview for some
individuals who
would be identified
in the licensee's
or applicant's
Physical Security
Plan. In general,
the individuals who
would always
receive a clinical
interview before
being granted UAA
would be those who
perform critical
operational and
security-related
functions at the
licensee's site.
The proposed
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that any noted
psychological
characteristics of
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA do
not adversely
affect their
trustworthiness and
reliability.
(e)(5) If, in the A new Sec.
course of 73.56(e)(5) would
conducting the require the
psychological psychologist or
assessment, the psychiatrist who
licensed clinical conducts the
psychologist or psychological
psychiatrist assessment to
identifies report to the
indications of, or reviewing official
information related any information
to, a medical obtained through
condition that conducting the
could adversely assessment that
impact the indicates the
individual's individual may have
fitness for duty or a medical condition
trustworthiness and that could
reliability, the adversely affect
psychologist or his or her fitness
psychiatrist shall for duty or
inform the trustworthiness and
reviewing official, reliability. For
who shall ensure example, some
that an appropriate psychological tests
evaluation of the identify
possible medical indications of a
condition is substance abuse
conducted under the problem. Or, an
requirements of individual may
part 26 of this disclose during the
chapter. clinical interview
that he or she is
taking prescription
medications that
could cause
impairment. In
these instances,
the proposed rule
would require the
reviewing official
to ensure that the
potential impact of
any possible
medical condition
on the individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability is
evaluated. The
term,
``appropriate,''
would be used with
respect to the
medical evaluation
to recognize that
healthcare
professionals vary
in their
qualifications.
[[Page 62760]]
For example, a
psychiatrist who
conducts the
assessment would be
qualified to assess
the potential
impacts on an
individual's
fitness for duty of
any psychoactive
medications the
individual may be
taking, whereas a
substance abuse
professional, nurse
practitioner, or
other licensed
physician may not.
The NRC is aware of
instances in which
indications of a
substance problem
or other medical
condition that
could adversely
affect an
individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability were
identified during
the psychological
assessment, but
were not
communicated to
fitness-for-duty
program personnel
and, therefore,
were not evaluated
as part of the
access
authorization
decision. The
proposed paragraph
would be added to
ensure that
information about
potential medical
conditions is
communicated and
evaluated. This
provision would be
added to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the access
authorization
process.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(iii) (f) Behavioral Proposed Sec.
Behavioral observation, observation. Access 73.56(f)
conducted by supervisors authorization [Behavioral
and management personnel, programs must observation] would
designed to detect include a replace current
individual behavioral behavioral Sec.
changes which, if left observation element 73.56(b)(2)(iii),
unattended, could lead to that is designed to which requires
acts detrimental to the detect behaviors or licensees' AA
public health and safety. activities that may programs to include
constitute an a behavioral
unreasonable risk observation
to the health and element, to be
safety of the conducted by
public and common supervisors and
defense and management
security, including personnel, and
a potential threat designed to detect
to commit individual
radiological behavioral changes
sabotage. which, if left
unattended, could
lead to acts
detrimental to the
public health and
safety. The
proposed paragraph
would amend the
requirements of the
current paragraph
and add others.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f) would
amend the objective
of the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs in
the current
provision. The
proposed paragraph
would eliminate the
current reference
to behavior changes
which, if left
unattended, could
lead to detrimental
acts. Although
detecting and
evaluating behavior
changes in order to
determine whether
they may lead to
acts detrimental to
the public health
and safety is
important, the
behavioral
observation element
of fitness-for-duty
programs that is
required under 10
CFR 26.22(a)(4)
also addresses this
objective.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would be revised,
in part, to
eliminate this
redundancy.
[[Page 62761]]
In addition, the
current provision's
requirement for
behavioral
observation to
focus only on
detecting behavior
changes is too
narrow. The NRC
intends that
behavioral
observation must
also be conducted
in order to
increase the
likelihood that
potentially adverse
behavior patterns
and actions will be
detected and
evaluated before
there is an
opportunity for
such behavior
patterns or acts to
result in
detrimental
consequences. For
example, experience
in other industries
has shown that an
individual's
unusual interest in
an organization's
security activities
and operations that
are outside the
scope of the
individual's normal
work assignments
may be an
indication that the
individual is
gathering
intelligence for
adversarial
purposes. If the
behavioral
observation element
of AA programs
focuses only on
behavior changes,
and an individual
has demonstrated a
pattern of
``unusual
interest'' since
starting work for
the licensee, other
persons who are
aware of the
individual's
behavior pattern
may not consider
the behavior to be
a potential concern
and, therefore, may
not raise the
concern. As a
result, an
opportunity to
detect and evaluate
this behavior
pattern would be
lost.
Therefore, in order
to increase the
effectiveness of
the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs and
more clearly convey
the NRC's intent,
the proposed
paragraph would be
revised to clarify
that the objective
of behavioral
observation is to
detect behavior or
activities that
have the potential
to constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety of the
public and common
defense and
security, including
a potential threat
to commit
radiological
sabotage. The
portion of current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(iii)
that addresses who
must conduct
behavioral
observation (i.e.,
supervisors and
management
personnel) would be
moved to a separate
paragraph for
increased
organizational
clarity in this
section, and would
be amended for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2).
(f)(1) The Proposed Sec.
licensees, 73.56(f)(1) would
applicants, and C/ clarify the intent
Vs specified in of the current
paragraph (a) of requirement by
this section shall specifying the
ensure that the individuals who
individuals must be subject to
specified in behavioral
paragraph (b)(1) of observation. The
this section and, proposed paragraph
if applicable, would be added to
(b)(2) of this address stakeholder
section are subject requests at the
to behavioral public meetings
observation. discussed in
Section IV.3, for
increased
specificity in the
language of the
rule.
[[Page 62762]]
(f)(2) The The proposed
individuals paragraph would
specified in amend the portion
paragraph (b)(1) of current Sec.
and, if applicable, 73.56(b)(2)(iii)
(b)(2) of this that requires only
section shall supervisors and
observe the management
behavior of other personnel to
individuals. The conduct behavioral
licensees, observation by
applicants, and C/ requiring all
Vs specified in individuals who are
paragraph (a) of subject to an
this section shall authorization
ensure that program to conduct
individuals who are behavioral
subject to this observation.
section also Increasing the
successfully number of
complete behavioral individuals who
observation conduct behavioral
training. observation would
enhance the
effectiveness of AA
programs by
increasing the
likelihood of
detecting behavior
or activities that
may be adverse to
the safe operation
and security of the
facility and may,
therefore,
constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety and common
defense and
security. This
change is necessary
to address the
NRC's increased
concern with a
potential insider
threat discussed in
Section IV.3.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2) also
would require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to ensure that
individuals who are
subject to an
authorization
program
successfully
complete behavioral
observation
training. The means
by which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would
demonstrate that an
individual has
successfully
completed the
training would be
through the
administration of
the comprehensive
examination
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec.
73.56(f)(2)(iii).
Because all
individuals who are
subject to the AA
program would be
required to conduct
behavioral
observation,
training is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
have the knowledge,
skills, and
abilities necessary
to do so.
(f)(2)(i) Behavioral Proposed Sec.
observation 73.56(f)(2)(i)
training must be would require all
completed before personnel who are
the licensee, subject to this
applicant, or C/V section to complete
grants an initial behavioral
unescorted access observation
authorization, as training before the
defined in licensee,
paragraph (h)(5) of applicant, or C/V
this section, and grants initial
must be current unescorted access
before the authorization to
licensee, the individual, as
applicant, or C/V defined in proposed
grants an paragraph (h)(5)
unescorted access [Initial unescorted
authorization access
update, as defined authorization]. The
in paragraph (h)(6) proposed rule would
of this section, or also require that
an unescorted an individual's
access training must be
authorization current before the
reinstatement, as licensee,
defined in applicant, or C/V
paragraph (h)(7) of grants an
this section; unescorted access
authorization
update or
reinstatement to
the individual, as
defined in proposed
paragraphs (h)(6)
[Updated unescorted
access
authorization] and
(h)(7)
[Reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization
reinstatement] of
this section,
respectively.
Annual refresher
training, which
would be the means
by which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would meet the
requirement for
training to be
``current,'' would
be addressed in
proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2)(ii).
The proposed
requirement to
complete behavioral
observation
training before
initial unescorted
access
authorization is
granted is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
have the knowledge,
skills, and
abilities required
to meet their
responsibilities
for conducting
behavioral
observation under
proposed paragraph
(f)(2)(i). The
basis for requiring
refresher training
is discussed with
respect to proposed
paragraph
(f)(2)(ii) of this
section.
[[Continued on page 62763]]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
]
[[pp. 62763-62812]] Power Reactor Security Requirements
[[Continued from page 62762]]
[[Page 62763]]
(f)(2)(ii) Proposed Sec.
Individuals shall 73.45(f)(2)(ii)
complete refresher would require
training on a annual refresher
nominal 12-month training in
frequency, or more behavioral
frequently where observation, at a
the need is minimum, with more
indicated. frequent refresher
Individuals may training when the
take and pass a need is indicated.
comprehensive The proposed
examination that paragraph would
meets the require annual or
requirements of more frequent
paragraph refresher training
(f)(2)(iii) of this in order to ensure
section in lieu of that individuals
completing annual retain the
refresher training; knowledge, skills,
and abilities
gained through
initial training.
Refresher training
may also be
necessary if an
individual
demonstrates a
failure to
implement
behavioral
observation
requirements in
accordance with AA
program procedures
or new information
is added to the
behavioral
observation
training
curriculum.
The proposed
paragraph would
also permit
individuals who
pass a
comprehensive
``challenge''
examination that
demonstrates their
continued
understanding of
behavioral
observation to be
excused from the
refresher training
that would
otherwise be
required under the
proposed paragraph.
The proposed rule
would require that
the ``challenge''
examination must
meet the
examination
requirements
specified in
proposed paragraph
(f)(2)(iii) of this
section and
individuals who did
not pass would
undergo remedial
training.
Permitting
individuals to pass
a comprehensive
``challenge''
examination rather
than take refresher
training each year
would ensure that
they are retaining
their knowledge,
skills, and
abilities while
reducing some costs
associated with
meeting the annual
refresher training
requirement.
(f)(2)(iii) Proposed Sec.
Individuals shall 73.56(f)(2)(iii)
demonstrate the would require
successful individuals to
completion of demonstrate that
behavioral they have
observation successfully
training by passing completed
a comprehensive behavioral
examination that observation
addresses the training by passing
knowledge and a comprehensive
abilities necessary examination. The
to detect behavior proposed provision
or activities that would require
have the potential remedial training
to constitute an and re-testing for
unreasonable risk individuals who
to the health and fail to achieve a
safety of the passing score on
public and common the examination.
defense and These proposed
security, including requirements would
a potential threat be modeled on other
to commit required training
radiological programs that have
sabotage. Remedial been successful in
training and re- ensuring that
testing are examinations are
required for valid and
individuals who individuals have
fail to achieved an
satisfactorily adequate
complete the understanding of
examination. the subject matter.
(f)(2)(iv) Initial Proposed Sec.
and refresher 73.56(f)(2)(iv)
training may be would permit the
delivered using a use of various
variety of media media for
(including, but not administering
limited to, training in order
classroom lectures, to achieve the
required reading, efficiencies
video, or computer- associated with
based training computer-based
systems). The training, for
licensee, example, and other
applicant, or C/V new training
shall monitor the delivery
completion of technologies that
training. may become
available.
Permitting the use
of various media to
administer the
training would
improve the
efficiency of AA
programs and reduce
regulatory burden,
by providing
flexibility in the
methods that
licensees and other
entities may use to
administer the
required training.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require the
completion of
training to be
monitored by the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V.
[[Page 62764]]
This requirement is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
who are subject to
an authorization
program actively
participate in and
receive the
required training.
The NRC is aware
that some
individuals have
engaged in
successful
litigation against
licensees on the
basis that they
were not aware of
the requirements to
which they were
subject, in part,
because of
deficiencies in
licensee processes
for ensuring that
individuals are
trained. Therefore,
the proposed rule
would add this
requirement to
improve the
effectiveness of
the training
element of AA
programs.
(f)(3) Individuals Proposed Sec.
who are subject to 73.56(f)(3) would
an authorization require individuals
program under this to report any
section shall concerns arising
report to the from behavioral
reviewing official observation to the
any concerns licensee's,
arising from applicant's, or C/
behavioral V's reviewing
observation, official. This
including, but not specificity is
limited to, necessary because
concerns related to the NRC is aware of
any questionable past instances in
behavior patterns which individuals
or activities of reported concerns
others. to supervisors or
other licensee
personnel who did
not then inform the
reviewing official
of the concern. As
a result, the
concern was not
addressed and any
implications of the
concern for the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability were
not evaluated.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
require individuals
to report directly
to the reviewing
official, to ensure
that the reviewing
official is made
aware of the
concern, has the
opportunity to
evaluate it, and
determine whether
to grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
terminate UAA. The
proposed provision
would be added to
clarify and
strengthen the
behavioral
observation element
of AA programs by
increasing the
likelihood that
questionable
behaviors or
activities are
appropriately
addressed by the
licensees and other
entities who are
subject to the
rule.
(g) Arrest A new Sec.
reporting. Any 73.56(g) would
individual who has establish
applied for or is requirements
maintaining related to the
unescorted access arrest, indictment,
authorization under filing of charges,
this section shall or conviction of
promptly report to any individual who
the reviewing is applying for or
official any formal maintaining UAA
action(s) taken by under this section.
a law enforcement The proposed
authority or court paragraph would
of law to which the require individuals
individual has been to promptly report
subject, including to the reviewing
an arrest, an official any such
indictment, the formal action(s) to
filing of charges, ensure that the
or a conviction. On reviewing official
the day that the has an opportunity
report is received, to evaluate the
the reviewing implications of the
official shall formal action(s)
evaluate the with respect to the
circumstances individual's
related to the trustworthiness and
formal action(s) reliability.
and determine
whether to grant,
maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's
unescorted access
authorization.
[[Page 62765]]
The proposed rule
includes other
provisions that
would also ensure
that the reviewing
official is aware
of and evaluates
the implications of
any formal
action(s) to which
an individual may
be subject,
including the
requirement for a
criminal history
review under
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(7) and
regular updates to
the criminal
history review
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
However, these
proposed provisions
would not provide
for prompt
evaluation of any
formal action(s)
that arise in the
intervening time
period since a
criminal history
review was last
conducted.
Therefore, this
requirement would
be added to ensure
that the reviewing
official is made
aware of formal
actions at the time
that they occur,
has the opportunity
to evaluate the
implications of
these formal
actions with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability, and,
if necessary, take
timely action to
deny or unfavorably
terminate the
individual's UAA,
if the reviewing
official determines
that the formal
actions cast doubt
on the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed rule would
also specifically
require the formal
action(s) to be
reported to the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official.
This specificity is
necessary because
the NRC is aware of
past instances in
which individuals
reported formal
actions to
supervisors who did
not then inform the
reviewing official.
As a result, some
individuals were
granted or
maintained UAA
without the high
assurance that they
are trustworthy and
reliable that AA
programs must
provide, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(c)
[General
performance
objective].
Therefore, a
specific
requirement for
individuals to
report directly to
the reviewing
official is
necessary to ensure
that the reviewing
official is aware
of the actions, has
the opportunity to
evaluate the
circumstances
surrounding the
actions, and
determine whether
to grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
terminate UAA. The
proposed paragraph
would not establish
a specific time
limit within which
an individual would
be required to
report a formal
action because the
time frames within
which different
formal actions
occur may vary
widely, depending
on the nature of
the formal action
and characteristics
of the locality in
which the formal
action is taken.
However, nothing in
the proposed
provision would
prohibit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs from
establishing, in
program procedures,
reporting time
limits that are
appropriate for
their local
circumstances.
[[Page 62766]]
The proposed rule
would use the term,
``promptly,'' to
clarify the NRC's
intent that
individuals are
responsible for
reporting any
formal action(s) of
the type specified
in the proposed
paragraph without
delay. The proposed
paragraph would
also require the
reviewing official
to evaluate the
circumstances
related to the
formal action and
decide whether to
grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's UAA on
the day that he or
she receives the
report of an
arrest, indictment,
the filing of
charges, or
conviction. The
proposed
requirement is
necessary because
the NRC is aware of
past instances in
which reviewing
officials have been
informed of a
formal action, but
have not acted
promptly to
evaluate the
information and
determine its
implications with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. As a
result, some
individuals were
granted or
maintained UAA
without the high
assurance that they
are trustworthy and
reliable that AA
programs must
provide, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(c)
[General
performance
objective].
The proposed
paragraph would
provide for the
administrative
withdrawal of UAA
without a positive
determination that
the individual is
trustworthy and
reliable (which
would permit the
granting or
maintaining of UAA)
or a negative
determination of
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability (which
would require the
denial or
unfavorable
termination of
UAA), because the
reviewing official
may not have
sufficient
information on the
day that the report
is received to make
the determination.
However, if, based
on the information
available to the
reviewing official,
he or she is unable
to make either a
positive or
negative
determination, the
proposed rule would
require the
administrative
withdrawal of UAA
until such a
determination can
be made. The
administrative
withdrawal of the
individual's UAA
would be necessary
to protect public
health and safety
and the common
defense and
security when the
trustworthiness and
reliability of an
individual cannot
be positively
determined.
Sec. 73.56(c) Existing, (c)(1) Deleted...... The proposed rule
reinstated, transferred, would eliminate
and temporary access current Sec.
authorization. (1) 73.56(c)(1), which
Individuals who have had an permitted
uninterrupted unescorted individuals who had
access authorization for at an uninterrupted
least 180 days on April 25, unescorted access
1991 need not be further authorization for
evaluated. Such individuals at least 180 days
shall be subject to the on April 25, 1991,
behavioral observation to retain
requirements of this unescorted access
section. authorization and
required them to be
subject to
behavioral
observation. The
current paragraph
would be eliminated
because these
requirements no
longer apply.
[[Page 62767]]
Sec. 73.56(c) Existing, (h) Granting Proposed Sec.
reinstated, transferred, unescorted access 73.56(h) would
and temporary access authorization. The replace and amend
authorization. licensees, current Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(c), which
Vs specified in permits AA programs
paragraph (a) of to specify
this section shall conditions for
implement the reinstating an
requirements of interrupted UAA,
this paragraph for for transferring
granting initial UAA from another
unescorted access licensee, and for
authorization, permitting
updated unescorted temporary UAA. As
access discussed in
authorization, and Section IV.3, the
reinstatement of requirements in
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization. 73.56 are based
upon several
fundamental changes
to the NRC's
approach to access
authorization since
the terrorist
attacks of
September 11, 2001,
and an increased
concern for an
active or passive
insider who may
collude with
adversaries to
commit radiological
sabotage.
The primary concern,
which many of the
amendments to Sec.
73.56 are designed
to address, is the
necessity of
increasing the
rigor of the access
authorization
process to provide
high assurance that
any individual who
is granted and
maintains UAA is
trustworthy and
reliable. Proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
would identify
three categories of
proposed
requirements for
granting UAA: (1)
Initial unescorted
access
authorization, (2)
updated unescorted
access
authorization, and
(3) reinstatement
of unescorted
access
authorization. The
proposed
categories, which
are based upon
whether an
individual who has
applied for UAA has
previously held UAA
under Sec. 73.56
and the length of
time that has
elapsed since the
individual's last
period of UAA
ended, would be
defined in proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(5)
[Initial unescorted
access
authorization],
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(6)
[Updated unescorted
access
authorization], and
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(7)
[Reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization].
Proposed Sec.
73.56(h) would
direct licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to use the
criteria for
granting UAA that
are found in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(5),
(h)(6), and (h)(7),
depending on which
of the proposed
paragraphs would
apply to the
individual seeking
UAA. Current Sec.
73.56 permits
authorization
programs to specify
conditions for
reinstating an
interrupted UAA or
transferring UAA
from another
licensee, but it
does not use the
concepts of
``initial
unescorted access
authorization,''
``updated
unescorted access
authorization,'' or
``reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization.''
These concepts
would be used in
proposed Sec.
73.56 to focus the
requirements for
UAA more precisely
on whether the
individual has
established a
``track record'' in
the industry, and
to specify the
amount of original
information-
gathering that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would be
required to
perform, based on
whether previous AA
programs have
collected
information about
the individual.
[[Page 62768]]
For individuals who
have established a
favorable track
record in the
industry, the steps
that licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would complete
in order to grant
UAA to an
individual would
also depend upon
the length of time
that has elapsed
since the
individual's last
period of UAA was
terminated and the
amount of
supervision to
which the
individual was
subject during the
interruption. (the
term,
``interruption,''
refers to the
interval of time
between periods
during which an
individual
maintains UAA under
Sec. 73.56 and
will be discussed
in reference to
Sec. 73.56
(h)(4)). In
general, the more
time that has
elapsed since an
individual's last
period of UAA
ended, the more
steps that the
proposed rule would
require licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to complete
before granting UAA
to the individual.
However, if the
individual was
subject to AA
program elements in
the recent past,
the proposed rule
would require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to complete
fewer steps in
order to grant UAA
to the individual.
Individuals who
have established a
favorable work
history in the
industry have
demonstrated their
trustworthiness and
reliability from
previous periods of
UAA, so they pose
less potential risk
to public health
and safety and the
common defense and
security than
individuals who are
new to the
industry.
Much is known about
these individuals.
Not only were they
subject to the
initial background
investigation
requirements before
they were initially
granted UAA, but,
while they were
working under an AA
program, they were
watched carefully
through ongoing
behavioral
observation, and
demonstrated the
ability to
consistently comply
with the many
procedural
requirements that
are necessary to
perform work safely
at nuclear power
plants. Therefore,
the proposed rule
would decrease the
unnecessary
regulatory burden
associated with
granting UAA under
Sec. 73.56 by
reducing the steps
that AA programs
would be required
to take in order to
grant UAA to such
individuals.
[[Page 62769]]
(h)(1) Accepting Proposed Sec.
unescorted access 73.56(h)(1) would
authorization from permit licensees,
other authorization applicants, and C/
programs. Vs to rely upon the
Licensees, authorization
applicants, and C/ programs and
Vs who are seeking program elements of
to grant unescorted other licensees,
access applicants or C/Vs,
authorization to an as well as other
individual who is authorization
subject to another programs and
authorization program elements
program that that meet the
complies with this requirements of
section may rely on proposed Sec.
the program 73.56, to meet the
elements completed requirements of
by the transferring this section for
authorization granting and
program to satisfy maintaining UAA.
the requirements of Proposed Sec.
this section. An 73.56(h)(1) would
individual may update the
maintain his or her terminology used in
unescorted access current Sec.
authorization if he 73.56(a)(4), which
or she continues to states that
be subject to licensees may
either the accept an AA
receiving program used by its
licensee's, C/Vs or other
applicant's, or C/ organizations
V's authorization provided it meets
program or the the requirements of
transferring this section. The
licensee's, proposed paragraph
applicant's, or C/ would also modify
V's authorization current Sec.
program, or a 73.56(c)(2), which
combination of permits AA programs
elements from both to specify
programs that conditions for
collectively transferring UAA
satisfy the from one licensee
requirements of to another. The
this section. The proposed paragraph
receiving would require the
authorization AA program who is
program shall receiving an
ensure that the unescorted access
program elements authorization that
maintained by the was granted under
transferring another AA program
program remain to ensure that each
current. of the AA program
elements to which
individuals must be
subject, such as
behavioral
observation
training and
psychological re-
assessments, remain
current, including
situations in which
the individual is
subject to a
combination of
program elements
that are
administered
separately by the
receiving and
transferring AA
programs.
The proposed
paragraph would
increase the
specificity of the
requirements that
must be met by
licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
for granting UAA
and establish
detailed minimum
standards that all
programs must meet.
These proposed
detailed minimum
standards are
designed to address
recent changes in
industry practices
that have resulted
in a more transient
workforce, as
discussed in
Section IV.3. The
authorization
programs of
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would be
substantially more
consistent than in
the past under
these proposed
detailed standards.
Therefore,
permitting
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to rely on other
AA programs to meet
the proposed rule's
requirements is
reasonable and
appropriate. In
addition, the
proposed provisions
would reduce
unnecessary
regulatory burden
by eliminating
redundancies in the
steps required to
grant UAA to an
individual who is
transferring from
one program to
another.
[[Page 62770]]
(h)(2) Information A new Sec.
sharing. To meet 73.56(h)(2) would
the requirements of permit licensees
this section, and other entities
licensees, to rely upon
applicants, and C/ information that
Vs may rely upon was gathered by
the information previous licensees,
that other applicants, and C/
licensees, Vs to meet the
applicants, and C/ requirements of
Vs who are subject this section.
to this section Because information
have gathered about will be shared
individuals who among licensees,
have previously applicants, and C/
applied for Vs, this proposed
unescorted access provision would
authorization and substantially
developed about decrease the
individuals during likelihood that an
periods in which individual would be
the individuals inadvertently
maintained granted UAA by
unescorted access another licensee
authorization. after having his or
her UAA denied or
unfavorably
terminated under
another program. It
also recognizes
that there have
been changes in
staffing practices
at power reactors,
including a greater
reliance on
personnel transfers
and temporary work
forces, as
discussed in detail
in Section IV.3.
For individuals who
have previously
been evaluated
under an
authorization
program, were
granted UAA within
the past 3 years,
and successfully
maintained UAA,
this proposed
provision would
eliminate the need
to repeat efforts
that were completed
as part of the
prior access
authorization
process, thereby
saving substantial
duplication of
effort and
expenditure of
resources. The
proposed provision
would work in
conjunction with
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), which
would require a
mechanism for
information
sharing.
The provision is
consistent with the
recent access
authorization
orders and with NRC-
endorsed guidance,
as well as current
industry practices.
(h)(3) Requirements Proposed Sec.
applicable to all 73.56(h)(3) would
unescorted access establish
authorization requirements that
categories. Before the licensee,
granting unescorted applicant, or C/V
access would be required
authorization to to meet before
individuals in any granting UAA to
category, including individuals in any
individuals whose of the categories
unescorted access described in
authorization has paragraphs (h)(5),
been interrupted (h)(6), or (h)(7)
for a period of 30 of this section,
or fewer days, the including
licensee, individuals whose
applicant, or C/V UAA has been
shall ensure that-- interrupted for a
period of 30 or
fewer days. The
proposed paragraph
would clearly
specify that the
requirements for
granting UAA
contained in the
paragraph are
intended to be
applied without
exceptions to
individuals in the
specified
categories.
[[Page 62771]]
(h)(3)(i) The Proposed Sec.
individual's 73.46(h)(3)(i)
written consent to through (h)(3)(vii)
conduct a would specify the
background steps required to
investigation, if grant UAA to any
necessary, has been individual. The
obtained and the proposed paragraph
individual's true would require
identity has been licensees,
verified, in applicants, and C/
accordance with Vs to ensure that
paragraphs (d)(2) the individual's
and (d)(3) of this written consent for
section, the background
respectively; investigation in
(ii) A credit proposed paragraph
history evaluation (h)(3)(i) of this
or re-evaluation section has been
has been completed obtained; complete
in accordance with a verification of
the requirements of the individual's
paragraphs (d)(5) true identity in
or (i)(1)(v) of proposed (h)(3)(ii)
this section, as of this section;
applicable;. ensure completion
(iii) The of the credit
individual's history evaluation
character and or re-evaluation,
reputation have as applicable, in
been ascertained, proposed paragraph
in accordance with (h)(3)(ii) of this
paragraph (d)(6) of section; ensure
this section;. completion of the
(iv) The reference checks
individual's required to
criminal history ascertain the
record has been individual's
obtained and character and
reviewed or reputation in
updated, in proposed paragraph
accordance with (h)(3)(iii) of this
paragraphs (d)(7) section; ensure
and (i)(1)(v) of completion of the
this section, as initial or updated
applicable;. criminal history
(v) A psychological review, as
assessment or applicable, in
reassessment of the proposed paragraph
individual has been (h)(3)(iv) of this
completed in section; ensure
accordance with the completion of the
requirements of psychological
paragraphs (e) or assessment or re-
(i)(1)(v) of this assessment, as
section, as applicable, in
applicable;. proposed paragraph
(vi) The individual (h)(3)(v) of this
has successfully section; ensure
completed the completion of
initial or initial or
refresher, as refresher training
applicable, in proposed
behavioral paragraph
observation (h)(3)(vi) of this
training that is section; and ensure
required under that the individual
paragraph (f) of has been informed,
this section; and. in writing, or his
or her arrest-
reporting
responsibilities in
paragraph
(h)(3)(vii) of this
section.
(vii) The The bases for each
individual has of the proposed
been informed, requirements listed
in writing, of in proposed Sec.
his or her 73.56(h)(3)(i)
arrest-reporting through (h)(3)(vii)
responsibilities are discussed in
under paragraph detail with respect
(g) of this to proposed Sec.
section.. 73.56(d)(2),
(d)(3), (d)(5)
through (d)(7), and
(e) through (g),
respectively. The
bases for the
proposed
requirements for
updates to the
credit history
evaluation,
criminal history
review, and
psychological
assessment are
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v). The
requirements that
authorization
programs would be
required to meet in
order to grant UAA
to individuals in
every access
authorization
category would be
listed in these
paragraphs, in
response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3 for
increased clarity
in the
organizational
structure of
requirements for
granting UAA.
[[Page 62772]]
(h)(4) Interruptions Proposed Sec.
in unescorted 73.56(h)(4) would
access describe the term
authorization. For ``interruption,''
individuals who which would be used
have previously in proposed Sec.
held unescorted 73.56(h)(5)
access [Initial unescorted
authorization under access
this section but authorization],
whose unescorted proposed Sec.
access 73.56(h)(6)
authorization has [Updated unescorted
since been access
terminated under authorization], and
favorable proposed Sec.
conditions, the 73.56(h)(7) and
licensee, Sec. 73.56(h)(8)
applicant, or C/V [Reinstatement of
shall implement the unescorted access
requirements in authorization] to
this paragraph for refer to the
initial unescorted interval of time
access between periods
authorization in during which an
paragraph (h)(5) of individual holds
this section, UAA under Sec.
updated unescorted 73.56. Licensees,
access applicants, or C/Vs
authorization in would calculate an
paragraph (h)(6) of interruption in UAA
this section, or as the total number
reinstatement of of days falling
unescorted access between the day
authorization in upon which the
paragraph (h)(7) of individual's last
this section, based period of UAA or UA
upon the total ended and the day
number of days that upon which the
the individual's licensee,
unescorted access applicant, or C/V
authorization has grants UAA to the
been interrupted, individual. This
to include the day change would be
after the made to enhance and
individual's last clarify the access
period of authorization
unescorted access requirement in
authorization was current Sec.
terminated and the 73.56(c)(2), which
intervening days does not define the
until the day upon meaning of the term
which the licensee, ``interrupted
applicant, or C/V access
grants unescorted authorization.''
access
authorization to
the individual. If
potentially
disqualifying
information is
disclosed or
discovered about an
individual,
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs shall take
additional actions,
as specified in the
licensee's or
applicant's
physical security
plan, in order to
grant or maintain
the individual's
unescorted access
authorization.
(h)(5) Initial A new Sec.
unescorted access 73.56(h)(5)
authorization. [Initial unescorted
Before granting access
unescorted access authorization]
authorization to an would establish the
individual who has category of
never held ``initial
unescorted access unescorted access
authorization under authorization''
this section or requirements to
whose unescorted apply both to
access individuals who
authorization has have not previously
been interrupted held UAA under this
for a period of 3 section and those
years or more and whose UAA has been
whose last period interrupted for a
of unescorted period of 3 or more
access years and whose
authorization was last period of UAA
terminated under ended favorably. In
favorable general, the longer
conditions, the the period of time
licensee, since the
applicant, or C/V individual's last
shall ensure that period of UAA
an employment ended, the greater
history evaluation the possibility
has been completed that the individual
in accordance with may have undergone
paragraph (d)(4) of significant changes
this section. The in lifestyle or
period of the character that
employment history would diminish his
that the individual or her
shall disclose, and trustworthiness and
the licensee, reliability.
applicant, or C/V Therefore, this
shall evaluate, paragraph would
must be the past 3 require an
years or since the individual who has
individual's not been subject to
eighteenth an AA program for 3
birthday, whichever or more years to
is shorter. For the undergo the same
1-year period full and extensive
immediately screening to which
preceding the date an individual who
upon which the has never held UAA
individual applies would be subject.
for unescorted The proposed
access paragraph would
authorization, the require the
licensee, licensee,
applicant, or C/V applicant, or C/V,
shall ensure that before granting UAA
the employment to an individual,
history evaluation to complete an
is conducted with evaluation of the
every employer, individual's
regardless of the employment history
length of over the past 3
employment. years. The 3-year
time period to be
addressed in the
employment history
evaluation would be
consistent with
requirements
established in the
access
authorization
orders issued by
the NRC to nuclear
power plant
licensees on
January 7, 2003, as
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62773]]
For the remaining 2- In addition, this 3-
year period, the year time period
licensee, has been used
applicant, or C/V successfully within
shall ensure that AA programs since
the employment Sec. 73.56 was
history evaluation first promulgated
is conducted with and has met the
the employer by NRC's goal of
whom the individual ensuring that
claims to have been individuals who are
employed the granted UAA are
longest within each trustworthy and
calendar month, if reliable.
the individual Therefore, the 3-
claims employment year time period
during the given would be retained
calendar month. in proposed Sec.
73.56. The
employment history
evaluation would
focus on the
individual's
employment record
during the year
preceding his or
her application for
UAA by requiring
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to make a ``best
effort,'' as
described with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
to obtain and
evaluate employment
history information
from every employer
by whom the
individual claims
to have been
employed during the
year. The proposed
rule would require
this focus on the
year preceding the
individual's
application for UAA
because the
individual's
employment history
during the past
year provides
current information
related to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. For
the earlier 2 years
of the employment
history period, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
employment history
with every employer
by whom the
applicant claims to
have been employed
the longest within
each calendar month
that would fall
within that 2-year
period.
The proposed
provision would
permit this
``sampling''
approach to the
employment history
evaluation for the
earlier 2-year
period because
industry experience
has shown that
employers are often
reluctant to
disclose adverse
information to
other private
employers about
former employees,
and that the longer
it has been since
an individual was
employed, the less
likely it is that a
former employer
will disclose
useful information.
Experience
implementing AA
programs has also
shown that the
shorter the time
period during which
an individual was
employed by an
employer, the less
likely it is that
the employer
retains any useful
information related
to the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would not require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to conduct the
employment history
evaluation with
every employer by
whom the individual
claims to have been
employed, but,
rather, to contact
only the employer
by whom the
individual claims
to have been
employed the
longest within each
calendar month that
falls within that 2-
year period (i.e.,
the ``given''
calendar month).
Contacting these
employers would
increase the
likelihood that the
employers would
have knowledge of
the applicant and
would be willing to
disclose it.
[[Page 62774]]
(h)(6) Updated Proposed Sec.
unescorted access 73.56(h)(6)
authorization. [Updated unescorted
Before granting access
unescorted access authorization]
authorization to an would establish a
individual whose category of
unescorted access ``updated
authorization has unescorted access
been interrupted authorization'' to
for more than 365 apply to
days but fewer than individuals whose
3 years and whose UAA has been
last period of interrupted for
unescorted access more than 365 days
authorization was but less than 3
terminated under years and whose
favorable last period of UAA
conditions, the was terminated
licensee, favorably. The
applicant, or C/V proposed
shall ensure that requirements for
an employment granting updated
history evaluation UAA would be less
has been completed stringent than the
in accordance with proposed
paragraph (d)(4) of requirements for
this section. The granting initial
period of the UAA. The proposed
employment history requirements would
that the individual be less stringent
shall disclose, and because the
the licensee, individual who is
applicant, or C/V applying for
shall evaluate, updated UAA would
must be the period have a more recent
since unescorted ``track record'' of
access successful
authorization was performance within
last terminated, up the industry. Also
to and including the licensee,
the day the applicant, or C/V
applicant applies would have access
for updated to information
unescorted access about the
authorization. For individual seeking
the 1-year period UAA from the
immediately licensee,
preceding the date applicant, or C/V
upon which the who last granted
individual applies UAA to the
for unescorted individual as a
access result of the
authorization, the increased
licensee, information-sharing
applicant, or C/V requirements of the
shall ensure that proposed rule.
the employment However, the
history evaluation licensee,
is conducted with applicant, or C/V
every employer, would not have
regardless of the information about
length of the individual's
employment. activities from the
period during which
the individual's
UAA was
interrupted.
Therefore, the
proposed rule's
requirements for
updated UAA would
focus on gathering
and evaluating
information from
the interruption
period.
For the remaining For example, in the
period since case of an
unescorted access individual whose
authorization was last period of UAA
last terminated, ended 2 years ago,
the licensee, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V applicant or C/V
shall ensure that would gather
the employment information about
history evaluation the individual's
is conducted with activities within
the employer by the 2-year
whom the individual interruption
claims to have been period. Similarly,
employed the if an individual's
longest within each last period of UAA
calendar month, if ended 13 months
the individual ago, the licensee,
claims employment applicant, or C/V
during the given would gather
calendar month. information about
the individual's
activities within
the past 13 months.
For the reasons
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(5),
the proposed
paragraph would
require the
employment history
evaluation to be
conducted with
every employer in
the year preceding
the individual's
application for
updated UAA, and to
contact only the
employer by whom
the individual
claims to have been
employed the
longest within any
earlier calendar
month (i.e., the
``given'' calendar
month) that would
fall within the
interruption
period.
[[Page 62775]]
(h)(7) Reinstatement Proposed Sec.
of unescorted 73.56(h)(7)
access [Reinstatement of
authorization (31 unescorted access
to 365 days). In authorization]
order to grant would establish a
authorization to an category of
individual whose ``reinstatement of
unescorted access unescorted access
authorization has authorization,''
been interrupted which would apply
for a period of to individuals
more than 30 days whose UAA has been
but no more than interrupted for a
365 days and whose period of more than
last period of 30 days but no more
unescorted access than 365 days and
authorization was whose last period
terminated under of UAA was
favorable terminated
conditions, the favorably. The
licensee, proposed steps for
applicant, or C/V reinstating an
shall ensure that individual's UAA
an employment after an
history evaluation interruption of 365
has been completed or fewer days would
in accordance with be less stringent
the requirements of than those required
paragraph (d)(4) of for initial UAA or
this section within an updated UAA.
5 business days of This is because
reinstating these individuals
unescorted access have a recent,
authorization. The positive ``track
period of the record'' within the
employment history industry and that
that the individual record provides
shall disclose, and evidence that the
the licensee, risk to public
applicant, or C/V health and safety
shall evaluate, or the common
must be the period defense and
since the security posed by a
individual's less rigorous
unescorted access employment history
authorization was evaluation is
terminated, up to acceptable. The
and including the proposed paragraph
day the applicant would limit the
applies for period of time to
reinstatement of be addressed in the
unescorted access employment history
authorization. The to the period of
licensee, the interruption in
applicant, or C/V UAA and require
shall ensure that that the employment
the employment history evaluation
history evaluation must be conducted
has been conducted with the employer
with the employer by whom the
by whom the individual claims
individual claims to have been
to have been employed the
employed the longest within each
longest within the calendar month, if
calendar month, if the individual
the individual claims employment
claims employment during a given
during a given calendar month.
calendar month.
If the employment An employment
history evaluation history for earlier
is not completed periods of time
within 5 business would be
days due to unnecessary because
circumstances that the granting
are outside of the licensee,
licensee's, applicant, or C/V
applicant's, or C/ would have access
V's control and the to information
licensee, about the
applicant, or C/V individual from the
is not aware of any licensee,
potentially applicant, or C/V
disqualifying who had recently
information terminated the
regarding the individual's UAA.
individual within However, the
the past 5 years, licensee,
the licensee, applicant, or C/V
applicant, or C/V would not have
may maintain the information about
individual's the individual's
unescorted access activities during
authorization for the period of
an additional 5 interruption, so
business days. If the proposed rule's
the employment requirements for
history evaluation reinstating UAA
is not completed would focus on
within 10 business gathering and
days of reinstating evaluating
unescorted access information only
authorization, the from the
licensee, interruption
applicant, or C/V period. By contrast
may maintain the to the proposed
individual's requirements for an
unescorted access initial UAA and an
authorization for updated UAA,
an additional 5 proposed Sec.
business days. If 73.56(h)(7) would
the employment permit the
history evaluation licensee,
is not completed applicant, or C/V
within 10 business to reinstate an
days of reinstating individual's UAA
unescorted access without first
authorization, the completing the
licensee, employment history
applicant, or C/V evaluation. As
shall would be required
administratively for an updated UAA,
withdraw the the proposed rule
individual's would limit the
unescorted access period of time to
authorization until be addressed by the
the employment employment history
history evaluation evaluation to the
is completed. interruption
period.
[[Page 62776]]
However, the
proposed paragraph
would permit the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to reinstate the
individual's UAA
before completing
the employment
history evaluation
because these
individuals have a
recent, positive
track record within
the industry and
that record
demonstrates that
they would pose an
acceptable risk to
public health and
safety or the
common defense and
security. If the
employment history
evaluation is not
completed within
the 5-day period
permitted, the
proposed paragraph
would permit the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to maintain the
individual's UAA
for up to 10 days
following the day
upon which UAA was
reinstated, but
only if the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
is unaware of any
potentially
disqualifying
information about
the individual. If
the employment
history evaluation
is not completed
within the 10 days
permitted, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to administratively
withdraw the
individual's UAA
until the
employment history
evaluation is
completed. The
proposed rule would
not establish
employment history
requirements for
individuals whose
UAA has been
interrupted for 30
or fewer days.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(3) would
require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to obtain
and review a
personal history
disclosure from the
applicant for UAA
that would address
the period since
the individual's
last period of UAA
was terminated.
However, the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be permitted
to forego
conducting an
employment history
evaluation for
individuals whose
UAA has been
interrupted for
such a short
period, because
there would be
little to be
learned.
Sec. 73.56(b)(3) The (h)(8) Determination Proposed Sec.
licensee shall base its basis. The 73.56(h)(8) would
decision to grant, deny, licensee's, amend but retain
revoke, or continue an applicant's, or C/ the meaning of
unescorted access V's reviewing current Sec.
authorization on review and official shall 73.56(b)(3), which
evaluation of all pertinent determine whether requires licensees
information developed. to grant, deny, to base a decision
unfavorably to grant, deny,
terminate, or revoke, or continue
maintain or amend UAA on review and
an individual's evaluation of all
unescorted access pertinent
authorization information
status, based on an developed. The
evaluation of all terms used in the
pertinent proposed paragraph,
information that such as
has been gathered ``unfavorably
about the terminate'' to
individual as a replace ``revoke''
result of any and ``maintain'' to
application for replace
unescorted access ``continue,'' would
authorization or be updated for
developed during or consistency with
following in any the terms currently
period during which used by the
the individual industry and in
maintained other portions of
unescorted access the proposed
authorization. section. In
addition, the
proposed paragraph
would include
references to the
reviewing official,
rather than the
licensee, to convey
more accurately
that the only
individual who is
authorized to make
access
authorization
decisions under
this section is the
designated
reviewing official.
[[Page 62777]]
The licensee's, The terms, ``all
applicant's or C/ pertinent'' and
V's reviewing ``accumulated
official may not information,''
determine whether would be used in
to grant unescorted the proposed
access paragraph because
authorization to an some of the
individual or information that a
maintain an reviewing official
individual's must have before
unescorted access making a
authorization until determination is
all of the required gathered under the
information has requirements of 10
been provided to CFR part 26, such
the reviewing as drug and alcohol
official and he or test results and
she determines that the results of the
the accumulated suitable inquiry.
information In addition, the
supports a positive proposed paragraph
finding of would expand on the
trustworthiness and current requirement
reliability. for a review and
evaluation of all
pertinent
information by
adding a
prohibition on
making an access
authorization
decision until all
of the required
information has
been provided to
the reviewing
official and the
reviewing official
has determined that
the information
indicates that the
subject individual
is trustworthy and
reliable. These
changes would be
made to more
clearly communicate
the NRC's intent by
improving the
specificity of the
language of the
rule.
Sec. 73.56(c)(3) The (h)(9) Unescorted Proposed Sec.
licensee shall grant access for NRC- 73.56(h)(9) would
unescorted access certified update but retain
authorization to all personnel. The the meaning of
individuals who have been licensees and current Sec.
certified by the Nuclear applicants 73.56(c)(3), which
Regulatory Commission as specified in requires licensees
suitable for such access. paragraph (a) of to grant unescorted
this section shall access to
grant unescorted individuals who
access to all have been certified
individuals who by the NRC as
have been certified suitable for such
by the NRC as access. This
suitable for such provision ensures
access including, that licensees and
but not limited to, applicants are
contractors to the allowed to grant
NRC and NRC UAA to individuals
employees. whom the NRC has
determined require
such access, and
whom the NRC has
investigated and is
certifying as
suitable for
access, without
requiring the
licensees or
applicants to meet
all of the
requirements that
would otherwise be
necessary before
granting unescorted
access to these
individuals. In
addition to
avoiding
duplication of
effort, this
proposed provision
would help to
ensure that NRC-
certified
individuals will
obtain prompt
unescorted access
to protected and
vital areas, if
necessary. The
proposed paragraph
would update the
entities who are
subject to this
requirement by
adding applicants
to reflect the
NRC's new licensing
processes for
nuclear power
plants, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(a).
[[Page 62778]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(4) Failure (h)(10) Access A new Sec.
by an individual to report prohibited. 73.56(h)(10) would
any previous suspension, Licensees and prohibit the
revocation, or denial of applicants may not entities who are
unescorted access to permit an subject to this
nuclear power reactors is individual, who is section from
considered sufficient cause identified as permitting any
for denial of unescorted having an access- individual whose
access authorization. denied status in most recent
the information- application for UAA
sharing mechanism has been denied or
required under most recent period
paragraph (o)(6) of of UAA was
this section, or unfavorably
has an access terminated from
authorization entering any
status other than protected or vital
favorably area, or to have
terminated, to the ability to use
enter any nuclear nuclear power plant
power plant digital systems
protected area or that could
vital area, under adversely impact
escort or operational safety,
otherwise, or take security, or
actions by emergency response
electronic means capabilities. The
that could impact proposed paragraph
the licensee's or would be added
applicant's because the NRC is
operational safety, aware that, in the
security, or past, some
emergency response licensees permitted
capabilities, under individuals whose
supervision or UAA was denied or
otherwise, except unfavorably
if, upon review and terminated to enter
evaluation, the protected areas as
reviewing official visitors.
determines that Licensees' current
such access is Physical Security
warranted. Plans require that
Licensees and any visitor to a
applicants shall protected area or
develop vital area must be
reinstatement escorted and under
review procedures the supervision of
for assessing an individual who
individuals who has UAA and,
have been in an therefore, is
access-denied trained in
status. behavioral
observation, in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section and
related
requirements in
part 26. However,
in the current
threat environment,
the NRC believes
that permitting any
individual who has
been determined not
to be trustworthy
and reliable to
enter protected or
vital areas does
not adequately
protect public
health and safety
or the common
defense and
security.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would prohibit this
practice.
The proposed
paragraph would
also prohibit
individuals whose
UAA has been denied
or unfavorably
terminated from
electronically
accessing
licensees' and
applicants'
operational safety,
security, and
emergency response
systems. The
proposed
prohibition on
electronic access
would be consistent
with other
requirements in the
proposed regulation
and is necessary
for the same
reasons that
physical access
would be
prohibited. An
individual whose
most recent
application for UAA
was denied, or
whose most recent
period of UAA was
terminated
unfavorably could
be considered again
for UAA, but only
if the applicable
requirements are
met, as specified
in the licensee's
or applicant's
Physical Security
Plan, and the
reviewing official
makes a positive
determination that
the individual is
trustworthy and
reliable, and,
therefore, that UAA
is warranted. These
provisions are
necessary to
strengthen the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
(i) Maintaining A new Sec.
access 73.56(i)
authorization. [Maintaining access
authorization]
would establish the
conditions that
must be met in
order for an
individual who has
been granted UAA to
maintain UAA under
this section, and
present them
together in one
paragraph for
organizational
clarity in the
rule. The proposed
paragraph would be
added in response
to stakeholder
requests for this
clarification at
the public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62779]]
(i)(1) Individuals Proposed Sec.
may maintain 73.56(i)(1)(i) and
unescorted access (i)(1)(ii) would
authorization under reiterate the
the following requirements for
conditions: subjecting
(i) The individual individuals who are
remains subject to maintaining UAA to
a behavioral behavioral
observation program observation in
that complies with proposed paragraph
the requirements of (f) of this section
paragraph (f) of and for
this section;. successfully
(ii) The individual completing
successfully refresher training
completes or passing a
behavioral ``challenge''
observation examination each
refresher training year during which
or testing on the the individual
nominal 12-month maintains UAA in
frequency required proposed paragraph
in (f)(2)(ii) of (f)(2)(ii) of this
this section;. section. These
proposed
requirements would
be reiterated in
this paragraph to
emphasize their
applicability to
maintaining UAA for
organizational
clarity in the
proposed rule. The
bases for these
proposed
requirements are
discussed in detail
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(f) and
(f)(2)(ii),
respectively.
(i)(1)(iii) The Proposed Sec.
individual complies 73.56(i)(1)(iii)
with the would require an
licensee's, individual, in
applicant's, or C/ order to maintain
V's authorization UAA, to comply with
program policies the policies and
and procedures to procedures to which
which he or she is the individual is
subject, including subject, including
the arrest- the arrest-
reporting reporting
responsibility requirement in
specified in proposed paragraph
paragraph (g) of Sec. 73.56(g).
this section; The requirement to
comply with the
applicable
licensee's,
applicant's, and C/
V's policies and
procedures would be
added because
licensees and
applicants would
establish AA
policies and
implementing
procedures in their
Physical Security
Plans, required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(a), which
would include, but
would not be
limited to, a
description of the
conditions under
which an
individual's UAA
must be unfavorably
terminated. These
policies and
procedures would
prohibit certain
acts by
individuals, and
individuals would
be required to
avoid committing
such acts, in order
to maintain UAA. In
addition, part 26
requires licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs also to develop,
implement, and
maintain fitness-
for-duty program
policies and
procedures with
which individuals
must comply in
order to maintain
UAA. For example,
10 CFR 26.27(b)(3)
requires the
unfavorable
termination of an
individual's UAA,
if the individual
has been involved
in the sale, use,
or possession of
illegal drugs
within a nuclear
power plant
protected area.
The proposed rule
would require
compliance with
these authorization
policies and
procedures, as well
the arrest-
reporting
requirement in
proposed Sec.
73.56(g), for
clarity in the
proposed rule. The
basis for the
arrest-reporting
requirement is
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(g).
(i)(1)(iv) The Proposed Sec.
individual is 73.56(i)(1)(iv)
subject to a would require
supervisory individuals, in
interview at a order to maintain
nominal 12-month UAA, to be subject
frequency, to an annual
conducted in supervisory review
accordance with the during each year
requirements of the that the individual
licensee's or maintains UAA. The
applicant's supervisory review
Physical Security would be conducted
Plan; and for the purposes
and in the manner
that licensees and
applicants would
specify in the
Physical Security
Plans required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(a). The
proposed paragraph
would include a
requirement for
these annual
supervisory reviews
for completeness
and organizational
clarity in the
proposed rule.
[[Page 62780]]
(i)(1)(v) The A new Sec.
licensee, 73.56(i)(1)(v)
applicant, or C/V would establish
determines that the requirements for
individual periodic updates of
continues to be the criminal
trustworthy and history review,
reliable. This credit history
determination must evaluation, and
be made as follows: psychological
(A) The licensee, assessment in order
applicant, or C/V for an individual
shall complete a to maintain UAA.
criminal history The proposed rule
update, credit would add these
history re- update and re-
evaluation, and evaluation
psychological re- requirements
assessment of the because it is
individual within 5 necessary to ensure
years of the date that individuals
on which these who are maintaining
elements were last UAA over long
completed, or more periods of time
frequently, based remain trustworthy
on job assignment;. and reliable. The
(B) The reviewing proposed update
official shall requirements would
complete an also apply to
evaluation of the transient workers
information who, under the
obtained from the proposed provisions
criminal history for granting
update, credit updated UAA in
history re- proposed Sec.
evaluation, 73.56(h)(6) and a
psychological re- reinstatement of
assessment, and the UAA in proposed
supervisory Sec. 73.56(h)(7),
interview required may be granted UAA
under paragraph without undergoing
(i)(1)(iv) of this the criminal
section within 30 history review,
calendar days of credit history
initiating any one evaluation, and
of these elements;. psychological
(C) The results of assessment that are
the criminal required to grant
history update, initial UAA in
credit history re- proposed Sec.
evaluation, 73.56(h)(5) each
psychological re- time that the
assessment, and the individual
supervisory transfers between
interview required licensee sites or
under paragraph applies for UAA
(i)(1)(iv) of this after an
section must interruption
support a positive period. It is also
determination of necessary to ensure
the individual's that these
continued transient workers
trustworthiness and remain trustworthy
reliability; and. and reliable.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)(A)
would require that
the updates and re-
evaluation must
occur within 5
years of the date
on which the
program elements
were last
completed.
(D) If the criminal The 5-year interval
history update, is consistent with
credit history re- the update
evaluation, requirements of
psychological re- other Federal
assessment, and agencies and
supervisory review private entities
have not been who impose similar
completed and the requirements on
information individuals who
evaluated by the must be trustworthy
reviewing official and reliable. More
within 5 years of frequent updates
the initial and re-evaluations
completion of these would be required
elements or the for some
most recent update, individuals, as
re-evaluation, and specified in the
re-assessment under licensee's or
this paragraph, or applicant's
within the time Physical Security
period specified in Plan, based on the
the licensee's or nature of their job
applicant's assignments, for
Physical Security the reasons
Plans, the discussed with
licensee, respect to proposed
applicant, or C/V Sec.
shall 73.56(e)(4)(ii).
administratively The new Sec.
withdraw the 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B)
individual's would also require
unescorted access licensees,
authorization until applicants, and C/
these requirements Vs to conduct the
have been met. required re-
evaluation
activities that are
specified in the
proposed paragraph,
and the supervisory
review required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(iv),
within 30 days of
the initiating any
one of these
elements. This
requirement is
necessary to ensure
that the reviewing
official has the
opportunity to
review the
information
collected in the
proper context,
comparing each
element to the
other, which would
then provide the
best possible
composite
representation of
the individual's
continued
trustworthiness and
reliability.
[[Page 62781]]
In a case in which a
medical evaluation
had been determined
to be necessary
through the conduct
of the
psychological re-
assessment, the
results of the
medical evaluation
would also become
part of the data
reviewed by the
reviewing official
during the 30 day
period. Proposed
Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)(C)
would require the
reviewing official
to determine that
the results of the
update support a
positive
determination of
the individual's
continuing
trustworthiness and
reliability in
order for the
individual to
maintain UAA.
Whereas, Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)(D)
would require the
reviewing official
to administratively
withdraw the
individual's UAA if
a positive
determination
cannot be made,
because the
information upon
which the
determination must
be made is not yet
available. These
requirements are
necessary to
provide high
assurance that any
individuals who are
maintaining UAA
have been
positively
determined to
continue to be
trustworthy and
reliable.
(i)(2) If an Proposed Sec.
individual who has 73.56(i)(2) would
unescorted access require licensees,
authorization is applicants, and C/
not subject to an Vs to terminate an
authorization individual's UAA if
program that meets the individual, for
the requirements of more than 30
this part for more [consecutive] days,
than 30 continuous is not subject to
days, then the an authorization
licensee, program that meets
applicant, or C/V the requirements of
shall terminate the this section. The
individual's requirements of the
unescorted access proposed paragraph
authorization and would permit an
the individual individual to be
shall meet the away from all
requirements in elements of an AA
this section, as program for 30
applicable, to consecutive days in
regain unescorted order to
access accommodate
authorization. vacations, extended
work assignments
away from the
individual's normal
work location, and
significant
illnesses when the
individual would
not be reasonably
available for
behavioral
observation. The
proposed paragraph
would be consistent
with industry
practices that have
been endorsed by
the NRC and related
requirements in
part 26, and added
in response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62782]]
(j) Access to vital Proposed Sec.
areas. Each 73.56(j) would
licensee and amend, and move
applicant who is into Sec. 73.56,
subject to this current Sec.
section shall 73.55(d)(7)(i),
establish, which establishes
implement, and requirements for
maintain a list of managing unescorted
individuals who are access to nuclear
authorized to have power plant vital
unescorted access areas. The proposed
to specific nuclear paragraph would be
power plant vital moved into Sec.
areas to assist in 73.56 for
limiting access to organizational
those vital areas clarity in the
during non- rule. The proposed
emergency requirement is
conditions. The necessary to
list must include support the
only those mitigation of the
individuals who insider threat
require access to postulated in 10
those specific CFR 73.1.
vital areas in Specifically,
order to perform individuals' access
their duties and to vital areas must
responsibilities. be controlled to
The list must be ensure that no-one
approved by a may enter these
cognizant licensee vital areas without
or applicant having a work-
manager, or related need, and
supervisor who is when the need no
responsible for longer exists,
directing the work access to the vital
activities of the areas must be
individual who is terminated. The NRC
granted unescorted is aware of many
access to each circumstances in
vital area, and the past in which
updated and re- some licensees
approved no less routinely allowed
frequently than access to all vital
every 31 days. areas for all
persons who had
been granted
unescorted access
to a licensee
protected area,
even during periods
when the
individuals were
not assigned to be
working at the
licensee site. The
defense-in-depth
required to
mitigate the
insider threat
requires that even
though persons have
been determined to
be trustworthy and
reliable for
unescorted access
to a protected area
and are under
behavioral
observation, access
to vital areas must
be restricted to
current work-
related need.
(k) Trustworthiness A new Sec.
and reliability of 73.56(k) would
background require licensees,
screeners and applicants, and C/
authorization Vs to ensure that
program personnel. any individuals who
Licensees, collect, process,
applicants, and C/ or have access to
Vs shall ensure the sensitive
that any personal
individuals who information that is
collect, process, required under this
or have access to section are,
personal themselves,
information that is trustworthy and
used to make reliable. The
unescorted access proposed rule would
authorization add this provision
determinations because the
under this section integrity and
have been effectiveness of
determined to be authorization
trustworthy and programs depend, in
reliable. large part, on the
accuracy of the
information that is
collected about
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA.
Therefore, it is
critical that any
individuals who
collect, process,
or have access to
the personal
information that is
used to make UAA
determinations are
not vulnerable to
compromise or
influence attempts
to falsify or alter
the personal
information that is
collected. Although
the NRC is not
aware of any
instances in which
individuals who
collected,
processed, or had
access to personal
information were
compromised or
subject to
influence attempts,
there have been
past circumstances
in which it was
discovered that
persons collecting
and reviewing such
personal
information were
found to have
extensive criminal
histories, which
clearly calls into
question their
trustworthiness and
reliability.
Therefore, the
proposed
requirements would
be added to
strengthen the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62783]]
(k)(1) Background Proposed Sec.
screeners. 73.56(k)(1) would
Licensees, impose new
applicants, and C/ requirements for
Vs who rely on determining the
individuals who are trustworthiness and
not directly under reliability of the
their control to employees of any
collect and process subcontractors or
information that vendors that
will be used by a licensees,
reviewing official applicants, or C/Vs
to make unescorted rely upon to
access collect sensitive
authorization personal
determinations information for the
shall ensure that a purposes of
background check of determining UAA.
such individuals The majority of
has been completed licensees contract
and determines that (or subcontract, in
such individuals the case of C/Vs)
are trustworthy and with other
reliable. At a businesses that
minimum, the specialize in
following checks background
are required: investigation
(i) Verification of services, typically
the individual's focused on
identity;. verifying the
(ii) A local employment
criminal history histories and
review and character and
evaluation from the reputation of
State of the individuals who
individual's have applied for
permanent UAA. The proposed
residence;. paragraph would
(iii) A credit require that the
history review and employees of these
evaluation;. firms are
(iv) An employment themselves
history review and trustworthy and
evaluation for the reliable, and would
past 3 years; and. establish means by
(v) An evaluation of which licensees,
character and applicants, and C/
reputation.. Vs would obtain
verification from
the subcontractor
or vendor that the
employees meet the
trustworthiness and
reliability
standards of the
licensee,
applicant, and C/V.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(k)(1)(i)
through (v) would
require a
background
investigation of
these subcontractor
or vendor employees
to include a
verification of the
employee's
identity, a review
and evaluation of
the employee's
criminal history
record from the
State in which the
employee
permanently
resides, a credit
history review and
evaluation, an
employment history
review and
evaluation from the
past 3 years, and
an evaluation of
the employee's
character and
reputation,
respectively. These
requirements would
be added for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(k).
(k)(2) Authorization A new Sec.
program personnel. 73.56(k)(2) would
Licensees, require that
applicants and C/Vs individuals who
shall ensure that evaluate and have
any individual who access to any
evaluates personal personal
information for the information that is
purpose of collected for the
processing purposes of this
applications for section must be
unescorted access determined to be
authorization trustworthy and
including, but not reliable, and
limited to a establishes two
clinical alternative methods
psychologist of for making this
psychiatrist who determination.
conducts Proposed Sec.
psychological 73.56(k)(2)(i)
assessments under would permit
paragraph (e) of licensees,
this section; has applicants, and C/
access to the Vs to subject such
files, records, and individuals to the
personal process established
information in this proposed
associated with section for
individuals who granting UAA.
have applied for Proposed Sec.
unescorted access 73.56(k)(2)(ii)
authorization; or would permit
is responsible for licensees,
managing any applicants, or C/Vs
databases that to subject such
contain such files, individuals to the
records, and requirements for
personal granting UAA in
information has proposed paragraphs
been determined to (d)(1) through
be trustworthy and (d)(5) and (e) of
reliable, as this section and a
follows: local criminal
(i) The individual history review and
is subject to an evaluation from the
authorization State of the
program that meets individuals
requirements of permanent
this section; or. residence, rather
(ii) The licensee, than the criminal
applicant, or C/V history review
determines that the specified in
individual is proposed Sec.
trustworthy and 73.56(d)(7).
reliable based upon Proposed Sec.
an evaluation that 73.56(k)(2)(ii)
meets the recognizes that, in
requirements of some cases,
paragraphs (d)(1) licensees cannot
through (d)(5) and legally obtain the
(e) of this section same type of
and a local criminal history
criminal history information about
review and authorization
evaluation from the program personnel
State of the as they are able to
individual's obtain for other
permanent individuals who are
residence.. subject to Sec.
73.56. Therefore,
this proposed
provision would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to rely on local
criminal history
checks in such
cases. These
requirements would
be added for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(k).
[[Page 62784]]
Sec. 73.56(e) Review (l) Review Proposed Sec.
procedures. Each licensee procedures. Each 73.56(l) would
implementing an unescorted licensee, retain the meaning
access authorization applicant, and C/V of current Sec.
program under the who is implementing 73.56(e) but update
provisions of this section an authorization some of the terms
shall include a procedure program under this used in the
for the review, at the section shall provision. The
request of the affected include a procedure proposed paragraph
employee, of a denial or for the review, at would replace the
revocation by the licensee the request of the term,
of unescorted access affected ``revocation,''
authorization of an individual, of a with the term,
employee of the licensee, denial or ``unfavorable
contractor, or vendor, unfavorable termination,'' for
which adversely affects termination of the reasons
employment. The procedure unescorted access discussed with
must provide that the authorization. The respect to proposed
employee is informed of the procedure must paragraph
grounds for denial or require that the (d)(1)(iii) of this
revocation and allow the individual is section. In
employee an opportunity to informed of the addition, the
provide additional relevant grounds for the proposed paragraph
information, and provide an denial or would add
opportunity for an unfavorable references to
objective review of the termination and applicants to
information on which the allow the reflect the NRC's
denial or revocation was individual an new licensing
based. The procedure may be opportunity to processes for
an impartial and provide additional nuclear power
independent internal relevant plants, as
management review. information, and discussed with
Unescorted access may not provide an respect to proposed
be granted to the opportunity for an Sec. 73.56(a).
individual during the objective review of Reference to C/Vs
review process. the information on would also be added
which the denial or for completeness,
unfavorable as discussed with
termination of respected to
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization was 73.56(a)(3).
based. The
procedure may be an
impartial and
independent
internal management
review. Licensees
and applicants may
not grant or permit
the individual to
maintain unescorted
access
authorization
during the review
process.
Sec. 73.56(f) Protection (m) Protection of Proposed Sec.
of information. (1) Each information. Each 73.56(m) would
licensee, contractor, or licensee, retain current Sec.
vendor who collects applicant, or C/V 73.56(f)(1) but
personal information on an who is subject to update it to
employee for the purpose of this section who include reference
complying with this section collects personal to applicants and C/
shall establish and information about Vs for internal
maintain a system of files an individual for consistency in the
and procedures for the the purpose of proposed rule. The
protection of the personal complying with this current requirement
information. section shall for a system of
establish and files and
maintain a system procedures for the
of files and protection of
procedures to information would
protect the be moved to
personal proposed Sec.
information. 73.56(m)(5) for
organizational
clarity in the
rule.
Sec. 73.56(f)(2) (f)(2) Deleted...... Current Sec.
Licensees, contractors, and 73.56(f)(2) would
vendors small make be deleted, but the
available such personal intent of the
information to another requirement would
licensee, contractor, or be incorporated
vendor provided that the into proposed Sec.
request is accompanied by a 73.56(m)(1) for
signed release from the organizational
individual. clarity in the
rule.
Sec. 73.56(f)(3) (m)(1) Licensees, Proposed Sec.
Licensees, contractors, and applicants, and C/ 73.56(m)(1) would
vendors may not disclose Vs shall obtain a amend current Sec.
the personal information signed consent from 73.56(f)(3), which
collected and maintained to the subject prohibits
persons other than: individual that licensees,
(ii) NRC representatives;... authorizes the applicants, and C/
(iii) Appropriate law disclosure of the Vs from disclosing
enforcement officials under personal personal
court order;. information information
(iv) The subject individual collected and collected under
or his or her maintained under this section to any
representative;. this section before individuals other
(v) Those licensee disclosing the than those listed
representatives who have a personal in the regulation.
need to have access to the information, except The proposed
information in performing for disclosures to paragraph would
assigned duties, including the following continue to permit
audits of licensee's, individuals: disclosure of the
contractor's, and vendor's (i) The subject personal
programs;. individual or his information to the
(vi) Persons deciding or her listed individuals,
matters on review or representative, but would add
appeal; or. when the individual permission for the
(vii) Other persons pursuant has designated the licensee,
to court order. This representative in applicant, or C/V
section does not authorize writing for to disclose the
the licensee, contractor, specified personal
or vendor to withhold unescorted access information to
evidence of criminal authorization others if the
conduct from law matters;. licensee or other
enforcement officials.. (ii) NRC entity has obtained
representatives;. a signed release
(iii) Appropriate for such a
law enforcement disclosure from the
officials under subject individual.
court order;. The proposed
(iv) A licensees, provision would be
applicant's or C/ added because some
V's representatives licensees have
who have a need to misinterpreted the
have access to the current requirement
information in as prohibiting them
performing assigned from releasing the
duties, including personal
determinations of information under
trustworthiness and any circumstances,
reliability, and except to the
audits of parties listed in
authorization the current
programs;. provision. In some
(v) The presiding instances, such
officer in a failures to release
judicial or information have
administrative inappropriately
proceeding that is inhibited an
initiated by the individual's
subject individual;. ability to obtain
(vi) Persons information that
deciding matters was necessary for a
under the review review or appeal of
procedures in the licensee's
paragraph (k) of determination for
this section; and. UAA. Therefore, the
(vii) Other persons explicit permission
pursuant to court for licensees and
order.. other entities to
release personal
information when an
individual consents
to the release, in
writing, would be
to have access to a
full and complete
evidentiary record
in review
procedures and
legal proceedings.
[[Page 62785]]
Proposed Sec.
73.56(m)(1)(i)
through (m)(1)(vii)
would list in
separate paragraphs
the individuals to
whom licensees and
other entities
would be permitted
to release personal
information about
an individual.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(m)(1)(ii),
(m)(1)(iii), and
(m)(1)(vii) would
retain the current
Sec. 73.56
permission for the
release of
information to NRC
representatives,
appropriate law
enforcement
officials under
court order, and
other persons
pursuant to court
order. Proposed
Sec.
73.56(m)(1)(i)
would retain the
current permission
for the release of
information to the
subject individual
and his or her
designated
representative. The
proposed paragraph
would add
requirements for
the individual to
designate his or
her representative
in writing and
specify the UAA
matters to be
disclosed. The
proposed changes
would be made in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees who have
sought guidance
from the NRC
related to the
manner in which an
individual must
``designate'' a
representative.
Proposed Sec.
73.56 (m)(1)(iv)
would amend the
current reference
to licensee
representatives who
have a need to have
access to the
information in
performing assigned
duties. The current
rule refers only to
individuals who are
performing audits
of access.
The intent of the
provision was that
licensees and C/Vs
would be permitted
to release
information to
their
representatives who
must have access to
the personal
information in
order to perform
assigned job duties
related to the
administration of
the program.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
clarify the
provision by adding
licensee
representatives who
perform
determinations of
trustworthiness and
reliability as a
further example of
individuals who may
be permitted access
to personal
information but
only to the extent
that such access is
required to perform
their assigned
functions. Proposed
Sec.
73.56(m)(1)(v) and
(m)(1)(vi) would
amend the portion
of current Sec.
73.56(f)(3)(vi)
that refers to
``persons deciding
matters on review
or appeal.'' The
proposed changes
would be made in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees,
including whether
the rule covers
persons deciding
matters in judicial
proceedings or only
the internal review
process specified
in current Sec.
73.56(e) [Review
procedures] as well
as whether
information could
be released in a
judicial proceeding
that was not
initiated by the
subject individual.
The proposed rule
would clarify that
the permission
includes
individuals who are
presiding in a
judicial or
administrative
proceeding, but
only if the
proceeding is
initiated by the
subject individual.
[[Page 62786]]
Sec. 73.56(f)(3)(i) Other (m)(2) Personal Proposed Sec.
licensees, contractors, or information that is 73.56(m)(2) would
vendors, or their collected under enhance the current
authorized representatives, this section must requirement for the
legitimately seeking the be disclosed to disclosure of
information as required by other licensees, relevant
this section for unescorted applicants, and C/ information to
access decisions and who Vs, or their licensees,
have obtained a signed authorized applicants, and C/
release from the individual. representatives, Vs, and their
who are seeking the authorized
information for representatives who
unescorted access have a legitimate
authorization need for the
determinations information and a
under this section signed release from
and who have an individual who
obtained a signed is seeking UAA
release from the under this part.
subject individual. This proposed
provision would be
added to further
clarify current
Sec. 73.56
requirements
because some
licensees have
misinterpreted the
current provision
as prohibiting the
release of
information to C/Vs
who have licensee-
approved
authorization
programs and
require such
information in
determining
individuals'
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed change
would be made in
order to further
clarify the NRC's
intent that C/Vs
shall have access
to personal
information for the
specified purposes.
(m)(3) Upon receipt A new Sec.
of a written 73.56(m)(3) would
request by the require the
subject individual licensee,
or his or her applicant, or C/V
designated possessing the
representative, the records specified
licensee, applicant in Sec. 73.56(m)
or C/V possessing to promptly provide
such records shall copies of all
promptly provide records pertaining
copies of all to a denial or
records pertaining unfavorable
to a denial or termination of the
unfavorable individual's UAA to
termination of the the subject
individuals individual or his
unescorted access or her designated
authorization. representative upon
written request.
This paragraph
would be added to
protect
individuals'
ability to have
access to a full
and complete
evidentiary record
in review
procedures and
legal proceedings.
(m)(4) A licensee's, Proposed Sec.
applicant's, or C/ 73.56(m)(4) would
V's contracts with require that a
any individual or licensee's,
organization who applicant's, or C/
collects and V's contracts with
maintains personal any individual or
information that is organization who
relevant to an collects and
unescorted access maintains personal
authorization information that is
determination must relevant to a UAA
require that such determination must
records be held in require that such
confidence, except records be
as provided in maintained in
paragraphs (m)(1) confidence. The
through (m)(3) of paragraph would
this section. make an exception
for the disclosure
of information to
the individuals
identified in Sec.
73.56(m)(1)
through (m)(3).
This paragraph
would be added to
ensure that
entities who
collect and
maintain personal
information use and
maintain those
records with the
highest regard for
individual privacy.
(m)(5) Licensees, A new Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(m)(5) would
Vs who collect and require licensees,
maintain personal applicants, and C/
information under Vs, and any
this section, and individual or
any individual or organization who
organization who collects and
collects and maintains personal
maintains personal information on
information on their behalf, to
behalf of a establish,
licensee, applicant implement, and
or C/V, shall maintain a system
establish, and procedures to
implement, and ensure that the
maintain a system personal
and procedures for information is
the secure storage secure and cannot
and handling of the be accessed by any
personal unauthorized
information individuals. The
collected. proposed rule would
add this specific
requirement because
the NRC is aware of
circumstances in
which the personal
information of
individuals
applying for UAA
has been removed
from a C/V's
business location
and transported to
the personal
residences of its
employees.
The proposed
provision would
prohibit such
practices in order
to further protect
the privacy rights
of individuals who
are subject to the
proposed rule.
[[Page 62787]]
Sec. 73.56(f)(3)(vii) (m)(6) This Proposed Sec.
Other persons pursuant to paragraph does not 73.56(m)(5) would
court order. This section authorize the retain the meaning
does not authorize the licensee, of the second
licensee, contractor, or applicant, or C/V sentence of current
vendor to withhold evidence to withhold Sec.
of criminal conduct from evidence of 73.56(f)(3)(vii),
law enforcement officials. criminal conduct which states that
from law the protection of
enforcement information
officials. requirements in
current Sec.
73.56(f)(3)(vii) do
not authorize the
licensee to
withhold evidence
of criminal conduct
from law
enforcement
officers, but
renumber the second
sentence as a
separate paragraph.
The first sentence
of current Sec.
73.56(f)(3)(vii)
permits licensees
to release personal
information about
an individual
without his or her
written consent
under a court
order. Therefore,
the proposed rule
would present the
second sentence of
current Sec.
73.56(f)(3)(vii) is
a separate
paragraph to
emphasize that the
prohibition on
withholding
personal
information from
law enforcement
officials applies
to any information
that may be
developed under the
requirements of
this section. This
change would be
made to improve the
clarity of the
rule.
Sec. 73.56(g) Audits...... (n) Audits and Proposed Sec.
Sec. 73.56(g)(2) Each corrective action. 73.56(n) [Audits
licensee retains Each licensee and and corrective
responsibility for the applicant who is action] would
effectiveness of any subject to this rename and amend
contractor and vendor section shall be current Sec.
program it accepts and the responsible for the 73.56(g) [Audits].
implementation of continuing The phrase, ``and
appropriate corrective effectiveness of corrective
action.. the authorization action,'' would be
program, including added to the
authorization section title to
program elements emphasize the NRCs
that are provided intent that
by C/Vs, and the licensees,
authorization applicants, and C/
programs of any C/ Vs must ensure that
Vs that are comprehensive
accepted by the corrective actions
licensee and are taken in
applicant. Each response to any
licensee, violations of the
applicant, and C/V requirements of
who is subject to this section
this section shall identified from an
ensure that audit. The second
authorization sentence of
programs and proposed Sec.
program elements 73.56(n) would
are audited to restate the
confirm compliance requirement for AA
with the program audits in
requirements of current Sec.
this section and 73.56(g)(1) and add
that comprehensive a requirement for
actions are taken comprehensive
to correct any non- corrective actions
conformance that is to be taken to any
identified. violations
identified as a
result of the
audits. These
changes would be
made because NRC is
aware that some
licensees have met
the requirements
for scheduling
audits in current
Sec. 73.56(g)(1),
but have not acted
promptly to resolve
violations that
were identified.
Therefore, the
proposed
requirements would
clarify the NRC's
intent that
comprehensive
corrective actions
must be taken in
response to audit
findings. The first
sentence of
proposed Sec.
73.56(n) would be
added to clarify
that licensees and
applicants are
responsible for the
continued
effectiveness of
their AA programs,
as well as those C/
V programs or
program elements
upon which they
rely to meet the
requirements of
this section.
The proposed
sentence would
retain the meaning
of the last
sentence of current
Sec. 73.56(g)(2),
which states that
each licensee
retains
responsibility for
the effectiveness
of any contractor
and vendor program
it accepts and the
implementation of
appropriate
corrective action,
but would move it
to proposed Sec.
73.56(n) for
organizational
clarity.
[[Page 62788]]
Sec. 73.56(g)(1) Each (n)(1) Each Proposed Sec.
licensee shall audit its licensee, applicant 73.56(n)(1) would
access authorization and C/V who is retain the required
program within 12 months of subject to this 24-month audit
the effective date of section shall frequency in
implementation of this ensure that their current Sec.
program and at least every entire 73.56(g)(1).
24 months thereafter to authorization Licensees,
ensure that the program is audited applicants, and C/
requirements of this as needed, but no Vs would be
section are satisfied. less frequently required to monitor
than nominally program performance
every 24 months. indicators and
Licensees, operating
applicants and C/Vs experience, and
are responsible for audit AA program
determining the elements more
appropriate frequently than
frequency, scope, every 24 months, as
and depth of needed. In
additional auditing determining the
activities within need for more
the nominal 24- frequent audits,
month period based the entities who
on the review of are subject to this
program performance section would
indicators, such as consider the
the frequency, frequency, nature,
nature, and and severity of
severity of discovered program
discovered deficiencies,
problems, personnel personnel or
or procedural procedural changes,
changes, and previous audit
previous audit findings, as well
findings. as ``lessons
learned.'' The
proposed change is
intended to promote
performance-based
rather than
compliance-based
audit activities
and clarify that
programs must be
audited following a
significant change
in personnel,
procedures, or
equipment as soon
as reasonably
practicable.
The NRC recognizes
that AA programs
evolve and new
issues and problems
continue to arise.
A high rate of
turnover of AA
program personnel
in contracted
services
exacerbates this
concern. Licensee
audits have
identified problems
that were
associated in some
way with personnel
changes, such as
new personnel not
understanding their
duties or
procedures, the
implications of
actions that they
took or did not
take, and changes
in processes. The
purpose of these
focused audits
would be to ensure
that changes in
personnel or
procedures do not
adversely affect
the operation of a
particular element
within the AA
program, or
function in
question.
Accordingly, the
proposed audit
requirement would
ensure that any
programmatic
problems that may
result from
significant changes
in personnel or
procedures would be
detected and
corrected on a
timely basis.
[[Page 62789]]
Sec. 73.56(g)(2) Each (n)(2) Authorization Proposed Sec.
licensee who accepts the program services 73.56(n)(2) would
access authorization that are provided add a new
program of a contractor or to a licensee, or requirement
vendor as provided for by applicant, by C/V specifying that if
paragraph (a)(4) of this personnel who are a licensee or
section shall have access off site or are not applicant relies
to records and shall audit under the direct upon a C/V program
contractor or vendor daily supervision or program element
programs every 12 months to or observation of to meet the
ensure that the the licensee's or requirements of
requirements of this applicant's this section, and
section are satisfied. personnel must be if the C/V
audited on a personnel providing
nominal 12-month the AA program
frequency. In service are off
addition, any site or, if they
authorization are on site but not
program services under the direct
that are provided daily supervision
to C/Vs by or observation of
subcontractor the personnel of
personnel who are the licensee or
off site or are not applicant, then the
under the direct licensee or
daily supervision applicant must
or observation of audit the C/V
the C/V's personnel program or program
must be audited on element on a
a nominal 12-month nominal 12-month
frequency. frequency. The
proposed rule would
also require that
any authorization
program services
that are provided
to C/Vs by
subcontractor
personnel who are
off site or are not
under the direct
daily supervision
or observation of
the C/V's personnel
must be audited on
a nominal 12-month
frequency. The
activities of C/V
personnel who work
on site and are
under the daily
supervision of AA
program personnel
would be audited
under proposed Sec.
73.56(n). The
proposed rule
expands and
clarifies the
current requirement
in Sec.
73.56(g)(2), which
requires licensees
who accept the
access
authorization
program of a
contractor or
vendor to audit the
C/V programs every
12 months, but does
not distinguish
between C/V
personnel who work
off site and other
C/V personnel, and
does not address
personnel who work
as subcontractors
to C/Vs.
Requiring annual
audits for C/V
personnel who work
off site and for C/
V subcontractors is
necessary to ensure
that the services
provided continue
to be effective,
given that other
means of monitoring
their
effectiveness, such
as daily oversight,
are unavailable.
(n)(3) Licensees' Proposed Sec.
and applicants' 73.56(n)(3) would
contracts with C/Vs add a new
must reserve the requirement that
right to audit the addresses
C/V and the C/V's contractual
subcontractors relationships
providing between licensees,
authorization applicants, and C/
program services at Vs. The proposed
any time, including rule would specify
at unannounced that contracts
times, as well as between licensees,
to review all applicants, and C/
information and Vs must allow the
documentation that licensees or
is reasonably applicants the
relevant to the right to audit the
performance of the C/Vs and the C/V's
program. subcontractors
providing
authorization
program services at
any time, including
at unannounced
times, as well as
to review all
information and
documentation that
is reasonably
relevant to the
performance of the
AA program. The
proposed paragraph
would apply to any
C/V with whom the
licensee or
applicant contracts
for authorization
program services.
The proposed rule
would specify that
contracts must
allow audits at
unannounced times,
which the NRC
considers necessary
to enhance the
effectiveness of
the audits.
[[Page 62790]]
Such unannounced
audits could be
necessary, for
example, if a
licensee or
applicant receives
an allegation that
an off-site C/V is
falsifying records
and the licensee or
applicant
determines that an
unannounced audit
would provide the
most effective
means to
investigate such an
allegation. The
proposed paragraph
would ensure that
the licensee's or
other entity's
contract with the C/
V would permit the
unannounced audit
as well as access
to any information
necessary to
conduct the audit
and ensure the
proper performance
of the AA program.
(n)(4) Licensees' A new Sec.
and applicants' 73.56(n)(4) would
contracts with C/ ensure that
Vs, and a C/V's licensees' and
contracts with applicants'
subcontractors, contracts with C/Vs
must also require permit the licensee
that the licensee or applicant to be
or applicant shall provided with or
be provided with, permitted to obtain
or permitted access copies of and take
to, copies of any away any documents
documents and take that auditors may
away any documents, need to assure that
that may be needed the C/V or its
to assure that the subcontractors are
C/V and its performing their
subcontractors are functions properly
performing their and that staff and
functions properly procedures meet
and that staff and applicable
procedures meet requirements. This
applicable proposed provision
requirements. would respond to
several incidents
in which parties
under contract to
licensees did not
permit AA program
auditors to remove
documents from a C/
V's premises that
were necessary to
document audit
findings, develop
corrective actions,
and ensure that the
corrective actions
were comprehensive
and effective.
(n)(5) Audits must A new Sec.
focus on the 73.56(n)(5) would
effectiveness of require audits to
the authorization focus on the
program or program effectiveness of AA
element(s), as programs and
appropriate. At program elements in
least one member of response to
the audit team industry and NRC
shall be a person experience that
who is some licensees' AA
knowledgeable of program audits have
and practiced with focused only on the
meeting extent to which the
authorization program or program
program performance elements meet the
objectives and minimum regulatory
requirements. The requirements in the
individuals current rule.
performing the Consistent with a
audit of the performance-based
authorization approach, the
program or program proposed paragraph
element(s) shall be would more clearly
independent from communicate the
both the subject NRC's intent that
authorization AA programs must
programs management meet the
and from personnel performance
who are directly objective of
responsible for providing high
implementing the assurance that
authorization individuals who are
program(s) being subject to the
audited. program are
trustworthy and
reliable, and do
not constitute an
unreasonable risk
to public health
and safety or the
common defense and
security, including
the potential to
commit radiological
sabotage. The
proposed paragraph
would also require
that the audit team
must include at
least one
individual who has
practical
experience in
implementing all
facets of AA
programs and that
the team members
must be
independent. These
provisions would be
added in response
to issues that have
arisen since the
requirements for AA
programs were first
promulgated, in
which licensee
audits were
ineffective because
the personnel who
conducted the
audits:
[[Page 62791]]
(1) lacked the
requisite knowledge
to evaluate the
wholistic
implications of
individual
requirements or the
complexities
associated with
meeting the rule's
performance
objective and,
therefore, could
not adequately
evaluate program
effectiveness, or
(2) were not
independent from
the day-to-day
operation of the AA
program and,
therefore, could
not be objective,
because in some
cases, these
persons were
auditing their own
activities. The
proposed
requirements would
be necessary to
correct these audit
deficiencies.
(n)(6) The result of Proposed Sec.
the audits, along 73.56(n)(6) would
with any clarify the
recommendations, requirements for
must be documented documentation and
and reported to dissemination of
senior corporate audit results.
and site Section 73.56(h)(2)
management. Each of the current rule
audit report must specifies that
identify conditions licensees shall
that are adverse to retain records of
the proper results of audits,
performance of the resolution of the
authorization audit findings, and
program, the cause corrective actions.
of the The proposed rule
condition(s), and, would retain the
when appropriate, requirement that
recommended licensees,
corrective actions, applicants, and C/
and corrective Vs document audit
actions taken. The findings. The
licensee, applicant proposed rule would
or C/V shall review add a requirement
the audit findings that any
and take any recommendations
additional must be documented,
corrective actions, and also would add
to include re- a requirement that
auditing of the findings and
deficient areas recommendations
where indicated, to must be reported to
preclude, within senior corporate
reason, repetition and site
of the condition. management. The
The resolution of proposed rule
the audit findings specifies more
and corrective fully than the
actions must be current rule what
documented. an audit report
must contain.
The second sentence
of the proposed
paragraph would
require each audit
report to identify
conditions that are
adverse to the
proper performance
of the AA program,
the cause of the
condition(s), and,
when appropriate,
recommended
corrective actions,
and corrective
actions already
taken. The third
sentence of the
proposed paragraph
would require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to review the audit
findings and, where
warranted, take
additional
corrective actions,
to include re-
auditing of the
deficient areas
where indicated, to
preclude, within
reason, repetition
of the condition.
Finally, the
proposed rule would
require the
resolution of the
audit findings and
corrective actions
to be documented.
The current rule
does not state
explicitly that
resolution of the
audit findings and
corrective actions
must be documented;
it provides only
that records of
resolution of the
audit findings and
corrective actions
must be retained
for 3 years. The
additional
sentences in the
proposed rule would
provide consistency
with Criterion XVI
in appendix B to 10
CFR part 50 and
would indicate that
AA audit reports
must be included in
licensees' and
applicants'
corrective action
programs, and that
any nonconformance
is not only
identified, but
corrected.
[[Page 62792]]
(n)(7) Licensees and Proposed Sec.
applicants may 73.56(n)(7) would
jointly conduct clarify the
audits, or may circumstances in
accept audits of C/ which licensees,
Vs that were applicants, and C/
conducted by other Vs may accept and
licensees and rely on others'
applicants who are audits. The current
subject to this rule in Sec.
section, if the 73.56(g) states
audit addresses the only that licensees
services obtained may accept audits
from the C/V by of contractors and
each of the sharing vendors conducted
licensees and by other licensees.
applicants. C/Vs The proposed rule
may jointly conduct would amend the
audits, or may current provision
accept audits of to incorporate
its subcontractors specific permission
that were conducted for licensees and
by other licensees, other entities to
applicants and C/Vs jointly conduct
who are subject to audits as well as
this section, if rely on one
the audit addresses anothers audits, if
the services the audits upon
obtained from the which they are
subcontractor by relying address the
each of the sharing services obtained
licensees, from the C/V by
applicants and C/Vs. each of the sharing
licensees or
applicants. These
proposed changes
would make the rule
consistent with
current licensee
practices that have
been endorsed by
the NRC and reduce
unnecessary
regulatory burden
by reducing the
number of redundant
audits that would
be performed.
(n)(7)(i) Licensees, Proposed Sec.
applicants and C/Vs 73.56(n)(7)(i)
shall review audit would require
records and reports licensees,
to identify any applicants, and C/
areas that were not Vs to identify any
covered by the areas that were not
shared or accepted covered by a shared
audit and ensure or accepted audit
that authorization and ensure that any
program elements unique services
and services upon used by the
which the licensee, licensee,
applicant or C/V applicant, or C/V
relies are audited, that were not
if the program covered by the
elements and shared audit are
services were not audited. The
addressed in the proposed provision
shared audit. is necessary to
ensure that all
authorization
program elements
and services upon
which each of the
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs relies are
audited, and that
elements not
included in the
shared audits are
not overlooked or
ignored.
Sec. 73.56(g)(2) * * * (n)(7)(ii) Sharing Proposed Sec.
Licensees may accept audits licensees and 73.56 (n)(7)(ii)
of contractors and vendors applicants need not would add a new
conducted by other re-audit the same C/ paragraph
licensees. V for the same clarifying that
period of time. licensees,
Sharing C/Vs need applicants, and C/
not re-audit the Vs need not re-
same subcontractor audit the same C/V
for the same period for the same period
of time. of time, and that C/
Vs who share the
services of the
same subcontractor
with other C/Vs or
licensees and
applicants, need
not re-audit the
same subcontractor
for the same period
of time.
The proposed rule
would include this
provision in
response to
implementation
questions from
stakeholders at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3 who
reported that some
industry auditors
and quality
assurance personnel
have misunderstood
the intent of the
current provision
and have required
licensees to re-
audit C/V programs
that have been
audited by other
licensees during
the same time
period. However,
such re-auditing
would be
unnecessary, as the
shared program
elements and
services should be
identical, and the
period of time
covered by the
audit should be the
same nominal 12-
month period.
Therefore, the
proposed provision
would be added to
clarify the intent
of current Sec.
73.56(g)(2).
[[Page 62793]]
Sec. 73.56(g)(2) * * * (n)(7)(iii) Each Proposed Sec.
Each sharing utility shall sharing licensee, 73.56(n)(7)(iii)
maintain a copy of the applicant and C/V would retain the
audit report, to include shall maintain a requirement in
findings, recommendations copy of the shared current Sec.
and corrective actions. audit, including 73.56(g)(2) that
findings, each sharing entity
recommendations, shall maintain a
and corrective copy of the shared
actions. audit report. The
proposed provision
would specify that
the requirement to
retain a copy of a
shared audit report
includes a
requirement to
retain a copy of
findings,
recommendations,
and corrective
actions, and that
the requirement
pertains to each
sharing licensee,
applicant and C/V.
This provision is
necessary to ensure
that the audit
documents are
available for NRC
review.
Sec. 73.56(h) Records..... (o) Records. Each Proposed Sec.
Sec. 73.56(h)(1) Each licensee, 73.56(o) [Records]
licensee who issues an applicant, and C/V would establish a
individual unescorted who is subject to requirement that
access authorization shall this section shall licensees,
retain the records on which maintain the applicants and C/Vs
the authorization is based records that are who are subject to
for the duration of the required by the this section must
unescorted access regulations in this retain the records
authorization and for a section for the required under the
five-year period following period specified by proposed rule for
its termination.. the appropriate either the periods
regulation. If a that are specified
retention period is by the appropriate
not otherwise regulation or for
specified, these the life of the
records must be facility's license,
retained until the certificate, or
Commission other regulatory
terminates the approval, if no
facility's license, records retention
certificate, or requirement is
other regulatory specified. The
approval. proposed rule would
replace the current
records requirement
in Sec.
73.56(h)(1), which
requires retention
of records on which
UAA is granted for
a period of 5 years
following
termination of UAA,
and retention of
records upon which
a denial of UAA is
based for 5 years,
and in Sec.
73.56(h)(2), which
requires retention
of audit records
for 3 years. The
proposed records
retention
requirement is a
standard
administrative
provision that is
used in all other
parts of 10 CFR
that contain
substantive
requirements
applicable to
licensees and
applicants.
(o)(1) All records Proposed Sec.
may be stored and 73.56(o)(1) would
archived permit the records
electronically, that would be
provided that the required under the
method used to provisions of the
create the proposed section to
electronic records be stored and
meets the following archived
criteria: electronically if
(i) Provides an the method used to
accurate create the
representation of electronic records:
the original (1) Provides an
records;. accurate
(ii) Prevents representation of
unauthorized access the original
to the records;. records; (2)
(iii) Prevents the prevents access to
alteration of any the information by
archived any individuals who
information and/or are not authorized
data once it has to have such
been committed to access; (3)
storage; and. prevents the
(iv) Permits easy alteration of any
retrieval and re- archived
creation of the information and/or
original records.. data once it has
been committed to
storage; and (4)
allows easy
retrieval and re-
creation of the
original records.
The proposed
paragraph would be
added to recognize
that most records
are now stored
electronically and
must be protected
to ensure the
integrity of the
data. Records are
now stored
electronically and
must be protected
to ensure the
integrity of the
data.
[[Page 62794]]
(o)(2) Each Proposed Sec.
licensee, 73.56(o)(2) would
applicant, and C/V require licensees,
who is subject to applicants, and C/
this section shall Vs to retain
retain the certain records
following records related to UAA
for at least 5 determinations for
years after the at least 5 years
licensee, after an
applicant, or C/V individual's UAA
terminates or has been terminated
denies an or denied, or until
individual's the completion of
unescorted access all related legal
authorization or proceedings,
until the whichever is later.
completion of all The proposed
related legal requirement to
proceedings, retain records
whichever is later: until the
(i) Records of the completion of all
information that related legal
must be collected proceedings would
under paragraphs address the fact
(d) and (e) of this that legal actions
section that involving records
results in the of the type
granting of specified in the
unescorted access proposed paragraph
authorization;. can continue longer
(ii) Records than the 5 years
pertaining to that the current
denial or rule requires these
unfavorable records to be
termination of retained. Adding a
unescorted access requirement to
authorization and retain the records
related management until all legal
actions; and. proceedings are
(iii) Documentation complete would
of the granting and protect
termination of individuals'
unescorted access ability to have
authorization.. access to a full
and complete
evidentiary record
in legal
proceedings. The
proposed rule would
identify more
specifically the
records to be
retained than the
current rule, which
in Sec.
73.56(h)(1)
specifies only
``the records on
which authorization
is based'' and
``the records on
which denial is
based.'' Proposed
Sec. 73.56(o)(2)
would require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to retain three
specified types of
records:
(1) Records listed
in proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(2)(i),
which specifies
records of the
information that
must be collected
under Sec.
73.56(d)
[Background
investigation] and
Sec. 73.56(e)
[Psychological
assessment] of the
proposed rule that
results in the
granting of UAA;
(2) records listed
in proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(2)(ii),
which specifies
records pertaining
to denial or
unfavorable
termination of UAA
and related
management actions;
and (3) records
listed in proposed
Sec.
73.56(o)(2)(iii),
which specifies
documentation of
the granting and
termination of UAA.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(2)(iii),
requiring retention
of records that are
related to the
granting and
termination of an
individual's UAA,
would be added to
ensure that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who may be
considering
granting UAA to an
individual can
determine which
category of UAA
requirements would
apply to the
individual, based
upon the length of
time that has
elapsed since the
individual's last
period of UAA was
terminated and
whether the
individual's last
period of UAA was
terminated
favorably.
[[Page 62795]]
Sec. 73.56(h)(2) Each (o)(3) Each Proposed Sec.
licensee shall retain licensee, 73.56(o)(3)(i) and
records of results of applicant, and C/V (ii) would require
audits, resolution of the who is subject to licensees,
audit findings and this section shall applicants, and C/
corrective actions for retain the Vs to retain
three years. following records records related to
for at least 3 behavioral
years or until the observation
completion of all training and
related legal records related to
proceedings, audits, audit
whichever is later: findings, and
(i) Records of corrective actions
behavioral for at least 3
observation years, or until the
training conducted completion of all
under paragraph related legal
(f)(2) of this proceedings,
section; and. whichever is later.
(ii) Records of Proposed Sec.
audits, audit 73.56(o)(3)(i)
findings, and would add a new
corrective actions requirement, not
taken under addressed in the
paragraph (n) of current rule, to
this section.. retain records of
behavioral
observation
training. Because
the proposed rule
is adding a
requirement that
all individuals who
are subject to the
AA program must
perform behavioral
observation, and
therefore that they
must all be trained
in behavioral
observation, this
proposed record
retention
requirement is
necessary to allow
the NRC to review
the implementation
of the training
requirement.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(3)(i)
would retain the 3-
year recordkeeping
requirements of the
current rule in
Sec. 73.56(h)(2)
for audit findings
and corrective
action records.
(o)(4) Licensees, Proposed Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(o)(4) would
Vs shall retain add a new
written agreements requirement that
for the provision licensees,
of services under applicants, and C/
this section for Vs shall retain
the life of the written agreements
agreement or until for the provision
completion of all of authorization
legal proceedings program services
related to a denial for the life of the
or unfavorable agreement or until
termination of completion of all
unescorted access legal proceedings
authorization that related to a denial
involved those or unfavorable
services, whichever termination of UAA
is later. that involved those
services, whichever
is later. The
proposed
requirement for
retention of the
agreement for the
life of the
agreement would
ensure that the
agreement is
available for use
as a source of
information about
the scope of duties
under the
agreement. The
proposed
requirement to
retain the written
agreements for any
matter under legal
challenge until the
matter is resolved
is necessary to
ensure that the
materials remain
available, should
an individual, the
NRC, a licensee, or
another entity who
would be subject to
the rule require
access to them in a
legal or regulatory
proceeding.
(o)(5) Licensees, Proposed Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(o)(5) would
Vs shall retain be added to require
records of the licensees,
background checks, applicants, and C/
and psychological Vs to retain
assessments of records related to
authorization the background
program personnel, checks and
conducted under psychological
paragraphs (d) and assessments of AA
(e) of this program personnel,
section, for the conducted under
length of the proposed paragraphs
individual's (d) and (e) of Sec.
employment by or 73.56, for the
contractual length of the
relationship with individual's
the licensee, employment by or
applicant, or C/V, contractual
or until the relationship with
completion of any the licensee,
legal proceedings applicant, or C/V,
relating to the or until the
actions of such completion of all
authorization related legal
program personnel, proceedings,
whichever is later. whichever is later.
The proposed period
during which these
records must be
maintained would be
based on the NRC's
need to have access
to the records for
inspection purposes
and the potential
need for the
records to remain
available should an
individual, the
NRC, a licensee, or
another entity who
would be subject to
this rule require
access to them in a
legal or regulatory
proceeding.
However, the
proposed rule would
establish a limit
on the period
during which the
records must be
retained in order
to reduce the
burden associated
with storing such
records
indefinitely.
[[Page 62796]]
(o)(6) Licensees, A new Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(o)(6) would
Vs shall ensure require licensees,
that the applicants and C/Vs
information about to establish and
individuals who administer an
have applied for information-sharing
unescorted access mechanism (i.e., a
authorization, database) that
which is specified permits all of the
in the licensee's entities who are
or applicant's subject to Sec.
Physical Security 73.56 to access
Plan, is recorded certain information
and retained in an about individuals
information-sharing who have applied
mechanism that is for UAA under this
established and section. The
administered by the information that
licensees, must be shared
applicants, and C/ would be specified
Vs who are subject in the Physical
to his section. Security Plans that
Licensees, licensees and
applicants, and C/ entities would be
Vs shall ensure required to submit
that only correct for NRC review and
and complete approval under
information is proposed Sec.
included in the 73.56(a). The
information-sharing proposed paragraph
mechanism. If, for would require
any reason, the licensees,
shared information applicants, and C/
used for Vs to enter this
determining an information about
individual's individuals who
trustworthiness and have applied for
reliability changes UAA into the
or new information information-sharing
is developed about mechanism and
the individual, update the shared
licensees, information, if the
applicants, and C/ licensee, applicant
Vs shall correct or or C/V determines
augment the shared that information
information previously entered
contained in the is incorrect or
information-sharing develops new
mechanism. information about
the individual. The
proposed
requirement for an
information-sharing
mechanism is
necessary to
address several
long-standing
weaknesses in the
sharing of
information about
individuals among
licensee and C/V
authorization
programs that is
required under
current Sec.
73.56.
If the changed or Although the
developed industry has
information has maintained a
implications for database for many
adversely affecting years, some
an individual's licensees did not
trustworthiness and participate, some
reliability, the programs did not
licensee, enter complete
applicant, or C/V information, some
who has discovered programs did not
the incorrect enter the
information, or information in a
develops new timely manner, and
information, shall C/Vs who were
inform the implementing
reviewing official authorization
of any programs were not
authorization permitted to
program under which participate. As a
the individual is result, some
maintaining licensees and C/Vs
unescorted access were at risk of
authorization of granting UAA to
the updated individuals without
information on the being aware, in a
day of discovery. few instances, that
The reviewing the individual's
official shall last period of UAA
evaluate the had been terminated
information and unfavorably or that
take appropriate potentially
actions, which may disqualifying
include denial or information about
unfavorable the individual had
termination of the been developed by a
individual's previous licensee
unescorted access after the
authorization. If, individual was
for any reason, the granted UAA by a
information-sharing subsequent
mechanism is licensee, because
unavailable and a that additional
notification of information was not
changes or updated communicated.
information is Therefore, the
required, proposed rule would
licensees, require
applicants, and C/ establishing and
Vs shall take administering an
manual actions to information-sharing
ensure that the mechanism to
information is strengthen the
shared, and update effectiveness of
the records in the authorization
information-sharing programs by
mechanism as soon ensuring that
as reasonably information that
possible. Records has implications
maintained in the for an individual's
database must be trustworthiness and
available for NRC reliability is
review. available in a
timely manner,
accurate, and
complete.
[[Page 62797]]
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to inform the
reviewing official
of any licensee,
applicant, or C/V
who may be
considering an
individual for UAA
or has granted UAA
to an individual of
any corrected or
new information
about that
individual on the
day that incorrect
or new information
is discovered. The
proposed
requirement to
inform the
subsequent
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would be
added to ensure
that the corrected
or new information
is actively
communicated, in
addition to
entering it into
the information-
sharing mechanism.
The proposed rule
would also require
the receiving
reviewing official
to evaluate the
corrected or new
information and
determine its
implications for
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. If the
information
indicates that the
individual cannot
be determined to be
trustworthy and
reliable, the
proposed rule would
require the
receiving reviewing
official to deny or
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's UAA.
The proposed
requirement to
inform subsequent
AA programs of
corrected or new
information is
necessary because
receiving AA
programs would not
otherwise become
aware of the
information unless
and until the
individual seeks
UAA from another AA
program or is
subject to the re-
evaluation required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to take manual
actions to share
the required
information, if the
industry database
is unavailable for
any reason. These
manual actions
could include, but
would not be
limited to,
telephone contacts,
faxes, and email
communications.
However, the
proposed rule would
also require that
any records created
manually must be
entered into the
database once it is
again available.
These provisions
would be necessary
to maintain the
effectiveness of
the information-
sharing component
of AA programs.
Finally, the
proposed paragraph
would also require
the information-
sharing mechanism
to be available for
NRC review. This
requirement is
necessary to ensure
that NRC personnel
have access to the
information-sharing
mechanism for
required inspection
activities.
[[Page 62798]]
(o)(7) If a A new Sec.
licensee, 73.56(o)(7) would
applicant, or C/V ensure that the
administratively temporary
withdraws an administrative
individual's withdrawal of an
unescorted access individual's UAA,
authorization under caused by a delay
the requirements of in completing any
this section, the portion of the
licensee, background
applicant, or C/V investigation or re-
may not record the evaluation that is
administrative not under the
action to withdraw individual's
the individual's control, would not
unescorted access be treated as an
authorization as an unfavorable
unfavorable termination, except
termination and may if the reviewing
not disclose it in official determines
response to a that the delayed
suitable inquiry information
conducted under the requires denial or
provisions of part unfavorable
26 of this chapter, termination of the
a background individual's UAA.
investigation This proposed
conducted under the provision would be
provisions of this necessary to ensure
section, or any that individuals
other inquiry or are not unfairly
investigation. subject to any
Immediately upon adverse
favorable consequences for
completion of the the licensee's or
background other entity's
investigation delay in completing
element that caused the background
the administrative investigation or
withdrawal, the other requirements
licensee, of the proposed
applicant, or C/V section.
shall ensure that
any matter that
could link the
individual to the
temporary
administrative
action is
eliminated from the
subject
individual's access
authorization or
personnel record
and other records,
except if a review
of the information
obtained or
developed causes
the reviewing
official to
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's
unescorted access.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.58
[Safety/security interface]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.58 Safety/security interface Proposed Sec. 73.58 would be
requirements for nuclear power a new requirement in part 73.
reactors. The need for the proposed
rulemaking is based on: (i)
The Commission's comprehensive
review of its safeguards and
security programs and
requirements, (ii) the
variables in the current
threat environment, (iii) the
analyses made during the
development of the changes to
the Design Basis Threat, (iv)
the plant-specific security
analyses, and (v) the
increased complexity of
licensee security measures now
being required with an
attendant increase in the
potential for adverse
interactions between safety
and security. Additionally, it
is based on plant events that
demonstrated that changes made
to a facility, its security
plan, or implementation of the
plan can have adverse effects
if the changes are not
adequately assessed and
managed. The Commission has
determined that the proposed
safety/security rule
requirements are necessary for
reasonable assurance that the
public health and safety and
common defense and security
continue to be adequately
protected because the current
regulations do not
specifically require
evaluation of the effects of
plant changes on security or
the effects of security plan
changes on plant safety.
Further, the regulations do
not require communication
about the implementation and
timing of changes, which would
promote awareness of the
effects of changing
conditions, and result in
appropriate assessment and
response.
[[Page 62799]]
Each operating nuclear power reactor The introductory text would
licensee with a license issued under indicate this section would
part 50 or 52 of this chapter shall apply to power reactors
comply with the requirements of this licensed under 10 CFR parts 50
section. or 52. Paragraph (a)(1) of
(a)(1) The licensee shall assess and this section would require
manage the potential for adverse licensees to assess proposed
affects on safety and security, changes to plant
including the site emergency plan, configurations, facility
before implementing changes to plant conditions, or security to
configurations, facility conditions, identify potential adverse
or security.. effects on the capability of
the licensee to maintain
either safety or security
before implementing those
changes. The assessment would
be qualitative or
quantitative. If a potential
adverse effect would be
identified, the licensee shall
take appropriate measures to
manage the potential adverse
effect. Managing the potential
adverse effect would be
further described in paragraph
(b). The requirements of the
proposed Sec. 73.58 would be
additional requirements to
assess proposed changes and to
manage potential adverse
effects contained in other NRC
regulations, and would not be
intended to substitute for
them. The primary function of
this proposed rule would be to
explicitly require that
licensees consider the
potential for changes to cause
adverse interaction between
security and safety, and to
appropriately manage any
adverse results. Documentation
of assessments performed per
paragraph (a)(1) would not be
required so as not to delay
plant and security actions
unnecessarily.
(a)(2) The scope of changes to be Paragraph (a)(2) of this
assessed and managed must include section would identify that
planned and emergent activities (such changes identified by either
as, but not limited to, physical planned or emergent activities
modifications, procedural changes, must be assessed by the
changes to operator actions or licensee. Paragraph (a)(2) of
security assignments, maintenance this section would also
activities, system reconfiguration, provide a description of
access modification or restrictions, typical activities for which
and changes to the security plan and changes must be assessed and
its implementation). for which resultant adverse
interactions must be managed.
(b) Where potential adverse Paragraph (b) of this section
interactions are identified, the would require that, when
licensee shall communicate them to potential adverse interactions
appropriate licensee personnel and would be identified, licensees
take compensatory and/or mitigative shall communicate the
actions to maintain safety and potential adverse interactions
security under applicable Commission to appropriate licensee
regulations, requirements, and license personnel. The licensee shall
conditions. also take appropriate
compensatory and mitigative
actions to maintain safety and
security consistent with the
applicable NRC requirements.
The compensatory and/or
mitigative actions taken must
be consistent with existing
requirements for the affected
activity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.71
[Reporting of safeguards events]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Each licensee This paragraph would
subject to the be added to provide
provisions of Sec. for the very rapid
73.55 shall notify communication to
the NRC Operations the Commission of
Center,\1\ as soon an imminent or
as possible but not actual threat to a
later than 15 power reactor
minutes after facility. The
discovery of an proposed 15-minute
imminent or actual requirement would
safeguards threat more accurately
against the reflect the current
facility and other threat environment.
safeguards events Because an actual
described in or imminent threat
paragraph I of could quickly
appendix G to this result in a
part \2\. security event, a
Footnote: 1. shorter reporting
Commercial (secure time would be
and non-secure) required. This
telephone number of shortened time
the NRC Operations would permit the
Center are NRC to contact
specified in Federal authorities
appendix A to this and other licensees
part.. in a rapid manner
Footnote: 2. to inform them of
Notifications to this event,
the NRC for the especially if this
declaration of an event is the
emergency class opening action on a
shall be performed coordinated
in accordance with multiple-target
Sec. 50.72 of attack. Such notice
this chapter.. may permit other
licensees to
escalate to a
higher protective
level in advance of
an attack. The
Commission would
expect licensees to
notify the NRC
Operations Center
as soon as possible
after they notify
local law
enforcement
agencies, but
within 15 minutes.
The Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other types of
licensees in future
rulemaking.
Footnote 1 would
provide a cross
reference to
appendix A to part
73 which contains
NRC contact
information.
Footnote 2 would
remind licensees of
their concurrent
emergency
declaration
responsibilities
under 10 CFR 50.72.
[[Page 62800]]
(a)(1) When making a The proposed rule
report under would include this
paragraph (a) of introductory
this section, the statement, which
licensees shall: provides a
structure for the
following list of
information to be
provided in the 15-
minute report.
(a)(1)(i) Identify This requirement
the facility name; would be added to
and ensure the
licensee's facility
is clearly
identified when a
report is made.
(a)(1)(ii) Briefly This requirement
describe the nature would be added to
of the threat or ensure the nature
event, including: and substance of
the event would be
clearly articulated
based on the best
information
available to the
licensee at the
time of the report.
The information
should be as
factual and as
succinct as
possible.
Additional
information
regarding the
identification of
events to be
reported and the
nature of the
information to be
provide will be
described in
guidance.
(a)(1)(ii)(A) Type This requirement
of threat or event would be added to
(e.g., armed provide for a
assault, vehicle minimum, succinct
bomb, credible bomb categorization of
threat, etc.); and the information
described in the
report. This would
allow the licensee
the opportunity to
provide a scope for
the information
included in the
report. The
information should
be as factual and
as succinct as
possible at the
time of the report.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
(a)(1)(ii)(B) Threat This requirement
or event status would be added to
(i.e., imminent, in provide information
progress, or regarding the most
neutralized). current status of
the event or
information being
reported. The
information should
be as factual as
possible at the
time of the report.
(b)(2) This notification (a)(2) Notifications This paragraph would
must be made in accordance must be made be revised to
with the requirements of according to reflect the new
Paragraphs (a) (2), (3), paragraph (e) of location for the
(4), and (5) of this this section, as methods for these
section. applicable. notifications. The
requirements for
the methods all of
the verbal
notifications
[under this
section] would be
consolidated under
paragraph (e).
(a)(1) Each licensee subject (b) Each licensee This requirement
to the provisions of Sec. subject to the would be renumbered
Sec. 73.25, 73.26, provisions of Sec. and retained with
73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), Sec. 73.25, minor revision.
or 73.67(g) shall notify 73.26, 73.27(c), Footnote (1) would
the NRC Operations Center1 73.37, 73.67(e), or be relocated to new
within one hour after 73.67(g) shall paragraph (a) and
discovery of the loss of notify the NRC revised. The
any shipment of SNM or Operations Center acronym ``SNM''
spent fuel, and within one within one (1) hour would be spelled
hour after recovery of or after discovery of out as ``special
accounting for such lost the loss of any nuclear material.''
shipment. shipment of special The word
Footnote: 1. Commercial nuclear material ``nuclear'' would
telephone number of the NRC (SNM) or spent be added to ``spent
Operation Center is (301) nuclear fuel, and fuel'' to be
816-5100. within one (1) hour consistent with
after recovery of terminology used
or accounting for elsewhere in part
the lost shipment. 73. Reference to
Notifications must the methods of
be made according telephonic
to paragraph (e) of reporting would be
this section, as added to specify
applicable. paragraph (e) of
this section.
(b)(1) Each licensee subject (c) Each licensee This requirement
to the provisions of Sec. subject to the would be renumbered
Sec. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, provisions of Sec. and retained with
73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or Sec. 73.20, minor revision. The
73.67 shall notify the NRC 73.37, 73.50, words ``1 hour of''
Operations Center within 1 73.51, 73.55, would be replaced
hour of discovery of the 73.60, or 73.67 by the words ``one
safeguards events described shall notify the (1) hour after'' to
in Paragraph I(a)(1) of NRC Operations clarify the time
appendix G to this part. Center within one frame established
(1) hour after by this
discovery of the requirement. The
safeguards events reference to
described in appendix G would be
paragraph II of revised as a
appendix G to this conforming change
part. Notifications to specify the
must be made events to be
according to reported. Reference
paragraph (e) of to the methods of
this section, as reporting would be
applicable. added to specify
paragraph (e) of
this section.
[[Page 62801]]
(d) Each licensee This paragraph would
subject to the be added to provide
provisions of Sec. a requirement for
73.55 shall notify power reactor
the NRC Operations licensees to notify
Center, as soon as the Commission of
possible but not suspicious
later than four (4) activities,
hours after attempts at access,
discovery of the etc., that may
safeguards events indicate pre-
described in operational
paragraph III of surveillance,
appendix G to this reconnaissance, or
part. Notifications intelligence
must be made gathering
according to activities targeted
paragraph (e) of against the
this section, as facility. This
applicable. would more
accurately reflect
the current threat
environment; would
assist the
Commission in
evaluating threats
to multiple
licensees; and
would assist the
intelligence and
homeland security
communities in
evaluating threats
across critical
infrastructure
sectors. The
reporting process
intended in this
proposed rule would
be similar
reporting process
that the licensees
currently use under
guidance issued by
the Commission
subsequent to
September 11, 2001,
and would formalize
Commission
expectations;
however, the
reporting interval
would be lengthened
from 1 hour to 4
hours.
The Commission views
this length of time
as reasonable to
accomplish these
broader objectives.
This reporting
requirement does
not include a
followup written
report. The
Commission believes
that a written
report from the
licensees would be
of minimal value
and would be an
unnecessary
regulatory burden,
because the types
of incidents to be
reported are
transitory in
nature and time-
sensitive. The
proposed text would
be neither a
request for
intelligence
collection
activities nor
authority for the
conduct of law
enforcement or
intelligence
activities. This
paragraph would
simply require the
reporting of
observed
activities. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other types of
licensees in future
rulemaking.
(a)(2) This notification (e) The licensees This requirement
must be made to the NRC shall make the would be renumbered
Operations Center via the notifications and revised as a
Emergency Notification required by conforming change
System, if the licensee is paragraphs (a), to new paragraph
party to that system. (b), (c), and (d) (d). Other
of this section to revisions would
the NRC Operations include changing
Center via the the phrase ``This
Emergency notification must
Notification be made to'' would
System, or other be replaced by the
dedicated active-voice phrase
telephonic system ``The licensee
that may be shall make'' to
designated by the clarify that it
Commission, if the would be the
licensee has access licensee who takes
to that system. the notification
action. The phrase
``or other
dedicated
telephonic system
that may be
designated by the
Commission'' would
be added to allow
flexibility to
address advances in
communications
systems.
(a)(2) If the Emergency (e)(1) If the This requirement
Notification System is Emergency would be renumbered
inoperative or unavailable, Notification System and retained with
the licensee shall make the or other designated minor revision. The
required notification via telephonic system phrase ``within one
commercial telephonic is inoperative or hour'' would be
service or other dedicated unavailable, replaced with the
telephonic system or any licensees shall phrase ``within the
other methods that will make the required timeliness
ensure that a report is notification via requirements of
received by the NRC commercial paragraphs (a),
Operations Center within telephonic service (b), (c), and (d)
one hour. or any other of this section, as
methods that will applicable.'' This
ensure that a would provide
report is received consistency with
by the NRC the varying
Operations Center submission
within the intervals for
timeliness notifications under
requirements of paragraphs (a)
paragraphs (a), through (d).
(b), (c), and (d)
of this section, as
applicable.
(a)(2) The exemption of (e)(2) The exception This requirement
Section 73.21(g)(3) applies of Sec. would be renumbered
to all telephonic reports 73.21(g)(3) for and retained with
required by this section. emergency or minor revision to
extraordinary provide clarity
conditions applies [and consistency
to all telephonic with Sec. 73.21
reports required by safeguards
this section. information
regulations] on
what types of
telephonic
notifications are
exempt from the
secure
communications
requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
[[Page 62802]]
(a)(3) The licensee shall, (e)(3) For events This requirement
upon request to the NRC, reported under would be retained
maintain an open and paragraph (a) of and revised into
continuous communication this section, the three separate
channel with the NRC licensee may be requirements. The
Operations Center. requested by the first sentence
NRC to maintain an would be reworded
open, continuous to reflect the
communication renumbered event
channel with the reports under this
NRC Operations section. For the 15-
Center, once the minute reports, the
licensee has paragraph would
completed other indicate that a
required licensee may be
notifications under requested to
this section, Sec. establish a
50.72 of this ``continuous
chapter, or communications
appendix E of part channel'' following
50 of this chapter the initial 15-
and any immediate minute
actions to notification. The
stabilize the establishment of a
plant. When continuous
established, the communications
continuous channel would not
communications supercede current
channel shall be emergency
staffed by a preparedness or
knowledgeable security
individual in the requirements to
licensee's security notify State
or operations officials or local
organizations law enforcement
(e.g., a security authorities, nor
supervisor, an would it supercede
alarm station requirements to
operator, take immediate
operations action to stabilize
personnel, etc.) the reactor plant
from a location (e.g.>, in response
deemed appropriate to a reactor scram
by the licensee. or to the loss of
offsite power).
The continuous A new requirement
communications would be added for
channel may be the person
established via the communicating to be
Emergency knowledgeable and
Notification System from the licensee's
or other dedicated security or
telephonic system operations
that may be organization. This
designated by the language would
Commission, if the provide licensees
licensee has access with flexibility in
to that system, or choosing personnel
a commercial to fulfill this
telephonic system. communications role
and in choosing the
location for this
communication
(e.g., control
room, security
alarm station,
technical support
center, etc.). This
language would also
provide licensees
direction and
flexibility on the
telephonic systems
that may be used
for this
communications
channel.
(a)(3) The licensee shall, (e)(4) For events This requirement
upon request to the NRC, reported under would be renumbered
maintain an open and paragraphs (b) or and retained with
continuous communication (c) of this minor revision to
channel with the NRC section, the support the
Operations Center. licensee shall renumbering of
maintain an open, existing paragraphs
continuous (a) and (b) to new
communication (b) and (c).
channel with the
NRC Operations
Center upon request
from the NRC.
(e)(5) For This would be a new
suspicious events requirement. For
reported under suspicious activity
paragraph (d) of reports, no
this section, the continuous
licensee is not communication
required to channel would be
maintain an open, required. The
continuous Commission's view
communication is that because
channel with the these reports are
NRC Operations intended for law
Center. enforcement, threat
assessment, and
intelligence
community purposes,
rather than event
followup purposes,
a continuous
communications
channel is not
necessary.
(c) Each licensee subject to (f) Each licensee This requirement
the provisions of Sec. subject to the would be renumbered
Sec. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, provisions of Sec. and retained with
73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or Sec. 73.20, minor revision. The
each licensee possessing 73.37, 73.50, term ``safeguards
SSNM and subject to the 73.51, 73.55, event'' would be
provisions of Sec. 73.60, or each added between
73.67(d) shall maintain a licensee possessing ``current'' and
current log * * *. SSNM and subject to ``log'' to provide
the provisions of greater clarity and
Sec. 73.67(d) consistency with
shall maintain a appendix G.
current safeguards
event log.
(c) * * * and record the (f)(1) The licensee This requirement
safeguards events described shall record the would be renumbered
in Paragraphs II (a) and safeguards events and retained with
(b) of appendix G to this described in revision. This
part within 24 hours of paragraph IV of paragraph would
discovery by a licensee appendix G of this also be revised to
employee or member of the part within 24 reflect the
licensee's contract hours of discovery. renumbering of
security organization. appendix G. The
language on
discovery by a
licensee or
licensee contractor
would be removed to
reduce confusion.
The Commission
expects all logable
events to be
recorded,
irrespective of who
identifies the
security issue
(i.e., recordable
events discovered
by licensee staff,
contractors, NRC or
State inspectors,
or independent
auditors should be
logged).
(c) * * * The licensee shall (f)(2) The licensees This requirement
retain the log of events shall retain the would be renumbered
recorded under this section log of events and retained with
as a record for three years recorded under this minor revision by
after the last entry is section as a record adding ``(3)''
made in each log or until for three (3) years after ``three''
termination of the license. after the last [years].
entry is made in
each log or until
termination of the
license.
[[Page 62803]]
(a)(4) The initial (g) Written reports. This requirement
telephonic notification (1) Each licensee would be renumbered
must be followed within a making an initial and retained with
period of 60 days by a telephonic revision. The
written report submitted to notification under current text would
the NRC by an appropriate paragraphs (a), be retained
method listed in Sec. (b), and (c) of requiring a written
73.4. this section shall 60-day report be
also submit a submitted for 1-
written report to hour notifications
the NRC within a under paragraph (b)
period of 60 days and (c). A written
by an appropriate 60-day report would
method listed in also be required
Sec. 73.4. for 15-minute
notifications under
paragraph (a).
(g)(2) Licenses are This paragraph would
not required to be a new
submit a written requirement.
report following a Licensees would not
telephonic be required to
notification made submit a written
under paragraph (d) report for a
of this section. suspicious activity
notification made
under paragraph (d)
as no ``security
event'' has
occurred. Any
followup that might
be necessary would
be handled through
the Commission's
threat assessment
procedures.
(d) Each licensee shall (g)(3) Each licensee This requirement
submit to the Commission shall submit to the would be renumbered
the 60-day written reports Commission written and retained. The
required under the reports that are of timing requirement
provisions of this section a quality that will and the quality
that are of a quality that permit legible requirement would
will permit legible reproduction and be split into
reproduction and processing. paragraph (g)(1)
processing. * * *. and (g)(3),
respectively.
(d) * * * [I]f the facility (g)(4) Licensees These requirements
is subject to Sec. 50.73 subject to Sec. would be renumbered
of this chapter, the 50.73 of this and retained.
licensee shall prepare the chapter shall
written report on NRC Form prepare the written
366. If the facility is not report on NRC Form
subject to Sec. 50.73 of 366.
this chapter, the licensee (g)(5) Licensees not
shall not use this form but subject to Sec.
shall prepare the written 50.73 of this
report in letter format * * chapter, shall
*. prepare the written
report in letter
format.
(a)(4) In addition to the (g)(6) In addition This requirement
addressees specified in to the addressees would be renumbered
Sec. 73.4, the licensee specified in Sec. and retained with
shall also provide one copy 73.4, the licensees minor revision. The
of the written report shall also provide paragraph would be
addressed to the Director, one copy of the revised to change
Division of Nuclear written report and the organization
Security, Office of Nuclear any revisions within the NRC,
Security and Incident addressed to the that should receive
Response. Director, Office of an extra copy of
Nuclear Security the written, or any
and Incident revisions to the
Response. written report, in
addition to the
standard submission
addresses under
Sec. 73.4. The
phrase ``Director,
Division of Nuclear
Security'' would be
replaced with the
``Director, Office
of Nuclear Security
and Incident
Response.'' to
reflect changes
within the Office
of Nuclear Security
and Incident
Response and reduce
the need for future
changes to this
regulation with
realignment of the
NRC's internal
structure.
(a)(4) The report must (g)(7) The report This requirement
include sufficient must include would be retained
information for NRC sufficient and be renumbered.
analysis and evaluation. information for NRC
analysis and
evaluation.
(a)(5) Significant (g)(8) Significant This requirement
supplemental information supplemental would be renumbered
which becomes available information which and revised.
after the initial becomes available Language would be
telephonic notification to after the initial added to clarity
the NRC Operations Center telephonic the updating of
or after the submission of notification to the notifications made
the written report must be NRC Operations under paragraph (e)
telephonically reported to Center or after the and to require
the NRC Operations Center submission of the revised written
and also submitted in a written report must reports. Written
revised written report be telephonically initial and revised
(with the revisions reported to the NRC reports would be
indicated) to the Regional Operations Center submitted in
Office and the Document under paragraph (e) accordance with
Control Desk. of this section and paragraph (g)(6) of
also submitted in a this section.
revised written
report (with the
revisions
indicated) as
required under
paragraph (g)(6) of
this section.
(a)(5) Errors discovered in (g)(9) Errors This requirement
a written report must be discovered in a would be renumbered
corrected in a revised written report must and retained.
report with revisions be corrected in a
indicated. revised report with
revisions indicated.
(a)(5) The revised report (g)(10) The revised This requirement
must replace the previous report must replace would be renumbered
report; the update must be the previous and retained with
a complete entity and not report; the update minor grammatical
contain only supplementary must be complete changes.
or revised information. and not be limited
to only
supplementary or
revised information.
(a)(5) Each licensee shall (g)(11) Each This requirement
maintain a copy of the licensee shall would be renumbered
written report of an event maintain a copy of and retained with
submitted under this the written report minor revision by
section as record for a of an event adding ``(3)''
period of three years from submitted under after ``three''
the date of the report. this section as [years].
record for a period
of three (3) years
from the date of
the report.
(e) Duplicate reports are (h) Duplicate This requirement
not required for events reports are not would be retained
that are also reportable in required for events and be renumbered.
accordance with Sec. Sec. that are also
50.72 and 50.73 of this reportable in
chapter. accordance with
Sec. Sec. 50.72
and 50.73 of this
chapter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62804]]
Table 6.--Proposed Part 73 Appendix B
[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B to Part 73....... Appendix B to Part This proposed
General Criteria for 73. Paragraph VI and
Security Personnel. VI. Nuclear Power header would be
Reactor Training added to the
and Qualification current appendix B
Plan. to replicate
current
requirements,
ensure continuity
between training
and qualification
programs and
requirements for
security personnel,
and provide for the
separation,
modification,
addition, and
clarification of
training and
qualification
requirements as
they apply
specifically to
operating nuclear
power reactors.
Introduction................ A. General The phrase ``General
Requirements and Requirements and''
Introduction. would be added to
this header for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Introduction, A.1. The licensee This requirement
Paragraph 1: Security shall ensure that would retain the
personnel who are all individuals who requirement for
responsible for the are assigned duties security personnel
protection of special and to meet minimum
nuclear material on site or responsibilities criteria to ensure
in transit and for the required to prevent that they will
protection of the facility significant core effectively perform
or shipment vehicle against damage and spent their assigned
radiological sabotage fuel sabotage, security-related
should, like other elements implement the job duties. The
of the physical security Commission-approved phrase ``security
system, be required to meet security plans, personnel'' would
minimum criteria to ensure licensee response be replaced with
that they will effectively strategy, and the phrase ``all
perform their assigned implementing individuals'' to
security-related job duties. procedures, meet describe the
minimum training Commission
and qualification determination that
requirements to any individual who
ensure each is assigned to
individual perform a security
possesses the function must be
knowledge, skills, trained and
and abilities qualified to
required to effectively perform
effectively perform that security
the assigned duties function. The
and phrase ``on site or
responsibilities. in transit and for
the protection of
the facility or
shipment vehicle''
would be deleted to
remove language not
applicable to power
reactors. The
phrase ``against
radiological
sabotage'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``required
to prevent core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage,''.
The phrase
``implementation of
the Commission-
approved security
plans, licensee
response strategy,
and implementing
procedures'' would
provide a detailed
list of
programmatic areas
for which the
licensee must
provide effective
training and
qualification to
satisfy the
performance
objective for
protection against
radiological
sabotage. The word
``should'' would be
deleted because
training and
qualification would
be required not
suggested.
The phrase ``like
other elements of
the physical
security system, be
required to meet
minimum criteria to
ensure that they
will effectively
perform their
assigned security-
related job
duties'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``meet
minimum training
and qualification
requirements to
ensure each
individual
possesses the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
required to
effectively perform
the assigned duties
and
responsibilities''
to describe the
Commission
determination that
minimum training
and qualification
requirements are
met to provide
assurance that
assigned
individuals possess
the knowledge,
skills, and
abilities that are
required to
effectively perform
the assigned
function.
Appendix B, Introduction: In A.2. To ensure that This requirement
order to ensure that those those individuals would retain the
individuals responsible for who are assigned to requirement for the
security are properly perform duties and licensee to ensure
equipped and qualified to responsibilities that all personnel
execute the job duties required for the assigned security
prescribed for them, the implementation of duties and
NRC has developed general the Commission- responsibilities
criteria that specify approved security are properly
security personnel plans, licensee trained and
qualification requirements. response strategy, qualified. The
and implementing word, ``suited''
procedures are would be added to
properly suited, reflect the
trained, equipped, suitability
and qualified to requirements of the
perform their current appendix B.
assigned duties and The word,
responsibilities, ``trained'' would
the Commission has be added to reflect
developed minimum the training
training and requirements of the
qualification current appendix B.
requirements that
must be implemented
through a
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
[[Page 62805]]
The phrase
``responsible for
security'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``who are
assigned to perform
duties and
responsibilities
required for the
implementation of
the Commission-
approved security
plans, licensee
response strategy,
and implementing
procedures'' to
identify the major
programmatic areas
from which security
duties are derived.
The phrase
``execute the job
duties prescribed
for them'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``perform
their assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to for consistency
with the updated
language used in
the proposed rule.
The acronym ``NRC''
would be replaced
with the word
``Commission'' to
remove the use of
this acronym. The
phrase ``general
criteria that
specify security
personnel
qualification
requirements''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``minimum training
and qualification
requirements'' for
consistency with
the use of the word
``minimum'' and the
phrase ``general
criteria that
specify''. The
phrase ``that shall
be implemented
through a
Commission-approved
training and
qualification
plan'' would be
added for
consistency with
the proposed 10 CFR
73.55.
Appendix B, Introduction: A.3. The licensee This requirement for
These general criteria shall establish, selection,
establish requirements for maintain, and training,
the selection, training, follow a Commission- equipping, testing,
equipping, testing, and approved training and qualification
qualification of and qualification would be retained
individuals who will be plan, describing and reformatted to
responsible for protecting how the minimum combine two current
special nuclear materials, training and requirements. An
nuclear facilities, and qualification expansion of the
nuclear shipments. requirements set plan requirements
Appendix B, Introduction: forth in this would describe the
When required to have appendix will be content of an
security personnel that met, to include the approved training
have been trained, processes by which and qualification
equipped, and qualified to all members of the plan that would
perform assigned security security demonstrate how the
job duties in accordance organization, will requirements in the
with the criteria in this be selected, appendix are met.
appendix, the licensee must trained, equipped,
establish, maintain, and tested, and
follow a plan that shows qualified.
how the criteria will be
met.
Appendix B, II.D: Each A.4. Each individual This requirement to
individual assigned to assigned to perform demonstrate
perform the security security program knowledge, skills
related task identified in duties and would be retained.
the licensee physical responsibilities The requirement to
security or contingency required to demonstrate
plan shall demonstrate the effectively knowledge, skills,
required knowledge, skill, implement the and abilities prior
and ability in accordance Commission-approved to assignment would
with the specified security plans, be added to ensure
standards for each task as licensee protective that each
stated in the NRC approved strategy, and the individual
licensee training and licensee demonstrates the
qualifications plan. implementing ability to apply
procedures, shall formal classroom
demonstrate the training to
knowledge, skills, assigned duties and
and abilities responsibilities.
required to
effectively perform
the assigned duties
and
responsibilities
before the
individual is
assigned the duty
or responsibility.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. * A.5. The licensee This requirement
* * shall consider job- shall ensure that would be based upon
related functions such as the training and the current
strenuous activity, qualification requirement of
physical exertion, levels program simulates, appendix B,
of stress, and exposure to as closely as Paragraph I.C., and
the elements as they practicable, the require that due to
pertain to each specific conditions changes in the
individual's assigned under which the threat environment
security job duties for individual shall be that personnel must
both normal and emergency required to perform be trained in a
operations. assigned duties and manner which
responsibilities. simulates the site
specific conditions
under which the
assigned duties and
responsibilities
are required to be
performed.
[[Page 62806]]
Appendix B, Introduction: A.6. The licensee This requirement
Security personnel who are may not allow any would be based upon
responsible for the individual to the current
protection of special perform any appendix B,
nuclear material on site or security function, Introduction. Due
in transit and for the assume any security to changes to the
protection of the facility duties or threat environment,
or shipment vehicle against responsibilities, this requirement
radiological sabotage or return to would identify the
should, like other elements security duty, applicability of
of the physical security until that appendix B training
system, be required to meet individual and qualification
minimum criteria to ensure satisfies the standards to all
that they will effectively training and security-related
perform their assigned qualification duties, whether
security-related job duties. requirements of they be performed
this appendix and by traditional
the Commission- security
approved training organization
and qualification personnel or other
plan, unless plant staff.
specifically Licensees would be
authorized by the required by the
Commission. proposed rule to
describe how non-
security personnel
would be trained to
perform the
specific functions
to which they are
assigned in
accordance with the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan,
and that non-
security personnel
would be required
to meet the
requirements of
this proposed
appendix that are
specifically
articulated and
necessary to
perform the
required, specific
duty or
responsibility
assigned.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. A.7. Annual This annual training
At least every 12 months, requirements must requirement would
central alarm station be scheduled at a be retained and
operators shall be required nominal twelve (12) revised for
to meet the physical month periodicity. consistency with
requirements of B.1.b of Annual requirements the proposed Sec.
this section, and guards, may be completed up 73.55. The intent
armed response personnel, to three (3) months would be to provide
and armed escorts shall be before or three (3) regulatory
required to meet the months after the stability and
physical requirements of scheduled date. consistency by
Paragraphs B.1.b(1) and However, the next requiring annual
(2), and C of this section. annual training training at a
must be scheduled nominal 12 month
twelve (12) months intervals, while
from the previously providing for those
scheduled date instances when a
rather than the licensee may not be
date the training able to conduct
was actually annual training on
completed. the scheduled date
due to site
specific conditions
or unforseen
circumstances. This
would provide
needed flexibility
in accomplishing
required training.
This requirement
would provide for
annual training to
be conducted up to
three (3) months
prior to, or three
(3) months after
the scheduled
initial date.
However, to insure
that the required
training period
would be not
repeatedly extended
beyond the required
12 months, this
requirement would
require that the
next subsequent
training date be 12
months from the
originally
scheduled date. The
intent would be to
provide licensees
with the necessary
flexibility to
resolve scheduling
issues due to
unexpected
circumstances such
as forced outages,
unforseen weather
conditions, and
ensure that
training would be
completed within
the minimum
required frequency.
I. Employment suitability B. Employment This header would be
and qualification. suitability and retained without
qualification. change.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.A. B.1. Suitability.... This header would be
Suitability: retained without
change.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.1. B.1.a. Before This requirement
Prior to employment, or employment, or would be retained
assignment to the security assignment to the with only minor
organization, an individual security grammatical
shall meet the following organization, an changes.
suitability criteria: individual shall:
Appendix B, Paragraph B.1.a.(1) Possess a This requirement to
I.A.1.a. Educational high school diploma possess a high
development--Possess a high or pass an school diploma or
school diploma or pass an equivalent pass an equivalent
equivalent performance performance performance
examination designed to examination examination would
measure basic job-related designed to measure be retained. The
mathematical, language, and basic mathematical, title ``Educational
reasoning skills, ability, language, and development'' would
and knowledge, required to reasoning skills, be deleted because
perform security job duties. abilities, and it would not be
knowledge required needed. The phrase
to perform security ``job-related''
duties and would be deleted
responsibilities; because it would be
addressed by the
phrase ``required
to perform''. The
word ``job'' would
be replaced with
the word
``responsibilities'
' to more
accurately reflect
the skills
required. The word
``ability'' would
be replaced with
the word
``abilities'' to
correct grammar.
[[Page 62807]]
Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.2. B.1.a.(2) Have This age requirement
Prior to employment or attained the age of for armed personnel
assignment to the security 21 for an armed would be retained.
organization in an armed capacity or the age The phrase ``or the
capacity, the individual, of 18 for an age of 18 for an
in addition to (a) and (b) unarmed capacity; unarmed capacity''
above, must be 21 years of and would be added to
age or older. specify a minimum
age since the
current NRC
approved training
and qualification
plans for all
licensees requires
unarmed members to
have attained the
age of 18 prior to
assignment.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.1.a.(3) An unarmed The phrase ``Have no
I.A.1.b. Felony individual assigned felony convictions
convictions--Have no felony to the security involving the use
convictions involving the organization may of a weapon'' would
use of a weapon and no not have any felony be deleted because
felony convictions that convictions that the proposed rule
reflect on the individual's reflect on the would address this
reliability. individual's requirement in 10
reliability. CFR 73.18 for an
armed member of the
security
organization. The
phrase ``An unarmed
individual assigned
to the security
organization may
not have any felony
convictions'' would
be added to retain
the current
requirement for
unarmed
individuals.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.C. B.1.b. The The ``attested to by
The qualifications of each qualification of a security
individual must be each individual to supervisor''
documented and attested by perform assigned requirement would
a licensee security duties and be retained. The
supervisor. responsibilities phrase ``to perform
must be documented assigned duties and
by a qualified responsibilities''
training instructor would be added to
and attested to by clarify the
a security performance
supervisor. standard for
documentation. The
phrase ``by a
qualified training
instructor'' would
be added to require
that the security
supervisor must
attest to the fact
that the required
training for each
individual was
administered by a
qualified
instructor and
documentation was
obtained and
properly completed.
The word
``licensee'' would
be deleted because
a contract security
supervisor may
attest to an
individual's
qualification.
These changes would
better describe the
requirement for
verification and
documentation of
training by a
supervisor.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.B. B.2. Physical This header would be
Physical and mental qualifications. retained and the
qualifications. two topics
separately
addressed. The word
``mental'' is
deleted because
psychological
qualifications are
set forth
separately.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1. B.2.a. General This header would be
Physical qualifications: Physical retained. The word
Qualifications. ``General'' would
be added to
indicate that site
specific physical
qualifications
would be applicable
if not addressed
herein.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.a.(1) The requirement
I.B.1.a. Individuals whose Individuals whose would be retained.
security tasks and job duties and The phrase ``tasks
duties are directly responsibilities and job duties''
associated with the are directly would be replaced
effective implementation of associated with the with the phrase
the licensee physical effective ``duties and
security and contingency implementation of responsibilities''
plans shall have no the Commission- to reflect current
physical weaknesses or approved security language usage. The
abnormalities that would plans, licensee phrase ``licensee
adversely affect their protective physical security
performance of assigned strategy, and and contingency
security job duties. implementing plans'' would be
procedures, may not replaced with the
have any physical phrase ``Commission-
conditions that approved security
would adversely plans, licensee
affect their protective
performance. strategy, and
implementing
procedures'' to
specify the source
of the duties and
responsibilities.
The phrase ``of
assigned security
job duties'' would
be deleted because
it would be
addressed by the
phrase ``whose
duties and
responsibilities''
at the beginning of
this proposed
requirement. The
phrase ``weaknesses
or abnormalities''
would be replaced
with ``conditions''
to specify that all
physical attributes
affecting
performance should
be considered.
[[Page 62808]]
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.a.(2) Armed and This physical
I.B.1.b. In addition to a. unarmed members of examination
above, guards, armed the security requirement would
response personnel, armed organization shall be retained.
escorts, and central alarm be subject to a Proposed revisions
station operators shall physical would combine two
successfully pass a examination current
physical examination designed to measure requirements,
administered by a licensed the individual's reflect current
physician. The examination physical ability to language usage, and
shall be designed to perform assigned describe the
measure the individual's duties and requirement for
physical ability to perform responsibilities as measuring the
assigned security job identified in the individual's
duties as identified in the Commission-approved physical ability to
licensee physical security security plans, assure they can
and contingency plans. licensee protective perform assigned
strategy, and duties.
implementing
procedures.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.a.(3) This This physical
I.B.1.b. In addition to a. physical examination
above, guards, armed examination must be requirement would
response personnel, armed administered by a be retained.
escorts, and central alarm licensed health Proposed revisions
station operators shall professional with would describe the
successfully pass a final determination minimum
physical examination being made by a qualifications of
administered by a licensed licensed physician the individual
physician. to verify the administering the
individual's physical
physical capability examination and
to perform assigned separate the
duties and professional
responsibilities. qualifications that
must be met by the
individual(s)
administering the
physical
examination and the
person making the
determination of
the individual's
physical capability
to perform assigned
duties.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.a.(4) The The physical
I.B.1.b. Armed personnel licensee shall requirements
shall meet the following ensure that both requirement would
additional physical armed and unarmed be retained.
requirements: members of the Proposed revisions
security due to changes to
organization who the threat
are assigned environment would
security duties and describe the
responsibilities minimum physical
identified in the requirements for
Commission-approved both armed and
security plans, the unarmed security
licensee protective personnel.
strategy, and Inclusion of
implementing unarmed personnel
procedures, meet would be necessary
the following to account for
minimum physical those instances
requirements, as where the two types
required to of security
effectively perform personnel share
their assigned similar duties and
duties. responsibilities
required to
implement the
approved plans and
procedures. The
requirement would
not apply to
administrative
security staff,
such as clerks or
secretaries, for
the performance of
their assigned
administrative
duties and
responsibilities.
However, should
such personnel, or
other non-security
personnel be
assigned to perform
security functions
required to
implement the
Commission-approved
security plans and
implementing
procedures, these
personnel must be
trained and
qualified to
perform these
duties and possess
appropriate vision,
hearing, and
physical
capabilities that
are required to
effectively perform
the assigned duties
or
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b. Vision: This header would be
I.B.1.b.(1) Vision: retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(1) For each This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) For each individual, distant would be retained.
individual, distant visual visual acuity in
acuity in each eye shall be each eye shall be
correctable to 20/30 correctable to 20/
(Snellen or equivalent) in 30 (Snellen or
the better eye and 20/40 in equivalent) in the
the other eye with better eye and 20/
eyeglasses or contact 40 in the other eye
lenses. with eyeglasses or
contact lenses.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(2) Near This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Near visual visual acuity, would be retained.
acuity, corrected or corrected or
uncorrected, shall be at uncorrected, shall
least 20/40 in the better be at least 20/40
eye. in the better eye.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(3) Field of This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Field of vision must be at would be retained.
vision must be at least 70 least 70 degrees
degrees horizontal meridian horizontal meridian
in each eye. in each eye.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(4) The This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) The ability ability to would be retained.
to distinguish red, green, distinguish red,
and yellow colors is green, and yellow
required. colors is required.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(5) Loss of This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Loss of vision in one eye would be retained.
vision in one eye is is disqualifying.
disqualifying.
[[Page 62809]]
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(6) Glaucoma This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Glaucoma is disqualifying, would be retained.
shall be disqualifying, unless controlled
unless controlled by by acceptable
acceptable medical or medical or surgical
surgical means, provided means, provided
such medications as may be that medications
used for controlling used for
glaucoma do not cause controlling
undesirable side effects glaucoma do not
which adversely affect the cause undesirable
individual's ability to side effects which
perform assigned security adversely affect
job duties, and provided the individual's
the visual acuity and field ability to perform
of vision requirements assigned security
stated above are met. job duties, and
provided the visual
acuity and field of
vision requirements
stated previously
are met.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(7) On-the-job This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job evaluation must be would be retained.
evaluation shall be used used for
for individuals who exhibit individuals who
a mild color vision defect. exhibit a mild
color vision defect.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(8) If The vision
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) If uncorrected requirements in
uncorrected distance vision distance vision is Paragraphs
is not at least 20/40 in not at least 20/40 I.B.1.b.(1)(a) and
the better eye, the in the better eye, I.B.1.b.(1)(b)
individual shall carry an the individual would be retained
extra pair of corrective shall carry an and combined. The
lenses. extra pair of phrase ``in the
Appendix B, Paragraph corrective lenses event that the
I.B.1.b.(1)(b) Where in the event that primaries are
corrective eyeglasses are the primaries are damaged'' would be
required, they shall be of damaged. Corrective added to ensure
the safety glass type. eyeglasses must be that the individual
of the safety glass would continue to
type. meet minimum vision
requirements should
one pair be damaged
and not usable. The
phrase ``carry an
extra pair of
corrective lenses''
would include any
future
technological
advancements in
vision correction
and would include
glasses and/or
contact lenses, or
other materials by
any name whose
purpose would be to
correct an
individual's
vision.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.b.(9) The use of This requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(c) The use of corrective would be retained.
corrective eyeglasses or eyeglasses or
contact lenses shall not contact lenses may
interfere with an not interfere with
individual's ability to an individual's
effectively perform ability to
assigned security job effectively perform
duties during normal or assigned duties and
emergency operations. responsibilities
during normal or
emergency
conditions.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.c. Hearing: This header would be
I.B.1.b.(2) Hearing: retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.c.(1) The requirement
I.B.b.(2)(a) Individuals Individuals may not concerning hearing
shall have no hearing loss have hearing loss loss would be
in the better ear greater in the better ear retained.
than 30 decibels average at greater than 30 Referenced
500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 decibels average at standards would be
Hz with no level greater 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, deleted. The NRC
that 40 decibels at any one and 2,000 Hz with staff has
frequency (by ISO 389 no level greater determined that
``Standard Reference Zero that 40 decibels at reference to
for the Calibration of any one frequency. specific
Puritone Audiometer'' calibration
(1975) or ANSI S3.6-1969 R. standards would no
1973) ``Specifications for longer be necessary
Audiometers''). ISO 389 and and that it would
ANSI S3.6-1969 have been not be appropriate
approved for incorporation to require these
by reference by the standards by this
Director of the Federal proposed rule
Register. because such
standards may
become outdated and
obsolete, and
equipment may
change due to
technological
advancements, which
would require
future rule changes
to update the
referenced
documents. The
expectation would
be that a licensed
professional will
perform this
examination using
professionally
accepted standards
to include
calibration
standards for
equipment used.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.c.(2) A hearing This requirement
I.B.1.b.(2)(b) A hearing aid is acceptable would be retained.
aid is acceptable provided provided suitable
suitable testing procedures testing procedures
demonstrate auditory acuity demonstrate
equivalent to the above auditory acuity
stated requirement. equivalent to the
hearing requirement.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.c.(3) The use of This requirement
I.B.1.b.(2)(c) The use of a a hearing aid may would be retained.
hearing aid shall not not decrease the
decrease the effective effective
performance of the performance of the
individual's assigned individual's
security job duties during assigned security
normal or emergency job duties during
operations. normal or emergency
operations.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.d. Existing This requirement
I.B.1.b.(3) Diseases-- medical conditions. would be revised to
require that the
licensee consider
all existing
medical conditions
that would
adversely effect
performance and not
limit consideration
to only pre-
existing conditions
or ``diseases.''
[[Page 62810]]
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.d.(1) The requirement
I.B.1.b.(3) * * * Individuals may not concerning medical
Individuals shall have no have an established history would be
established medical history medical history or retained. Proposed
or medical diagnosis of medical diagnosis revisions would
epilepsy or diabetes, or, of existing medical require that the
where such a condition conditions which licensee consider
exists * * *. could interfere any existing
with or prevent the medical conditions
individual from and not limit this
effectively consideration to
performing assigned only specified
duties and conditions. The
responsibilities. phrase ``epilepsy
or diabetes, or,
where such a
condition exists''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``existing medical
conditions which
could interfere
with or prevent the
individual from
effectively
performing assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to state the
requirement that
the licensee must
consider all
medical conditions
that could
adversely affect
performance.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.d.(2) If a This requirement to
I.B.1.b.(3) * * * the medical condition provide medical
individual shall provide exists, the evidence that a
medical evidence that the individual shall condition can be
condition can be controlled provide medical controlled would be
with proper medication so evidence that the retained. The
that the individual will condition can be phrase ``proper
not lapse into a coma or controlled with medication'' is
unconscious state while medical treatment replaced with the
performing assigned in a manner which phrase ``medical
security job duties. does not adversely treatment'' to
affect the account for
individual's conditions that may
fitness-for-duty, be treated without
mental alertness, medication and
physical condition, future changes in
or capability to medicine. The
otherwise phrase ``so that
effectively perform the individual will
assigned duties and not lapse into a
responsibilities. coma or unconscious
state while'' would
be replaced with
the phrase ``in a
manner which does
not adversely
affect the
individual's
fitness-for-duty,
mental alertness,
physical condition,
or capability to
otherwise
effectively'' to
describe the
requirement that
the ability to
perform duties
would be the
criteria and not be
limited to the
current specific
conditions of coma
or unconscious
state. The phrase
``job duties''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``duties and
responsibilities''
to reflect plain
language
requirements.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.e. Addiction. This requirement
I.B.1.b.(4) Addiction-- Individuals may not regarding addiction
Individuals shall have no have any would be retained.
established medical history established medical The word
or medical diagnosis of history or medical ``effectively''
habitual alcoholism or drug diagnosis of would be added to
addiction, or, where such a habitual alcoholism describe the
condition has existed, the or drug addiction, requirement that
individual shall provide or, where this type the individual must
certified documentation of of condition has be able to carry
having completed a existed, the out tasks in a
rehabilitation program individual shall manner that would
which would give a provide certified provide the
reasonable degree of documentation of necessary results.
confidence that the having completed a The phrase ``job
individual would be capable rehabilitation duties'' would be
of performing assigned program which would replaced with the
security job duties. give a reasonable phrase ``duties and
degree of responsibilities''
confidence that the to satisfy plain
individual would be language
capable of requirements.
effectively
performing assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.2.f. Other This requirement to
I.B.1.b.(5) Other physical physical provide medical
requirements--An individual requirements. An evidence of
who has been incapacitated individual who has recovery from an
due to a serious illness, been incapacitated incapacitation
injury, disease, or due to a serious would be retained.
operation, which could illness, injury, The phrase ``job
interfere with the disease, or duties'' would be
effective performance of operation, which replaced with the
assigned security job could interfere phrase ``duties and
duties shall, prior to with the effective responsibilities''
resumption of such duties, performance of for consistency
provide medical evidence of assigned duties and with other proposed
recovery and ability to responsibilities rule and plain
perform such security job shall, before language
duties. resumption of requirements.
assigned duties and
responsibilities,
provide medical
evidence of
recovery and
ability to perform
these duties and
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2. B.3. Psychological This mental
Mental qualifications: qualifications: qualifications
requirement would
be retained. The
word ``mental''
would be replaced
by the word
``psychological''
to be consistent
with other proposed
changes and plain
language
requirements.
[[Page 62811]]
Appendix B, Paragraph B.3.a. Armed and This requirement to
I.B.2.a. Individuals whose unarmed members of demonstrate good
security tasks and job the security judgement, ability
duties are directly organization shall to implement
associated with the demonstrate the instructions/tasks,
effective implementation of ability to apply and to communicate
the licensee physical good judgment, would be retained.
security and contingency mental alertness, The phrase
plans shall demonstrate the capability to ``Individuals whose
mental alertness and the implement security tasks and
capability to exercise good instructions and job duties are
judgment, implement assigned tasks, and directly associated
instructions, assimilate possess the acuity with the effective
assigned security tasks, of senses and implementation of
and possess the acuity of ability of the licensee
senses and ability of expression physical security
expression sufficient to sufficient to and contingency
permit accurate permit accurate plans'' would be
communication by written, communication by replaced with the
spoken, audible, visible, written, spoken, phrase ``Armed and
or other signals required audible, visible, unarmed members of
by assigned job duties. or other signals the security
required by organization'' to
assigned duties and describe the
responsibilities. requirement that
these mental
requirements are
minimum standards
that must apply to
both armed and
unarmed security
personnel because
they share similar
duties and
responsibilities
for the physical
protection of the
site.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.3.b. A licensed The requirement
I.B.2.b. Armed individuals, clinical regarding emotional
and central alarm station psychologist, instability would
operators, in addition to psychiatrist, or be retained. The
meeting the requirement physician trained phrase ``Armed
stated in Paragraph a. in part to identify individuals, and
above, shall have no emotional central alarm
emotional instability that instability shall station operators''
would interfere with the determine whether would be replaced
effective performance of armed members of with the phrase
assigned security job the security ``armed members of
duties. The determination organization and the security
shall be made by a licensed alarm station organization and
psychologist or operators in alarm station
psychiatrist, or physician, addition to meeting operators'' to
or other person the requirement refer to both alarm
professionally trained to stated in Paragraph station operators,
identify emotional a. of this section, and for consistency
instability. have no emotional with the
instability that terminology used in
would interfere the proposed rule.
with the effective
performance of
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph B.3.c. A person Section B.3.c. would
I.B.2.b. Armed individuals, professionally be added to
and central alarm station trained to identify describe that these
operators, in addition to emotional emotional
meeting the requirement instability shall instability
stated in Paragraph a. determine whether requirements are
above, shall have no unarmed members of minimum standards
emotional instability that the security that must apply to
would interfere with the organization in armed and unarmed
effective performance of addition to meeting security personnel
assigned security job the requirement because they share
duties. The determination stated in Paragraph similar duties and
shall be made by a licensed a. of this section, responsibilities
psychologist or have no emotional for the physical
psychiatrist, or physician, instability that protection of the
or other person would interfere site.
professionally trained to with the effective
identify emotional performance of
instability. assigned duties and
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4. Medical This header would be
Medical examinations and examinations and retained.
physical fitness physical fitness
qualifications. qualifications.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.a. Armed members This medical
Guards, armed response of the security examination
personnel, armed escorts organization shall requirement would
and other armed security be subject to a be retained.
force members shall be medical examination Current
given a medical examination by a licensed requirements for an
including a determination physician, to examination and
and written certification determine the certification would
by a licensed physician individual's be reformatted to
that there are no medical fitness to separate the two
contraindications as participate in requirements in
disclosed by the medical physical fitness order to specify
examination to tests. the requirements
participation by the for medical
individual in physical examinations and
fitness tests. certifications.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.a. The licensee This requirement for
Guards, armed response shall obtain and written
personnel, armed escorts retain a written certification would
and other armed security certification from be retained.
force members shall be the licensed Current
given a medical examination physician that no requirements for an
including a determination medical conditions examination and
and written certification were disclosed by certification would
by a licensed physician the medical be reformatted to
that there are no medical examination that separate the two
contraindications as would preclude the requirements in
disclosed by the medical individual's order to specify
examination to ability to the requirements
participation by the participate in the for medical
individual in physical physical fitness examinations and
fitness tests. tests or meet the certifications. The
physical fitness licensee must
attributes or obtain and retain a
objectives written
associated with certification from
assigned duties. the licensed
physician who
performed the
examination, which
clearly states that
the individual has
no medical
condition that
would cause the
licensee to doubt
the individual's
ability to perform
the physical
requirements of the
fitness test and
therefore, could
not effectively
perform assigned
duties. The phrase
``associated with
assigned duties''
would be added to
require that the
test simulates the
conditions under
which the assigned
duties and
responsibilities
are required to be
performed.
[[Page 62812]]
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.b. Before This medical
Subsequent to this medical assignment, armed examination and
examination, guards, armed members of the physical fitness
response personnel, armed security requirement would
escorts and other armed organization shall be retained. The
security force members demonstrate phrase ``guards,
shall demonstrate physical physical fitness armed response
fitness for assigned for assigned duties personnel, armed
security job duties by and escorts and other
performing a practical responsibilities by armed security
physical exercise program performing a force members''
within a specific time practical physical would be replaced
period. fitness test. with the phrase
``armed members of
the security
organization'' for
consistency with
terminology used in
the proposed rule.
The phrase
``security job
duties'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
for consistency
with terminology
used in the
proposed rule. The
phrase ``exercise
program'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``practical
physical fitness
test'' for
consistency with
terminology used in
the proposed rule.
The term
``practical'' would
mean that the test
must be
representative of
the physical
requirements of
duties and
responsibilities
assigned to armed
members of the
security
organization. The
phrase ``specific
time period'' would
be deleted because
specific time
periods are
delineated in
Commission-approved
security plans.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.b.(1) The This requirement
The exercise program physical fitness related to physical
performance objectives test must consider conditions would be
shall be described in the physical conditions retained. The
license training and such as strenuous phrase ``and shall
qualifications plan and activity, physical consider job-
shall consider job-related exertion, levels of related functions
functions such as strenuous stress, and such as strenuous
activity, physical exposure to the activity, physical
exertion, levels of stress, elements as they exertion, levels of
and exposure to the pertain to each stress, and
elements as they pertain to individual's exposure to the
each individual's assigned assigned security elements as they
security job duties for job duties for both pertain to each
both normal and emergency normal and individual's
operations. emergency assigned security
operations and must job duties for both
simulate site normal and
specific conditions emergency
under which the operations'' is
individual will be replaced with the
required to perform phrase ``The
assigned duties and physical fitness
responsibilities. test must consider
physical conditions
such as strenuous
activity, physical
exertion, levels of
stress, and
exposure to the
elements as they
pertain to each
individual's
assigned security
job duties for both
normal and
emergency
operations'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used by the
proposed rule. The
phrase ``and shall
simulate site
specific conditions
under which the
individual will be
required to perform
assigned duties and
responsibilities''
would be added to
specify that site
specific conditions
such as facility
construction and
layout, weather,
terrain, elements,
should be simulated
to the extent
reasonably
practical.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.b.(2) The This approved plan
The exercise program licensee shall requirement would
performance objectives describe the be retained and
shall be described in the physical fitness separated to
license training and test in the address this
qualifications plan * * *. Commission-approved requirement
training and individually. The
qualification plan. phrase ``The
exercise program
performance
objectives shall be
described in the
license training
and qualifications
plan'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``The
licensee shall
describe the
physical fitness
test in the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification
plan'' to reflect
plain language
requirements.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. * B.4.d.(3) The This requirement
* * shall consider job- physical fitness would be based on
related functions such as test must include the current
strenuous activity, physical attributes appendix B,
physical exertion, levels and performance Paragraph I.C. and
of stress, and exposure to objectives which would require that
the elements as they demonstrate the the licensee
pertain to each strength, include, as part of
individual's assigned endurance, and the physical
security job duties for agility, consistent fitness test,
both normal and emergency with assigned performance
operations. duties in the objectives that are
Commission-approved designed to
security plans, demonstrate the
licensee protective ability of each
strategy, and individual to meet
implementing the physical
procedures during attributes required
normal and of assigned duties
emergency and
conditions. responsibilities.
[[Continued on page 62813]]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
]
[[pp. 62813-62862]] Power Reactor Security Requirements
[[Continued from page 62812]]
[[Page 62813]]
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.b(4) The This documentation
The physical fitness physical fitness and attesting
qualification of each qualification of requirement would
guard, armed response each armed member be retained. This
person, armed escort, and of the security requirement would
other security force member organization must be intended to
shall be documented and be documented by a include adequate
attested to by a licensee qualified training oversight and
security supervisor. instructor and verification of
attested to by a qualification while
security supervisor. providing
flexibility to the
licensee to
determine how to
best use management
resources. The
phrase ``by a
qualified training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
the training
instructor observes
and documents that
the qualification
criteria are met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
training for each
individual was
administered by a
qualified
instructor and
documentation was
obtained and
properly completed.
The word
``licensee'' would
be deleted because
the proposed rule
would permit a
contract security
supervisor to
attest to an
individual's
qualification. The
phrase ``guard,
armed response
person, armed
escort, and other
security force
member'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``each armed
member of the
security
organization'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5. Physical This header would be
Physical requalification-- requalification. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5.a. At least This requirement to
At least every 12 months, annually, armed and demonstrate the
central alarm station unarmed members of capability to meet
operators shall be required the security the physical
to meet the physical organization shall requirements would
requirements of B.1.b of be required to be retained. The
this section, and guards, demonstrate the phrase ``every 12
armed response personnel, capability to meet months'' would be
and armed escorts shall be the physical replaced with the
required to meet the requirements of word ``annually''
physical requirements of this appendix and to specify that
Paragraphs B.1.b (1) and the licensee annual requirements
(2), and C of this section. training and must be scheduled
qualification plan. at a nominal 12
month periodicity
but may be
conducted up to
three (3) months
prior to three (3)
months after the
scheduled date with
the next scheduled
date 12 months from
the originally
scheduled date.
This requirement
would be intended
to provide
flexibility to the
licensee to account
for those instances
when site specific
conditions, such as
outages, preclude
conducting
requalification at
the scheduled
dates, while
ensuring that the
intent of the
requirement would
be still met
without requiring
the next scheduled
date to be changed
to correspond with
the month in which
the requalification
is performed.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5.b. The physical This documentation
The physical fitness requalification of and attesting
qualification of each each armed and requirement would
guard, armed response unarmed member of be retained. This
person, armed escort, and the security requirement would
other security force member organization must be intended to
shall be documented and be documented by a include adequate
attested to by a licensee qualified training oversight and
security supervisor. instructor and verification of
attested to by a qualification while
security supervisor. providing
flexibility to the
licensee to
determine how to
best use management
resources. The
phrase ``by a
qualified training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
the training
instructor observes
and documents that
the qualification
criteria is met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
documentation is
retained and
properly completed.
The phrase ``guard,
armed response
person, armed
escort, and other
security force
member'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``each armed
and unarmed member
of the security
organization'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule. The
word ``licensee''
would be deleted
because the
proposed rule would
permit a contract
security supervisor
attest to an
individual's
qualification.
[[Page 62814]]
II. Training and C. Duty training.... This new header
qualifications. would be added to
provide a section
under which the
current and
proposed non-
weapons-related
training
requirements may be
grouped.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1. Duty training This training
Training requirements. Each and qualification requirement would
individual who requires requirements. All be retained and
training to perform personnel who are revised to combine
assigned security-related assigned to perform the two current
job tasks or job duties as any security- requirements of
identified in the licensee related duty or appendix B,
physical security or responsibility, Paragraph II.A. and
contingency plans shall, shall be trained II.B. This
prior to assignment, be and qualified to requirement would
trained to perform these perform assigned account for those
tasks and duties in duties and instances where the
accordance with the responsibilities to licensee may use,
licensee or the licensee's ensure that each in addition to
agent's documented training individual members of the
and qualifications plan. possesses the security
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.. minimum knowledge, organization, site
Qualification requirement. skills, and personnel from
Each person who performs abilities required outside of the
security-related job tasks to effectively security
or job duties required to carry out those organization to
implement the licensee assigned duties and perform security
physical security or responsibilities. related duties,
contingency plan shall, such as, but not
prior to being assigned to limited to,
these tasks or duties, be escorts, tampering,
qualified in accordance detection, and
with the licensee's NRC- compensatory
approved training and measures. The
qualifications plan. Commission views
are that security
personnel must
obtain the
requisite
knowledge, skills,
and abilities of
all security-
related duties
prior to
unsupervised
assignment.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. C.1.a. The areas of This requirement
The areas of knowledge, knowledge, skills, would be retained
skills, and abilities that and abilities that and revised to
shall be considered in the are required to replace the current
licensee's training and perform assigned list of 100 topic
qualifications plan are as duties and areas with a
follows: responsibilities requirement for the
[NOTE: The list of 100 must be identified licensee to provide
specific training subjects in the licensee's a site specific
is omitted here for Commission-approved list in the
conservation of space.]. training and approved security
qualification plan. plans and specify
assigned duties in
the training and
qualification plan.
The Commission has
determined that the
current list would
no longer be
necessary to ensure
that the listed
topic areas are
addressed by each
licensee. In
accordance with
this proposed
appendix, all
licensees are
required to ensure
that all personnel
are trained and
qualified to
perform their
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
Those requirements
would encompass
topics that are
currently listed,
making it
unnecessary to
specifically list
the 100 areas of
knowledge, skills,
and abilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1.b. Each This training
Each individual who individual who is requirement would
requires training to assigned duties and be retained. The
perform assigned security- responsibilities requirement would
related job tasks or job identified in the specify training of
duties as identified in the Commission-approved all individuals
licensee physical security security plans, assigned to perform
or contingency plans shall, licensee protective security functions
prior to assignment, be strategy, and required to
trained to perform these implementing implement the
tasks and duties in procedures shall, Commission-approved
accordance with the before assignment,: security plans,
licensee or the licensee's (1) be trained to licensee response
agent's documented training perform assigned strategy, and
and qualifications plan. duties and implementing
responsibilities in procedures. The
accordance with the phrase ``requires
requirements of training to perform
this appendix and assigned security-
the Commission- related job tasks
approved training or job duties as''
and qualification would be replaced
plan. with the phrase
``is assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to reflect changes
to terminology
used. The phrase
``in the licensee
physical security
or contingency''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission-
approved security
plans, licensee
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures'' to
reflect changes to
terminology used.
The phrase ``these
tasks and duties''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``assigned duties
and
responsibilities''
to reflect changes
to terminology
used. The phrase
``licensee or the
licensee's agent's
documented training
and qualifications
plan'' would be
replaced with the
phrase
``requirements of
this appendix and
the Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' to reflect
changes to
terminology used.
[[Page 62815]]
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. C.1.b. (2) meet the This qualification
Each person who performs minimum requirement would
security-related job tasks qualification be retained. The
or job duties required to requirements of requirement would
implement the licensee this appendix and specify the
physical security or the Commission- qualification
contingency plan shall, approved training standard for all
prior to being assigned to and qualification individuals
these tasks or duties, be plan. assigned to perform
qualified in accordance security functions
with the licensee's NRC- required to
approved training and implement the
qualifications plan. Commission-approved
security plans,
licensee response
strategy, and
implementing
procedures. The
phrase ``be
qualified in
accordance with''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``meet the minimum
qualification
requirements of
this appendix and''
to specify that the
approved T&Q plan
implements the
requirements of
this proposed rule.
The phrase
``licensee's NRC-
approved'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``Commission
approved'' to
reflect changes to
terminology used.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1.b. (3) be This requirement
Training Requirements--Each trained and would be based on
individual who requires qualified in the the current
training to perform use of all appendix B,
assigned security-related equipment or Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as devices required to specify the
identified in the licensee effectively perform requirement for
physical security or all assigned duties training in the use
contingency plans shall, and of equipment
prior to assignment, be responsibilities. required to
trained to perform these effectively perform
tasks and duties in all assigned duties
accordance with the and
licensee or licensee's responsibilities.
agent's documented training The Commission
and qualification plan. views this as
facilitating the
performance
objective of the
proposed Sec.
73.55 B.1.
C.2. On-the-job This new header
training. would be added for
consistency with
the format of this
proposed paragraph.
This new topic area
would be intended
to specify the
requirement that
the licensee
training and
qualification
program must
include an on-the-
job training
program to ensure
that assigned
personnel have
demonstrated an
acceptable level of
performance and
proficiency within
the actual work
environment, prior
to assignment to an
unsupervised
position.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.2.a. The licensee This new requirement
Training Requirements--Each training and would be based on
individual who requires qualification the current
training to perform program must appendix B,
assigned security-related include on-the-job Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as training would specify the
identified in the licensee performance requirement that
physical security or standards and the licensee
contingency plans shall, criteria to ensure include on-the-job
prior to assignment, be that each training as part of
trained to perform these individual the training and
tasks and duties in demonstrates the qualification
accordance with the requisite program to ensure
licensee or licensee's knowledge, skills, each individual
agent's documented training and abilities demonstrates, in an
and qualification plan. needed to on-the-job setting,
Appendix B, Paragraph effectively carry- an acceptable level
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job out assigned duties of performance and
evaluation shall be used and proficiency to
for individuals who exhibit responsibilities in carry-out assigned
a mild color vision defect. accordance with the duties and
Commission-approved responsibilities
security plans, prior to an
licensee protective assignment. The
strategy, and expectation would
implementing be that on-the-job
procedures, before training would be
the individual is conducted by
assigned the duty qualified security
or responsibility. personnel who will
observe the
trainee's
performance and
provide input for
improvement and
final qualification
of the trainee and
allow each
individual to
develop and apply,
in a controlled but
realistic training
environment, the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
presented in formal
and informal
classroom settings.
This requirement
would be in
addition to
licensee specific
classroom training
that may include
instruction on
security practices
and theory and
other training
activities for
security-related
duties.
[[Page 62816]]
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.2.b. In addition This new requirement
Training Requirements--Each to meeting the would be based on
individual who requires requirement stated the current
training to perform in paragraph appendix B,
assigned security-related C.2.a., before Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as assignment, would specify the
identified in the licensee individuals requirement for on-
physical security or assigned duties and the-job training.
contingency plans shall, responsibilities to This requirement
prior to assignment, be implement the would specify that
trained to perform these Safeguards 40 hours is the
tasks and duties in Contingency Plan minimum time for
accordance with the shall complete a practical skill
licensee or licensee's minimum of 40 hours development and
agent's documented training of on-the-job performance
and qualification plan. training to demonstration
demonstrate their necessary to fully
ability to assess an
effectively apply individual's
the knowledge, knowledge, skills,
skills, and and abilities to
abilities required effectively carry-
to effectively out assigned duties
perform assigned and
duties and responsibilities
responsibilities in prior to assignment
accordance with the to an unsupervised
approved security position. This
plans, licensee requirement would
protective be in addition to
strategy, and formal and informal
implementing classroom
procedures. On-the- instruction. The
job training must phrase ``by a
be documented by a qualified training
qualified training instructor'' would
instructor and be added to require
attested to by a that the security
security supervisor. supervisor must
attest to the fact
that the required
training for each
individual was
administered by a
qualified
instructor and
documentation was
obtained and
properly completed.
Appendix B, Paragraph C.2.c. On-the-job This new requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job training for would be based on
evaluation shall be used contingency the current
for individuals who exhibit activities and requirements
a mild color vision defect. drills must appendix B,
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. include, but is not Paragraph II.A. and
The exercise program limited to, hands- appendix B,
performance objectives on application of Paragraph II.D.
shall be described in the knowledge, skills, This requirement
license training and and abilities would provide a
qualifications plan and related to: list of minimum
shall consider job-related (1) Response team generic topics
functions such as strenuous duties.. which are
activity, physical (2) Use of force.... applicable to all
exertion, levels of stress, (3) Tactical sites and must be
and exposure to the movement.. addressed, but are
elements as they pertain to (4) Cover and not intended to
each individual's assigned concealment.. limit the licensee
security job duties for (5) Defensive- such that site
both normal and emergency positions.. specific topics are
operations. (6) Fields-of-fire.. not also included.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. (7) Re-deployment... This requirement
Training Requirements--Each (8) Communications would also specify
individual who requires (primary and that the licensee
training to perform alternate).. identify and
assigned security-related (9) Use of assigned document in the
job tasks or job duties as equipment.. training and
identified in the licensee (10) Target sets.... qualification plan,
physical security or (11) Table top the specific
contingency plans shall, drills.. knowledge, skills,
prior to assignment, be (12) Command and and abilities
trained to perform these control duties.. required by each
tasks and duties in individual to
accordance with the perform their
licensee or licensee's assigned duties and
agent's documented training responsibilities
and qualification plan. and would
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. generically include
The areas of knowledge, any specific items
skills, and abilities that that are currently
shall be considered in the listed in the
licensee's training and current appendix B,
qualifications plan are as Paragraph II.D.,
follows:. and therefore,
[NOTE: The list of one would require that
hundred specific training any applicable
subjects is omitted here topics from the
for conservation of space.]. deleted list are
addressed.
C.3. Tactical This new header
response team would be added for
drills and formatting.
exercises.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.a. Licensees This requirement
Training Requirements--Each shall demonstrate would be based on
individual who requires response the current
training to perform capabilities appendix B,
assigned security-related through a Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as performance to changes in the
identified in the licensee evaluation program threat environment,
physical security or as described in the requirement
contingency plans shall, appendix C to this would specify that
prior to assignment, be part. the licensee
trained to perform these develop and follow
tasks and duties in a performance
accordance with the evaluation program
licensee or licensee's designed to
agent's documented training demonstrate the
and qualification plan. effectiveness of
the onsite response
capabilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b. The licensee This requirement
Training Requirements--Each shall conduct would be based on
individual who requires drills and the current
training to perform exercises in appendix B,
assigned security-related accordance with Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as Commission-approved to changes in the
identified in the licensee security plans, threat environment,
physical security or licensee protective the requirement
contingency plans shall, strategy, and would specify that
prior to assignment, be implementing the licensee
trained to perform these procedures. conduct drills and
tasks and duties in exercises to
accordance with the demonstrate the
licensee or licensee's effectiveness of
agent's documented training security plans,
and qualification plan. licensee protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.
[[Page 62817]]
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b.(1) Drills and This requirement
Training Requirements--Each exercises must be would be based on
individual who requires designed to the current
training to perform challenge appendix B,
assigned security-related participants in a Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as manner which to changes in the
identified in the licensee requires each threat environment,
physical security or participant to the requirement
contingency plans shall, demonstrate would specify that
prior to assignment, be requisite the licensee
trained to perform these knowledge, skills, conduct drills and
tasks and duties in and abilities. exercises that are
accordance with the designed to
licensee or licensee's demonstrate each
agent's documented training participants
and qualification plan. requisite
knowledge, skills,
and abilities to
perform security
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b.(2) Tabletop This requirement
Training Requirements--Each exercises may be would be based on
individual who requires used to supplement the current
training to perform drills and appendix B,
assigned security-related exercises to Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as accomplish desired to changes in the
identified in the licensee training goals and threat environment,
physical security or objectives. the requirement
contingency plans shall, would convey the
prior to assignment, be Commission view
trained to perform these that licensees may
tasks and duties in use tabletop
accordance with the exercises to
licensee or licensee's supplement drills
agent's documented training and exercises as a
and qualification plan. means of achieving
training goals and
objectives.
D. Duty This new header
qualification and would be added for
requalification. formatting
purposes. The word
``duty'' would be
used to clarify
that the following
sections relate to
non-weapons
training topics.
D.1. Qualification This new header
demonstration. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.a. Armed and This requirement
the request of an unarmed members of would be based on
authorized representative the security the current
of the Commission, the organization shall requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate demonstrate the CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i).
the ability of the physical required knowledge, Due to changes in
security personnel to carry skills, and the threat
out their assigned duties abilities to carry environment, it is
and responsibilities. out assigned duties the Commission's
and view that licensees
responsibilities as must be able to
stated in the demonstrate the
Commission-approved ability of security
security plans, personnel to carry
licensee protective out their assigned
strategy, and duties and
implementing responsibilities.
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.b. This This requirement
the request of an demonstration must would be based on
authorized representative include an annual the current
of the Commission, the written exam and requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate hands-on CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i)
the ability of the physical performance and would specify a
security personnel to carry demonstration. licensee
out their assigned duties requirement to
and responsibilities. perform written
examinations and
hands-on
performance tests
to demonstrate
knowledge of the
skill or ability
being tested. The
Commission's view
is that written
examinations and
hands-on
performance tests
are two components
that are necessary
to demonstrate the
overall
qualification and
proficiency of an
individual
performing security
duties.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon (1) Written Exam. This requirement
the request of an The written exams would be based on
authorized representative must include those the current
of the Commission, the elements listed in requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate the Commission- CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i).
the ability of the physical approved training Due to changes in
security personnel to carry and qualification the threat
out their assigned duties plan and shall environment, the
and responsibilities. require a minimum rule would require
score of 80 percent a minimum exam
to demonstrate an score of 80 percent
acceptable using accepted
understanding of training and
assigned duties and evaluation
responsibilities, techniques. The
to include the Commission has
recognition of determined that a
potential tampering score of 80 percent
involving both demonstrates the
safety and security minimum level of
equipment and understanding and
systems. (2) Hands- familiarity of the
on Performance material acceptable
Demonstration. and would be
Armed and unarmed consistent with
members of the minimum scores
security commonly accepted
organization shall throughout the
demonstrate hands- Nuclear Industry.
on performance for
assigned duties and
responsibilities by
performing a
practical hands-on
demonstration for
required tasks. The
hands-on
demonstration must
ensure that theory
and associated
learning objectives
for each required
task are considered
and each individual
demonstrates the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
required to
effectively perform
the task.
[[Page 62818]]
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.c. Upon request This requirement
the request of an by an authorized would be based upon
authorized representative representative of the current
of the Commission, the the Commission, any requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate individual assigned CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i)
the ability of the physical to perform any and would include,
security personnel to carry security-related upon request, that
out their assigned duties duty or an individual
and responsibilities. responsibility assigned security
shall demonstrate duties or
the required responsibilities
knowledge, skills, demonstrate
and abilities for knowledge, skills
each assigned duty and abilities
and responsibility, required for such
as stated in the assignments or
Commission-approved responsibilities.
security plans, This requirement
licensee protective would be distinct
strategy, or from the required
implementing annual written
procedures. demonstration above
and would be
necessary for
regulatory
consistency. This
rule would require
that any individual
who is assigned to
perform any
security-related
duty or
responsibility must
demonstrate their
capability to
effectively perform
those assigned
duties or
responsibilities
when requested,
regardless of the
individual's
specific
organizational
affiliation. These
demonstrations
would provide the
Commission with
independent
verification and
validation that
individuals can
actually perform
their assigned
security duties.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2. Requalification This header would be
Requalification-- retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2.a. Armed and This requalification
Security personnel shall be unarmed members of requirement would
requalified at least every the security be retained and
12 months to perform organization shall revised to combine
assigned security-related be requalified at two requirements of
job tasks and duties for least annually in the current
both normal and contingency accordance with the appendix B,
operations. requirements of Paragraph II.E. The
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. this appendix and rule would require
Requalification shall be in the Commission- that armed and
accordance with the NRC- approved training unarmed members of
approved licensee training and qualification the security
and qualifications plan. plan. organization must
be requalified
annually to
demonstrate that
each individual
continues to be
capable of
effectively
performing assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
The phrase
``Security
personnel'' would
be replaced with
the phrase ``Armed
and unarmed members
of the security
organization'' for
consistency with
the proposed rule.
The phrase ``every
12 months'' would
be replaced with
the word ``annual''
for consistency
with the proposed
rule.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2.b. The results The requalification
The results of of requalification requirement would
requalification must be must be documented be retained. The
documented and attested by by a qualified proposed rule would
a licensee security training instructor require that the
supervisor. and attested by a licensee provide
security supervisor. adequate oversight
and verification of
qualification
process. The phrase
``by a qualified
training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
that the training
instructor observes
and documents that
qualification
criteria is met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
documentation is
retained and
properly completed.
The word
``licensee'' would
be deleted to
provide flexibility
to the licensee to
determine the best
use of management
resources and to
specify that
contract security
supervisors may be
used to satisfy
this requirement.
III. Weapons training and E. Weapons training. This header would be
Qualification. retained and
revised. The word
``Qualification''
would be deleted
because
``qualification''
is addressed
individually in
this proposed rule.
E.1. General This new header is
firearms training. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62819]]
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.a. Armed members This training
Guards, armed response of the security requirement would
personnel and armed escorts organization shall be retained and
requiring weapons training be trained and revised to specify
to perform assigned qualified in that the training
security related job tasks accordance with the be conducted in
or job duties shall be requirements of accordance with the
trained in accordance with this appendix and appendix and
the licensees' documented the Commission- training and
weapons training programs. approved training qualification
and qualification plans. The phrase
plan. ``Guards, armed
response personnel
and armed escorts''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Armed members of
the security
organization'' for
consistency with
language used in
the proposed rule.
The phrase
``requiring weapons
training to perform
assigned security
related job tasks
or job duties''
would be deleted
because that
requirement is
implied in the
proposed rule
language. The
phrase ``licensees'
documented weapons
training programs''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' for
consistency with
language used in
the proposed rule.
E.1.b. Firearms This new header
instructors. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(1) Each armed This requirement
Each individual shall be member of the would be based on
proficient in the use of security the current
his assigned weapon(s) and organization shall appendix B,
shall meet prescribed be trained and Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following qualified by a and would be
areas: certified firearms revised to
instructor for the incorporate current
use and maintenance requirements in
of each assigned approved training
weapon to include and qualification
but not limited to, plans.
qualification
scores, assembly,
disassembly,
cleaning, storage,
handling, clearing,
loading, unloading,
and reloading, for
each assigned
weapon.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(2) Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be instructors shall would be based on
proficient in the use of be certified from a the current
his assigned weapon(s) and national or State appendix B,
shall meet prescribed recognized entity. Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following and revised to
areas: require that
licensees only use
certified
instructors. It is
the Commission view
that certification
would be required
from a national or
State recognized
entity such as
Federal, State
military or
nationally
recognized entities
such as National
Rifle Association
(NRA),
International
Association of Law
Enforcement
Firearms
Instructors
(IALEFI).
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(3) This requirement
Each individual shall be Certification must would be based on
proficient in the use of specify the weapon the current
his assigned weapon(s) and or weapon type(s) appendix B,
shall meet prescribed for which the Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following instructor is and revised to
areas: qualified to teach. establish minimum
standards for those
conducting firearms
instruction. This
requirement would
not intend that
each firearm
instructor be
certified on the
different
manufacturers or
brands, but rather
that certification
be obtained by
weapon type such as
handgun, shotgun,
rifle, machine gun,
or other enhanced
weapons since each
type requires
different skills
and abilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(4) Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be instructors shall would be based upon
proficient in the use of be recertified in the current
his assigned weapon(s) and accordance with the appendix B,
shall meet prescribed standards Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following recognized by the and revised to
areas: certifying national establish minimum
or state entity, standards for those
but in no case conducting firearms
shall re- instruction.
certification Firearms instructor
exceed three (3) skills are
years. perishable and
therefore the
proposed rule would
require periodic re-
qualification to
demonstrate
proficiency. The
Commission has
determined that
three (3) years is
a commonly accepted
interval for re-
certification
throughout the
firearms community.
[[Page 62820]]
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. E.1.c. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for firearms would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle familiarization. the current
must be for daylight The licensee shall appendix B,
firing, and each individual conduct annual Paragraph IV. Due
shall perform night firing firearms to changes in the
for familiarization with familiarization threat environment,
assigned weapon(s). training in the Commission
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. accordance with the seeks to establish
Each individual shall be Commission-approved minimum standards
requalified at least every training and for weapons
12 months. qualification plan. familiarization.
This requirement
would require
individuals receive
basic firearms
familiarization and
skills training
with each weapon
type such as
nomenclature,
stance, grip, sight
alignment, sight
stance, grip, sight
alignment, sight
picture, trigger
squeeze, safe
handling, range
rules, prior to
participating in a
qualifying course
of fire. The
specifics of the
familiarization
must be included in
the Commission-
approved plan.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.d. The This proposed rule
Each individual shall be Commission-approved would retain the
proficient in the use of training and current standards
his assigned weapon(s) and qualification plan listed in appendix
shall meet prescribed shall include, but B, Paragraph III.A
standards in the following is not limited to, as weapons training
areas: the following areas to be
1. Mechanical assembly, areas: addressed in the
disassembly, range (1) Mechanical Commission-approved
penetration capability of assembly, T&Q plan. Due to
weapon, and bull's-eye disassembly, range changes in the
firing.. penetration threat environment,
2. Weapons cleaning and capability of it is the
storage.. weapon, and bull's- Commission view
3. Combat firing, day and eye firing.. that additional
night.. (2) Weapons cleaning areas of
4. Safe weapons handling.... and storage.. demonstrated weapon
5. Clearing, loading, (3) Combat firing, proficiency should
unloading, and reloading. day and night.. be added to the
6. When to draw and point a (4) Safe weapons current
weapon.. handling.. regulations. The
7. Rapid fire techniques.... (5) Clearing, proposed rule would
8. Close quarter firing..... loading, unloading, require an
9. Stress firing............ and reloading.. individual
10. Zeroing assigned (6) When to draw and demonstrate
weapon(s).. point a weapon.. proficiency in the
(7) Rapid fire following areas:
techniques.. target engagement,
(8) Closed quarter weapon
firing.. malfunctions, cover
(9) Stress firing... and concealment
(10) Zeroing weapon transition
assigned weapon(s) between strong
(sight and sight/ (primary) and weak
scope adjustments).. (support) hands,
(11) Target and weapon
engagement.. familiarization
(12) Weapon (areas 11 through
malfunctions.. 15.)
(13) Cover and
concealment..
(14) Weapon
transition between
strong (primary)
and weak (support)
hands..
(15) Weapon
familiarization..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. E.1.e. The licensee The requirements of
Security knowledge, skills, shall ensure that appendix B,
and abilities--Each each armed member Paragraph II.D.
individual assigned to of the security would be modified
perform the security- organization is to clarify training
related task identified in instructed on the requirements
the licensee physical use of deadly force regarding the use
security or contingency as authorized by of deadly force.
plan shall demonstrate the applicable State The proposed rule
required knowledge, skill, law. would specify that
and ability in accordance the substance of
with the specified training in the use
standards for each task as of deadly force
stated in the NRC approved should be focused
licensee training and on applicable state
qualifications plan. The laws.
areas of knowledge, skills,
and abilities that shall be
considered in the
licensee's training and
qualifications plan are as
follows: The use of deadly
force.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. E.1.f. Armed members This requirement
Individuals shall be of the security would be based upon
weapons requalified at organization shall the current
least every 12 months in participate in requalification
accordance with the NRC weapons range requirements stated
approved licensee training activities on a in appendix B,
and qualifications plan, nominal four (4) Paragraph IV.D. It
and in accordance with the month periodicity. is the Commission
requirements stated in A, Performance may be view that the
B, and C of this section. conducted up to proposed rule,
five (5) weeks requiring weapons
before to five (5) range activities,
weeks after the would ensure
scheduled date. The individuals
next scheduled date maintain
must be four (4) proficiency in the
months from the use of assigned
originally weapons and
scheduled date. associated
perishable skills.
IV. Weapons qualification F. Weapons This header would be
and requalification program. qualification and retained.
requalification
program.
F.1. General weapons This header would be
qualification added for
requirements. formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.1.a. Qualification The requirement
Qualification firing for firing must be would retain the
the handgun and the rifle accomplished in qualification
must be for daylight accordance with requirements stated
firing, and each individual Commission in appendix B,
shall perform night firing requirements and Paragraph IV. The
for familiarization with the Commission- proposed rule would
assigned weapon(s). approved training specify that such
and qualification qualifications have
plan for assigned to be accomplished
weapons. in accordance with
Commission-approved
training and
qualification
plans.
[[Page 62821]]
The results of weapons F.1.b. The results This weapons
qualification and of weapons qualification and
requalification must be qualification and requalification
documented by the licensee requalification requirement would
or the licensee's agent. must be documented be retained. The
and retained as a word ``must'' would
record. be replaced with
the word ``shall''
for consistency
with this proposed
rule. The phrase
``by the licensee
or the licensee's
agent'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``and
retained as a
record'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule.
Each individual shall be F.1.c. Each This requalification
requalified at least every individual shall be requirement would
12 months. re-qualified at be retained. The
least annually. phrase ``every 12
months'' would be
replaced with the
word ``annually''
for consistency
with this proposed
rule.
Energy Policy Act of 2005... F.2. Alternate This new requirement
weapons would be added for
qualification. Upon consistency with
written request by the proposed Sec.
the licensee, the 73.19. The proposed
Commission may rule would require
authorize an the licensee to
applicant or request NRC
licensee to provide authorization to
firearms implement
qualification alternative
programs other than firearms
those listed in qualification
this appendix if programs pursuant
the applicant or to the licensee's
licensee request for
demonstrates that authorization to
the alternative use ``enhanced
firearm weapons'' as
qualification defined in the
program satisfies proposed Sec.
Commission 73.19.
requirements.
Written requests
must provide
details regarding
the proposed
firearms
qualification
programs and
describe how the
proposed
alternative
satisfies
Commission
requirements.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.3. Tactical This requirement
Qualification firing for weapons would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle qualification. The the current
must be for daylight licensee Training qualification
firing, and each individual and Qualification requirement in
shall perform night firing Plan must describe appendix B,
for familiarization with the firearms used, Paragraph IV. Due
assigned weapon(s). the firearms to changes to the
qualification threat environment,
program, and other the proposed rule
tactical training would require that
required to the licensee
implement the develop and
Commission-approved implement a site
security plans, specific firearms
licensee protective qualification
strategy, and program and other
implementing tactical training
procedures. to simulate site
Licensee developed conditions under
qualification and which the
re-qualification protective strategy
courses for each will be
firearm must implemented. The
describe the examples given
performance (lighting,
criteria needed, to elevation and
include the site fields-of-fire) are
specific conditions intended to be
(such as lighting, neither all
elevation, fields- inclusive nor
of-fire) under limiting.
which assigned
personnel shall be
required to carry-
out their assigned
duties.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4. Firearms This requirement
Qualification firing for qualification would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle courses. The the current
must be for daylight licensee shall qualification
firing, and each individual conduct the requirements in
shall perform night firing following appendix B,
for familiarization with qualification Paragraph IV. The
assigned weapon(s). courses for weapons proposed rule would
used. specify performance
expectations for
weapons courses.
[[Page 62822]]
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.a. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for daylight would combine the
the handgun and the rifle qualification current appendix B,
must be for daylight course. Qualifying Paragraph IV.A.,
firing, and each individual score must be an B., and C. Because
shall perform night firing accumulated total of changes to the
for familiarization with of 70 percent with threat environment,
assigned weapon(s). handgun and it is the
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. shotgun, and 80 Commission view
Handgun--Guards, armed percent with semi- that a higher
escorts and armed response automatic rifle and/ qualification
personnel shall qualify or enhanced percentage is
with a revolver or weapons, of the required. The
semiautomatic pistol firing maximum obtainable Commission has
the national police course, target score. determined that
or an equivalent nationally among law
recognized course. enforcement
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. authorities, 70
Semiautomatic Rifle-- percent is a
Guards, armed escorts and commonly accepted
armed response personnel, fire qualification
assigned to use the value requirement
semiautomatic rifle by the for handguns and
licensee training and shotguns and that
qualifications plan, shall 80 percent is the
qualify with a commonly accepted
semiautomatic rifle by value for semi-
firing the 100-yard course automatic and
of fire specified in enhanced weapons.
section 17.5(1) of the The proposed rule
National Rifle Association, would increase the
High Power Rifle Rules book acceptable level of
(effective March 15, 1976), proficiency to 70
(1) or a nationally percent for handgun
recognized equivalent and shotgun, and 80
course of fire. percent for the
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. semi-automatic
Shotgun--Guards, armed rifle and enhanced
escorts, and armed response weapons.
personnel assigned to use
the 12 gauge shotgun by the
licensee training and
qualifications plan shall
qualify with a full choke
or improved modified choke
12 gauge shotgun firing the
following course:.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.b. Annual night This requirement
Qualification firing for fire qualification would combine the
the handgun and the rifle course. Qualifying qualification
must be for daylight score must be an standards stated in
firing, and each individual accumulated total the current
shall perform night firing of 70 percent with appendix B,
for familiarization with handgun and Paragraph IV.A.,
assigned weapon(s). shotgun, and 80 B., and C. Because
percent with semi- of changes to the
automatic rifle and/ threat environment,
or enhanced it is the
weapons, of the Commission view
maximum obtainable that a higher
target score. qualification
percentage is
required. The
Commission has
determined that
among law
enforcement
authorities, 70
percent is a
commonly accepted
night fire
qualification value
requirement for
handguns and
shotguns and that,
under the same
conditions, 80
percent is the
commonly accepted
value for semi-
automatic and
enhanced weapons.
The proposed rule
would increase the
Night Fire
qualification score
from
familiarization in
the current rule,
to an acceptable
level of
proficiency of 70
percent for handgun
and shotgun, and 80
percent for the
semi-automatic
rifle and enhanced
weapons.
[[Page 62823]]
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.c. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for tactical would combine the
the handgun and the rifle qualification current
must be for daylight course. Qualifying qualification
firing, and each individual score must be an requirements in
shall perform night firing accumulated total appendix B,
for familiarization with of 80 percent of Paragraph IV.A.,
assigned weapon(s). the maximum B., and C. In the
obtainable score. proposed rule, the
annual tactical
course of fire
would be developed
and implemented to
simulate the
licensee protective
strategy in
accordance with the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
Licensees would not
be not required to
include every
aspect of its site
protective strategy
into one tactical
course of fire.
Instead, licensees
should periodically
evaluate and change
their tactical
course of fire to
incorporate
different or
changed elements of
the site protective
strategy so that
armed security
personnel are
exposed to multiple
and different site
contingency
scenarios. In the
current threat
environment, LLEA
tactical teams
typically require a
minimum
qualification score
of 80 percent to
ensure that a
higher percentage
of rounds hit the
intended target to
neutralize the
threat. This
correlates to
licensee protective
strategies in which
a higher percentage
of rounds that hit
the intended target
increase the
ability of the
security force to
neutralize the
adversarial threat
to prevent
radiological
sabotage. As a
result, the
proposed rule would
specify 80 percent
as the minimum
acceptable
qualification score
for the Tactical
Qualification
Course.
F.5. Courses of fire This heading would
be added to clarify
the subsequent
information and to
be consistent with
the remainder of
this appendix.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a. Handgun...... This heading would
Handgun-- be brought forward
from current rule
and would be
renumbered
accordingly.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel security be retained. The
shall qualify with a organization, phrase ``national
revolver or semiautomatic assigned duties and police course''
pistol firing the national responsibilities would be replaced
police course, or an involving the use with ``law
equivalent nationally of a revolver or enforcement
recognized course. semiautomatic course'' for
pistol shall consistency with
qualify in the terminology
accordance with used nationally in
standards and reference to
scores established firearms standards
by a law and courses.
enforcement course,
or an equivalent
nationally
recognized course.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a.(2) Qualifying This requirement
Qualifying score shall be scores must be an would be brought
an accumulated total of 70 accumulated total forward from
percent of the maximum of 70 percent of current rule and
obtainable score. the maximum would be renumbered
obtainable target accordingly.
score.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. F.5.b. Semiautomatic This header would be
Semiautomatic Rifle-- rifle. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. F.5.b.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel, security be retained. The
assigned to use the organization, phrase ``national
semiautomatic rifle by the assigned duties and police course''
licensee training and responsibilities would be replaced
qualifications plan, shall involving the use with ``law
qualify with a of a semiautomatic enforcement
semiautomatic rifle by rifle shall qualify course'' for
firing the 100-yard course in accordance with consistency with
of fire specified in the standards and the terminology
Section 17.5(1) of the scores established used nationally in
National Rifle Association, by a law reference to
High Power Rifle Rules book enforcement course, firearms standards
(effective March 15, 1976), or an equivalent and courses.
(1) or a nationally nationally
recognized equivalent recognized course.
course of fire.
Qualifying score shall be an F.5.b.(2) Qualifying This requirement
accumulated total of 80 scores must be an would be retained.
percent of the maximum accumulated total
obtainable score. of 80 percent of
the maximum
obtainable score.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c. Shotgun...... This header would be
Shotgun-- retained.
[[Page 62824]]
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts, and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel security be retained. The
assigned to use the 12 organization, phrase ``national
gauge shotgun by the assigned duties and police course''
licensee training and responsibilities would be replaced
qualifications plan shall involving the use with ``law
qualify with a full choke of a shotgun shall enforcement
or improved modified choke qualify in course'' for
12 gauge shotgun firing the accordance with consistency with
following course: standards and the terminology
scores established used nationally in
by a law reference to
enforcement course, firearms standards
or an equivalent and courses. The
nationally phrase ``12 gauge''
recognized course. would be deleted to
account for future
changes and because
this specific
requirement would
be no longer needed
in this proposed
appendix.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c.(2) Qualifying The qualification
To qualify the individual scores must be an requirement would
shall be required to place accumulated total be retained. Due to
50 percent of all pellets of 70 percent of changes in the
(36 pellets) within the the maximum threat environment,
black silhouette. obtainable target the qualification
score. score would be
increased from 50
percent in the
current rule, to an
acceptable level of
proficiency. The
proposed 70 percent
requirement is a
commonly accepted
minimum
qualification
score, for shotguns
in the law
enforcement
community.
F.5.d. Enhanced This header would be
weapons. added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. F.5.d.(1) Armed This new requirement
Each individual shall be members of the would be added to
proficient in the use of security account for future
his assigned weapon(s) and organization, technological
shall meet prescribed assigned duties and advancements in
standards in the following responsibilities weaponry available
areas: involving the use to licensees. The
of any weapon or phrase ``national
weapons not police course''
described above, would be replaced
shall qualify in with ``law
accordance with enforcement
applicable course'' for
standards and consistency with
scores established the terminology
by a law used nationally in
enforcement course reference to
or an equivalent firearms standards
nationally and courses.
recognized course Examples of ``Law
for these weapons. enforcement course
or an equivalent
nationally
recognized course
for such weapons''
includes those by
the Departments of
Justice, Energy, or
Defense.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. F.5.d.(2) Qualifying This new 80 percent
Each individual shall be scores must be an qualification score
proficient in the use of accumulated total requirement would
his assigned weapon(s) and of 80 percent of be consistent and
shall meet prescribed the maximum comparable with the
standards in the following obtainable score. requirements for
areas: semi-automatic
rifles.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6. Requalification This header would be
Requalification--. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6.a. Armed members This requalification
Individuals shall be of the security requirement would
weapons requalified at organization shall be retained. The
least every 12 months in be re-qualified for phrase ``every 12
accordance with the NRC each assigned months'' would be
approved licensee training weapon at least replaced with the
and qualifications plan, annually in word ``annually''
and in accordance with the accordance with for consistency
requirements stated in A, Commission with this proposed
B, and C of this section. requirements and rule. The phrase
the Commission- ``Individuals shall
approved training be weapons
and qualification requalified'' would
plan. be replaced with
the phrase ``Armed
members of the
security
organization shall
be re-qualified for
each assigned
weapon'' to reflect
changes in the
terminology used to
describe this
topic. The phrase
``the NRC approved
licensee training
and qualifications
plan, and in
accordance with the
requirements stated
in A, B, and C of
this section''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission
requirements and
the Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' to reflect
changes in the
terminology used to
describe this
topic.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6.b. Firearms This requalification
Individuals shall be requalification requirement would
weapons requalified at must be conducted be retained. Due to
least every 12 months in using the courses changes in the
accordance with the NRC of fire outlined in threat environment,
approved licensee training Paragraph 5 of this the proposed rule
and qualifications plan, section. would specify the
and in accordance with the criteria for
requirements stated in A, weapons
B, and C of this section. requalification.
V. Guard, armed response G. Weapons, personal This heading would
personnel, and armed escort equipment and be retained and
equipment. maintenance. modified by adding
the word
``maintenance'' for
clarity.
G.1. Weapons........ This header was
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62825]]
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. G.1.a. The licensee This new requirement
Each individual shall be shall provide armed would be based upon
proficient in the use of personnel with the current 10 CFR
his assigned weapon(s) and weapons that are 73.55 b.(4)(i) and
shall meet prescribed capable of appendix B,
standards in the following performing the Paragraph III.A. It
areas: function stated in also reflects new
10 CFR 73.55 b.(4)(i) The the Commission- requirements that
licensee may not permit an approved security would implement the
individual to act as a plans, licensee Energy Policy Act
guard, watchman armed protective of 2005. This
response person, or other strategy, and requirement would
member of the security implementing be intended to
organization unless the procedures. account for
individual has been technological
trained, equipped, and advancements in
qualified to perform each this area. Under
assigned security job duty the proposed rule,
in accordance with appendix licensees could
B, in accordance with request Commission
appendix B, ``General authorization to
Criteria for Security possess and use
Personnel,'' to this part.. enhanced weapons
Section 653 of the Energy that may otherwise
Policy Act of 2005.. be prohibited by
individual state
laws. This
authority has been
granted to the NRC
through Section 653
of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005.
G.2. Personal This header would be
equipment. added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A. G.2.a. The licensee This requirement
Fixed Site--Fixed site shall ensure that would be based upon
guards and armed response each individual is the current
personnel shall either be equipped or has appendix B,
equipped with or have ready access to all Paragraph V.A. This
available the following personal equipment requirement would
security equipment or devices required be intended to
appropriate to the for the effective specify that the
individual's assigned implementation of licensee is
contingency security the Commission- responsible for
related tasks or job duties approved security ensuring that each
as described in the plans, licensee individual is
licensee physical security protective provided all
and contingency plans: strategy, and personal equipment
implementing required to
procedures. effectively perform
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
The phrase ``has
ready access to''
would mean that
equipment or
devices, that are
required to perform
assigned duties,
are available as
described in the
Commission-approved
security plans,
licensee.
Appendix B, Paragraph G.2.b. The licensee This requirement
V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. shall provide armed combines the
Appendix B, Paragraph security personnel, current
V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full at a minimum, but requirements
face.. is not limited to, appendix B,
Appendix B, Paragraph the following. Paragraph V.A.5(b),
V.A.5.(c) Body armor (1) Gas mask, full 5(c), 5(g), 9, and
(bullet-resistant vest).. face.. 10. Due to changes
Appendix B, Paragraph (2) Body armor in the threat
V.A.5.(d) Flashlights and (bullet-resistant environment, the
batteries.. vest).. NRC has determined
Appendix B, Paragraph (3) Ammunition/ that this list of
V.A.5.(e) Baton.. equipment belt.. equipment would be
Appendix B, Paragraph (4) Duress alarms... the minimum
V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs.. (5) Two-way portable required to
Appendix B, Paragraph radios (handi- effectively perform
V.A.5.(g) Ammunition- talkie) 2 channels response duties.
equipment belt.. minimum, 1
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6. operating and 1
Binoculars.. emergency..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7.
Night vision aids, i.e.,
hand-fired illumination
flares or equivalent..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8.
Tear gas or other nonlethal
gas..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9.
Duress alarms..
Appendix B, Paragraph
V.A.10. Two-way portable
radios (handi-talkie) 2
channels minimum, 1
operating and 1 emergency..
[[Page 62826]]
Appendix B, Paragraph G.2.c. Based upon This requirement
V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. the licensee would be based upon
Appendix B, Paragraph protective strategy the current
V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full and the specific appendix B,
face.. duties and Paragraph V.A.5.
Appendix B, Paragraph responsibilities The NRC has
V.A.5.(c) Body armor assigned to each determined that
(bullet-resistant vest).. individual, the this list of
Appendix B, Paragraph licensee should additional
V.A.5.(d) Flashlights and provide, but is not equipment must be
batteries.. limited to, the provided because
Appendix B, Paragraph following. such equipment is
V.A.5.(e) Baton.. (1) Flashlights and required to
Appendix B, Paragraph batteries.. effectively
V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs.. (2) Baton or other implement the
Appendix B, Paragraph non-lethal weapons.. licensee protective
V.A.5.(g) Ammunition- (3) Handcuffs....... strategy and the
equipment belt.. (4) Binoculars...... specific duties and
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6 (5) Night vision responsibilities
Binoculars.. aids (e.g. goggles, assigned to each
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7. weapons sights).. individual. The
Night vision aids, i.e., (6) Hand-fired current requirement
hand-fired illumination illumination flares appendix B,
flares or equivalent.. or equivalent.. Paragraph V.A.5.(a)
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8. (7) Tear gas or ``Helmet, combat''
Tear gas or other nonlethal other non-lethal would be deleted
gas.. gas.. because the NRC has
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9. determined that
Duress alarms.. although the use of
Appendix B, Paragraph this item is
V.A.10. Two-way portable recommended it is
radios (handi-talkie) 2 an optional item
channels minimum, 1 that is not
operating and 1 emergency.. required to
effectively
implement a
protective strategy
or perform assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
The proposed
addition in (2) ``
. . . or other non-
lethal weapons''
would recognize
that the use of
batons and other
non-lethal weapons
by armed security
officers is subject
to state law.
Related to the use
of non-lethal
weapons, each state
has minimum
training
requirements for
armed private
security officers.
G.3. Maintenance.... This heading would
be added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. G.3.a. Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be maintenance would be based upon
proficient in the use of program. Each the current
his assigned weapon(s) and licensee shall appendix B,
shall meet prescribed implement a Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following firearms This proposed rule
areas: maintenance and would require a
accountability firearms
program in maintenance program
accordance with the to ensure weapons
Commission and ammunition are
regulations and the properly
Commission-approved maintained,
training and function as
qualification plan. designed, and are
The program must properly stored and
include: accounted for. In
(1) Semiannual test order to certify
firing for accuracy armorer, each
and functionality.. weapon manufacturer
(2) Firearms provides training
maintenance regarding the
procedures that maintenance, care
include cleaning and repair of
schedules and weapons they
cleaning provide to
requirements.. licensees. The
(3) Program activity Commission believes
documentation.. that armorers must
(4) Control and be certified to
Accountability ensure that the
(Weapons and quality of
ammunition).. maintenance, care
(5) Firearm storage and repair of the
requirements.. weapons are in
(6) Armorer accordance with
certification.. manufacturers
specifications.
H. Records.......... This heading would
be added formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. H.1. The licensee This requirement
The licensee or the agent shall retain all would be added to
shall maintain reports, records, replace the current
documentation of the or other appendix B,
current plan and retain documentation Paragraph II.A, for
this documentation of the required by this consistency with
plan as a record for three appendix in the proposed Sec.
years after the close of accordance with the 73.55(r), and to
period for which the requirements of specify the records
licensee possesses the Sec. 73.55(r). retention
special nuclear material requirement. This
under each license for requirement would
which the plan was be intended to
developed and, if any consolidate all
portion of the plan is records retention
superseded, retain the requirements.
material that is superseded
for three years after each
change.
[[Page 62827]]
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. H.2. The licensee This requirement
The physical fitness shall retain each would combine all
qualification of each individual's record retention
guard, armed response initial requirements
person, armed escort, and qualification currently in
other security force member record for three appendix B.
shall be documented. (3) years after
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. termination of the
The licensee shall retain individual's
this documentation as a employment and
record for three years from shall retain each
the date of each re-qualification
qualification.. record for three
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. (3) years after it
The licensee shall document is superceded.
each individual's physical
requalification and shall
retain this documentation
of requalification as a
record for three years from
the date of each
requalification..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.
The qualifications of each
individual must be
documented..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
individual's qualifications
as a record for three years
after the employee ends
employment in the security-
related capacity and for
three years after the close
of period for which the
licensee possesses the
special nuclear material
under each license, and
superseded material for
three years after each
change..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E.
The results of
requalification must be
documented..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
individual's
requalification as a record
for three years from the
date of each
requalification..
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.
The results of weapons
qualification and
requalification must be
documented by
requalification must be
documented by the licensee
or the licensee's agent..
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
qualification as a record
for three years from the
date of the qualification
or requalification, as
appropriate..
Appendix B, Paragraph I.F. H.3. The licensee This requirement
The results of suitability, shall document data would combine two
physical, and mental and test results requirements
qualifications data and from each currently in
test results must be individual's appendix B.
documented by the licensee suitability,
or the licensee's agent. physical, and
The licensee or the agent psychological
shall retain this qualification and
documentation as a record shall retain this
for three years from the documentation as a
date of obtaining and record for three
recording these results. years from the date
of obtaining and
recording these
results.
I. Audits and This heading would
reviews. be added to ensure
consistency with
the structure of
the appendix.
The licensee shall This requirement
review the would be added for
Commission-approved consistency with
training and audit and review
qualification plan requirements of the
in accordance with proposed 10 CFR
the requirements of 73.55(n).
Sec. 73.55(n).
Definitions................. J. Definitions...... This heading would
be brought forward
from the current
rule and would be
renumbered
accordingly.
Terms defined in parts 50, Terms defined in This requirement
70, and 73 of this chapter parts 50, 70, and would be brought
have the same meaning when 73 of this chapter forward from the
used in this appendix. have the same current rule and
meaning when used would be renumbered
in this appendix. accordingly.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62828]]
Table 7.--Part 73 Appendix C Section II
[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix C.................. Section II: Nuclear This paragraph and
power plant header would be
safeguards added to
contingency plans. independently
address Nuclear
Power Reactor
Safeguards
Contingency Plan
requirements
without impacting
other licensees.
The proposed
requirements
addressed in this
proposed paragraph
retain and
incorporate the
requirements of the
appendix C.
Introduction................ (a) Introduction.... This requirement
would be retained.
The safeguards This requirement
contingency plan would be added to
must describe how generally describe
the criteria set the Commission's
forth in this expectations for
appendix will be the content of the
satisfied through safeguards
implementation and contingency plan.
must provide
specific goals,
objectives and
general guidance to
licensee personnel
to facilitate the
initiation and
completion of
predetermined and
exercised responses
to threats, up to
and including the
design basis threat
described in Sec.
73.1(a)(1).
Contents of the Plan........ Contents of the plan This requirement
would be retained.
Each licensee safeguards (b) Each safeguards This requirement
contingency plan shall contingency plan would be retained
include five categories of must include the with editorial
information: following twelve changes. The
1. Background. (12) categories of current categories
2. Generic Planning Base. information: of information (1)
3. Licensee Planning Base. (1) Background...... through (5) would
4. Responsibility Matrix. (2) Generic Planning be retained with
5. Procedures. Base.. (5) being
(3) Licensee reformatted to (12)
Planning Base.. and renamed
(4) Responsibility ``Implementing
Matrix.. Procedures'' to
(5) Primary Security update the
Functions.. terminology used to
(6) Response identify this
Capabilities.. category of
(7) Protective information. The
Strategy.. proposed categories
(8) Integrated of information (5)
Response Plan.. through (11) would
(9) Threat Warning be added to improve
System.. the usefulness and
(10) Performance applicability of
Evaluation Program.. the safeguards
(11) Audits and contingency plan.
Reviews..
(12) Implementing
Procedures..
1. Background............... (c) Background...... This header would be
retained with
editorial changes.
Under the following topics, (c)(1) Consistent This requirement
this category of with the design would be retained
information shall identify basis threat with information
and define the perceived specified in Sec. added to identify
dangers and incidents with 73.1(a)(1), specific goals,
which the plan will deal licensees shall objectives and
and the general way it will identify and general information
handle these: describe the for the development
perceived dangers, of the safeguards
threats, and contingency plan.
incidents against
which the
safeguards
contingency plan is
designed to protect.
1.b. Purpose of the Plan--A (c)(2) Licensees This requirement
discussion of the general shall describe the would be retained
aims and operational general goals and with editorial
concepts underlying operational changes. The header
implementation of the plan. concepts underlying ``Purpose of the
Introduction: The goals of implementation of Plan'' would be
licensee safeguards the approved deleted because
contingency plans for safeguards purpose is
responding to threats, contingency plan, described in the
thefts, and radiological to include, but not proposed paragraph
sabotage are: limited to the (a)(2). The phrase
following: ``A discussion of
the general aims
and'' would be
deleted because the
specific goals and
objectives
discussed in the
proposed paragraph
(c)(1) would
include ``general
aims'', therefore,
it is not necessary
to further break
this topic area
into individual
components. The
phrase ``, to
include, but not
limited to the
following'' would
be added to provide
flexibility for the
licensee to add
information not
specifically
listed.
1.c. Scope of the Plan--A (c)(2)(i) The types This requirement
delineation of the types of of incidents would be retained
incidents covered in the covered. with editorial
plan. changes. The header
``Scope of the
Plan'' would be
deleted because the
scope of the
safeguards
contingency plan
under this proposed
rule would not be
limited to only a
delineation of the
types of incidents
covered in the
plan.
Introduction: A licensee (c)(2)(ii) The This requirement
safeguards contingency plan specific goals and would be retained
is a documented plan to objectives to be with additional
give guidance to licensee accomplished. information added
personnel in order to for the
accomplish specific defined identification of
objectives * * *. specific goals and
objectives to be
accomplished to
ensure the plan is
appropriately
oriented toward
mission
accomplishment.
[[Page 62829]]
Background: Under the (c)(2)(iii) The This requirement
following topics, this different elements would be retained
category of information of the onsite with additional
shall identify and define physical protection information added
the perceived dangers and program that are to describe defense-
incidents with which the used to provide at in-depth concepts
plan will deal and the all times the as they apply at
general way it will handle capability to each site and how
these: detect, assess, the individual
intercept, components that
challenge, delay, make up the onsite
and neutralize physical protection
threats, up to and program would work
including the together to ensure
design basis threat the capability to
relative to the detect, assess,
perceived dangers intercept,
and incidents challenge, delay,
described in the and neutralize the
Commission-approved threats consistent
safeguards with the proposed
contingency plan. requirements of
Sec. 73.55.
Introduction: The goals of (c)(2)(iv) How the This requirement
licensee safeguards onsite response would be retained
contingency plans * * * effort is organized with additional
are: and coordinated to information added
(1) to organize the response ensure that to describe the
effort at the licensee licensees, elements of a site
level,. capability to integrated response
prevent significant to prevent
core damage and significant core
spent fuel sabotage damage and spent
is maintained fuel sabotage.
throughout each
type of incident
covered.
Introduction: The goals of (c)(2)(v) How the This requirement
licensee safeguards onsite response would be retained
contingency plans * * * effort is with additional
are: integrated to information
(3) to ensure the include specific provided for an
integration of the licensee procedures, integrated response
response with the responses guidance, and as addressed in the
by other entities, and; strategies to proposed paragraph
Introduction: It is maintain or restore (j). Reference to
important to note that a core cooling, appendix E to part
licensee's safeguards containment, and 50 or to Sec.
contingency plan is spent fuel pool 70.22(I) would no
intended to be cooling longer be required
complimentary to any capabilities using because the
emergency plans developed existing or readily performance
pursuant to appendix E to available resources standard for this
part 50 or to Sec. (equipment and proposed
70.22(I) of this chapter. personnel) that can requirement would
be effectively be broad enough to
implemented under include these
the circumstances references and any
associated with other emergency
loss of large areas plans developed as
of the plant due to a result of
explosions or fires. Commission mandated
enhancements.
1.d. Definitions--A list of (c)(2)(vi) A list of This requirement
terms and their definitions terms and their would be retained
used in describing definitions used in with editorial
operational and technical describing changes. The header
aspects of the plan. operational and ``Definitions'' is
technical aspects deleted because it
of the approved would no longer be
safeguards required under the
contingency plan. new format of this
proposed rule. The
phrase ``approved
safeguards
contingency'' would
be added to reflect
changes to the
terminology used to
describe this
topic.
2. Generic Planning Base.... (d) Generic planning This requirement
base. would be retained.
2. Under the following (d)(1) Licensees This requirement
topics, this category of shall define the would be retained
information shall define criteria for with editorial
the criteria for initiation initiation and changes. The phrase
and termination of termination of ``Under the
responses to safeguards responses to following topics''
contingencies together with threats to include would be replaced
the specific decisions, the specific with the phrase
actions, and supporting decisions, actions, ``The licensee
information needed to bring and supporting shall define'' to
about such responses: information needed establish the
to respond to each required action to
type of incident be taken by the
covered by the licensee. The
approved safeguards phrase ``safeguards
contingency plan. contingencies''
would be replaced
by the word
``threats'' to
reflect changes in
the terminology
used to describe
this topic. The
phrase ``together
with'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``to
include''. The
phrase ``bring
about such
responses'' is
replaced by the
phrase ``respond to
each type of
incident covered by
the approved
safeguards
contingency plan.''
2.a. Such events may include (d)(2) Licensees This requirement
alarms or other indications shall ensure early would be retained
signaling penetration of a detection of with editorial
protected area, vital area, unauthorized changes. Reference
or material access area; activities and to specific site
material control or shall respond to areas would be
material accounting all alarms or other deleted. The
indications of material indications of a licensee would be
missing or unaccounted for; threat condition required to respond
or threat indications-- such as, tampering, to unauthorized
either verbal, such as bomb threats, activities where
telephoned threats, or unauthorized detection has
implied, such as escalating barrier penetration occurred. Examples
civil disturbances. (vehicle or provided would be
personnel), missing revised for
or unaccounted for consistency with
nuclear material, the terminology
escalating civil used in the
disturbances, proposed rule and
imminent threat would not be
notification, or intended to be all
other threat inclusive.
warnings.
Appendix C--Introduction. An (d)(3) The This requirement
acceptable safeguards safeguards would be retained
contingency plan must contingency plan with editorial
contain: must:. changes. The phrase
``an acceptable''
is deleted because
the requirements of
this proposed rule
address what would
be acceptable.
[[Page 62830]]
2.a. Identification of those (d)(3)(i) Identify This requirement
events that will be used the types of events would be retained
for signaling the beginning that signal the with editorial
or aggravation of a beginning or changes. The phrase
safeguards contingency initiation of a ``according to how
according to how they are safeguards they are perceived
perceived initially by contingency event. initially by
licensee's personnel. licensee's
personnel'' would
be deleted because
the concept of
perceived is
captured through
assessment.
Introduction: The goals of (d)(3)(ii) Provide This requirement
licensee safeguards predetermined and would be retained
contingency plans * * * structured with editorial
are: (2) to provide responses to each changes. The phrase
predetermined, structured type of postulated ``safeguards
responses by licensees to event. contingencies'' has
safeguards contingencies, been replaced with
``each type of
postulated event''
to include a wider
range of potential
events.
2.b. Definition of the (d)(3)(iii) Define This requirement
specific objective to be specific goals and would be retained
accomplished relative to objectives for with editorial
each identified event. response to each changes. The word
postulated event. ``goals'' would be
added for
consistency with
the proposed
Paragraph (a)(3).
2.b.(1) a predetermined set (d)(3)(iv) Identify This requirement
of decisions and actions to the predetermined would be retained
satisfy stated objectives, decisions and with more specific
actions which are information being
required to satisfy provided to ensure
the written goals that written goals
and objectives for and objectives are
each postulated identified for each
event. postulated event.
2.b.(2) an identification of (d)(3)(v) Identify This requirement
the data, criteria, the data, criteria, would be retained
procedures, and mechanisms procedures, with editorial
necessary to efficiently mechanisms and changes. The word
implement the decisions, logistical support ``efficiently''
and; necessary to would be deleted
implement the because it is
predetermined considered to be an
decisions and arbitrary term that
actions. would not describe
the performance
standard of this
proposed
requirement.
2.b.(3) a stipulation of the (d)(3)(vi) Identify This requirement
individual, group, or the individuals, would be retained
organizational entity groups, or with editorial
responsible for each organizational changes. The use of
decision and action. entities the word
responsible for ``predetermined''
each predetermined has been inserted
decision and action. to organizationally
align decisions and
actions to
responsible
entities.
2.b.(3) a stipulation of the (d)(3)(vii) Define This requirement
individual, group, or the command-and- would be retained
organizational entity control structure with editorial
responsible for each required to changes. The
decision and action. coordinate each required elements
individual, group, of command and
or organizational control have been
entity carrying out added to establish
predetermined clear lines of
actions. authority.
Introduction: The goals of (d)(3)(viii) This requirement has
licensee safeguards Describe how been retained with
contingency plans * * * effectiveness will editorial changes.
are: (4) to achieve a be measured and A change has been
measurable performance in demonstrated to made to replace the
response capability. include the word ``response''
effectiveness of with the phrase
the capability to ``detect, assess,
detect, assess, intercept,
intercept, challenge, delay,
challenge, delay, and neutralize'' to
and neutralize provide a more
threats, up to and detailed
including the description of
design basis threat. system
effectiveness.
3. Licensee Planning Base... (e) Licensee This requirement
planning base. would be retained.
This category of information (e) Licensees shall This requirement
shall include the factors describe the site- would be retained
affecting contingency specific factors with editorial
planning that are specific affecting changes. The phrase
for each facility or means contingency ``or means of
of transportation. To the planning and shall transportation'' is
extent that the topics are develop plans for deleted because
treated in adequate detail actions to be taken this phrase does
in the licensee's approved in response to not apply to
physical security plan, postulated threats. nuclear power
they may be incorporated by The following reactor licensees.
cross reference to that topics must be The phrase ``To the
plan. The following topics addressed: extent that the
should be addressed: topics are treated
in adequate detail
in the licensee's
approved physical
security plan, they
may be incorporated
by cross reference
to that plan''
would be deleted
because this
information would
be required to be
specifically
detailed in
contingency
planning.
3.a. Licensee's (e)(1) This requirement has
Organizational Structure Organizational been retained with
for Contingency Responses. Structure. The more detailed
A delineation of the safeguards information being
organization's chain of contingency plan provided for the
command and delegation of must describe the integration of
authority as these apply to organization's command groups,
safeguards contingencies. chain of command succession of
and delegation of command, and
authority during control functions.
safeguards
contingencies, to
include a
description of how
command-and-control
functions will be
coordinated and
maintained.
3.b. Physical Layout........ (e)(2) Physical This requirement
layout. would be retained.
3.b.(i) Fixed Sites. A (e)(2)(i) The This requirement
description of the physical safeguards would be retained
structures and their contingency plan with editorial
location on the site * * *. must include a site changes. The header
description, to ``Fixed Sites''
include maps and would be deleted
drawings, of the because it would
physical structures not be necessary
and their locations. for the purpose of
this proposed rule.
Specific
information to
permit orientation
and familiarization
of the site would
also be included.
[[Page 62831]]
3.b.(i) A description * * * (e)(2)(i)(A) Site This requirement has
and a description of the Description. The been retained with
site in relation to nearby site description more detailed
towns, roads, and other must address the information being
environmental features site location in included to
important to the effective relation to nearby consider the site's
coordination of response towns, geographic
operations. transportation relationship to the
routes (e.g., rail, community and
water, air, roads), environment.
pipelines,
hazardous material
facilities, onsite
independent spent
fuel storage
installations, and
pertinent
environmental
features that may
have an effect upon
coordination of
response operations.
3.b.(i) Particular emphasis (e)(2)(i)(B) This requirement
should be placed on main Approaches. would be retained
and alternate entry routes Particular emphasis with editorial
for law enforcement must be placed on changes. The word
assistance forces and the main and alternate ``should'' has been
location of control points entry routes for replaced with the
for marshaling and law enforcement or word ``must'' to
coordinating response other offsite establish this
activities. support agencies language as a
and the location of requirement.
control points for
marshaling and
coordinating
response activities.
(e)(2)(ii) Licensees This requirement
with co-located would be retained
Independent Spent with more detailed
Fuel Storage information being
Installations shall provided for
describe response response to
procedures for both incidents occurring
the operating outside the
reactor and the protected area and
Independent Spent for the utilization
Fuel Storage of assets.
Installation to
include how onsite
and offsite
responders will be
coordinated and
used for incidents
occurring outside
the protected area.
3.c. Safeguards Systems (e)(3) Safeguards This requirement
Hardware. A description of Systems Hardware. would be retained
the physical security and The safeguards with editorial
accounting system hardware contingency plan changes to specify
that influence how the must contain a hardware for
licensee will respond to an description of the material
event. Examples of systems physical security accountability.
to be discussed are and material
communications, alarms, accounting system
locks, seals, area access, hardware that
armaments, and surveillance. influence how the
licensee will
respond to an event.
3.d. Law Enforcement (e)(4) Law This requirement
Assistance. enforcement would be retained.
assistance.
3.d. A listing of available (e)(4)(i) The This requirement
local law enforcement safeguards would be retained
agencies and a description contingency plan with more detailed
of their response must contain a information being
capabilities and their listing of provided for
criteria for response; and available local, documenting
* * *. State, and Federal supporting agency
law enforcement capabilities and
agencies and a assets.
general description
of response
capabilities, to
include number of
personnel, types of
weapons, and
estimated response
time lines.
3.d. * * * and a discussion (e)(4)(ii) The This requirement
of working agreements or safeguards would be retained
arrangements for contingency plan with the addition
communicating with these must contain a of written
agencies. discussion of information to be
working agreements included in working
with offsite law agreements with
enforcement offsite law
agencies to include enforcement
criteria for agencies.
response, command
and control
protocols, and
communication
procedures.
3.e. Policy Constraints and (e)(5) Policy This requirement
Assumptions. A discussion constraints and would be retained.
of State laws, local assumptions. The The text of 3.e.(2)
ordinances, and company safeguards ``Use of Employee
policies and practices that contingency plan property'' would be
govern licensee response to must contain a deleted because
incidents. Examples that discussion of State this information
may be discussed include: laws, local would not be
(1) Use of deadly force;.... ordinances, and considered relevant
(2) Use of employee company policies for discussion
property;. and practices that under policy
(3) Use of off-duty govern licensee constraints and
employees;. response to assumptions. The
(4) Site security incidents and must requirement would
jurisdictional boundaries.. include, but is not be added to
limited to, the implement
following. applicable
(i) Use of deadly provisions from the
force.. EPAct of 2005. This
(ii) Recall of off- requirement is not
duty employees.. applicable to
(iii) Site licensees that
jurisdictional possess such
boundaries.. weaponry under
(iv) Use of enhanced authority separate
weapons, if from EPAct 2005.
applicable..
3.f. Administrative and (e)(6) This requirement
Logistical Considerations-- Administrative and would be retained.
logistical
considerations.
3.f. Descriptions of (e)(6)(i) The This requirement
licensee practices that may safeguards would be retained
have an influence on the contingency plan with information
response to safeguards must contain a added to reflect
contingency events. The description of changes in the
considerations shall licensee practices terminology used to
include a description of which influence how describe this
the procedures that will be the licensee topic.
used for ensuring that all responds to a
equipment needed to effect threat to include,
a successful response to a but not limited to,
safeguards contingency will a description of
be easily accessible, in the procedures that
good working order, and in will be used for
sufficient supply to ensuring that all
provide redundancy in case equipment needed to
of equipment failure. effect a successful
response will be
readily accessible,
in good working
order, and in
sufficient supply
to provide
redundancy in case
of equipment
failure.
4. Responsibility Matrix.... (f) Responsibility This requirement
matrix. would be retained.
[[Page 62832]]
This category of information (f)(1) The This requirement
consists of detailed safeguards would be retained
identification of the contingency plan with information
organizational entities must describe the added to reflect
responsible for each organizational changes in the
decision and action entities that are terminology used to
associated with specific responsible for describe this
responses to safeguards each decision and topic.
contingencies. action associated
with responses to
threats.
For each initiating event, a (f)(1)(i) For each This requirement
tabulation shall be made identified would be retained
for each response entity initiating event, a with editorial
depicting the assignment of tabulation must be changes. The
responsibilities for all made for each parenthetical
decisions and actions to be response depicting phrase ``(Not all
taken in response to the the assignment of entities will have
initiating event. (Not all responsibilities assigned
entities will have assigned for all decisions responsibilities
responsibilities for any and actions to be for any given
given initiating event.). taken. initiating event)''
would be deleted
because it is
considered to be
constricting
information.
The tabulations in the (f)(1)(ii) The This requirement
Responsibility Matrix shall tabulations would be retained
provide an overall picture described in the with editorial
of the response actions and responsibility changes. The word
their interrelationships. matrix must provide ``shall'' has been
an overall replaced with
description of ``must'' to
response actions establish this
and language as a
interrelationships. requirement.
Safeguards responsibilities (f)(2) Licensees This requirement
shall be assigned in a shall ensure that would be retained
manner that precludes duties and with editorial
conflict in duties or responsibilities changes.
responsibilities that would required by the
prevent the execution of approved safeguards
the plan in any safeguards contingency plan do
contingency. not conflict with
or prevent the
execution of other
site emergency
plans.
Safeguards responsibilities (f)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall be assigned in a shall identify and would be retained
manner that precludes discuss potential with added written
conflict in duties or areas of conflict discussion (text)
responsibilities that would between site plans in the plan to
prevent the execution of in the integrated document
the plan in any safeguards response plan consideration of
contingency. required by Section other plans to
II(b)(8) of this preclude conflict
appendix. between multiple
plans.
(f)(4) Licensees This requirement
shall address would be added to
safety/security address
interface issues in communication
accordance with the between licensee
requirements of safety and security
Sec. 73.58 to entities, to ensure
ensure activities that activities
by the security involving one
organization, organizational
maintenance, entity do not
operations, and adversely affect
other onsite another. Details
entities are would be addressed
coordinated in a in the proposed
manner that Sec. 73.58 safety/
precludes conflict security interface.
during both normal
and emergency
conditions.
(g) Primary security This requirement
functions. would be added to
improve the
usefulness and
applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (g)(1) Licensees This requirement
Requiring responding guards shall establish and would be retained
or other armed response maintain at all with editorial
personnel to interpose times, the changes. The phrase
themselves between vital capability to ``radiological
areas and material access detect, assess, and sabotage'' is
areas and any adversary respond to all replaced with the
attempting entry for the threats to the phrase ``all
purpose of radiological facility up to and threats up to and
sabotage or theft of including the including the
special nuclear material design basis threat. design basis
and to intercept any person threat'' to more
exiting with special accurately
nuclear material, and, * * represent the
*. standard that the
licensee also
protect against
perceived threats
not contained in
the design basis
threat.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (g)(2) To facilitate This requirement
facilitate initial response initial response to would be retained
to detection of penetration a threat, licensees with editorial
of the protected area and shall ensure the changes. Early
assessment of the existence capability to detection has been
of a threat, a capability observe all areas added to permit a
of observing the isolation of the facility in timely and
zones and the physical a manner that effective response.
barrier at the perimeter of ensures early The goal is to
the protected area shall be detection of observe and detect
provided, preferably by unauthorized potential threats
means of closed circuit activities and as far from the
television or by other limits exposure of facility as
suitable means which limit responding possible.
exposure of responding personnel to
personnel to possible possible attack.
attack.
(g)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall generally would be added to
describe how the describe the
primary security concept of defense-
functions are in-depth for
integrated to improved system
provide defense-in- effectiveness.
depth and are
maintained despite
the loss of any
single element of
the onsite physical
protection program.
(g)(4) Licensees' This requirement
description must would be added to
begin with onsite further describe
physical protection the concept of
measures defense-in-depth
implemented in the for improved system
outermost facility effectiveness.
perimeter, and must
move inward through
those measures
implemented to
protect vital and
target set
equipment.
(h) Response This requirement
capabilities. would be added.
[[Page 62833]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (h)(1) Licensees This requirement
Requiring responding guards shall establish and would be retained
or other armed response maintain at all with editorial
personnel to interpose times the changes. The phrase
themselves between vital capability to ``radiological
areas and material access intercept, sabotage'' is
areas and any adversary challenge, delay, replaced with the
attempting entry for the and neutralize phrase ``all
purpose of radiological threats up to and threats up to and
sabotage or theft of up to and including including the
special nuclear material the design basis design basis
and to intercept any person threat. threat'' for
exiting with special consistency with
nuclear material, and, * * the proposed Sec.
*. 73.55.
Appendix C, Paragraph 4. For (h)(2) Licensees The requirement
each initiating event, a shall identify the would be retained
tabulation shall be made personnel, with information
for each response entity equipment, and added to identify
depicting the assignment of resources necessary the allocation of
responsibilities for all to perform the personnel and the
decisions and actions to be actions required to availability of
taken in response to the prevent significant assets required to
initiating event. core damage and be implemented in
spent fuel sabotage response to
in response to postulated events.
postulated events.
(h)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added. The
predetermined word
actions can be ``predetermined''
completed under the is used to provide
postulated for the
conditions. accomplishment of
automatic actions
to achieve the
security mission.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4) Licensees This requirement
number of guards, and shall provide at would be retained
armed, trained personnel all times an armed with editorial
immediately available at response team changes. The
the facility to fulfill comprised of requirement would
these response requirements trained and be based on Sec.
shall nominally be ten qualified personnel 73.55(h)(3) and
(10), unless specifically who possess the would describe the
required otherwise on a knowledge, skills, performance
case by case basis by the abilities, and standard for
Commission; however, this equipment required personnel assigned
number may not be reduced to implement the armed response
to less than five (5) Commission-approved duties.
guards. safeguards
contingency plan
and site protective
strategy. The plan
must include a
description of the
armed response team
including the
following:
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4)(i) The This requirement
number of guards, and authorized minimum would be retained
armed, trained personnel number of armed with information
immediately available at responders, added to establish
the facility to fulfill available at all the number of
these response requirements times inside the personnel required
shall nominally be ten protected area. to be assigned
(10), unless specifically armed response
required otherwise on a duties within the
case by case basis by the protected area.
Commission; however, this This is intended to
number may not be reduced ensure that
to less than five (5) predetermined
guards. positions
documented in
approved
contingency plans
and are occupied
during threat
situations.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4)(ii) The This requirement
number of guards, and authorized minimum would be retained
armed, trained personnel number of armed with information
immediately available at security officers, added to establish
the facility to fulfill available onsite at the number of
these response requirements all times. personnel required
shall nominally be ten to be assigned
(10), unless specifically armed response
required otherwise on a duties on site.
case by case basis by the This is intended to
Commission; however, this ensure that
number may not be reduced predetermined
to less than five (5) positions
guards. documented in
approved
contingency plans
and are occupied
during threat
situations.
(h)(5) The total This requirement
number of armed would be added to
responders and document the number
armed security of armed response
officers must be personnel and their
documented in the roles and
approved security relationships to
plans and the protective
documented as a strategy.
component of the
protective strategy.
(h)(6) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
individuals ensure assigned
assigned duties and personnel are
responsibilities to trained to perform
implement the their assigned
Safeguards duties and
Contingency Plan responsibilities.
are trained and
qualified in
accordance with
appendix B of this
part and the
Commission-approved
security plans.
(i) Protective This header is added
strategy. for formatting
purposes.
(i)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall develop, would be added to
maintain, and provide tactical
implement a written planning
protective strategy information for the
that describes the armed response team
deployment of the and each individual
armed response team in response to
relative to the threats.
general goals,
operational
concepts,
performance
objectives, and
specific actions to
be accomplished by
each individual in
response to
postulated events.
(i)(2) The This header is added
protective strategy for formatting
must: purposes.
[[Page 62834]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (i)(2)(i) Be This requirement
Requiring responding guards designed to prevent would be retained
or other armed response significant core and revised to
personnel to interpose damage and spent describe the design
themselves between vital fuel sabotage of the licensee
areas and material access through the protective strategy
areas and any adversary coordinated consistent with the
attempting entry for the implementation of proposed Sec.
purpose of radiological specific actions 73.55(b)(2). Most
sabotage or theft of and strategies significantly, the
special nuclear material required to word ``interpose''
and to intercept any person intercept, would be replaced
exiting with special challenge, delay, by the phrase
nuclear material, and, * * and neutralize ``intercept,
*. threats up to and challenge, delay,
including the and neutralize'' to
design basis threat provide a
of radiological measurable
sabotage. performance based
requirement that
identifies the
specific actions
required to satisfy
the action
``interpose'' as
required by the
current Sec.
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
, and to provide a
measurable
performance based
requirement against
which the
effectiveness of
the licensee
protective strategy
could be measured.
(i)(2)(ii) Describe This requirement
and consider site would be added
specific based on changes to
conditions, to the threat
include but not environment the
limited to, Commission has
facility layout, determined that it
the location of is necessary to
target set emphasize
equipment and consideration of
elements, target the listed areas
set equipment that for design and
is in maintenance planning purposes.
or out of service,
and the potential
effects that
unauthorized
electronic access
to safety and
security systems
may have on the
protective strategy
capability to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel sabotage.
(i)(2)(iii) Identify This requirement
predetermined would be added to
actions and time identify
lines for the ``predetermined
deployment of armed actions'' to
personnel. provide for
automatic actions
toward
accomplishing the
security mission.
(i)(2)(iv) Provide This requirement
bullet resisting would be added to
protected positions provide a
with appropriate performance based
fields of fire. requirement for the
placement/location
of Bullet-Resisting
Enclosures (BREs).
This proposed
requirement would
ensure that each
position would be
of sufficient
strength to enhance
survivability of
armed personnel
against the design
basis threat and
would ensure that
assigned areas of
responsibility are
clearly visible and
within the
functional
capability of
assigned weapons.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (i)(2)(v) Limit This requirement
facilitate initial response exposure of would be retained
to detection of penetration security personnel with editorial
* * * which limit exposure to possible attack. changes added to
of responding personnel to describe the
possible attack. ballistic
protection or use
of available cover
and concealment for
security personnel.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (i)(3) Licensees This requirement
guard, watchman or armed shall provide a would be retained
response individual on duty command and control with editorial
shall be capable of structure, to changes added to
maintaining continuous include response by describe the
communication with an off-site law elements of
individual in each enforcement integrated incident
continuously manned alarm agencies, which command during
station required by ensures that postulated events.
paragraph (e)(1) of this decisions and
section, who shall be actions are
capable of calling for coordinated and
assistance from other communicated in a
guards, watchmen, and armed timely manner and
response personnel and from that facilitates
local law enforcement response in
authorities. accordance with the
integrated response
plan.
(j) Integrated This new header
Response Plan. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Introduction: It is (j)(1) Licensees This requirement
important to note that a shall document, would be retained
licensee's safeguards maintain, and with editorial
contingency plan is implement an changes. The
intended to be Integrated Response requirement would
complimentary to any Plan which must describe integrated
emergency plans developed identify, describe, and coordinated
pursuant to appendix E to and coordinate responses to
part 50 or to Sec. actions to be taken threats.
70.22(i) of this chapter. by licensee
personnel and
offsite agencies
during a
contingency event
or other emergency
situation.
(j)(2) The This requirement
Integrated Response would be added to
Plan must: improve the
usefulness and
applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
(j)(2)(i) Be This requirement
designed to would be added to
integrate and ensure the design
coordinate all of an integrated
actions to be taken response plan that
in response to an has been developed
emergency event in in coordination and
a manner that will conjunction with
ensure that each other plans.
site plan and
procedure can be
successfully
implemented without
conflict from other
plans and
procedures.
[[Page 62835]]
(j)(2)(ii) Include This requirement
specific would be added to
procedures, ensure the design
guidance, and of an integrated
strategies to response plan that
maintain or restore addresses a myriad
core cooling, of postulated
containment, and events within the
spent fuel pool design basis threat
cooling environment and to
capabilities using develop mitigating
existing or readily strategies for
available resources events that may
(equipment and exceed the design
personnel) that can basis threat.
be effectively
implemented under
the circumstances
associated with
loss of large areas
of the plant due to
explosions or fires.
(j)(2)(iii) Ensure This requirement
that onsite would be added to
staffing levels, describe the
facilities, and availability of
equipment required systems and assets
for response to any to ensure a high
identified event, state of readiness
are readily is maintained for
available and postulated events.
capable of
fulfilling their
intended purpose.
(j)(2)(iv) Provide This requirement
emergency action would be added to
levels to ensure ensure that event
that threats result information is
in at least a communicated in a
notification of timely and accurate
unusual event and manner.
implement
procedures for the
assignment of a
predetermined
classification to
specific events.
(j)(2)(v) Include This requirement
specific would be added to
procedures, consider advanced
guidance, and threats related to
strategies computer
describing cyber technology.
incident response
and recovery.
(j)(3) Licensees This new header is
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
(j)(3)(i) Reconfirm This requirement
on an annual basis, would be added to
liaison with local, establish a
State, and Federal periodic standard
law enforcement for maintaining
agencies, liaison with off-
established in site law
accordance with enforcement
Sec. 73.55(k)(8), resources to ensure
to include a continual and
communication ongoing
protocols, command understanding of
and control all aspects of a
structure, response to
marshaling potential threats.
locations,
estimated response
times, and
anticipated
response
capabilities and
specialized
equipment.
(j)(3)(ii) Provide This requirement
required training would be added to
to include provide for
simulator training training of
for the operations personnel to ensure
response to they possess the
security events knowledge, skills,
(e.g. loss of and abilities
ultimate heat sink) required to perform
for nuclear power assigned duties and
reactor personnel responsibilities.
in accordance with
site procedures to
ensure the
operational
readiness of
personnel
commensurate with
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(j)(3)(iii) This requirement
Periodically train would be added to
personnel in provide training of
accordance with personnel to ensure
site procedures to they possess the
respond to a tactical and
hostage or duress negotiations
situation. skills, knowledge
and abilities
needed to respond
to a hostage or
duress situation.
(j)(3)(iv) Determine This requirement
the possible would be added to
effects that nearby provide for the
hazardous material identification of
facilities may have site specific
upon site response operational
plans and modify conditions that may
response plans, affect how the
procedures, and licensee responds
equipment as to threats.
necessary.
(j)(3)(v) Ensure This requirement
that identified would be added to
actions are ensure that actions
achievable under identified in the
postulated safeguards
conditions. contingency plan,
protective
strategy,
integrated response
plan, and any other
emergency plans,
are achievable
under postulated
conditions.
(k) Threat warning This new header is
system. added for
formatting
purposes.
(k)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall implement a would be added to
``Threat warning provide for
system'' which progressive steps
identifies specific to gradually
graduated enhance security
protective measures based on perceived
and actions to be or identified
taken to increase threat.
licensee
preparedness
against a
heightened or
imminent threat of
attack.
[[Page 62836]]
(k)(2) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
the specific ensure preplanned
protective measures actions (protective
and actions measures) are
identified for each consistent with
threat level are other plans. The
consistent with the Commission has
Commission-approved determined that
safeguards because of changes
contingency plan, to the threat
and other site environment this
security, and proposed
emergency plans and requirement would
procedures. be needed to
emphasize the
importance of
coordinating all
site plans in a
manner that
precludes conflict.
(k)(3) Upon This requirement
notification by an would be added to
authorized provide for the
representative of implementation of
the Commission, preplanned actions
licensees shall in response to
implement the specific threat
specific protective levels or
measures assigned conditions.
to the threat level
indicated by the
Commission
representative.
(l) Performance This new header
Evaluation Program. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
(l)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall document and would be added to
maintain a ensure that the
Performance licensee maintains
Evaluation Program a Performance
that describes how Evaluation Plan to
the licensee will test, evaluate,
demonstrate and determine and
assess the improve upon the
effectiveness of effectiveness of
the onsite physical onsite physical
protection program protection program
to prevent to protect the
significant core identified targets
damage and spent and target sets in
fuel sabotage, and accordance with the
to include the security mission.
capability of armed
personnel to carry
out their assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
(l)(2) The This requirement
Performance would be added to
Evaluation Program establish
must include procedures and
procedures for the frequencies for the
conduct of conduct of drills
quarterly drills and exercises to
and annual force-on- ensure that system
force exercises effectiveness
that are designed determinations are
to demonstrate the made.
effectiveness of
the licensee's
capability to
detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize a
simulated threat.
(l)(2)(i) The scope This requirement
of drills conducted would be added to
for training provide for the
purposes must be conduct of drills
determined by the for training
licensee as needed, purposes only.
and can be limited
to specific
portions of the
site protective
strategy.
(l)(2)(ii) Drills, This requirement
exercises, and would be added to
other training must ensure drills and
be conducted under exercises are
conditions that realistic in that
simulate as closely they simulate as
as practical the closely as
site specific possible, the
conditions under physical conditions
which each member (running, lifting,
will, or may be, climbing) and
required to perform mental stress
assigned duties and levels (decision
responsibilities. making, radio
communications,
strategy changes)
that will be
experienced in an
actual event.
(l)(2)(iii) This requirement
Licensees shall would be added to
document each ensure that
performance comprehensive
evaluation to records are
include, but not maintained.
limited to,
scenarios,
participants, and
critiques.
(l)(2)(iv) Each This requirement
drill and exercise would be added to
must include a ensure that
documented post comprehensive
exercise critique reports are
in which developed to ensure
participants that observed
identify failures, issues are
deficiencies, or identified in the
other findings in after action
performance, plans, report.
equipment, or
strategies.
(l)(2)(v) Licensees This requirement
shall enter all would be added to
findings, ensure that
deficiencies, and corrective action
failures identified plans are developed
by each performance and tracked to
evaluation into the provide resolution.
corrective action
program to ensure
that timely
corrections are
made to the onsite
physical protection
program and
necessary changes
are made to the
approved security
plans, licensee
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.
(l)(2)(vi) Licensees This requirement
shall protect all would be added to
findings, provide for the
deficiencies, and appropriate level
failures relative of protection for
to the the type of
effectiveness of information being
the onsite physical developed.
protection program Information
in accordance with involving findings,
the requirements of deficiencies and
Sec. 73.21. failures is
considered
sensitive and must
be protected
accordingly.
(l)(3) For the This new header
purpose of drills would be added for
and exercises, formatting
licensees shall: purposes.
[[Page 62837]]
(l)(3)(i) Use no This requirement
more than the would be added to
number of armed ensure that
personnel specified realistic tests are
in the approved conducted against
security plans to those forces
demonstrate available onsite on
effectiveness. a routine basis.
Conducting drills
under other than
with actual or non
typical staffing
levels would not
provide for
accurate system
effectiveness
determinations.
(l)(3)(ii) Minimize This requirement
the number and would be added to
effects of ensure that
artificialities exercises are
associated with conducted as
drills and realistically as
exercises. possible.
Artificialities if
not minimized would
result in
inaccurate system
effectiveness
determinations.
(l)(3)(iii) This requirement
Implement the use would be added to
of systems or provide for the
methodologies that utilization of
simulate the technological
realities of armed advancements for
engagement through simulating live
visual and audible fire combat
means, and reflects situations in a
the capabilities of controlled
armed personnel to environment. These
neutralize a target may include but are
though the use of not limited to the
firearms during use of laser
drills and engagement systems
exercises. or dye marking
cartridges.
(l)(3)(iv) Ensure This requirement
that each scenario would be added to
used is capable of ensure that
challenging the scenarios are
ability of armed developed to stress
personnel to the protective
perform assigned strategy in manner
duties and that deficiencies
implement required or weaknesses can
elements of the be identified.
protective strategy.
(l)(4) The This requirement
Performance would be added to
Evaluation Program improve the
must be designed to usefulness and
ensure that: applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
(l)(4)(i) Each This requirement
member of each would be added to
shift who is ensure that
assigned duties and individual members
responsibilities of the security
required to force participate
implement the in drills at a
approved safeguards frequency that
contingency plan provides them with
and licensee knowledge and
protective strategy performance based
participates in at experience applying
least one (1) drill the protective
on a quarterly strategy.
basis and one (1)
force on force
exercise on an
annual basis.
(l)(4)(ii) The mock This requirement
adversary force would be added to
replicates, as ensure that the
closely as mock adversary
possible, adversary force is capable of
characteristics and portraying the
capabilities in the design basis threat
design basis threat in terms of size,
described in Sec. activity, movement,
73.1(a)(1), and is tactics, equipment
capable of and weaponry.
exploiting and
challenging the
licensee protective
strategy,
personnel, command
and control, and
implementing
procedures.
(l)(4)(iii) This requirement
Protective would be added to
strategies are provide an
evaluated and opportunity to
challenged through evaluate protective
tabletop strategies focusing
demonstrations. on incident command
in an open
discussion format.
(l)(4)(iv) Drill and This requirement
exercise would be added to
controllers are ensure the use of
trained and qualified
qualified to ensure controllers who are
each controller has knowledgeable of
the requisite safety,
knowledge and environmental
experience to conditions,
control and hazards, tactics,
evaluate exercises. weapons equipment,
and physical
security systems.
(l)(4)(v) Drills and This requirement
exercises are would be added to
conducted safely in ensure licensee
accordance with safety plans are
site safety plans. considered in the
conduct of drills
and exercises.
(l)(5) Members of This requirement
the mock adversary would be added to
force used for NRC ensure that the
observed exercises mock adversary
shall be force is not
independent of both influenced by
the security security management
program management or personnel
and personnel who responsible for
have direct security. This
responsibility for mitigates the
implementation of potential for the
the security scenario to be
program, including compromised or not
contractors, to carried out to the
avoid the desired
possibility for a expectation. This
conflict-of- proposed
interest. requirement is
based on the EPAct
2005 section 651.
(l)(6) Scenarios ....................
(l)(6)(i) Licensees This requirement
shall develop and would be added to
document multiple ensure that varying
scenarios for use scenarios with
in conducting differing adversary
quarterly drills configurations are
and annual force-on- used against all
force exercises. target sets for
increased
readiness. This
permits a better
determination of
overall system
effectiveness.
[[Page 62838]]
(l)(6)(ii) Licensee This requirement
scenarios must be would be added to
designed to test ensure that
and challenge any scenarios are
component or developed in a
combination of manner that each
components, of the aspect of the
onsite physical security system and
protection program strategy will be
and protective analyzed to
strategy. determine
effectiveness.
(l)(6)(iii) Each This requirement
scenario must use a would be added to
unique target set ensure that
or target sets, and scenarios are
varying developed in a
combinations of manner that each
adversary aspect of the
equipment, security system and
strategies, and strategy will be
tactics, to ensure analyzed to
that the determine overall
combination of all system
scenarios effectiveness.
challenges every
component of the
onsite physical
protection program
and protective
strategy to
include, but not
limited to,
equipment,
implementing
procedures, and
personnel.
(l)(6)(iv) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
scenarios used for ensure the
required drills and development of
exercises are not scenarios with
repeated within any differing adversary
twelve (12) month configurations
period for drills against varying
and three years (3) target sets. This
for exercises. promotes increased
readiness and
permits a better
determination of
overall system
effectiveness.
Audit and Review............ (m) Records, audits, This header would be
and reviews. retained and
revised to add
records retention
requirements.
App. C 5.(1) For nuclear (m)(1) Licensees This requirement
power reactor licensees shall review and would be revised to
subject to the requirements audit the ensure that the
of Sec. 73.55, the Commission-approved protective strategy
licensee shall provide for safeguards is revised as a
a review of the safeguards contingency plan in result of any
contingency plan either: accordance with the significant changes
App. C 5.(1)(i) At intervals requirements Sec. that would effect
not to exceed 12 months, or 73.55(n) of this the ability to
* * * part. respond in
App. C 5.(1)(ii) As accordance with the
necessary, based on an existing
assessment by the licensee contingency plan.
against performance
indicators, and as soon as
reasonably practicable
after a change occurs in
personnel, procedures,
equipment, or facilities
that potentially could
adversely affect security,
but no longer than 12
months after the change.
App. C 5.(1)(ii) * * * In
any case, each element of
the safeguards contingency
plan must be reviewed at
least every 24 months.
App. C 5.(2) A licensee
subject to the requirements
of either Sec. 73.46 or
Sec. 73.55, shall ensure
that the review of the
safeguards contingency plan
is by individuals
independent of both
security program management
and personnel who have
direct responsibility for
implementation of the
security program.
Appendix C Paragraph 5(3).
The licensee shall document
the results and the
recommendations of the
safeguards contingency plan
review, management findings
on whether the safeguards
contingency plan is
currently effective, and
any actions taken as a
result of recommendations
from prior reviews in a
report to the licensee's
plant manager and to
corporate management at
least one level higher than
that having responsibility
for the day-to-day plant
operation.
Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) (m)(2) The licensee This requirement
The review must include an shall make would be revised to
audit of safeguards necessary ensure that the
contingency procedures and adjustments to the protective strategy
practices, and an audit of Commission-approved is revised as a
commitments established for safeguards result of any
response by local law contingency plan to significant changes
enforcement authorities. ensure successful that would affect
implementation of the ability to
Commission respond in
regulations and the accordance with the
site protective existing
strategy. contingency plan.
Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) (m)(3) The This requirement
The review must include an safeguards would be revised to
audit of safeguards contingency plan ensure that an
contingency procedures and review must include audit of the
practices, and an audit of an audit of safeguards
commitments established for implementing contingency plan is
response by local law procedures and conducted to
enforcement authorities. practices, the site validate essential
protective aspects of the
strategy, and plan.
response agreements
made by local,
State, and Federal
law enforcement
authorities.
[[Page 62839]]
Appendix C Paragraph 5.(3) (m)(4) Licensees This requirement
The report must be shall retain all would be added to
maintained in an auditable reports, records, improve the
form, available for or other usefulness and
inspection for a period of documentation applicability of
3 years. required by this the safeguards
appendix in contingency plan.
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.55(r).
Appendix C Paragraph 5. (n) Implementing This requirement
Procedures. procedures. would be retained
with editorial
changes. The word
``Implementing''
has been added to
further define the
requirement.
In order to aid execution of (n)(1) Licensees This requirement
the detailed plan as shall establish and would be revised to
developed in the maintain written ensure that plans
Responsibility Matrix, this implementing are developed to
category of information procedures that cover security
shall detail the actions to provide specific force routine,
be taken and decisions to guidance and emergency,
be made by each member or operating details administrative, and
unit of the organization as that identify the other operational
planned in the actions to be taken duties.
Responsibility Matrix. and decisions to be
Contents of the Plan: made by each member
Although the implementing of the security
procedures (the fifth organization who is
category of Plan assigned duties and
information) are the responsibilities
culmination of the planning required for the
process, and therefore are effective
an integral and important implementation of
part of the safeguards the Commission-
contingency plan, they approved security
entail operating details plans and the site
subject to frequent changes. protective strategy.
Contents of the Plan: The (n)(2) Licensees This requirement
licensee is responsible for shall ensure that would be revised to
ensuring that the implementing ensure that plans
implementing procedures procedures are developed to
reflect the information in accurately reflect cover security
the Responsibility Matrix, the information force routine,
appropriately summarized contained in the emergency,
and suitably presented for Responsibility administrative, and
effective use by the Matrix required by other operational
responding entities. this appendix, the duties. The phrase
Commission-approved ``appropriately
security plans, the summarized and
Integrated Response suitably presented
Plan, and other for effective use
site plans. by the responding
entities'' would be
deleted because
this concept would
be covered under
demonstration.
Contents of the Plan: They (n)(3) Implementing This requirement
need not be submitted to procedures need not would be retained
the Commission for be submitted to the with editorial
approval, but will be Commission for changes.
inspected by NRC staff on a approval but are
periodic basis. subject to
inspection.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.--Part 73 Appendix G
[Reportable safeguards events]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Introductory text to App. [Introductory text This appendix would
G] to App. G] be revised by
Pursuant to the provisions Under the provisions adding new
of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) and of Sec. 73.71(a), requirements for
(c), licensees subject to (d), and (f) of nuclear power
the provisions of 10 CFR this part, reactor licensees.
73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, licensees subject Power reactor
73.60, and 73.67 shall to the provisions licensees subject
report or record, as of Sec. 73.55 of to the provisions
appropriate, the following this part shall of Sec. 73.55
safeguards events. report or record, would be required
as appropriate, the to notify the
following Commission (1)
safeguards events within 15 minutes
under paragraphs I, after discovery of
II, III, and IV of an imminent or
this appendix. actual threat
Under the against the
provisions of Sec. facility and (2)
73.71(b), (c), and within four hours
(f) of this part, of discovery of
licensees subject suspicious events.
to the provisions The proposed 15-
of Sec. Sec. minute requirement
73.20, 73.37, would more
73.50, 73.60, and accurately reflect
73.67 of this part the current threat
shall report or environment.
record, as Because an actual
appropriate, the or potential threat
following could quickly
safeguards events result in an event,
under paragraphs II a shorter reporting
and IV of this time would be
appendix. Licensees required. However,
shall make such the requirement for
reports to the Commission
Commission under notification within
the provisions of 15 minutes would be
Sec. 73.71 of applied only to
this part. nuclear power
reactor licensees,
at this time. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other licensees in
future rulemaking.
The new 4-hour
notification would
be intended to aid
the Commission, law
enforcement, and
the intelligence
community in
assessing
suspicious activity
that may be
indicative of pre-
operational
surveillance,
reconnaissance, or
intelligence
gathering efforts.
Events reported
under paragraphs I
or II would require
a followup written
report. Events
reported under
paragraph III would
not require a
followup written
report.
[[Page 62840]]
I. Events to be Paragraph I would be
reported as soon as added to establish
possible, but no the type of events
later than 15 to be reported
minutes after within 15 minutes.
discovery, followed Because the
by a written report identification of
within sixty (60) information
days. relating to an
(a) The initiation actual or imminent
of a security threat could
response consistent quickly result in
with a licensee's an event, which
physical security might necessitate
plan, safeguards expedited
contingency plan, Commission action
or defensive (e.g., notification
strategy based on of other licensees
actual or imminent or Federal
threat against a authorities), a
nuclear power shortened reporting
plant.. time would be
required. This
proposed
requirement would
also ensure that
threat-related
information would
be made available
to the Commission's
threat assessment
process in a timely
manner. Initiation
of response
consistent with
plans and the
defensive strategy
that are not
related to an
imminent or actual
threat against the
facility would not
need to be reported
(e.g false, or
nuisance
responses).
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported would be
provided in
guidance.
I.(b) The licensee This provision would
is not required to be added to reduce
report security unnecessary
responses initiated regulatory burden
as a result of on the licensees to
information notify the
communicated to the Commission of
licensee by the security responses
Commission, such as initiated in
the threat warning response to
system addressed in communications from
appendix C to this the Commission
part. (e.g., changes to
the threat level).
I. Events to be reported II. Events to be This requirement
within one hour of reported within one would be retained
discovery, followed by a (1) hour of and renumbered.
written report within 60 discovery, followed
days. by a written report
within sixty (60)
days.
(a) Any event in which there II.(a) Any event in This requirement
is reason to believe that a which there is would be retained
person has committed or reason to believe with minor revision
caused, or attempted to that a person has and renumbered. The
commit or cause, or has committed or term credible would
made a credible threat to caused, or be removed. The
commit or cause: attempted to commit Commission's view
or cause, or has is that a
made a threat to determination of
commit or cause: the ``credibility''
of a threat is not
a licensee
responsibility, but
rests with the
Commission and the
intelligence
community.
(1) A theft or unlawful II.(a)(1) A theft or This requirement
diversion of special unlawful diversion would be retained
nuclear material; or of special nuclear and renumbered.
material; or
(2) Significant physical II.(a)(2) This requirement
damage to a power reactor Significant would be retained
or any facility possessing physical damage to with minor
SSNM or its equipment or any NRC-regulated editorial changes
carrier equipment power reactor or to improve clarity
transporting nuclear fuel facility possessing and readability and
or spent nuclear fuel, or strategic special renumbered. The
to the nuclear fuel or nuclear material or phrase ``NRC-
spent nuclear fuel a to carrier regulated'' would
facility or carrier equipment be added to specify
possesses; or transporting that all Commission
nuclear fuel or licensed facilities
spent nuclear fuel, and transport would
or to the nuclear be covered by this
fuel or spent requirement. This
nuclear fuel change would
facility which is simplify the
possessed by a language in this
carrier; or section while
retaining the basic
requirement.
(3) Interruption of normal II.(a)(3) This requirement
operation of a licensed Interruption of would be retained
nuclear power reactor normal operation of with minor revision
through the unauthorized any NRC-licensed and renumbered. The
use of or tampering with nuclear power word ``machinery''
its machinery, components, reactor through the would be deleted
or controls including the unauthorized use of since
security system. or tampering with ``components''
its components or includes machinery
controls, including and other physical
the security system. structures at a
licensed facility.
This proposed
requirement would
continue to be
applied only to
nuclear power
reactors licensed
by the Commission,
at this time. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other classes of
licensees in future
rulemaking.
(b) An actual entry of an II.(b) An actual or This requirement
unauthorized person into a attempted entry of would be renumbered
protected area, material an unauthorized and revised to
access area, controlled person into any delete the
access area, vital area, or area or transport previously
transport. for which the specifically
licensee is mentioned areas
required by (``protected area,
Commission material access
regulations to area, controlled
control access. access area, vital
area'') requiring
access controls and
change the language
to include the
actual or attempted
entry of an
unauthorized
individual into any
area required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations. This
change would more
accurately reflect
the current threat
environment.
[[Page 62841]]
The revision also
reflects Commission
experience with
implementation of
the 2003 security
order's
requirements and
review of revised
license security
plans. Licensee's
defensive
strategies and
revised Safeguards
Contingency Plans
have introduced
additional
significant
locations (e.g.
target sets) that
may not be limited
to the previously
specified areas.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
(c) Any failure, II.(c) Any failure, This requirement
degradation, or the degradation, or the would be renumbered
discovered vulnerability in discovered and revised to
a safeguard system that vulnerability in a delete the
could allow unauthorized or safeguard system previously
undetected access to a that could allow specifically
protected area, material unauthorized or mentioned areas
access area, controlled undetected access (``protected area,
access area, vital area, or to any area or material access
transport for which transport for which area, controlled
compensatory measures have the licensee is access area, vital
not been employed. required by area'') requiring
Commission access controls and
regulations to to broaden the
control access and language to include
for which any area required
compensatory to be controlled by
measures have not the Commission
been employed. regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
(d) The actual or attempted II.(d) The actual or This requirement
introduction of contraband attempted would be renumbered
into a protected area, introduction of and revised to
material access area, vital contraband into any delete the
area, or transport. area or transport previously
for which the specifically
licensee is mentioned areas
required by requiring access
Commission controls and change
regulations to the language to
control access. include the actual
or attempted entry
of an unauthorized
individual into any
area or transport
required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
NRC Information Assessment III. Events to be This paragraph would
Team (IAT) Advisories dated reported within add a requirement
October 16, and November four (4) hours of for power reactor
15, 2001; May 20, 2003; discovery. No licensees to report
March 1, 2004; and October written followup suspicious
5, 2005. report is required. activities,
FBI's ``Terrorist Threats to (a) Any other attempts at access,
the U.S. Homeland: information etc., that may
Reporting Guide for received by the indicate pre-
Critical and Key Resource licensee of operational
Owners and Operators'' suspicious surveillance,
dated January 24, 2005, surveillance reconnaissance, or
(Official Use Only).. activities or intelligence
attempts at access, gathering targeted
including:. against the
(1) Any security- facility. This
related incident change would more
involving accurately reflect
suspicious activity the current threat
that may be environment; would
indicative of assist the
potential pre- Commission in
operational evaluating threats
surveillance, to multiple
reconnaissance, or licensees; and
intelligence- would assist the
gathering intelligence and
activities directed homeland security
against the communities in
facility. Such evaluating threats
activity may across critical
include, but is not infrastructure
limited to, sectors. The
attempted reporting process
surveillance or intended in this
reconnaissance proposed rule would
activity, be similar to the
elicitation of reporting process
information from that the licensees
security or other currently use under
site personnel guidance issued by
relating to the the Commission
security or safe subsequent to
operation of the September 11, 2001,
plant, or and would formalize
challenges to Commission
security systems expectations;
(e.g., failure to however, the
stop for security reporting interval
checkpoints, would be lengthened
possible tests of from 1 hour to 4
security response hours. The
and security Commission views
screening this length of time
equipment, or as reasonable to
suspicious entry of accomplish these
watercraft into broader objectives.
posted off-limits This reporting
areas).. requirement does
(2) Any security- not include a
related incident followup written
involving report. The
suspicious aircraft Commission believes
overflight that a written
activity. report from the
Commercial or licensees would be
military aircraft of minimal value
activity considered and would be an
routine by the unnecessary
licensee is not regulatory burden,
required to be because the types
reported.. of incidents to be
reported are
transitory in
nature and time-
sensitive. The
proposed text would
be neither a
request for
intelligence
collection
activities nor
authority for the
conduct of law
enforcement or
intelligence
activities. This
paragraph would
simply require the
reporting of
observed
activities.
[[Page 62842]]
Paragraphs III(a)(1)
and (2) provide
broad examples of
events that should
be reported, or
need not be
reported.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other licensees in
future rulemaking.
III.(a)(3) Incidents This paragraph would
resulting in the be added to
notification of establish a
local, State or performance
national law standard for
enforcement, or law additional types of
enforcement incidents or
response to the activities
site not included involving law
in paragraphs I or enforcement
II of this authorities not
appendix; otherwise specified
in paragraphs I and
II of this
appendix.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
III.(b) The This paragraph would
unauthorized use of be added to address
or tampering with ``tampering''
the components or events that do not
controls, including rise to the
the security significance of
system, of nuclear affecting plant
power reactors. operations as
specified in
paragraph II.(a)(3)
and would use
similar language to
the proposed
paragraph
II.(a)(3).
III.(c) Follow-up This requirement
communications would be added to
regarding these establish a
incidents will be performance
completed through standard for any
the NRC threat follow-up
assessment process communication
via the NRC between licensees
Operations Center and the Commission
\1\. regarding the
Footnote: 1. initial report of
Commercial (secure ``suspicious''
and non-secure) activity. This
telephone numbers process has been
of the NRC set forth in
Operations Center guidance documents
are specified in and the Commission
appendix A of this intends that
part.. licensees would
continue to
implement the
existing process
with little change.
II. Events to be recorded IV. Events to be This requirement
within 24 hours of recorded within 24 would be retained
discovery in the safeguards hours of discovery and renumbered.
event log. in the safeguards
event log.
(a) Any failure, IV.(a) Any failure, The current
degradation, or discovered degradation, or requirement would
vulnerability in a discovered be renumbered and
safeguards system that vulnerability in a revised to delete
could have allowed safeguards system the previously
unauthorized or undetected that could have specifically
access to a protected area, allowed mentioned areas
material access area, unauthorized or (``protected area,
controlled access area, undetected access material access
vital area, or transport to any area or area, controlled
had compensatory measures transport in which access area, vital
not been established. the licensee is area'') requiring
required by access controls and
Commission change the language
regulations to to include the
control access had actual or attempted
compensatory entry of an
measures not been unauthorized
established. individual into any
area required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
recorded will be
provided in
guidance.
(b) Any other threatened, IV.(b) Any other This requirement
attempted, or committed act threatened, would be renumbered
not previously defined in attempted, or and retained with
appendix G with the committed act not minor revisions.
potential for reducing the previously defined This paragraph
effectiveness of the in this appendix would be changed to
safeguards system below with the potential replace ``the
that committed to in a for reducing the physical protection
licensed physical security effectiveness of system'' with ``the
or contingency plan or the the physical safeguards system''
actual condition of such protection program and ``described''
reduction in effectiveness. below that for ``committed.''
described in a These changes would
licensee physical reflect Commission
security or experience with
safeguards implementation of
contingency plan, security order
or the actual requirements and
condition of such a reviews of
reduction in revisions to
effectiveness. licensee security
plans.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Guidance
The NRC is preparing new regulatory guides that will contain
detailed guidance on the implementation of the proposed rule
requirements. These regulatory guides, currently under development,
will consolidate and update or eliminate previous guidance that was
used to develop, review, and approve the power reactor security plans
that licensees revised in response to the post-September 11, 2001,
security orders. Development of the regulatory guides is ongoing and
the publication of the regulatory guides is planned after the
publication of the final rule. Because this regulatory guidance may
contain Safeguard Information (SGI) and/or classified information,
these documents would only be available to those individuals with a
need-to-know, and are qualified to have access to SGI and/or classified
information, as applicable. However, the NRC has determined that access
to these guidance documents is not necessary for the public or other
stakeholders to provide informed comment on this proposed rule.
VI. Criminal Penalties
For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10
[[Page 62843]]
CFR parts 50, 72, and 73 under sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA.
Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 73, are
discussed in Sec. 73.81. The new Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58
are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not
included in Sec. 73.81(b).
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3,
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility
is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program
elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), and although an Agreement
State may not adopt program elements reserved to NRC, it may wish to
inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws,
but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.
VIII. Availability of Documents
The following table indicates which documents relating to this
rulemaking are available to the public and how they may be obtained.
Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC's Public Document Room is
located at the NRC's headquarters at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
MD 20852.
Rulemaking Web site (Web). The NRC's interactive rulemaking Web
site is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. These documents may be
viewed and downloaded electronically via this Web site.
NRC's Electronic Reading Room (ERR). The NRC's electronic reading
room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Assessment....................... X X ML061920093
Regulatory Analysis
Regulatory Analysis--appendices................ X X ML061920012
ML061380796
ML061440013
Information Collection Analysis................ X X ML062340362
ML062830016
NRC Form 754................................... X X ML060930319
Memorandum: Status of Security-Related X X ML041180532
Rulemaking (July 19, 2004).
Commission SRM (August 23, 2004)............... X X ML042360548
Memorandum: Schedule for Part 73 Rulemakings X X ML043060572
(November 16, 2004).
Revised Schedule for Completing Part 73 X X ML051800350
rulemaking (July 29, 2005).
COMSECY-05-0046 (September 29, 2005)........... X X ML052710167
SRM on COMSECY-05-0046 (November 1, 2005)...... X X ML053050439
EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures X X ML020520754
(ICM) Order''(67 FR 9792).
EA-02-261, ``Issuance of Order for Compensatory X X ML030060360
Measures Related to Access Authorization'' (68
FR 1643).
EA-03-039, ``Issuance of Order for Compensatory X X ML030980015
Measures Related to Training Enhancements on
Tactical and Firearms Proficiency and Physical
Fitness Applicable to Armed Nuclear Power
Plant Security Force Personnel'' (68 FR 24514).
NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness X X ML051740058
and ResponseActions for Security-based
Events''.
Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50-80)............ X X ML031681105
SECY-05-0048, Petition for Rulemaking on X X ML051790404
Protection of U.S.Nuclear Power Plants Against
Radiological Sabotage (PRM-50-80).
SRM-SECY-05-0048, Staff Requirements on SECY-05- X X ML053000500
0048.
Table 9 Cross-walk table for proposed Sec. X X ML060910004
73.55.
Table 10 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR X X ML060910006
part 73 appendix B.
Table 11 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR X X ML060910007
part 73 appendix C.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IX. Plain Language
The Presidential memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled ``Plain
Language in Government Writing'' directed that the Government's writing
be in plain language. This memorandum was published on June 10, 1998
(63 FR 31883). In complying with this directive, the NRC made editorial
changes to improve the organization and readability of the existing
language of the paragraphs being revised. These types of changes are
not discussed further in this document. The NRC has used the phrase
``may not'' throughout this proposed rule to indicate that a person or
entity is prohibited from taking a specific action. The NRC requests
comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the clarity
and reflectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent to the
address listed under the ADDRESSES caption of the preamble.
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub.
L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless
using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is
otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any voluntary consensus
standard that could be used instead of the proposed Government-unique
standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary consensus standard
if an appropriate standard is identified.
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not
required.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there
will be no significant offsite impact to
[[Page 62844]]
the public from this action. However, the general public should note
that the NRC is seeking public participation; availability of the
environmental assessment is provided in Section VIII. Comments on any
aspect of the environmental assessment may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their
comments on the environmental assessment.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This proposed rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information
collection requirements.
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision and new.
The title of the information collection: 10 CFR part 73, ``Power
Reactor Security Requirements'' proposed rule, and NRC Form 754,
``Armed Security Personnel Background Check.''
The form number if applicable: NRC Form 754.
How often the collection is required: Collections will be initially
required due to the need for power reactor licensees to revise security
plans and submit the plans for staff review and approval. New records
requirements are imposed to: document target sets in procedures,
maintain records of storage locations for unirradiated MOX fuel,
document the onsite physical protection system review, document
problems and deficiencies, implement a cyber security program including
the requirement to develop associated implementing procedures,
implement a cyber incident response and recovery plan, implement a
cyber security awareness and training plan, and implement the access
authorization program. New annual collection requirements will be
imposed including requirements to maintain a record of all individuals
to whom access control devices were issued. Collections will also be
required on a continuing basis due to new proposed reporting
requirements which include: to notify the NRC within 72 hours of taking
action to remove security personnel per proposed Sec. 73.18, to notify
the NRC within 15 minutes after discovery of an imminent threat or
actual safeguards threat against the facility including a requirement
to follow this report with a written report within 60 days, and a
requirement to report to NRC within 4 hours of incidents of suspicious
activity or tampering. A new NRC form 754 background check would be
required to be completed by all security personnel to be assigned armed
duties.
Who will be required or asked to report: Power reactor licensees
will be subject to all the proposed requirements in this rulemaking.
Category I special nuclear material facilities will be required to
report for only the collections in proposed Sec. 73.18 and Sec.
73.19.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 10 CFR part 73--
15,156 (8,523 annualized one-time plus 6,644 annual responses).
The estimated number of annual respondents: 65 to 68 and,
additionally, decommissioning sites for Sec. 73.55(a)(1).
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to
complete the requirement or request: 10 CFR 73--145,613 hours (84,190
hours annualized one-time and 49,013 hours annual recordkeeping [732
hours per recordkeeper] plus 821 hours annualized one-time and 11,590
hours annual reporting [173 hours per licensee]; NRC form 754--1,250
hours (or an average of 18.7 hours per site) for one-time collections
and 261 hours (or an average of 3.9 hours per site) annually.
Abstract: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to
amend the current security regulations and add new security
requirements pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this
rulemaking includes new security requirements for Category I strategic
special nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced
weapons and firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would:
(1) Make generically applicable security requirements imposed by
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission
during implementation, (2) fulfill certain provisions of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, (3) add several new requirements that resulted from
insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site
security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection
program and force-on-force exercises, (4) update the regulatory
framework in preparation for receiving license applications for new
reactors, and (5) impose requirements to assess and manage site
activities that can adversely affect safety and security.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on
the potential impact of the information collections contained in this
proposed rule and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Estimate of burden?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized,
including the use of automated collection techniques?
A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html
for 60 days after the
signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum
site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by November 27, 2006 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to
INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002 and 3150-
new), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments
received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do
so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received
after this date. You may also e-mail comments to
John_A._Asalone@omb.eop.gov or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650.
XIII. Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The Commission requests
public comments on the draft regulatory analysis. Availability of the
regulatory analysis is
[[Page 62845]]
provided in Section VIII. Comments on the draft analysis may be
submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule would not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing and
operation of nuclear power plants, production facilities, spent fuel
reprocessing or recycling facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, and
uranium enrichment facilities. The companies that own these plants do
not fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set
forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards
established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).
XVI. Backfit Analysis
The NRC evaluated the aggregated set of requirements in this
proposed rulemaking that constitute backfits in accordance with 10 CFR
50.109 to determine if the costs of implementing the rule would be
justified by a substantial increase in public health and safety or
common defense and security. The NRC finds that qualitative safety
benefits of the proposed part 73 rule provisions that qualify as
backfits in this proposed rulemaking, considered in the aggregate,
would constitute a substantial increase in protection to public health
and safety and the common defense and security, and that the costs of
this rule would be justified in view of the increase in protection to
safety and security provided by the backfits embodied in the proposed
rule. The backfit analysis is contained within Section 4.2 of the
regulatory analysis. Availability of the regulatory analysis is
provided in Section VIII.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 72
Administrative practice and procedure, Criminal penalties, Manpower
training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health,
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the AEA, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended;
and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to adopt the following
amendments to 10 CFR parts 50, 72, and 73.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
1. The authority citation for part 50 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234,
83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201,
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section 50.7 also
issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C.
5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83
Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103
also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2138).
Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and
appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853
(42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec.
204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and
50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.
2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42
U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68
Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under
sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
2. In Sec. 50.34, footnote 9 is removed and reserved, and
paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.
* * * * *
(d) Safeguards contingency plan. (1) Each application for a license
to operate a production or utilization facility that will be subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.50 and 73.60 of this chapter must include a licensee
safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth
in section I of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter. The
``Implementation Procedures'' required per section I of appendix C to
part 73 of this chapter do not have to be submitted to the Commission
for approval.
(2) Each application for a license to operate a utilization
facility that will be subject to Sec. 73.55 of this chapter must
include a licensee safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the
criteria set forth in section II of appendix C to part 73 of this
chapter. The ``Implementation Procedures'' required in section
II(g)(12) of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter do not have to be
submitted to the Commission for approval.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 50.54, paragraph (p)(1) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(p)(1) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards
contingency plan procedures in accordance with appendix C of part 73 of
this chapter for affecting the actions and decisions contained in the
Responsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The licensee
may make no change which would decrease the effectiveness of a physical
security plan, or guard training and qualification plan, prepared under
Sec. 50.34(c) or part 73 of this chapter, or of any category of
information with the exception of the ``Implementation Procedures''
category contained in a licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared
under Sec. 50.34(d) or part 73 of this chapter, as applicable, without
prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a
change shall submit an application for an amendment to the licensee's
license under Sec. 50.90.
* * * * *
4. In Sec. 50.72, paragraph (a), footnote 1 is revised and the
heading of paragraph (a) is republished for the convenience of the user
to read as follows:
Sec. 50.72 Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear
power reactors.
(a) General Requirements.\1\ * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Other requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by
licensed operating nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in
this chapter, in particular Sec. Sec. 20.1906, 20.2202, 50.36,
72.216, and 73.71, and may require NRC notification before that
required under Sec. 50.72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
[[Page 62846]]
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-
RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE
5. The authority citation for part 72 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-
486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135,
137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148,
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153,
10155, 10157, 10161, 10168); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C.
3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
549 (2005).
Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d),
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b),
10168(c), (d). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat.
955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42
U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub.
L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g). Subpart J also
issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101,
10137(a), 10161(h). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133,
98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42
U.S.C. 10198).
6. In Sec. 72.212, paragraphs (b)(5)(ii), (b)(5)(iii), (b)(5)(iv),
and (b)(5)(v) are revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(ii) Storage of spent fuel must be within a protected area, in
accordance with Sec. 73.55(e) of this chapter, but need not be within
a separate vital area. Existing protected areas may be expanded or new
protected areas added for the purpose of storage of spent fuel in
accordance with this general license.
(iii) For purposes of this general license, personnel searches
required by Sec. 73.55(h) of this chapter before admission to a new
protected area may be performed by physical pat-down searches of
persons in lieu of firearms and explosives detection equipment.
(iv) The observational capability required by Sec. 73.55(i)(7) of
this chapter as applied to a new protected area may be provided by a
guard or watchman on patrol in lieu of closed circuit television.
(v) For the purpose of this general license, the licensee is exempt
from Sec. Sec. 73.55(k)(2) and 73.55(k)(7)(ii) of this chapter.
* * * * *
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
7. The authority citation for part 73 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 149, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended,
sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201); sec. 201,
as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106
Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
8. In Sec. 73.2, definitions for covered weapon, enhanced weapon,
safety/security interface, security officer, standard weapon, and
target set are added in alphabetical order to read as follows:
Sec. 73.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon,
machinegun, ammunition for any such gun or weapon, or a large capacity
ammunition feeding device as specified under section 161A of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As used here, the terms ``handgun,
rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-
automatic assault weapon, machinegun, ammunition, or large capacity
ammunition feeding device'' have the same meaning as set forth for
these terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a). Covered weapons include both
enhanced weapons and standard weapons. However, enhanced weapons do not
include standard weapons.
* * * * *
Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled
rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons do not include destructive
devices, including explosives or weapons greater than 50 caliber (i.e.,
weapons with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5 in] diameter).
* * * * *
Safety/Security interface (SSI) means the actual or potential
interactions that may adversely affect security activities due to any
operational activities, or vice versa.
* * * * *
Security officer means a uniformed individual, either armed with a
covered weapon or unarmed, whose primary duty is the protection of a
facility, of radioactive material, or of other property against theft
or diversion or against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
Standard weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic
assault weapon, or a large capacity ammunition feeding device.
* * * * *
Target set means the combination of equipment or operator actions
which, if all are prevented from performing their intended safety
function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in
significant core damage (e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel
melting, and/or core disruption) barring extraordinary action by plant
operators. A target set with respect to spent fuel sabotage is draining
the spent fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of
time, allowing spent fuel heat up and the associated potential for
release of fission products.
* * * * *
9. In Sec. 73.8, paragraph (b) is revised and paragraph (c) is
added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval.
* * * * *
(b) The approved information collection requirements contained in
this part appear in Sec. Sec. 73.5, 73.18, 73.19, 73.20, 73.21, 73.24,
73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.56,
73.57, 73.58, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 73.71, 73.72, 73.73, 73.74, and
Appendices B, C, and G to this part.
(c) This part contains information collection requirements in
addition to those approved under the control number specified in
paragraph (a) of this section. These information collection
requirements and control numbers under which they are approved are as
follows:
(1) In Sec. 73.18, NRC Form 754 is approved under control number
3150-xxxx;
(2) In Sec. 73.71, NRC Form 366 is approved under control number
3150-0104; and
[[Page 62847]]
(3) In Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.57, Form FD-258 is approved under
control number 1110-yyyy.
10. Section 73.18 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.18 Firearms background check for armed security personnel.
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for
completion of firearms background checks on armed security personnel at
selected NRC-regulated facilities. Firearms background checks are
intended to verify that armed security personnel whose duties require
access to covered weapons are not prohibited from receiving,
possessing, transporting, importing, or using such weapons under
applicable Federal or State law. Licensees and certificate holders
listed under paragraph (c) of this section who have applied for
preemption authority under Sec. 73.19 (i.e., Sec. 73.19 authority),
or who have been granted preemption authority by Commission order, are
subject to the requirements of this section.
(b) General requirements. (1) Licensees and certificate holders
listed in paragraph (c) of this section who have received NRC approval
of their application for preemption authority shall ensure that a
firearms background check has been satisfactorily completed for all
security personnel requiring access to covered weapons as part of their
official security duties prior to granting access to any covered
weapons to those personnel. Security personnel who have satisfactorily
completed a firearms background check, but who have had a break in
employment with the licensee, certificate holder, or their security
contractor of greater than one (1) week subsequent to their most recent
firearms background check, or who have transferred from a different
licensee or certificate holder (even though the other licensee or
certificate holder satisfactorily completed a firearms background check
on such individuals), are not excepted from the requirements of this
section.
(2) Security personnel who have satisfactorily completed a firearms
background check pursuant to Commission orders are not subject to a
further firearms background check under this section, unless these
personnel have a break in service or transfer as set forth in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section.
(3) A change in the licensee, certificate holder, or ownership of a
facility, radioactive material, or other property designated under
Sec. 73.19, or a change in the security contractor that provides
security personnel responsible for protecting such facilities,
radioactive material, or other property, shall not constitute `a break
in service' or `transfer,' as those terms are used in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section.
(4) Licensees and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of
this section may begin the application process for firearms background
checks under this section for security personnel whose duties require
access to covered weapons immediately on application to the NRC for
preemption authority.
(5) Firearms background checks do not replace any other background
checks or criminal history checks required for the licensee's or
certificate holder's security personnel under this chapter.
(c) Applicability. This section applies to licensees or certificate
holders who have applied for or received NRC approval of their
application for Sec. 73.19 authority or were issued Commission orders
requiring firearms background checks.
(d) Firearms background check requirements. A firearms background
check for security personnel must include--
(1) A check of the individual's fingerprints against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint system; and
(2) A check of the individual's identifying information against the
FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
(e) Firearms background check submittals. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders shall submit to the NRC, in accordance with Sec.
73.4, for all security personnel requiring a firearms background check
under this section--
(i) A set of fingerprints, in accordance with paragraph (o) of this
section, and
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall retain a copy of all
NRC Forms 754 submitted to the NRC for a period of one (1) year
subsequent to the termination of an individual's access to covered
weapons or to the denial of an individual's access to covered weapons.
(f) NICS portion of a firearms background check. The NRC will
forward the information contained in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the
FBI for evaluation against the NICS. Upon completion of the NICS
portion of the firearms background check, the FBI will inform the NRC
of the results with one of three responses under 28 CFR part 25;
``proceed,'' ``denied,'' or ``delayed,'' and the associated NICS
transaction number. The NRC will forward these results and the
associated NICS transaction number to the submitting licensee or
certificate holder. The submitting licensee or certificate holder shall
provide these results to the individual who completed the NRC Form 754.
(g) Satisfactory and adverse firearms background checks. (1) A
satisfactorily completed firearms background check means a ``proceed''
response for the individual from the FBI's NICS.
(2) An adversely completed firearms background check means a
``denied'' or ``delayed'' response from the FBI's NICS.
(h) Removal from access to covered weapons. Licensees or
certificate holders who have received NRC approval of their application
for Sec. 73.19 authority shall ensure security personnel are removed
from duties requiring access to covered weapons upon the licensee's or
certificate holder's knowledge of any disqualifying status or the
occurrence of any disqualifying events under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n),
and the ATF's implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478.
(i) [Reserved].
(j) Security personnel responsibilities. Security personnel
assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons shall promptly
[within three (3) working days] notify their employing licensee's or
certificate holder's security management (whether directly employed by
the licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor
to the licensee or certificate holder) of the existence of any
disqualifying status or upon the occurrence of any disqualifying events
listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's implementing
regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that would prohibit them from possessing
or receiving a covered weapon.
(k) Awareness of disqualifying events. Licensees and certificate
holders who have received NRC approval of Sec. 73.19 authority shall
include within their NRC-approved security training and qualification
plans instruction on--
(1) Disqualifying status or events specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)
and (n), and ATF's implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478
(including any applicable definitions) identifying categories of
persons who are prohibited from possessing or receiving any covered
weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of security personnel assigned
duties requiring access to covered weapons to promptly notify their
employing licensee or certificate holder of the occurrence of any
disqualifying events.
(l) [Reserved].
(m) Notification of removal. Within 72 hours after taking action to
remove security personnel from duties requiring access to covered
weapons, because of
[[Page 62848]]
the existence of any disqualifying status or the occurrence of any
disqualifying event--other than due to the prompt notification by the
security officer under paragraph (j) of this section--licensees and
certificate holders who have received NRC approval of Sec. 73.19
authority shall notify the NRC Operations Center of such removal
actions, in accordance with appendix A of this part.
(n) Reporting violations of law. The NRC will promptly report
suspected violations of Federal law to the appropriate Federal agency
or suspected violations of State law to the appropriate State agency.
(o) Procedures for processing of fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees
and certificate holders who have applied for Sec. 73.19 authority,
using an appropriate method listed in Sec. 73.4, shall submit to the
NRC's Division of Facilities and Security one (1) completed, legible
standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint record for each individual requiring a
firearms background check, to the NRC's Director, Division of
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN: Criminal History
Check. Copies of this form may be obtained by writing the Office of
Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-6157, or by e-mail to
FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what alternative formats, including
electronic submissions, may be practicable are referenced in Sec.
73.4.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall indicate on the
fingerprint card or other fingerprint record that the purpose for this
fingerprint check is the accomplishment of a firearms background check.
(3) Licensees and certificate holders shall establish procedures to
ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing
the rejection rate of fingerprint cards or records due to illegible or
incomplete information.
(4) The Commission will review fingerprints for firearms background
checks for completeness. Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint record
containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the licensee
or certificate holder for corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one (1) free re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one (1) free re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as an
initial submittal and require a second payment of the processing fee.
The payment of a new processing fee entitles the submitter to an
additional free re-submittal, if necessary. Previously rejected
submissions may not be included with the third submission because the
submittal will be rejected automatically. Licensees and certificate
holders may wish to consider using different methods for recording
fingerprints for re-submissions, if difficulty occurs with obtaining a
legible set of impressions.
(5)(i) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon
application. Licensees and certificate holders shall submit payment
with the application for the processing of fingerprints, and payment
must be made by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check,
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' \1\
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the
NRC's Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, Office
of Adminsitration at (301) 415-7404.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the
FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by
the NRC on behalf of a licensee or certificate holder, and an
administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing
fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of
licensee and certificate holder fingerprint submissions. The Commission
publishes the amount of the fingerprint check application fee on the
NRC's public Web site.\2\ The Commission will directly notify licensees
and certificate holders who are subject to this regulation of any fee
changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For information on the current fee amount, refer to the
Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/eie.html
and select the link for the Criminal History Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee or
certificate holder all data received from the FBI as a result of the
licensee's or certificate holder's application(s) for fingerprint
background checks, including the FBI's fingerprint record.
(p) Appeals and correction of erroneous system information. (1)
Individuals who require a firearms background check under this section
and who receive a ``denied'' NICS response or a ``delayed'' NICS
response may not be assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons
during the pendency of an appeal of the results of the check or during
the pendency of providing and evaluating any necessary additional
information to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed'' response,
respectively.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall provide information on
the FBI's procedures for appealing a ``denied'' response to the denied
individual or on providing additional information to the FBI to resolve
a ``delayed'' response.
(3) An individual who receives a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS
response to a firearms background check under this section may request
the reason for the response from the FBI. The licensee or certificate
holder shall provide to the individual who has received the ``denied''
or ``delayed'' response the unique NICS transaction number associated
with the specific firearms background check.
(4) These requests for the reason for a ``denied'' or ``delayed''
NICS response must be made in writing, and must include the NICS
transaction number. The request must be sent to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; NICS Section; Appeals Service Team, Module A-1; PO Box
4278; Clarksburg, WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide the individual
with the reasons for the ``denied'' response or ``delayed'' response.
The FBI will also indicate whether additional information or documents
are required to support an appeal or resolution, for example, where
there is a claim that the record in question does not pertain to the
individual who was denied.
(5) If the individual wishes to challenge the accuracy of the
record upon which the ``denied'' or ``delayed'' response is based, or
if the individual wishes to assert that his or her rights to possess or
receive a firearm have been restored by lawful process, he or she may
make application first to the FBI. The individual shall file an appeal
of a ``denied'' response or file a request to resolve a ``delayed''
response within 45 calender days of the date the NRC forwards the
results of the firearms background check to the licensee or certificate
holder. The appeal or request must include appropriate documentation or
record(s) establishing the legal and/or factual basis for the
challenge. Any record or document of a court or other government entity
or official furnished in support of an appeal must be certified by the
court or other government entity or official as a true copy. The
individual may supplement their initial appeal or request--subsequent
to the 45 day filing deadline--with additional information as it
becomes available, for example, where obtaining a true copy of a court
transcript may take longer than 45 days. The individual should note in
their appeal or request any information or
[[Page 62849]]
records that are being obtained, but are not yet available.
(6) If the individual is notified that the FBI is unable to resolve
the appeal, the individual may then apply for correction of the record
directly to the agency from which the information forming the basis of
the denial was originated. If the individual is notified by the
originating agency, that additional information or documents are
required the individual may provide them to the originating agency. If
the record is corrected as a result of the appeal to the originating
agency, the individual may so notify the FBI and submit written proof
of the correction.
(7) An individual who has satisfactorily appealed a ``denied''
response or resolved a ``delayed'' response may provide written consent
to the FBI to maintain information about himself or herself in a
Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be established by the FBI and checked by
the NICS for the purpose of preventing the erroneous denial or extended
delay by the NICS of any future NICS checks.
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied'' response or resolving a
``delayed'' response are responsible for providing the FBI any
additional information the FBI requires to resolve the ``delayed''
response.
11. Section 73.19 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.19 Authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of
enhanced weapons.
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for licensees
and certificate holders to obtain NRC approval to use the expanded
authorities provided under section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA), in protecting NRC-designated facilities, radioactive
material, or other property. These authorities include ``preemption
authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons authority.''
(b) General requirements. Licensees and certificate holders listed
in paragraph (c) of this section may apply to the NRC, in accordance
with the provisions of this section, to receive stand-alone preemption
authority or combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption
authority.
(1) Preemption authority, as provided in section 161A of the AEA,
means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or
certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the
licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, or use one (1) or more category of standard and
enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, notwithstanding any local,
State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations).
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as provided in section 161A of the
AEA, means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or
certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the
licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, and use one (1) or more category of enhanced
weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, notwithstanding any local, State, or
certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations).
(3) Prior to receiving NRC approval of enhanced-weapons authority,
the licensee or certificate holder must have applied for and received
NRC approval for preemption authority, in accordance with this section
or under Commission orders.
(4) Prior to granting either authority, the NRC must determine that
the proposed use of this authority is necessary in the discharge of
official duties by security personnel engaged in protecting--
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a licensee or certificate
holder and designated by the Commission under paragraph (c) of this
section, or
(ii) Radioactive material or other property that is owned or
possessed by a licensee or certificate holder, or that is being
transported to or from an NRC-regulated facility. Before granting such
approval, the Commission must determined that the radioactive material
or other property is of significance to the common defense and security
or public health and safety and has designated such radioactive
material or other property under paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Applicability. (1) The following classes of licensees or
certificate holders may apply for stand-alone preemption authority--
(i) Power reactor facilities; and
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater
of strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.
(2) The following classes of licensees or certificate holders may
apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority--
(i) Power reactor facilities; and
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater
of strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.
(3) With respect to the possession and use of firearms by all other
NRC licensees or certificate holders, the Commission's requirements in
effect before [effective date of final rule] remain applicable, except
to the extent those requirements are modified by Commission order or
regulations applicable to such licensees and certificate holders.
(d) Application for preemption authority. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of this section may apply
to the NRC for the preemption authority described in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section. Licensees and certificate holders seeking such
authority shall submit an application to the NRC in writing, in
accordance with Sec. 73.4, and indicate that the licensee or
certificate holder is requesting preemption authority under section
161A of the AEA.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for
preemption authority under this section may begin firearms background
checks under Sec. 73.18 for their armed security personnel.
(3) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for
preemption authority under this section and who have satisfactorily
completed firearms background checks for a sufficient number of
security personnel (to implement their security plan while meeting
security personnel fatigue requirements of this chapter or Commission
order) shall notify the NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, of their
readiness to receive NRC approval of preemption authority and implement
all the provisions of Sec. 73.18.
(4) Based upon the licensee's or certificate holder's readiness
notification and any discussions with the licensee or certificate
holder, the NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate
holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the licensee's
or certificate holder's application for preemption authority.
(e) Application for enhanced-weapons authority. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section may
apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons authority described in paragraph
(a)(2) of this section. Licensees and certificate holders applying for
enhanced-weapons authority shall have also applied for preemption
authority. Licensees and certificate holders may make these
applications concurrently.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders seeking enhanced-weapons
authority shall submit an application to the NRC, in accordance with
Sec. 73.4, indicating that the licensee or certificate holder is
requesting enhanced-weapons authority under section 161A of the AEA.
Licensees and certificate holders shall also include with their
application--
[[Page 62850]]
(i) The additional information required by paragraph (f) of this
section;
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC for preemption authority (if
not concurrent with the application for enhanced weapons authority);
and
(iii) If applicable, the date when the licensee or certificate
holder received NRC approval of their application for preemption
authority under this section or by Commission order.
(3) The NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate
holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the licensee's
or certificate holder's application for enhanced-weapons authority. The
NRC must approve, or have previously approved, a licensee's or
certificate holder's application for preemption authority under
paragraph (d) of this section, or via Commission order, to approve the
application for enhanced weapons authority.
(4) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied to the NRC
for and received enhanced-weapons authority shall then apply to the
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a
federal firearms license (FFL) and also register under the National
Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with ATF's regulations under 27 CFR
parts 478 and 479 to obtain the enhanced weapons. Licensees and
certificate holders shall include a copy of the NRC's written approval
with their NFA registration application.
(f) Application for enhanced-weapons authority additional
information. (1) Licensees and certificate holders applying to the
Commission for enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this
section shall also submit to the NRC for prior review and written
approval new, or revised, physical security plans, security personnel
training and qualification plans, safeguards contingency plans, and
safety assessments incorporating the use of the specific enhanced
weapons the licensee or certificate holder intends to use. These plans
and assessments must be specific to the facility, radioactive material,
or other property being protected.
(2) In addition to other requirements set forth in this part, these
plans and assessments must--
(i) For the physical security plan, identify the specific types or
models, calibers, and numbers of enhanced weapons to be used;
(ii) For the training and qualification plan, address the training
and qualification requirements to use these specific enhanced weapons;
and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency plan, address how these
enhanced and any standard weapons will be employed by the licensee's or
certificate holder's security personnel in meeting the NRC-required
protective strategy, including tactical approaches and maneuvers.
(iv) For the safety assessment--
(A) Assess any potential safety impact on the facility, radioactive
material, or other property from the use of these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private
facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public in
areas outside of the site boundary from the use of these enhanced
weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private
facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public
from the use of these enhanced weapons at training facilities intended
for proficiency demonstration and qualification purposes.
(3) The licensee's or certificate holder's training and
qualification plan on possessing, storing, maintaining, qualifying on,
and using enhanced weapons must include information from applicable
firearms standards developed by nationally-recognized firearms
organizations or standard setting bodies or standards developed by
Federal agencies, such as: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. Department of
Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S. Department of Defense.
(4) Licensees or certificate holders shall submit any new or
revised plans and assessments for prior NRC review and written approval
notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec. 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and
76.60 of this chapter which otherwise permit a license or certificate
holder to make changes to such plans ``that would not decrease their
effectiveness'' without prior NRC review.
(g) Completion of training and qualification prior to use of
enhanced weapons. Licensees and certificate holders who have applied
for and received enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this
section shall ensure security personnel complete required firearms
training and qualification in accordance with the licensee's or
certificate holder's NRC-approved training and qualification plan. Such
training must be completed prior to security personnel's use of
enhanced weapons to protect NRC-designated facilities, radioactive
material, or other property and must be documented in accordance with
the requirements of the licensee's or certificate holder's training and
qualification plan.
(h) Use of enhanced weapons. Requirements regarding the use of
enhanced weapons by security personnel in the performance of their
official duties are contained in Sec. Sec. 73.46 and 73.55 and in
appendices B and C of this part, as applicable.
(i) [Reserved].
(j) Notification of adverse ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees
and certificate holders with an ATF federal firearms license (FFL) and/
or enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC, in accordance with Sec.
73.4, of instances involving any adverse ATF findings or ATF notices
related to their FFL or such weapons.
12. Section 73.55 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
(a) Introduction. (1) By [date--180 days--after the effective date
of the final rule published in the Federal Register], each nuclear
power reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR part 50, shall
incorporate the revised requirements of this section through amendments
to its Commission-approved Physical Security Plan, Training and
Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, referred to
collectively as ``approved security plans,'' and shall submit the
amended security plans to the Commission for review and approval.
(2) The amended security plans must be submitted as specified in
Sec. 50.4 of this chapter and must describe how the revised
requirements of this section will be implemented by the licensee, to
include a proposed implementation schedule.
(3) The licensee shall implement the existing approved security
plans and associated Commission orders until Commission approval of the
amended security plans, unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.
(4) The licensee is responsible for maintaining the onsite physical
protection program in accordance with Commission regulations and
related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of the
approved security plans and site implementing procedures.
(5) Applicants for an operating license under the provisions of
part 50 of this chapter, or holders of a combined license under the
provisions of part 52 of this chapter, shall satisfy the requirements
of this section before the receipt of special nuclear material in the
form of fuel assemblies.
(6) For licenses issued after [effective date of the final rule],
licensees shall
[[Page 62851]]
design construct, and equip the central alarm station and secondary
alarm station to equivalent standards.
(i) Licensees shall apply the requirements for the central alarm
station listed in paragraphs (e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of
this section to the secondary alarm station as well as the central
alarm station.
(ii) Licensees shall comply with the requirements of paragraph
(i)(4) of this section such that both alarm stations are provided with
equivalent capabilities for detection, assessment, monitoring,
observation, surveillance, and communications.
(b) General performance objective and requirements. (1) The
licensee shall establish and maintain a physical protection program, to
include a security organization which will have as its objective to
provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) The physical protection program must be designed to detect,
assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to and
including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in
Sec. 73.1(a), at all times.
(3) The licensee physical protection program must be designed and
implemented to satisfy the requirements of this section and ensure that
no single act, as bounded by the design basis threat, can disable the
personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to prevent significant core
damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(4) The physical protection program must include diverse and
redundant equipment, systems, technology, programs, supporting
processes, and implementing procedures.
(5) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability to meet
Commission requirements through the implementation of the physical
protection program, including the ability of armed and unarmed
personnel to perform assigned duties and responsibilities required by
the approved security plans and licensee procedures.
(6) The licensee shall establish and maintain a written performance
evaluation program in accordance with appendix B and appendix C to this
part, to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of armed responders
and armed security officers to perform their assigned duties and
responsibilities to protect target sets described in paragraph (f) of
this section and appendix C to this part, through implementation of the
licensee protective strategy.
(7) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an access
authorization program in accordance with Sec. 73.56.
(i) In addition to the access authorization program required above,
and the fitness-for-duty program required in part 26 of this chapter,
each licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain an insider
mitigation program.
(ii) The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and
monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of
individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a
protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to
minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either
directly or indirectly, the licensee capability to prevent significant
core damage or spent fuel sabotage.
(8) The licensee shall ensure that its corrective action program
assures that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations,
defective equipment and nonconformances in security program components,
functions, or personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures
shall ensure that the cause of any of these conditions is determined
and that corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
(c) Security plans. (1) Licensee security plans. Licensee security
plans must implement Commission requirements and must describe:
(i) How the physical protection program will prevent significant
core damage and spent fuel sabotage through the establishment and
maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment
and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel,
and the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies;
and
(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of
Commission requirements.
(2) Protection of security plans. The licensee shall protect the
approved security plans and other related safeguards information
against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical security plan. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement a Commission-approved physical security plan
that describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth
in this section will be implemented.
(ii) The physical security plan must describe the facility location
and layout, the security organization and structure, duties and
responsibilities of personnel, defense-in-depth implementation that
describes components, equipment and technology used.
(4) Training and qualification plan. (i) The licensee shall
establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training and
qualification plan, that describes how the criteria set forth in
appendix B ``General Criteria for Security Personnel,'' to this part
will be implemented.
(ii) The training and qualification plan must describe the process
by which armed and unarmed security personnel, watchpersons, and other
members of the security organization will be selected, trained,
equipped, tested, qualified, and re-qualified to ensure that these
individuals possess and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities
required to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities
effectively.
(5) Safeguards contingency plan. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement a Commission-approved safeguards contingency
plan that describes how the criteria set forth in section II of
appendix C, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,'' to this part
will be implemented.
(ii) The safeguards contingency plan must describe predetermined
actions, plans, and strategies designed to intercept, challenge, delay,
and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage.
(6) Implementing procedures. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement written procedures that document the structure
of the security organization, detail the specific duties and
responsibilities of each position, and implement Commission
requirements through the approved security plans.
(ii) Implementing procedures need not be submitted to the
Commission for prior approval, but are subject to inspection by the
Commission.
(iii) Implementing procedures must detail the specific actions to
be taken and decisions to be made by each position of the security
organization to implement the approved security plans.
(iv) The licensee shall:
(A) Develop, maintain, enforce, review, and revise security
implementing procedures.
(B) Provide a process for the written approval of implementing
procedures and revisions by the individual with overall responsibility
for the security functions.
(C) Ensure that changes made to implementing procedures do not
[[Page 62852]]
decrease the effectiveness of any procedure to implement and satisfy
Commission requirements.
(7) Plan revisions. The licensee shall revise approved security
plans as necessary to ensure the effective implementation of Commission
regulations and the licensee's protective strategy. Commission approval
of revisions made pursuant to this paragraph is not required, provided
that revisions meet the requirements of Sec. 50.54(p) of this chapter.
Changes that are beyond the scope allowed per Sec. 50.54(p) of this
chapter shall be submitted as required by Sec. Sec. 50.90 of this
chapter or Sec. 73.5.
(d) Security organization. (1) The licensee shall establish and
maintain a security organization designed, staffed, trained, and
equipped to provide early detection, assessment, and response to
unauthorized activities within any area of the facility.
(2) The security organization must include:
(i) A management system that provides oversight of the onsite
physical protection program.
(ii) At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who
has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization
and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this
individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the
approved security plans and licensee protective strategy.
(3) The licensee may not permit any individual to act as a member
of the security organization unless the individual has been trained,
equipped, and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
in accordance with the requirements of appendix B to part 73 and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(4) The licensee may not assign an individual to any position
involving detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities
unless that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56.
(5) If a contracted security force is used to implement the onsite
physical protection program, the licensee's written agreement with the
contractor must be retained by the licensee as a record for the
duration of the contract and must clearly state the following
conditions:
(i) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining
the physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders,
Commission regulations, and the approved security plans.
(ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove all
reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations,
orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and
documents are kept by the licensee or the contractor.
(iii) An individual may not be assigned to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56.
(iv) An individual may not be assigned duties and responsibilities
required to implement the approved security plans or licensee
protective strategy unless that individual has been properly trained,
equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with appendix B to part 73 and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(v) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the
ability to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities
effectively.
(vi) Any license for possession and ownership of enhanced weapons
will reside with the licensee.
(e) Physical barriers. Based upon the licensee's protective
strategy, analyses, and site conditions that affect the use and
placement of physical barriers, the licensee shall install and maintain
physical barriers that are designed and constructed as necessary to
deter, delay, and prevent the introduction of unauthorized personnel,
vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be controlled
or restricted.
(1) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans, the
design, construction, and function of physical barriers and barrier
systems used and shall ensure that each barrier and barrier system is
designed and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier
and barrier system.
(2) The licensee shall retain in accordance with Sec. 73.70, all
analyses, comparisons, and descriptions of the physical barriers and
barrier systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and
shall protect these records as safeguards information in accordance
with the requirements of Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical barriers must:
(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of the area(s) for which the
physical barrier provides protection or a function, such as protected
and vital area boundaries and stand-off distance.
(ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against the design
basis threat commensurate to the required function of each barrier and
in support of the licensee protective strategy.
(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and support access control
measures.
(iv) Support effective implementation of the licensee's protective
strategy.
(4) Owner controlled area. The licensee shall establish and
maintain physical barriers in the owner controlled area to deter,
delay, or prevent unauthorized access, facilitate the early detection
of unauthorized activities, and control approach routes to the
facility.
(5) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation zone must be maintained in
outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeter barrier. The
isolation zone shall be:
(A) Designed and of sufficient size to permit unobstructed
observation and assessment of activities on either side of the
protected area barrier.
(B) Equipped with intrusion detection equipment capable of
detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area
perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating
timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before
completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier.
(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-
time and play-back/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely
evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before and after
each alarm annunciation.
(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that
could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the licensee's
capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (B)
of this section, must be located outside of the isolation zone.
(6) Protected area. (i) The protected area perimeter must be
protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet
Commission requirements and all penetrations through this barrier must
be secured in a manner that prevents or delays, and detects the
exploitation of any penetration.
(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be
separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical
barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security
plan.
(iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by
locking devices that allow exit only and alarmed.
(iv) Where building walls, roofs, or penetrations comprise a
portion of the protected area perimeter barrier, an isolation zone is
not necessary, provided that the detection, assessment, observation,
monitoring, and
[[Page 62853]]
surveillance requirements of this section are met, appropriately
designed and constructed barriers are installed, and the area is
described in the approved security plans.
(v) The reactor control room, the central alarm station, and the
location within which the last access control function for access to
the protected area is performed, must be bullet-resisting.
(vi) All exterior areas within the protected area must be
periodically checked to detect and deter unauthorized activities,
personnel, vehicles, and materials.
(7) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment must be located only within
vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so
that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two
physical barriers designed and constructed to perform the required
function, except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
(ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single
protected area.
(iii) The reactor control room, the spent fuel pool, secondary
power supply systems for intrusion detection and assessment equipment,
non-portable communications equipment, and the central alarm station,
must be provided protection equivalent to vital equipment located
within a vital area.
(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of
service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely
affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with
Sec. 73.58, and adjustments must be made to the site protective
strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as necessary.
(v) The licensee shall protect all vital areas, vital area access
portals, and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection
equipment and locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be
designed to permit exit only.
(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked.
(8) Vehicle barrier system. The licensee must:
(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area
from which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable
the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance
objective and requirements described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes.
(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include
passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance adequate to
protect personnel, equipment, and systems against the design basis
threat.
(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of
transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized
access beyond a vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to a protected
area or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the protected area
perimeter.
(v) Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and
provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual
operation, in the event of a power failure to ensure that the active
barrier can be placed in the denial position within the time line
required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required
standoff distance.
(vi) Provide surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and
barrier systems to detect unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system.
(9) Waterways. (i) The licensee shall control waterway approach
routes or proximity to any area from which a waterborne vehicle, its
personnel, or its contents could disable the personnel, equipment, or
systems necessary to meet the performance objective and requirements
described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) The licensee shall delineate areas from which a waterborne
vehicle must be restricted and install waterborne vehicle control
measures, where applicable.
(iii) The licensee shall monitor waterway approaches and adjacent
areas to ensure early detection, assessment, and response to
unauthorized activity or proximity, and to ensure the integrity of
installed waterborne vehicle control measures.
(iv) Where necessary to meet the requirements of this section,
licensees shall coordinate with local, State, and Federal agencies
having jurisdiction over waterway approaches.
(10) Unattended openings in any barrier established to meet the
requirements of this section that are 620 cm2 (96.1
in2) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension
of 15 m (5.9 in) or greater, must be secured and monitored at a
frequency that would prevent exploitation of the opening consistent
with the intended function of each barrier.
(f) Target sets. (1) The licensee shall document in site procedures
the process used to develop and identify target sets, to include
analyses and methodologies used to determine and group the target set
equipment or elements.
(2) The licensee shall consider the effects that cyber attacks may
have upon individual equipment or elements of each target set or
grouping.
(3) Target set equipment or elements that are not contained within
a protected or vital area must be explicitly identified in the approved
security plans and protective measures for such equipment or elements
must be addressed by the licensee's protective strategy in accordance
with appendix C to this part.
(4) The licensee shall implement a program for the oversight of
plant equipment and systems documented as part of the licensee
protective strategy to ensure that changes to the configuration of the
identified equipment and systems do not compromise the licensee's
capability to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(g) Access control. (1) The licensee shall:
(i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access
into any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system,
established to meet the requirements of this section.
(ii) Control all points of personnel and vehicle access into vital
areas in accordance with access authorization lists.
(iii) During non-emergency conditions, limit unescorted access to
the protected area and vital areas to only those individuals who
require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of access control systems.
(v) Provide supervision and control over the badging process to
prevent unauthorized bypass of access control equipment located at or
outside of the protected area.
(vi) Isolate the individual responsible for the last access control
function (controlling admission to the protected area) within a bullet-
resisting structure to assure the ability to respond or to summon
assistance in response to unauthorized activities.
(vii) In response to specific threat and security information,
implement a two-person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in vital
areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to vital
areas. Under these conditions, the licensee shall implement measures to
verify that the two person rule has been met when a vital area is
accessed.
(2) In accordance with the approved security plans and before
granting unescorted access through an access control point, the
licensee shall:
(i) Confirm the identity of individuals.
(ii) Verify the authorization for access of individuals, vehicles,
and materials.
[[Page 62854]]
(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and
materials in accordance with paragraph (h) of this section.
(iv) Confirm, in accordance with industry shared lists and
databases, that individuals have not been denied access to another
power reactor facility.
(3) Access control points must be:
(i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment,
and monitoring, observation, and surveillance equipment, as
appropriate.
(ii) Located outside or concurrent with, the physical barrier
system through which it controls access.
(4) Emergency conditions. (i) The licensee shall design the access
control system to accommodate the potential need for rapid ingress or
egress of authorized individuals during emergency conditions or
situations that could lead to emergency conditions.
(ii) Under emergency conditions, the licensee shall implement
procedures to ensure that:
(A) Authorized emergency personnel are provided prompt access to
affected areas and equipment.
(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized entry to vital equipment is
detected.
(C) The capability to prevent significant core damage and spent
fuel sabotage is maintained.
(iii) The licensee shall ensure that restrictions for site access
and egress during emergency conditions are coordinated with responses
by offsite emergency support agencies identified in the site emergency
plans.
(5) Vehicles. (i) The licensee shall exercise control over all
vehicles while inside the protected area and vital areas to ensure they
are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or vital areas must be
operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the area, or
must be escorted by an individual trained, qualified, and equipped to
perform vehicle escort duties, while inside the area.
(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area must be limited to plant
functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in use.
(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected
area must be escorted by an armed member of the security organization.
(6) Access control devices. (i) Identification badges. The licensee
shall implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system
for all individuals authorized unescorted access to the protected area
and vital areas.
(A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area
only when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and
authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing
unescorted access to the protected area.
(B) Except where operational safety concerns require otherwise,
identification badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals
while inside the protected area and vital areas.
(C) The licensee shall maintain a record, to include the name and
areas to which unescorted access is granted, of all individuals to whom
photo identification badge/key-cards have been issued.
(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks,
combinations, passwords, and related access control devices used to
control access to protected areas, vital areas, security systems, and
safeguards information must be controlled and accounted for to reduce
the probability of compromise. The licensee shall:
(A) Issue access control devices only to individuals who require
unescorted access to perform official duties and responsibilities.
(B) Maintain a record, to include name and affiliation, of all
individuals to whom access control devices have been issued, and
implement a process to account for access control devices at least
annually.
(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion
that any access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory
measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected.
(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable
access control devices that have been, or may have been compromised.
(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all
access control devices issued to individuals who no longer require
unescorted access to the areas for which the devices were designed.
(7) Visitors. (i) The licensee may permit escorted access to the
protected area to individuals who do not have unescorted access
authorization in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.56 and
part 26 of this chapter. The licensee shall:
(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling
visitors.
(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor through physical
presentation of a recognized identification card issued by a local,
State, or Federal Government agency that includes a photo or contains
physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access.
(C) Maintain a visitor control register in which all visitors shall
register their name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment
affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited
before being escorted into any protected or vital area.
(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors that clearly indicates
that an escort is required.
(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, while inside the protected
area and vital areas.
(ii) Individuals not employed by the licensee but who require
frequent and extended unescorted access to the protected area and vital
areas shall satisfy the access authorization requirements of Sec.
73.56 and part 26 of this chapter and shall be issued a non-employee
photo identification badge that is easily distinguished from other
identification badges before being allowed unescorted access to the
protected area. Non-employee photo identification badges must indicate:
(A) Non-employee, no escort required.
(B) Areas to which access is authorized.
(C) The period for which access is authorized.
(D) The individual's employer.
(E) A means to determine the individual's emergency plan assembly
area.
(8) Escorts. The licensee shall ensure that all escorts are trained
in accordance with appendix B to this part, the approved training and
qualification plan, and licensee policies and procedures.
(i) Escorts shall be authorized unescorted access to all areas in
which they will perform escort duties.
(ii) Individuals assigned to escort visitors shall be provided a
means of timely communication with both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle escort duties shall be
provided a means of continuous communication with both alarm stations
to ensure the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iv) Escorts shall be knowledgeable of those activities that are
authorized to be performed within the areas for which they are assigned
to perform escort duties and must also be knowledgeable of those
activities that are authorized to be performed by any individual for
which the escort is assigned responsibility.
(v) Visitor to escort ratios shall be limited to 10 to 1 in the
protected area and 5 to 1 in vital areas, provided that the necessary
observation and control requirements of this section can be
[[Page 62855]]
maintained by the assigned escort over all visitor activities.
(h) Search programs. (1) At each designated access control point
into the owner controlled area and protected area, the licensee shall
search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials in
accordance with the requirements of this section and the approved
security plans, before granting access.
(i) The objective of the search program must be to deter, detect,
and prevent the introduction of unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices into
designated areas in which the unauthorized items could be used to
disable personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to meet the
performance objective and requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section.
(ii) The search requirements for unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices must be
accomplished through the use of equipment capable of detecting these
unauthorized items and through visual and hands-on physical searches,
as needed to ensure all items are identified before granting access.
(iii) Only trained and qualified members of the security
organization, and other trained and qualified personnel designated by
the licensee, shall perform search activities or be assigned duties and
responsibilities required to satisfy observation requirements for the
search activities.
(2) The licensee shall establish and implement written search
procedures for all access control points before granting access to any
individual, vehicle, package, delivery, or material.
(i) Search procedures must ensure that items possessed by an
individual, or contained within a vehicle or package, must be clearly
identified as not being a prohibited item before granting access beyond
the access control point for which the search is conducted.
(ii) The licensee shall visually and physically hand search all
individuals, vehicles, and packages containing items that cannot be or
are not clearly identified by search equipment.
(3) Whenever search equipment is out of service or is not operating
satisfactorily, trained and qualified members of the security
organization shall conduct a hands-on physical search of all
individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials that would
otherwise have been subject to equipment searches.
(4) When an attempt to introduce unauthorized items has occurred or
is suspected, the licensee shall implement actions to ensure that the
suspect individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials are
denied access and shall perform a visual and hands-on physical search
to determine the absence or existence of a threat.
(5) Vehicle search procedures must be performed by at least two (2)
properly trained and equipped security personnel, at least one of whom
is positioned to observe the search process and provide a timely
response to unauthorized activities if necessary.
(6) Vehicle areas to be searched must include, but are not limited
to, the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.
(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must be equipped with video
surveillance equipment that must be monitored by an individual capable
of initiating and directing a timely response to unauthorized activity.
(8) Exceptions to the search requirements of this section must be
submitted to the Commission for prior review and approval and must be
identified in the approved security plans.
(i) Vehicles and items that may be excepted from the search
requirements of this section must be escorted by an armed individual
who is trained and equipped to observe offloading and perform search
activities at the final destination within the protected area.
(ii) To the extent practicable, items excepted from search must be
off loaded only at specified receiving areas that are not adjacent to a
vital area.
(iii) The excepted items must be searched at the receiving area and
opened at the final destination by an individual familiar with the
items.
(i) Detection and assessment systems.
(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain an intrusion
detection and assessment system that must provide, at all times, the
capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized persons
and activities.
(2) Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate, and video
assessment equipment images shall display, concurrently in at least two
continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at least one of which must
be protected in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs
(e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of this section.
(3) The licensee's intrusion detection system must be designed to
ensure that both alarm station operators:
(i) Are concurrently notified of the alarm annunciation.
(ii) Are capable of making a timely assessment of the cause of each
alarm annunciation.
(iii) Possess the capability to initiate a timely response in
accordance with the approved security plans, licensee protective
strategy, and implementing procedures.
(4) Both alarm stations must be equipped with equivalent
capabilities for detection and communication, and must be equipped with
functionally equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, and
surveillance capabilities to support the effective implementation of
the approved security plans and the licensee protective strategy in the
event that either alarm station is disabled.
(i) The licensee shall ensure that a single act cannot remove the
capability of both alarm stations to detect and assess unauthorized
activities, respond to an alarm, summon offsite assistance, implement
the protective strategy, provide command and control, or otherwise
prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) The alarm station functions in paragraph (i)(4) of this
section must remain operable from an uninterruptible backup power
supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
(5) Detection. Detection capabilities must be provided by security
organization personnel and intrusion detection equipment, and shall be
defined in implementing procedures. Intrusion detection equipment must
be capable of operating as intended under the conditions encountered at
the facility.
(6) Assessment. Assessment capabilities must be provided by
security organization personnel and video assessment equipment, and
shall be described in implementing procedures. Video assessment
equipment must be capable of operating as intended under the conditions
encountered at the facility and must provide video images from which
accurate and timely assessments can be made in response to an alarm
annunciation or other notification of unauthorized activity.
(7) The licensee intrusion detection and assessment system must:
(i) Ensure that the duties and responsibilities assigned to
personnel, the use of equipment, and the implementation of procedures
provides the detection and assessment capabilities necessary to meet
the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and
location of the alarm.
(iii) Ensure that alarm devices, to include transmission lines to
[[Page 62856]]
annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking.
(iv) Provide visual and audible alarm annunciation and concurrent
video assessment capability to both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures timely recognition, acknowledgment and response by each alarm
station operator in accordance with written response procedures.
(v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a
component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on
the backup power supply.
(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm annunciations, the cause of
each alarm, and the disposition of each alarm.
(8) Alarm stations. (i) Both alarm stations must be continuously
staffed by at least one trained and qualified member of the security
organization.
(ii) The interior of the central alarm station must not be visible
from the perimeter of the protected area.
(iii) The licensee may not permit any activities to be performed
within either alarm station that would interfere with an alarm station
operator's ability to effectively execute assigned detection,
assessment, surveillance, and communication duties and
responsibilities.
(iv) The licensee shall assess and respond to all alarms and other
indications of unauthorized activities in accordance with the approved
security plans and implementing procedures.
(v) The licensee's implementing procedures must ensure that both
alarm station operators are knowledgeable of all alarm annunciations,
assessments, and final disposition of all alarms, to include but not
limited to a prohibition from changing the status of a detection point
or deactivating a locking or access control device at a protected or
vital area portal, without the knowledge and concurrence of the other
alarm station operator.
(9) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring. (i) The physical
protection program must include the capability for surveillance,
observation, and monitoring in a manner that provides early detection
and assessment of unauthorized activities.
(ii) The licensee shall provide continual surveillance,
observation, and monitoring of all areas identified in the approved
security plans as requiring surveillance, observation, and monitoring
to ensure early detection of unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of physical barriers or other components of the physical
protection program.
(A) Continual surveillance, observation, and monitoring
responsibilities must be performed by security personnel during routine
patrols or by other trained and equipped personnel designated as a
component of the protective strategy.
(B) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring requirements may be
accomplished by direct observation or video technology.
(iii) The licensee shall provide random patrols of all accessible
areas containing target set equipment.
(A) Armed security patrols shall periodically check designated
areas and shall inspect vital area entrances, portals, and external
barriers.
(B) Physical barriers must be inspected at random intervals to
identify tampering and degradation.
(C) Security personnel shall be trained to recognize indications of
tampering as necessary to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
as they relate to safety and security systems and equipment.
(iv) Unattended openings that are not monitored by intrusion
detection equipment must be observed by security personnel at a
frequency that would prevent exploitation of that opening.
(v) Upon detection of unauthorized activities, tampering, or other
threats, the licensee shall initiate actions consistent with the
approved security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and
implementing procedures.
(10) Video technology. (i) The licensee shall maintain in operable
condition all video technology used to satisfy the monitoring,
observation, surveillance, and assessment requirements of this section.
(ii) Video technology must be:
(A) Displayed concurrently at both alarm stations.
(B) Designed to provide concurrent observation, monitoring, and
surveillance of designated areas from which an alarm annunciation or a
notification of unauthorized activity is received.
(C) Capable of providing a timely visual display from which
positive recognition and assessment of the detected activity can be
made and a timely response initiated.
(D) Used to supplement and limit the exposure of security personnel
to possible attack.
(iii) The licensee shall implement controls for personnel assigned
to monitor video technology to ensure that assigned personnel maintain
the level of alertness required to effectively perform the assigned
duties and responsibilities.
(11) Illumination. (i) The licensee shall ensure that all areas of
the facility, to include appropriate portions of the owner controlled
area, are provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the
requirements of this section.
(ii) The licensee shall provide a minimum illumination level of 0.2
footcandle measured horizontally at ground level, in the isolation
zones and all exterior areas within the protected area, or may augment
the facility illumination system, to include patrols, responders, and
video technology, with low-light technology capable of meeting the
detection, assessment, surveillance, observation, monitoring, and
response requirements of this section.
(iii) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans
how the lighting requirements of this section are met and, if used, the
type(s) and application of low-light technology used.
(j) Communication requirements. (1) The licensee shall establish
and maintain, continuous communication capability with onsite and
offsite resources to ensure effective command and control during both
normal and emergency situations.
(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm station shall be capable of
calling for assistance in accordance with the approved security plans,
licensee integrated response plan, and licensee procedures.
(3) Each on-duty security officer, watchperson, vehicle escort, and
armed response force member shall be capable of maintaining continuous
communication with an individual in each alarm station.
(4) The following continuous communication capabilities must
terminate in both alarm stations required by this section:
(i) Conventional telephone service.
(ii) Radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication,
either directly or through an intermediary.
(iii) A system for communication with all control rooms, on-duty
operations personnel, escorts, local, State, and Federal law
enforcement agencies, and all other personnel necessary to coordinate
both onsite and offsite responses.
(5) Non-portable communications equipment must remain operable from
independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.
(6) The licensee shall identify site areas where communication
could be interrupted or can not be maintained and shall establish
alternative communication measures for these areas in implementing
procedures.
(k) Response requirements. (1) Personnel and equipment.
(i) The licensee shall establish and maintain, at all times, the
minimum number of properly trained and
[[Page 62857]]
equipped personnel required to intercept, challenge, delay, and
neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage as defined in Sec. 73.1, to prevent significant
core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) The licensee shall provide and maintain firearms, ammunition,
and equipment capable of performing functions commensurate to the needs
of each armed member of the security organization to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the approved
security plans, the licensee protective strategy, implementing
procedures, and the site specific conditions under which the firearms,
ammunition, and equipment will be used.
(iii) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans,
all firearms and equipment to be possessed by and readily available to,
armed personnel to implement the protective strategy and carry out all
assigned duties and responsibilities. This description must include the
general distribution and assignment of firearms, ammunition, body
armor, and other equipment used.
(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all firearms, ammunition, and
equipment required by the protective strategy are in sufficient supply,
are in working condition, and are readily available for use in
accordance with the licensee protective strategy and predetermined time
lines.
(v) The licensee shall ensure that all armed members of the
security organization are trained in the proper use and maintenance of
assigned weapons and equipment in accordance with appendix B to part
73.
(2) The licensee shall instruct each armed response person to
prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by
using force sufficient to counter the force directed at that person,
including the use of deadly force, when the armed response person has a
reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary in self-
defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances as
authorized by applicable State law.
(3) The licensee shall provide an armed response team consisting of
both armed responders and armed security officers to carry out response
duties, within predetermined time lines.
(i) Armed responders. (A) The licensee shall determine the minimum
number of armed responders necessary to protect against the design
basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a), subject to Commission
approval, and shall document this number in the approved security
plans.
(B) Armed responders shall be available at all times inside the
protected area and may not be assigned any other duties or
responsibilities that could interfere with assigned response duties.
(ii) Armed security officers. (A) Armed security officers
designated to strengthen response capabilities shall be onsite and
available at all times to carry out assigned response duties.
(B) The minimum number of armed security officers must be
documented in the approved security plans.
(iii) The licensee shall ensure that training and qualification
requirements accurately reflect the duties and responsibilities to be
performed.
(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all firearms, ammunition, and
equipment needed for completing the actions described in the approved
security plans and licensee protective strategy are readily available
and in working condition.
(4) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans,
procedures for responding to an unplanned incident that reduces the
number of available armed response team members below the minimum
number documented by the licensee in the approved security plans.
(5) Licensees shall develop, maintain, and implement a written
protective strategy in accordance with the requirements of this section
and appendix C to this part.
(6) The licensee shall ensure that all personnel authorized
unescorted access to the protected area are trained and understand
their roles and responsibilities during security incidents, to include
hostage and duress situations.
(7) Upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of threat, the
licensee shall:
(i) Determine the existence of a threat in accordance with
assessment procedures.
(ii) Identify the level of threat present through the use of
assessment methodologies and procedures.
(iii) Determine the response necessary to intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize the threat in accordance with the requirements of
appendix C to part 73, the Commission-approved safeguards contingency
plan, and the licensee response strategy.
(iv) Notify offsite support agencies such as local law enforcement,
in accordance with site procedures.
(8) The licensee shall document and maintain current agreements
with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, to include
estimated response times and capabilities.
(l) Facilities using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies. In addition
to the requirements described in this section for protection against
radiological sabotage, operating commercial nuclear power reactors
licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 and using special nuclear material
in the form of MOX fuel assemblies shall protect unirradiated MOX fuel
assemblies against theft or diversion.
(1) Licensees shall protect the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies
against theft or diversion in accordance with the requirements of this
section and the approved security plans.
(2) Commercial nuclear power reactors using MOX fuel assemblies are
exempt from the requirements of Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46 for
the physical protection of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(3) Administrative controls. (i) The licensee shall describe in the
approved security plans, the operational and administrative controls to
be implemented for the receipt, inspection, movement, storage, and
protection of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(ii) The licensee shall implement the use of tamper-indicating
devices for unirradiated MOX fuel assembly transport and shall verify
their use and integrity before receipt.
(iii) Upon delivery of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies, the
licensee shall:
(A) Inspect unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for damage.
(B) Search unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for unauthorized
materials.
(iv) The licensee may conduct the required inspection and search
functions simultaneously.
(v) The licensee shall ensure the proper placement and control of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies as follows:
(A) At least one armed security officer, in addition to the armed
response team required by paragraphs (h)(4) and (h)(5) of appendix C to
part 73, shall be present during the receipt and inspection of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(B) The licensee shall store unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies only
within a spent fuel pool, located within a vital area, so that access
to the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies requires passage through at
least three physical barriers.
(vi) The licensee shall implement a material control and
accountability program for the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies that
includes a predetermined and documented storage location for each
unirradiated MOX fuel assembly.
[[Page 62858]]
(vii) Records that identify the storage locations of unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies are considered safeguards information and must be
protected and stored in accordance with Sec. 73.21.
(4) Physical controls. (i) The licensee shall lock or disable all
equipment and power supplies to equipment required for the movement and
handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(ii) The licensee shall implement a two-person line-of-sight rule
whenever control systems or equipment required for the movement or
handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must be accessed.
(iii) The licensee shall conduct random patrols of areas containing
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies to ensure the integrity of barriers
and locks, deter unauthorized activities, and to identify indications
of tampering.
(iv) Locks, keys, and any other access control device used to
secure equipment and power sources required for the movement of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or openings to areas containing
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must be controlled by the security
organization.
(v) Removal of locks used to secure equipment and power sources
required for the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or
openings to areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must
require approval by both the on-duty security shift supervisor and the
operations shift manager.
(A) At least one armed security officer shall be present to observe
activities involving the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies
before the removal of the locks and providing power to equipment
required for the movement or handling of unirradiated MOX fuel
assemblies.
(B) At least one armed security officer shall be present at all
times until power is removed from equipment and locks are secured.
(C) Security officers shall be trained and knowledgeable of
authorized and unauthorized activities involving unirradiated MOX fuel
assemblies.
(5) At least one armed security officer shall be present and shall
maintain constant surveillance of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies when
the assemblies are not located in the spent fuel pool or reactor.
(6) The licensee shall maintain at all times the capability to
detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats to
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in accordance with the requirements of
this section.
(m) Digital computer and communication networks. (1) The licensee
shall implement a cyber-security program that provides high assurance
that computer systems, which if compromised would likely adversely
impact safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are protected from
cyber attacks.
(i) The licensee shall describe the cyber-security program
requirements in the approved security plans.
(ii) The licensee shall incorporate the cyber-security program into
the onsite physical protection program.
(iii) The cyber-security program must be designed to detect and
prevent cyber attacks on protected computer systems.
(2) Cyber-security assessment. The licensee shall implement a
cyber-security assessment program to systematically assess and manage
cyber risks.
(3) Policies, requirements, and procedures. (i) The licensee shall
apply cyber-security requirements and policies that identify management
expectations and requirements for the protection of computer systems.
(ii) The licensee shall develop and maintain implementing
procedures to ensure cyber-security requirements and policies are
implemented effectively.
(4) Incident response and recovery. (i) The licensee shall
implement a cyber-security incident response and recovery plan to
minimize the adverse impact of a cyber-security incident on safety,
security, or emergency preparedness systems.
(ii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must be
described in the integrated response plan required by appendix C to
this part.
(iii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must
ensure the capability to respond to cyber-security incidents, minimize
loss and destruction, mitigate and correct the weaknesses that were
exploited, and restore systems and/or equipment affected by a cyber-
security incident.
(5) Protective strategies. The licensee shall implement defense-in-
depth protective strategies to protect computer systems from cyber
attacks, detecting, isolating, and neutralizing unauthorized activities
in a timely manner.
(6) Configuration and control management program. The licensee
shall implement a configuration and control management program, to
include cyber risk analysis, to ensure that modifications to computer
system designs, access control measures, configuration, operational
integrity, and management process do not adversely impact facility
safety, security, and emergency preparedness systems before
implementation of those modifications.
(7) Cyber-security awareness and training. (i) The licensee shall
implement a cyber-security awareness and training program.
(ii) The cyber-security awareness and training program must ensure
that appropriate plant personnel, including contractors, are aware of
cyber-security requirements and that they receive the training required
to effectively perform their assigned duties and responsibilities.
(n) Security program reviews and audits.
(1) The licensee shall review the physical protection program at
intervals not to exceed 12 months, or
(i) As necessary based upon assessments or other performance
indicators.
(ii) Within 12 months after a change occurs in personnel,
procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely
affect security.
(2) As a minimum, each element of the onsite physical protection
program must be reviewed at least every twenty-four (24) months.
(i) The onsite physical protection program review must be
documented and performed by individuals independent of those personnel
responsible for program management and any individual who has direct
responsibility for implementing the onsite physical protection program.
(ii) Onsite physical protection program reviews and audits must
include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the approved security plans, implementing procedures, response
commitments by local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities,
cyber-security programs, safety/security interface, and the testing,
maintenance, and calibration program.
(3) The licensee shall periodically review the approved security
plans, the integrated response plan, the licensee protective strategy,
and licensee implementing procedures to evaluate their effectiveness
and potential impact on plant and personnel safety.
(4) The licensee shall periodically evaluate the cyber-security
program for effectiveness and shall update the cyber-security program
as needed to ensure protection against changes to internal and external
threats.
(5) The licensee shall conduct quarterly drills and annual force-
on-force exercises in accordance with appendix C to part 73 and the
licensee performance evaluation program.
(6) The results and recommendations of the onsite physical
protection program reviews and audits, management's findings regarding
[[Page 62859]]
program effectiveness, and any actions taken as a result of
recommendations from prior program reviews, must be documented in a
report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at
least one level higher than that having responsibility for day-to-day
plant operation.
(7) Findings from onsite physical protection program reviews,
audits, and assessments must be entered into the site corrective action
program and protected as safeguards information, if applicable.
(8) The licensee shall make changes to the approved security plans
and implementing procedures as a result of findings from security
program reviews, audits, and assessments, where necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of Commission regulations and the licensee
protective strategy.
(9) Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, onsite physical
protection program reviews, audits, and assessments may be conducted up
to thirty days prior to, but no later than thirty days after the
scheduled date without adverse impact upon the next scheduled annual
audit date.
(o) Maintenance, testing, and calibration. (1) The licensee shall:
(i) Implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to
ensure that security systems and equipment are tested for operability
and performance at predetermined intervals, are maintained in operable
condition, and are capable of performing their intended function when
needed.
(ii) Describe the maintenance, testing and calibration program in
the approved physical security plan. Implementing procedures must
specify operational and technical details required to perform
maintenance, testing, and calibration activities to include, but not
limited to, purpose of activity, actions to be taken, acceptance
criteria, the intervals or frequency at which the activity will be
performed, and compensatory actions required.
(iii) Document problems, failures, deficiencies, and other
findings, to include the cause of each, and enter each into the site
corrective action program. The licensee shall protect this information
as safeguards information, if applicable.
(iv) Implement compensatory measures in a timely manner to ensure
that the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program is not
reduced by failure or degraded operation of security-related components
or equipment.
(2) Each intrusion alarm must be tested for operability at the
beginning and end of any period that it is used for security, or if the
period of continuous use exceeds seven (7) days, the intrusion alarm
must be tested at least once every seven (7) days.
(3) Intrusion detection and access control equipment must be
performance tested in accordance with the approved security plans.
(4) Equipment required for communications onsite must be tested for
operability not less frequently than once at the beginning of each
security personnel work shift.
(5) Communication systems between the alarm stations and each
control room, and between the alarm stations and offsite support
agencies, to include back-up communication equipment, must be tested
for operability at least once each day.
(6) Search equipment must be tested for operability at least once
each day and tested for performance at least once during each seven (7)
day period and before being placed back in service after each repair or
inoperative state.
(7) All intrusion detection equipment, communication equipment,
physical barriers, and other security-related devices or equipment, to
include back-up power supplies must be maintained in operable
condition.
(8) A program for testing or verifying the operability of devices
or equipment located in hazardous areas must be specified in the
approved security plans and must define alternate measures to be taken
to ensure the timely completion of testing or maintenance when the
hazardous condition or radiation restrictions are no longer applicable.
(p) Compensatory measures. (1) The licensee shall identify measures
and criteria needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance
of personnel, equipment, systems, and components, that are required to
meet the requirements of this section.
(2) Compensatory measures must be designed and implemented to
provide a level of protection that is equivalent to the protection that
was provided by the degraded or inoperable personnel, equipment,
system, or components.
(3) Compensatory measures must be implemented within specific time
lines necessary to meet the requirements stated in paragraph (b) of
this section and described in the approved security plans.
(q) Suspension of safeguards measures. (1) The licensee may suspend
implementation of affected requirements of this section under the
following conditions:
(i) In accordance with Sec. Sec. 50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of this
chapter, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to
this section in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to
protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with
license conditions and technical specifications that can provide
adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This
suspension of safeguards measures must be approved as a minimum by a
licensed senior operator prior to taking this action.
(ii) During severe weather when the suspension is immediately
needed to protect personnel whose assigned duties and responsibilities
in meeting the requirements of this section would otherwise constitute
a life threatening situation and no action consistent with the
requirements of this section that can provide equivalent protection is
immediately apparent. Suspension of safeguards due to severe weather
must be initiated by the security supervisor and approved by a licensed
senior operator prior to taking this action.
(2) Suspended security measures must be reimplemented as soon as
conditions permit.
(3) The suspension of safeguards measures must be reported and
documented in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 73.71.
(4) Reports made under Sec. 50.72 of this chapter need not be
duplicated under Sec. 73.71.
(r) Records. (1) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and
remove copies of all records required to be kept by Commission
regulations, orders, or license conditions whether the records are kept
by the licensee or a contractor.
(2) The licensee shall maintain all records required to be kept by
Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions, as a record
until the Commission terminates the license for which the records were
developed and shall maintain superseded portions of these records for
at least three (3) years after the record is superseded, unless
otherwise specified by the Commission.
(s) Safety/security interface. In accordance with the requirements
of Sec. 73.58, the licensee shall develop and implement a process to
inform and coordinate safety and security activities to ensure that
these activities do not adversely affect the capabilities of the
security organization to satisfy the requirements of this section, or
overall plant safety.
(t) Alternative measures. (1) The Commission may authorize an
applicant or licensee to provide a measure for protection against
radiological sabotage other than one required by this section if the
applicant or licensee demonstrates that:
[[Page 62860]]
(i) The measure meets the same performance objective and
requirements as specified in paragraph (b) of this section and
(ii) The proposed alternative measure provides protection against
radiological sabotage or theft of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies,
equivalent to that which would be provided by the specific requirement
for which it would substitute.
(2) The licensee shall submit each proposed alternative measure to
the Commission for review and approval in accordance with Sec. Sec.
50.4 and 50.90 of this chapter before implementation.
(3) The licensee shall submit a technical basis for each proposed
alternative measure, to include any analysis or assessment conducted in
support of a determination that the proposed alternative measure
provides a level of protection that is at least equal to that which
would otherwise be provided by the specific requirement of this
section.
(4) Alternative vehicle barrier systems. In the case of alterative
vehicle barrier systems required by Sec. 73.55(e)(8), the licensee
shall demonstrate that:
(i) The alternative measure provides substantial protection against
a vehicle bomb, and
(ii) Based on comparison of the costs of the alternative measures
to the costs of meeting the Commission's requirements using the
essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, the costs of fully meeting the
Commission's requirements are not justified by the protection that
would be provided.
13. Section 73.56 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.56 Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear
power plants.
(a) Introduction. (1) By [date--180 days--after the effective date
of the final rule published in the Federal Register], each nuclear
power reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR part 50, shall
incorporate the revised requirements of this section through amendments
to its Commission-approved access authorization program and shall
submit the amended program to the Commission for review and approval.
(2) The amended program must be submitted as specified in Sec.
50.4 and must describe how the revised requirements of this section
will be implemented by the licensee, to include a proposed
implementation schedule.
(3) The licensee shall implement the existing approved access
authorization program and associated Commission orders until Commission
approval of the amended program, unless otherwise authorized by the
Commission.
(4) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining
the authorization program in accordance with Commission regulations and
related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of the
approved program and site implementing procedures.
(5) Applicants for an operating license under the provisions of
part 50 of this chapter, or holders of a combined license under the
provisions of part 52 of this chapter, shall satisfy the requirements
of this section upon receipt of an operating license or upon notice of
the Commission's finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter.
(6) Contractors and vendors (C/Vs) who implement authorization
programs or program elements shall develop, implement, and maintain
authorization programs or program elements that meet the requirements
of this section, to the extent that the licensees and applicants
specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) of this section rely upon
those C/V authorization programs or program elements to meet the
requirements of this section. In any case, only a licensee or applicant
shall grant or permit an individual to maintain unescorted access to
nuclear power plant protected and vital areas.
(b) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program. (1)
The following individuals shall be subject to an authorization program:
(i) Any individual to whom a licensee or applicant grants
unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected and vital areas.
(ii) Any individual whose assigned duties and responsibilities
permit the individual to take actions by electronic means, either
onsite or remotely, that could adversely impact a licensees or
applicants operational safety, security, or emergency response
capabilities; and
(iii) Any individual who has responsibilities for implementing a
licensee's or applicant's protective strategy, including, but not
limited to, armed security force officers, alarm station operators, and
tactical response team leaders; and
(iv) The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's reviewing official.
(2) At the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's discretion, other
individuals who are designated in access authorization program
procedures may be subject to an authorization program that meets the
requirements of this section.
(c) General performance objective. Access authorization programs
must provide high assurance that the individuals who are specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this
section are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not constitute
an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the common defense
and security, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage.
(d) Background investigation. In order to grant unescorted access
authorization to an individual, the licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the
individual has been subject to a background investigation. The
background investigation must include, but is not limited to, the
following elements:
(1) Informed consent. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified
in paragraph (a) of this section may not initiate any element of a
background investigation without the knowledge and written consent of
the subject individual. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall inform
the individual of his or her right to review information collected to
assure its accuracy and provide the individual with an opportunity to
correct any inaccurate or incomplete information that is developed by
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs about the individual.
(i) The subject individual may withdraw his or her consent at any
time. The licensee, applicant, or C/V to whom the individual has
applied for unescorted access authorization shall inform the individual
that--
(A) Withdrawal of his or her consent will withdraw the individual's
current application for access authorization under the licensee's,
applicant's, or C/V's authorization program; and
(B) Other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs will have access to
information documenting the withdrawal through the information-sharing
mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this section.
(ii) If an individual withdraws his or her consent, the licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section may not
initiate any elements of the background investigation that were not in
progress at the time the individual withdrew his or her consent, but
shall complete any background investigation elements that are in
progress at the time consent is withdrawn. In the information-sharing
mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this section, the
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall record the individual's application
for unescorted access authorization; his or her withdrawal of consent
for the background investigation; the reason given by the individual
for the withdrawal, if any; and any pertinent information collected
from the
[[Page 62861]]
background investigation elements that were completed.
(iii) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph
(a) of this section shall inform, in writing, any individual who is
applying for unescorted access authorization that the following actions
related to providing and sharing the personal information under this
section are sufficient cause for denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization:
(A) Refusal to provide written consent for the background
investigation;
(B) Refusal to provide or the falsification of any personal history
information required under this section, including the failure to
report any previous denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted
access authorization;
(C) Refusal to provide written consent for the sharing of personal
information with other licensees, applicants, or C/Vs required under
paragraph (d)(4)(v) of this section; and
(D) Failure to report any arrests or formal actions specified in
paragraph (g) of this section.
(2) Personal history disclosure. (i) Any individual who is applying
for unescorted access authorization shall disclose the personal history
information that is required by the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
authorization program and any information that may be necessary for the
reviewing official to make a determination of the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may not require an individual
to disclose an administrative withdrawal of unescorted access
authorization under the requirements of paragraphs (g), (h)(7), or
(i)(1)(v) of this section, if the individual's unescorted access
authorization was not subsequently denied or terminated unfavorably by
a licensee, applicant, or C/V.
(3) Verification of true identity. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
shall verify the true identity of an individual who is applying for
unescorted access authorization in order to ensure that the applicant
is the person that he or she has claimed to be. At a minimum,
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall validate the social security
number that the individual has provided, and, in the case of foreign
nationals, the alien registration number that the individual provides.
In addition, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall also determine
whether the results of the fingerprinting required under Sec. 73.21
confirm the individual's claimed identity, if such results are
available.
(4) Employment history evaluation. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
shall ensure that an employment history evaluation has been completed,
by questioning the individual's present and former employers, and by
determining the activities of individuals while unemployed.
(i) For the claimed employment period, the employment history
evaluation must ascertain the reason for termination, eligibility for
rehire, and other information that could reflect on the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) If the claimed employment was military service, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V who is conducting the employment history evaluation
shall request a characterization of service, reason for separation, and
any disciplinary actions that could affect a trustworthiness and
reliability determination.
(iii) Periods of self-employment or unemployment may be verified by
any reasonable method. If education is claimed in lieu of employment,
the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall request information that could
reflect on the individual's trustworthiness and reliability and, at a
minimum, verify that the individual was actively participating in the
educational process during the claimed period.
(iv) If a company, previous employer, or educational institution to
whom the licensee, applicant, or C/V has directed a request for
information refuses to provide information or indicates an inability or
unwillingness to provide information within 3 business days of the
request, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall document this refusal,
inability, or unwillingness in the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
record of the investigation, and obtain a confirmation of employment or
educational enrollment and attendance from at least one alternate
source, with questions answered to the best of the alternate source's
ability. This alternate source may not have been previously used by the
licensee, applicant, or C/V to obtain information about the
individual's character and reputation. If the licensee, applicant, or
C/V uses an alternate source because employment information is not
forthcoming within 3 business days of the request, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V need not delay granting unescorted access
authorization to wait for any employer response, but shall evaluate and
document the response if it is received.
(v) When any licensee, applicant, or C/V specified in paragraph (a)
of this section is legitimately seeking the information required for an
unescorted access authorization decision under this section and has
obtained a signed release from the subject individual authorizing the
disclosure of such information, a licensee, applicant, or C/V who is
subject to this section shall disclose whether the subject individual's
unescorted access authorization was denied or terminated unfavorably.
The licensee, applicant, or C/V who receives the request for
information shall make available the information upon which the denial
or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization was
based.
(vi) In conducting an employment history evaluation, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V may obtain information and documents by electronic
means, including, but not limited to, telephone, facsimile, or e-mail.
The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall make a record of the contents of
the telephone call and shall retain that record, and any documents or
files obtained electronically, in accordance with paragraph (o) of this
section.
(5) Credit history evaluation. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the full
credit history of any individual who is applying for unescorted access
authorization has been evaluated. A full credit history evaluation must
include, but would not be limited to, an inquiry to detect potential
fraud or misuse of social security numbers or other financial
identifiers, and a review and evaluation of all of the information that
is provided by a national credit-reporting agency about the
individual's credit history.
(6) Character and reputation. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ascertain the
character and reputation of an individual who has applied for
unescorted access authorization by conducting reference checks.
Reference checks may not be conducted with any person who is known to
be a close member of the individual's family, including but not limited
to, the individual's spouse, parents, siblings, or children, or any
individual who resides in the individual's permanent household. The
reference checks must focus on the individual's reputation for
trustworthiness and reliability.
(7) Criminal history review. The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
reviewing official shall evaluate the entire criminal history record of
an individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization to
assist in determining whether the individual has a record of criminal
activity that may adversely impact his or her
[[Page 62862]]
trustworthiness and reliability. The criminal history record must be
obtained in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.57.
(e) Psychological assessment. In order to assist in determining an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability, the licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall
ensure that a psychological assessment has been completed of the
individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization. The
psychological assessment must be designed to evaluate the possible
adverse impact of any noted psychological characteristics on the
individual's trustworthiness and reliability.
(1) A licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist shall conduct
the psychological assessment.
(2) The psychological assessment must be conducted in accordance
with the applicable ethical principles for conducting such assessments
established by the American Psychological Association or American
Psychiatric Association.
(3) At a minimum, the psychological assessment must include the
administration and interpretation of a standardized, objective,
professionally accepted psychological test that provides information to
identify indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology
that may have implications for an individual's trustworthiness and
reliability. Predetermined thresholds must be applied in interpreting
the results of the psychological test, to determine whether an
individual shall be interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed clinical
psychologist under paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section.
(4) The psychological assessment must include a clinical
interview--
(i) If an individual's scores on the psychological test in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section identify indications of disturbances
in personality or psychopathology that may have implications for an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability; or
(ii) If the licensee's or applicant's Physical Security Plan
requires a clinical interview based on job assignments.
(5) If, in the course of conducting the psychological assessment,
the licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist identifies
indications of, or information related to, a medical condition that
could adversely impact the individual's fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and reliability, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall
inform the reviewing official, who shall ensure that an appropriate
evaluation of the possible medical condition is conducted under the
requirements of part 26 of this chapter.
(f) Behavioral observation. Access authorization programs must
include a behavioral observation element that is designed to detect
behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the
health and safety of the public and common defense and security,
including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.
(1) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a)
of this section shall ensure that the individuals specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this
section are subject to behavioral observation.
(2) The individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if
applicable, (b)(2) of this section shall observe the behavior of other
individuals. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph
(a) of this section shall ensure that individuals who are subject to
this section also successfully complete behavioral observation
training.
(i) Behavioral observation training must be completed before the
licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an initial unescorted access
authorization, as defined in paragraph (h)(5) of this section, and must
be current before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an unescorted
access authorization update, as defined in paragraph (h)(6) of this
section, or an unescorted access authorization reinstatement, as
defined in paragraph (h)(7) of this section;
(ii) Individuals shall complete refresher training on a nominal 12-
month frequency, or more frequently where the need is indicated.
Individuals may take and pass a comprehensive examination that meets
the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this section in lieu of
completing annual refresher training;
(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the successful completion of
behavioral observation training by passing a comprehensive examination
that addresses the knowledge and abilities necessary to detect behavior
or activities that have the potential to constitute an unreasonable
risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and
security, including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.
Remedial training and re-testing are required for individuals who fail
to satisfactorily complete the examination.
(iv) Initial and refresher training may be delivered using a
variety of media (including, but not limited to, classroom lectures,
required reading, video, or computer-based training systems). The
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall monitor the completion of training.
(3) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program under
this section shall report to the reviewing official any concerns
arising from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to,
concerns related to any questionable behavior patterns or activities of
others.
(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual who has applied for or is
maintaining unescorted access authorization under this section shall
promptly report to the reviewing official any formal action(s) taken by
a law enforcement authority or court of law to which the individual has
been subject, including an arrest, an indictment, the filing of
charges, or a conviction. On the day that the report is received, the
reviewing official shall evaluate the circumstances related to the
formal action(s) and determine whether to grant, maintain,
administratively withdraw, deny, or unfavorably terminate the
individual's unescorted access authorization.
(h) Granting unescorted access authorization. The licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall
implement the requirements of this paragraph for granting initial
unescorted access authorization, updated unescorted access
authorization, and reinstatement of unescorted access authorization.
(1) Accepting unescorted access authorization from other
authorization programs. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are seeking
to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual who is
subject to another authorization program that complies with this
section may rely on the program elements completed by the transferring
authorization program to satisfy the requirements of this section. An
individual may maintain his or her unescorted access authorization if
he or she continues to be subject to either the receiving licensee's,
applicant's, or C/V's authorization program or the transferring
licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's authorization program, or a
combination of elements from both programs that collectively satisfy
the requirements of this section. The receiving authorization program
shall ensure that the program elements maintained by the transferring
program remain current.
(2) Information sharing. To meet the requirements of this section,
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may rely upon the information that
other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to
[[Continued on page 62863]]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
]
[[pp. 62863-62874]] Power Reactor Security Requirements
[[Continued from page 62862]]
[[Page 62863]]
this section have gathered about individuals who have previously
applied for unescorted access authorization and developed about
individuals during periods in which the individuals maintained
unescorted access authorization.
(3) Requirements applicable to all unescorted access authorization
categories. Before granting unescorted access authorization to
individuals in any category, including individuals whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for a period of 30 or fewer
days, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that--
(i) The individual's written consent to conduct a background
investigation, if necessary, has been obtained and the individual's
true identity has been verified, in accordance with paragraphs (d)(2)
and (d)(3) of this section, respectively;
(ii) A credit history evaluation or re-evaluation has been
completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (d)(5) or
(i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable;
(iii) The individual's character and reputation have been
ascertained, in accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section;
(iv) The individual's criminal history record has been obtained and
reviewed or updated, in accordance with paragraphs (d)(7) and (i)(1)(v)
of this section, as applicable;
(v) A psychological assessment or reassessment of the individual
has been completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs
(e) or (i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable;
(vi) The individual has successfully completed the initial or
refresher, as applicable, behavioral observation training that is
required under paragraph (f) of this section; and
(vii) The individual has been informed, in writing, of his or her
arrest-reporting responsibilities under paragraph (g) of this section.
(4) Interruptions in unescorted access authorization. For
individuals who have previously held unescorted access authorization
under this section but whose unescorted access authorization has since
been terminated under favorable conditions, the licensee, applicant, or
C/V shall implement the requirements in this paragraph for initial
unescorted access authorization in paragraph (h)(5) of this section,
updated unescorted access authorization in paragraph (h)(6) of this
section, or reinstatement of unescorted access authorization in
paragraph (h)(7) of this section, based upon the total number of days
that the individual's unescorted access authorization has been
interrupted, to include the day after the individual's last period of
unescorted access authorization was terminated and the intervening days
until the day upon which the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants
unescorted access authorization to the individual. If potentially
disqualifying information is disclosed or discovered about an
individual, licensees, applicants, and C/V's shall take additional
actions, as specified in the licensee's or applicant's physical
security plan, in order to grant or maintain the individual's
unescorted access authorization.
(5) Initial unescorted access authorization. Before granting
unescorted access authorization to an individual who has never held
unescorted access authorization under this section or whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for a period of 3 years or
more and whose last period of unescorted access authorization was
terminated under favorable conditions, the licensee, applicant, or C/V
shall ensure that an employment history evaluation has been completed
in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this section. The period of the
employment history that the individual shall disclose, and the
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall evaluate, must be the past 3 years or
since the individual's eighteenth birthday, whichever is shorter. For
the 1-year period immediately preceding the date upon which the
individual applies for unescorted access authorization, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V shall ensure that the employment history evaluation
is conducted with every employer, regardless of the length of
employment. For the remaining 2-year period, the licensee, applicant,
or C/V shall ensure that the employment history evaluation is conducted
with the employer by whom the individual claims to have been employed
the longest within each calendar month, if the individual claims
employment during the given calendar month.
(6) Updated unescorted access authorization. Before granting
unescorted access authorization to an individual whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for more than 365 days but
fewer than 3 years and whose last period of unescorted access
authorization was terminated under favorable conditions, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V shall ensure that an employment history evaluation
has been completed in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this section.
The period of the employment history that the individual shall
disclose, and the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall evaluate, must be
the period since unescorted access authorization was last terminated,
up to and including the day the applicant applies for updated
unescorted access authorization. For the 1-year period immediately
preceding the date upon which the individual applies for updated
unescorted access authorization, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall
ensure that the employment history evaluation is conducted with every
employer, regardless of the length of employment. For the remaining
period since unescorted access authorization was last terminated, the
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that the employment history
evaluation is conducted with the employer by whom the individual claims
to have been employed the longest within each calendar month, if the
individual claims employment during the given calendar month.
(7) Reinstatement of unescorted access authorization (31 to 365
days). In order to grant authorization to an individual whose
unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for a period of
more than 30 days but no more than 365 days and whose last period of
unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable
conditions, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that an
employment history evaluation has been completed in accordance with the
requirements of paragraph (d)(4) of this section within 5 business days
of reinstating unescorted access authorization. The period of the
employment history that the individual shall disclose, and the
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall evaluate, must be the period since
the individual's unescorted access authorization was terminated, up to
and including the day the applicant applies for reinstatement of
unescorted access authorization. The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall
ensure that the employment history evaluation has been conducted with
the employer by whom the individual claims to have been employed the
longest within the calendar month, if the individual claims employment
during a given calendar month. If the employment history evaluation is
not completed within 5 business days due to circumstances that are
outside of the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's control and the
licensee, applicant, or C/V is not aware of any potentially
disqualifying information regarding the individual within the past 5
years, the licensee, applicant, or C/V may maintain the individual's
unescorted access authorization for an additional 5 business days. If
the employment history evaluation is not
[[Page 62864]]
completed within 10 business days of reinstating unescorted access
authorization, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall administratively
withdraw the individual's unescorted access authorization until the
employment history evaluation is completed.
(8) Determination basis. The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
reviewing official shall determine whether to grant, deny, unfavorably
terminate, or maintain or amend an individual's unescorted access
authorization status, based on an evaluation of all pertinent
information that has been gathered about the individual as a result of
any application for unescorted access authorization or developed during
or following in any period during which the individual maintained
unescorted access authorization. The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
reviewing official may not determine whether to grant unescorted access
authorization to an individual or maintain an individual's unescorted
access authorization until all of the required information has been
provided to the reviewing official and he or she determines that the
accumulated information supports a positive finding of trustworthiness
and reliability.
(9) Unescorted access for NRC-certified personnel. The licensees
and applicants specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall grant
unescorted access to all individuals who have been certified by the NRC
as suitable for such access including, but not limited to, contractors
to the NRC and NRC employees.
(10) Access prohibited. Licensees and applicants may not permit an
individual, who is identified as having an access-denied status in the
information-sharing mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this
section, or has an access authorization status other than favorably
terminated, to enter any nuclear power plant protected area or vital
area, under escort or otherwise, or take actions by electronic means
that could impact the licensee's operational safety, security, or
emergency response capabilities, under supervision or otherwise, except
if, upon evaluation, the reviewing official determines that such access
is warranted. Licensees and applicants shall develop reinstatement
review procedures for assessing individuals who have been in an access-
denied status.
(i) Maintaining access authorization. (1) Individuals may maintain
unescorted access authorization under the following conditions:
(i) The individual remains subject to a behavioral observation
program that complies with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this
section;
(ii) The individual successfully completes behavioral observation
refresher training or testing on the nominal 12-month frequency
required in (f)(2)(ii) of this section;
(iii) The individual complies with the licensee's, applicant's, or
C/V's authorization program policies and procedures to which he or she
is subject, including the arrest-reporting responsibility specified in
paragraph (g) of this section;
(iv) The individual is subject to a supervisory interview at a
nominal 12-month frequency, conducted in accordance with the
requirements of the licensee's or applicant's Physical Security Plan;
and
(v) The licensee, applicant, or C/V determines that the individual
continues to be trustworthy and reliable. This determination must be
made as follows:
(A) The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall complete a criminal
history update, credit history re-evaluation, and psychological re-
assessment of the individual within 5 years of the date on which these
elements were last completed, or more frequently, based on job
assignment;
(B) The reviewing official shall complete an evaluation of the
information obtained from the criminal history update, credit history
re-evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory
interview required under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section within 30
calendar days of initiating any one of these elements;
(C) The results of the criminal history update, credit history re-
evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory interview
required under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section must support a
positive determination of the individual's continued trustworthiness
and reliability; and
(D) If the criminal history update, credit history re-evaluation,
psychological re-assessment, and supervisory review have not been
completed and the information evaluated by the reviewing official
within 5 years of the initial completion of these elements or the most
recent update, re-evaluation, and re-assessment under this paragraph,
or within the time period specified in the licensee's or applicant's
Physical Security Plans, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall
administratively withdraw the individual's unescorted access
authorization until these requirements have been met.
(2) If an individual who has unescorted access authorization is not
subject to an authorization program that meets the requirements of this
part for more than 30 continuous days, then the licensee, applicant, or
C/V shall terminate the individual's unescorted access authorization
and the individual shall meet the requirements in this section, as
applicable, to regain unescorted access authorization.
(j) Access to vital areas. Each licensee and applicant who is
subject to this section shall establish, implement, and maintain a list
of individuals who are authorized to have unescorted access to specific
nuclear power plant vital areas to assist in limiting access to those
vital areas during non-emergency conditions. The list must include only
those individuals who require access to those specific vital areas in
order to perform their duties and responsibilities. The list must be
approved by a cognizant licensee or applicant manager, or supervisor
who is responsible for directing the work activities of the individual
who is granted unescorted access to each vital area, and updated and
re-approved no less frequently than every 31 days.
(k) Trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and
authorization program personnel. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall
ensure that any individuals who collect, process, or have access to
personal information that is used to make unescorted access
authorization determinations under this section have been determined to
be trustworthy and reliable.
(1) Background screeners. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who rely
on individuals who are not directly under their control to collect and
process information that will be used by a reviewing official to make
unescorted access authorization determinations shall ensure that a
background check of such individuals has been completed and determines
that such individuals are trustworthy and reliable. At a minimum, the
following checks are required:
(i) Verification of the individual's identity;
(ii) A local criminal history review and evaluation from the State
of the individual's permanent residence;
(iii) A credit history review and evaluation;
(iv) An employment history review and evaluation for the past 3
years; and
(v) An evaluation of character and reputation.
(2) Authorization program personnel. Licensees, applicants, and C/
Vs shall ensure that any individual who evaluates personal information
for the
[[Page 62865]]
purpose of processing applications for unescorted access authorization
including, but not limited to a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist
who conducts psychological assessments under paragraph (e) of this
section; has access to the files, records, and personal information
associated with individuals who have applied for unescorted access
authorization; or is responsible for managing any databases that
contain such files, records, and personal information has been
determined to be trustworthy and reliable, as follows:
(i) The individual is subject to an authorization program that
meets requirements of this section; or
(ii) The licensee, applicant, or C/V determines that the individual
is trustworthy and reliable based upon an evaluation that meets the
requirements of paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) and (e) of this
section and a local criminal history review and evaluation from the
State of the individual's permanent residence.
(l) Review procedures. Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is
implementing an authorization program under this section shall include
a procedure for the review, at the request of the affected individual,
of a denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access
authorization. The procedure must require that the individual is
informed of the grounds for the denial or unfavorable termination and
allow the individual an opportunity to provide additional relevant
information, and provide an opportunity for an objective review of the
information on which the denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization was based. The procedure may be an
impartial and independent internal management review. Licensees and
applicants may not grant or permit the individual to maintain
unescorted access authorization during the review process.
(m) Protection of information. Each licensee, applicant, or C/V who
is subject to this section who collects personal information about an
individual for the purpose of complying with this section, shall
establish and maintain a system of files and procedures to protect the
personal information.
(1) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall obtain a signed consent
from the subject individual that authorizes the disclosure of the
personal information collected and maintained under this section before
disclosing the personal information, except for disclosures to the
following individuals:
(i) The subject individual or his or her representative, when the
individual has designated the representative in writing for specified
unescorted access authorization matters;
(ii) NRC representatives;
(iii) Appropriate law enforcement officials under court order;
(iv) A licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's representatives who have a
need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties,
including determinations of trustworthiness and reliability, and audits
of authorization programs;
(v) The presiding officer in a judicial or administrative
proceeding that is initiated by the subject individual;
(vi) Persons deciding matters under the review procedures in
paragraph (k) of this section; and
(vii) Other persons pursuant to court order.
(2) Personal information that is collected under this section must
be disclosed to other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, or their
authorized representatives, who are seeking the information for
unescorted access authorization determinations under this section and
who have obtained a signed release from the subject individual.
(3) Upon receipt of a written request by the subject individual or
his or her designated representative, the licensee, applicant, or C/V
possessing such records shall promptly provide copies of all records
pertaining to a denial or unfavorable termination of the individual's
unescorted access authorization.
(4) A licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's contracts with any
individual or organization who collects and maintains personal
information that is relevant to an unescorted access authorization
determination must require that such records be held in confidence,
except as provided in paragraphs (m)(1) through (m)(3) of this section.
(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who collect and maintain
personal information under this section, and any individual or
organization who collects and maintains personal information on behalf
of a licensee, applicant, or C/V, shall establish, implement, and
maintain a system and procedures for the secure storage and handling of
the personal information collected.
(6) This paragraph does not authorize the licensee, applicant, or
C/V to withhold evidence of criminal conduct from law enforcement
officials.
(n) Audits and corrective action. Each licensee and applicant who
is subject to this section shall be responsible for the continuing
effectiveness of the authorization program, including authorization
program elements that are provided by C/Vs, and the authorization
programs of any C/Vs that are accepted by the licensee and applicant.
Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is subject to this section shall
ensure that authorization programs and program elements are audited to
confirm compliance with the requirements of this section and that
comprehensive actions are taken to correct any non-conformance that is
identified.
(1) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is subject to this
section shall ensure that their entire authorization program is audited
as needed, but no less frequently than nominally every 24 months.
Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs are responsible for determining the
appropriate frequency, scope, and depth of additional auditing
activities within the nominal 24-month period based on the review of
program performance indicators, such as the frequency, nature, and
severity of discovered problems, personnel or procedural changes, and
previous audit findings.
(2) Authorization program services that are provided to a licensee,
or applicant, by C/V personnel who are off site or are not under the
direct daily supervision or observation of the licensee's or
applicant's personnel must be audited on a nominal 12-month frequency.
In addition, any authorization program services that are provided to C/
Vs by subcontractor personnel who are off site or are not under the
direct daily supervision or observation of the C/V's personnel must be
audited on a nominal 12-month frequency.
(3) Licensees' and applicants' contracts with C/Vs must reserve the
right to audit the C/V and the C/V's subcontractors providing
authorization program services at any time, including at unannounced
times, as well as to review all information and documentation that is
reasonably relevant to the performance of the program.
(4) Licensees' and applicants' contracts with C/Vs, and a C/V's
contracts with subcontractors, must also require that the licensee or
applicant shall be provided with, or permitted access to, copies of any
documents and take away any documents that may be needed to assure that
the C/V and its subcontractors are performing their functions properly
and that staff and procedures meet applicable requirements.
(5) Audits must focus on the effectiveness of the authorization
program or program element(s), as appropriate. At least one member of
the audit team shall be a person who is knowledgeable of and practiced
with meeting authorization program
[[Page 62866]]
performance objectives and requirements. The individuals performing the
audit of the authorization program or program element(s) shall be
independent from both the subject authorization program's management
and from personnel who are directly responsible for implementing the
authorization program(s) being audited.
(6) The result of the audits, along with any recommendations, must
be documented and reported to senior corporate and site management.
Each audit report must identify conditions that are adverse to the
proper performance of the authorization program, the cause of the
condition(s), and, when appropriate, recommended corrective actions,
and corrective actions taken. The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall
review the audit findings and take any additional corrective actions,
to include re-auditing of the deficient areas where indicated, to
preclude, within reason, repetition of the condition. The resolution of
the audit findings and corrective actions must be documented.
(7) Licensees and applicants may jointly conduct audits, or may
accept audits of C/Vs that were conducted by other licensees and
applicants who are subject to this section, if the audit addresses the
services obtained from the C/V by each of the sharing licensees and
applicants. C/Vs may jointly conduct audits, or may accept audits of
its subcontractors that were conducted by other licensees, applicants,
and C/Vs who are subject to this section, if the audit addresses the
services obtained from the subcontractor by each of the sharing
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs.
(i) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall review audit records and
reports to identify any areas that were not covered by the shared or
accepted audit and ensure that authorization program elements and
services upon which the licensee, applicant, or C/V relies are audited,
if the program elements and services were not addressed in the shared
audit.
(ii) Sharing licensees and applicants need not re-audit the same C/
V for the same period of time. Sharing C/Vs need not re-audit the same
subcontractor for the same period of time.
(iii) Each sharing licensee, applicant, and C/V shall maintain a
copy of the shared audit, including findings, recommendations, and
corrective actions.
(o) Records. Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is subject to
this section shall maintain the records that are required by the
regulations in this section for the period specified by the appropriate
regulation. If a retention period is not otherwise specified, these
records must be retained until the Commission terminates the facility's
license, certificate, or other regulatory approval.
(1) All records may be stored and archived electronically, provided
that the method used to create the electronic records meets the
following criteria:
(i) Provides an accurate representation of the original records;
(ii) Prevents unauthorized access to the records;
(iii) Prevents the alteration of any archived information and/or
data once it has been committed to storage; and
(iv) Permits easy retrieval and re-creation of the original
records.
(2) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is subject to this
section shall retain the following records for at least 5 years after
the licensee, applicant, or C/V terminates or denies an individual's
unescorted access authorization or until the completion of all related
legal proceedings, whichever is later:
(i) Records of the information that must be collected under
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section that results in the granting of
unescorted access authorization;
(ii) Records pertaining to denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization and related management actions; and
(iii) Documentation of the granting and termination of unescorted
access authorization.
(3) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is subject to this
section shall retain the following records for at least 3 years or
until the completion of all related legal proceedings, whichever is
later:
(i) Records of behavioral observation training conducted under
paragraph (f)(2) of this section; and
(ii) Records of audits, audit findings, and corrective actions
taken under paragraph (n) of this section.
(4) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall retain written agreements
for the provision of services under this section for the life of the
agreement or until completion of all legal proceedings related to a
denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization
that involved those services, whichever is later.
(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall retain records of the
background checks, and psychological assessments of authorization
program personnel, conducted under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this
section, for the length of the individual's employment by or
contractual relationship with the licensee, applicant, or C/V, or until
the completion of any legal proceedings relating to the actions of such
authorization program personnel, whichever is later.
(6) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that the
information about individuals who have applied for unescorted access
authorization, which is specified in the licensee's or applicant's
Physical Security Plan, is recorded and retained in an information-
sharing mechanism that is established and administered by the
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to his section.
Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that only correct and
complete information is included in the information-sharing mechanism.
If, for any reason, the shared information used for determining an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability changes or new information
is developed about the individual, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
shall correct or augment the shared information contained in the
information-sharing mechanism. If the changed or developed information
has implications for adversely affecting an individual's
trustworthiness and reliability, the licensee, applicant, or C/V who
has discovered the incorrect information, or develops new information,
shall inform the reviewing official of any authorization program under
which the individual is maintaining unescorted access authorization of
the updated information on the day of discovery. The reviewing official
shall evaluate the information and take appropriate actions, which may
include denial or unfavorable termination of the individual's
unescorted access authorization. If, for any reason, the information-
sharing mechanism is unavailable and a notification of changes or
updated information is required, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall
take manual actions to ensure that the information is shared, and
update the records in the information-sharing mechanism as soon as
reasonably possible. Records maintained in the database must be
available for NRC review.
(7) If a licensee, applicant, or C/V administratively withdraws an
individual's unescorted access authorization under the requirements of
this section, the licensee, applicant, or C/V may not record the
administrative action to withdraw the individual's unescorted access
authorization as an unfavorable termination and may not disclose it in
response to a suitable inquiry conducted under the provisions of part
26 of this chapter, a background investigation conducted under the
[[Page 62867]]
provisions of this section, or any other inquiry or investigation.
Immediately upon favorable completion of the background investigation
element that caused the administrative withdrawal, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V shall ensure that any matter that could link the
individual to the temporary administrative action is eliminated from
the subject individual's access authorization or personnel record and
other records, except if a review of the information obtained or
developed causes the reviewing official to unfavorably terminate the
individual's unescorted access.
14. Section 73.58 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.58 Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power
reactors.
Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license issued
under part 50 or 52 of this chapter shall comply with the requirements
of this section.
(a)(1) The licensee shall assess and manage the potential for
adverse affects on safety and security, including the site emergency
plan, before implementing changes to plant configurations, facility
conditions, or security.
(2) The scope of changes to be assessed and managed must include
planned and emergent activities (such as, but not limited to, physical
modifications, procedural changes, changes to operator actions or
security assignments, maintenance activities, system reconfiguration,
access modification or restrictions, and changes to the security plan
and its implementation).
(b) Where potential adverse interactions are identified, the
licensee shall communicate them to appropriate licensee personnel and
take compensatory and/or mitigative actions to maintain safety and
security under applicable Commission regulations, requirements, and
license conditions.
15. In Sec. 73.70, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.70 Records.
* * * * *
(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not
employed by the licensee under Sec. Sec. 73.46(d)(13),
73.55(g)(7)(ii), or 73.60. The licensee shall retain this register as a
record, available for inspection, for three (3) years after the last
entry is made in the register.
* * * * *
16. Section 73.71 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.
(a) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.55 shall
notify the NRC Operations Center,\3\ as soon as possible but not later
than 15 minutes after discovery of an imminent or actual safeguards
threat against the facility and other safeguards events described in
paragraph I of appendix G to this part.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone numbers of the
NRC Operations Center are specified in appendix A of this part.
\4\ Notifications to the NRC for the declaration of an emergency
class shall be performed in accordance with Sec. 50.72 of this
chapter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) When making a report under paragraph (a) of this section, the
licensee shall:
(i) Identify the facility name; and
(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the threat or event, including:
(A) Type of threat or event (e.g., armed assault, vehicle bomb,
credible bomb threat, etc.); and
(B) Threat or event status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or
neutralized).
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (e) of this
section, as applicable.
(b) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.25,
73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC
Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any
shipment of special nuclear material (SNM) or spent nuclear fuel, and
within one hour after recovery of or accounting for the lost shipment.
Notifications must be made according to paragraph (e) of this section,
as applicable.
(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC
Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the safeguards
events described in paragraph II of appendix G to this part.
Notifications must be made according to paragraph (e) of this section,
as applicable.
(d) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.55 shall
notify the NRC Operations Center, as soon as possible but not later
than four (4) hours after discovery of the safeguards events described
in paragraph III of appendix G to this part. Notifications must be made
according to paragraph (e) of this section, as applicable.
(e) The licensee shall make the telephonic notifications required
by paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section to the NRC
Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, or other
dedicated telephonic system that may be designated by the Commission,
if the licensee has access to that system.
(1) If the Emergency Notification System or other designated
telephonic system is inoperative or unavailable, licensees shall make
the required notification via commercial telephonic service or any
other methods that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC
Operations Center within the timeliness requirements of paragraphs (a),
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, as applicable.
(2) The exception of Sec. 73.21(g)(3) for emergency or
extraordinary conditions applies to all telephonic reports required by
this section.
(3) For events reported under paragraph (a) of this section, the
licensee may be requested by the NRC to maintain an open, continuous
communication channel with the NRC Operations Center, once the licensee
has completed other required notifications under this section, Sec.
50.72 of this chapter, or appendix E of part 50 of this chapter and any
immediate actions to stabilize the plant. When established, the
continuous communications channel shall be staffed by a knowledgeable
individual in the licensee's security or operations organizations
(e.g., a security supervisor, an alarm station operator, operations
personnel, etc.) from a location deemed appropriate by the licensee.
The continuous communications channel may be established via the
Emergency Notification System or dedicated telephonic system that may
be designated by the Commission, if the licensee has access to these
systems, or a commercial telephonic system.
(4) For events reported under paragraphs (b) or (c) of this
section, the licensee shall maintain an open, continuous communication
channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request from the NRC.
(5) For events reported under paragraph (d) of this section, the
licensee is not required to maintain an open, continuous communication
channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(f) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67(d) shall maintain a current
safeguards event log.
(1) The licensee shall record the safeguards events described in
paragraph IV of appendix G of this part within 24 hours of discovery.
(2) The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this
section as a record for three (3) years after the last entry is made in
each log or until termination of the license.
(g) Written reports. (1) Each licensee making an initial telephonic
notification
[[Page 62868]]
under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall also submit a
written report to the NRC within a 60 day period by an appropriate
method listed in Sec. 73.4.
(2) Licenses are not required to submit a written report following
a telephonic notification made under paragraph (d) of this section.
(3) Each licensee shall submit to the Commission written reports
that are of a quality that will permit legible reproduction and
processing.
(4) Licensees subject to Sec. 50.73 of this chapter shall prepare
the written report on NRC Form 366.
(5) Licensees not subject to Sec. 50.73 of this chapter shall
prepare the written report in letter format.
(6) In addition to the addressees specified in Sec. 73.4, the
licensee shall also provide one copy of the written report addressed to
the Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
(7) The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis
and evaluation.
(8) Significant supplemental information which becomes available
after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center
or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically
reported to the NRC Operations Center under paragraph (e) of this
section and also submitted in a revised written report (with the
revisions indicated) as required under paragraph (g)(6) of this
section.
(9) Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a
revised report with revisions indicated.
(10) The revised report must replace the previous report; the
update must be complete and not be limited to only supplementary or
revised information.
(11) Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of
an event submitted under this section as a record for a period of three
(3) years from the date of the report.
(h) Duplicate reports are not required for events that are also
reportable in accordance with Sec. Sec. 50.72 and 50.73 of this
chapter.
17. In appendix B to part 73, a new section VI is added to the
table of contents, the introduction text is revised by adding a new
paragraph between the first and second undesignated paragraphs, and
section VI is added to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
Table of Contents
* * * * *
VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan
A. General Requirements and Introduction
B. Employment Suitability and Qualification
C. Duty Training
D. Duty Qualification and Requalification
E. Weapons Training
F. Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program
G. Weapons, Personnel Equipment, and Maintenance
H. Records
I. Audits and Reviews
J. Definitions
Introduction
* * * * *
Applicants and power reactor licensees subject to the
requirements of Sec. 73.55 shall comply only with the requirements
in section VI of this appendix. All other licensees, applicants, or
certificate holders shall comply only with Sections I through V of
this appendix .
* * * * *
VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan
A. General Requirements and Introduction
1. The licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are
assigned duties and responsibilities required to prevent significant
core damage and spent fuel sabotage, implement the Commission-
approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and
implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification
requirements to ensure each individual possesses the knowledge,
skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned
duties and responsibilities.
2. To ensure that those individuals who are assigned to perform
duties and responsibilities required for the implementation of the
Commission-approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and
implementing procedures are properly suited, trained, equipped, and
qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities, the
Commission has developed minimum training and qualification
requirements that must be implemented through a Commission-approved
training and qualification plan.
3. The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a
Commission-approved training and qualification plan, describing how
the minimum training and qualification requirements set forth in
this appendix will be met, to include the processes by which all
members of the security organization, will be selected, trained,
equipped, tested, and qualified.
4. Each individual assigned to perform security program duties
and responsibilities required to effectively implement the
Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy,
and the licensee implementing procedures, shall demonstrate the
knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the
assigned duties and responsibilities before the individual is
assigned the duty or responsibility.
5. The licensee shall ensure that the training and qualification
program simulates, as closely as practicable, the specific
conditions under which the individual shall be required to perform
assigned duties and responsibilities.
6. The licensee may not allow any individual to perform any
security function, assume any security duties or responsibilities,
or return to security duty, until that individual satisfies the
training and qualification requirements of this appendix and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan, unless
specifically authorized by the Commission.
7. Annual requirements must be scheduled at a nominal twelve
(12) month periodicity. Annual requirements may be completed up to
three (3) months before or three (3) months after the scheduled
date. However, the next annual training must be scheduled twelve
(12) months from the previously scheduled date rather than the date
the training was actually completed.
B. Employment Suitability and Qualification
1. Suitability.
a. Before employment, or assignment to the security
organization, an individual shall:
(1) Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent
performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical,
language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge required to
perform security duties and responsibilities;
(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed capacity or the age
of 18 for an unarmed capacity; and
(3) An unarmed individual assigned to the security organization
may not have any felony convictions that reflect on the individual's
reliability.
b. The qualification of each individual to perform assigned
duties and responsibilities must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
2. Physical qualifications.
a. General physical qualifications.
(1) Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly
associated with the effective implementation of the Commission-
approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and
implementing procedures, may not have any physical conditions that
would adversely affect their performance.
(2) Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
be subject to a physical examination designed to measure the
individual's physical ability to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities as identified in the Commission-approved security
plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.
(3) This physical examination must be administered by a licensed
health professional with final determination being made by a
licensed physician to verify the individual's physical capability to
perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
(4) The licensee shall ensure that both armed and unarmed
members of the security organization who are assigned security
duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved
security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and implementing
procedures, meet the following minimum physical requirements, as
required to effectively perform their assigned duties.
[[Page 62869]]
b. Vision.
(1) For each individual, distant visual acuity in each eye shall
be correctable to 20/30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better eye
and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses or contact lenses.
(2) Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be at
least 20/40 in the better eye.
(3) Field of vision must be at least 70 degrees horizontal
meridian in each eye.
(4) The ability to distinguish red, green, and yellow colors is
required.
(5) Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying.
(6) Glaucoma is disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable
medical or surgical means, provided that medications used for
controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which
adversely affect the individual's ability to perform assigned
security job duties, and provided the visual acuity and field of
vision requirements stated previously are met.
(7) On-the-job evaluation must be used for individuals who
exhibit a mild color vision defect.
(8) If uncorrected distance vision is not at least 20/40 in the
better eye, the individual shall carry an extra pair of corrective
lenses in the event that the primaries are damaged. Corrective
eyeglasses must be of the safety glass type.
(9) The use of corrective eyeglasses or contact lenses may not
interfere with an individual's ability to effectively perform
assigned duties and responsibilities during normal or emergency
conditions.
c. Hearing.
(1) Individuals may not have hearing loss in the better ear
greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz
with no level greater that 40 decibels at any one frequency.
(2) A hearing aid is acceptable provided suitable testing
procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the hearing
requirement.
(3) The use of a hearing aid may not decrease the effective
performance of the individual's assigned security job duties during
normal or emergency operations.
d. Existing medical conditions.
(1) Individuals may not have an established medical history or
medical diagnosis of existing medical conditions which could
interfere with or prevent the individual from effectively performing
assigned duties and responsibilities.
(2) If a medical condition exists, the individual shall provide
medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with medical
treatment in a manner which does not adversely affect the
individual's fitness-for-duty, mental alertness, physical condition,
or capability to otherwise effectively perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
e. Addiction. Individuals may not have any established medical
history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug
addiction, or, where this type of condition has existed, the
individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed
a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of
confidence that the individual would be capable of effectively
performing assigned duties and responsibilities.
f. Other physical requirements. An individual who has been
incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or
operation, which could interfere with the effective performance of
assigned duties and responsibilities shall, before resumption of
assigned duties and responsibilities, provide medical evidence of
recovery and ability to perform these duties and responsibilities.
3. Psychological qualifications.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
demonstrate the ability to apply good judgment, mental alertness,
the capability to implement instructions and assigned tasks, and
possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to
permit accurate communication by written, spoken, audible, visible,
or other signals required by assigned duties and responsibilities.
b. A licensed clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician
trained in part to identify emotional instability shall determine
whether armed members of the security organization and alarm station
operators in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph
a. of this section, have no emotional instability that would
interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and
responsibilities.
c. A person professionally trained to identify emotional
instability shall determine whether unarmed members of the security
organization in addition to meeting the requirement stated in
paragraph a. of this section, have no emotional instability that
would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties
and responsibilities.
4. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be subject
to a medical examination by a licensed physician, to determine the
individual's fitness to participate in physical fitness tests. The
licensee shall obtain and retain a written certification from the
licensed physician that no medical conditions were disclosed by the
medical examination that would preclude the individual's ability to
participate in the physical fitness tests or meet the physical
fitness attributes or objectives associated with assigned duties.
b. Before assignment, armed members of the security organization
shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and
responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test.
(1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions
such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and
exposure to the elements as they pertain to each individual's
assigned security job duties for both normal and emergency
operations and must simulate site specific conditions under which
the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(2) The licensee shall describe the physical fitness test in the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes
and performance objectives which demonstrate the strength,
endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the
Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy,
and implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions.
(4) The physical fitness qualification of each armed member of
the security organization must be documented by a qualified training
instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
5. Physical requalification.
a. At least annually, armed and unarmed members of the security
organization shall be required to demonstrate the capability to meet
the physical requirements of this appendix and the licensee training
and qualification plan.
b. The physical requalification of each armed and unarmed member
of the security organization must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
C. Duty Training
1. Duty training and qualification requirements. All personnel
who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or
responsibility, shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned
duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses
the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively
carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities.
a. The areas of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be
identified in the licensee's Commission-approved training and
qualification plan.
b. Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities
identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee
protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before
assignment:
(1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(2) meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix
and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or
devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and
responsibilities.
2. On-the-job training.
a. The licensee training and qualification program must include
on-the-job training performance standards and criteria to ensure
that each individual demonstrates the requisite knowledge, skills,
and abilities needed to effectively carry-out assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with the Commission-approved security
plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures,
before the individual is assigned the duty or responsibility.
b. In addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph
C.2.a., before assignment, individuals assigned duties and
responsibilities to implement the Safeguards
[[Page 62870]]
Contingency Plan shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of on-the-job
training to demonstrate their ability to effectively apply the
knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform
assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the approved
security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing
procedures. On-the-job training must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
c. On-the-job training for contingency activities and drills
must include, but is not limited to, hands-on application of
knowledge, skills, and abilities related to:
(1) Response team duties.
(2) Use of force.
(3) Tactical movement.
(4) Cover and concealment.
(5) Defensive-positions.
(6) Fields-of-fire.
(7) Re-deployment.
(8) Communications (primary and alternate).
(9) Use of assigned equipment.
(10) Target sets.
(11) Table top drills.
(12) Command and control duties.
3. Tactical response team drills and exercises.
a. Licensees shall demonstrate response capabilities through a
performance evaluation program as described in appendix C to this
part.
b. The licensee shall conduct drills and exercises in accordance
with Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective
strategy, and implementing procedures.
(1) Drills and exercises must be designed to challenge
participants in a manner which requires each participant to
demonstrate requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities.
(2) Tabletop exercises may be used to supplement drills and
exercises to accomplish desired training goals and objectives.
D. Duty Qualification and Requalification
1. Qualification demonstration.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
demonstrate the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry
out assigned duties and responsibilities as stated in the
Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy,
and implementing procedures.
b. This demonstration must include an annual written exam and
hands-on performance demonstration.
(1) Written Exam. The written exams must include those elements
listed in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan
and shall require a minimum score of 80 percent to demonstrate an
acceptable understanding of assigned duties and responsibilities, to
include the recognition of potential tampering involving both safety
and security equipment and systems.
(2) Hands-on Performance Demonstration. Armed and unarmed
members of the security organization shall demonstrate hands-on
performance for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a
practical hands-on demonstration for required tasks. The hands-on
demonstration must ensure that theory and associated learning
objectives for each required task are considered and each individual
demonstrates the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to
effectively perform the task.
c. Upon request by an authorized representative of the
Commission, any individual assigned to perform any security-related
duty or responsibility shall demonstrate the required knowledge,
skills, and abilities for each assigned duty and responsibility, as
stated in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee
protective strategy, or implementing procedures.
2. Requalification.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
be requalified at least annually in accordance with the requirements
of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan.
b. The results of requalification must be documented by a
qualified training instructor and attested by a security supervisor.
E. Weapons Training
1. General firearms training.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be trained
and qualified in accordance with the requirements of this appendix
and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
b. Firearms instructors.
(1) Each armed member of the security organization shall be
trained and qualified by a certified firearms instructor for the use
and maintenance of each assigned weapon to include but not limited
to, qualification scores, assembly, disassembly, cleaning, storage,
handling, clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading, for each
assigned weapon.
(2) Firearms instructors shall be certified from a nationally or
State recognized entity.
(3) Certification must specify the weapon or weapon type(s) for
which the instructor is qualified to teach.
(4) Firearms instructors shall be recertified in accordance with
the standards recognized by the certifying national or State entity,
but in no case shall re-certification exceed three (3) years.
c. Annual firearms familiarization. The licensee shall conduct
annual firearms familiarization training in accordance with the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
d. The Commission-approved training and qualification plan shall
include, but is not limited to, the following areas:
(1) Mechanical assembly, disassembly, range penetration
capability of weapon, and bull's-eye firing.
(2) Weapons cleaning and storage.
(3) Combat firing, day and night.
(4) Safe weapons handling.
(5) Clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading.
(6) When to draw and point a weapon.
(7) Rapid fire techniques.
(8) Closed quarter firing.
(9) Stress firing.
(10) Zeroing assigned weapon(s) (sight and sight/scope
adjustments).
(11) Target engagement.
(12) Weapon malfunctions.
(13) Cover and concealment.
(14) Weapon transition between strong (primary) and weak
(support) hands.
(15) Weapon familiarization.
e. The licensee shall ensure that each armed member of the
security organization is instructed on the use of deadly force as
authorized by applicable State law.
f. Armed members of the security organization shall participate
in weapons range activities on a nominal four (4) month periodicity.
Performance may be conducted up to five (5) weeks before to five (5)
weeks after the scheduled date. The next scheduled date must be four
(4) months from the originally scheduled date.
F. Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program
1. General weapons qualification requirements.
a. Qualification firing must be accomplished in accordance with
Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan for assigned weapons.
b. The results of weapons qualification and requalification must
be documented and retained as a record.
c. Each individual shall be re-qualified at least annually.
2. Alternate weapons qualification. Upon written request by the
licensee, the Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to
provide firearms qualification programs other than those listed in
this appendix if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the
alternative firearm qualification program satisfies Commission
requirements. Written requests must provide regarding the proposed
firearms qualification programs and describe how the proposed
alternative satisfies Commission requirements.
3. Tactical weapons qualification. The licensee Training and
Qualification Plan must describe the firearms used, the firearms
qualification program, and other tactical training required to
implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee
protective strategy, and implementing procedures. Licensee developed
qualification and re-qualification courses for each firearm must
describe the performance criteria needed, to include the site
specific conditions (such as lighting, elevation, fields-of-fire)
under which assigned personnel shall be required to carry-out their
assigned duties.
4. Firearms qualification courses. The licensee shall conduct
the following qualification courses for weapons used:
a. Annual daylight qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and
80 percent with semi-automatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the
maximum obtainable target score.
b. Annual night fire qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and
80 percent with semi-automatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons of the
maximum obtainable target score.
c. Annual tactical qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated
[[Page 62871]]
total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.
5. Courses of fire.
a. Handgun.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a revolver or
semiautomatic pistol shall qualify in accordance with standards and
scores established by a law enforcement course, or an equivalent
nationally recognized course.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent
of the maximum obtainable target score.
b. Semiautomatic rifle.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a semiautomatic rifle
shall qualify in accordance with the standards and scores
established by a law enforcement course, or an equivalent nationally
recognized course.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent
of the maximum obtainable score.
c. Shotgun.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a shotgun shall qualify in
accordance with standards and scores established by a law
enforcement course, or an equivalent nationally recognized course.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent
of the maximum obtainable target score.
d. Enhanced weapons.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of any weapon or weapons not
described above, shall qualify in accordance with applicable
standards and scores established by a law enforcement course or an
equivalent nationally recognized course for these weapons.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent
of the maximum obtainable score.
6. Requalification.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be re-
qualified for each assigned weapon at least annually in accordance
with Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training
and qualification plan.
b. Firearms requalification must be conducted using the courses
of fire outlined in Paragraph 5 of this section.
G. Weapons, Personal Equipment, and Maintenance
1. Weapons.
a. The licensee shall provide armed personnel with weapons that
are capable of performing the function stated in the Commission-
approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and
implementing procedures.
2. Personal equipment.
a. The licensee shall ensure that each individual is equipped or
has ready access to all personal equipment or devices required for
the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security
plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.
b. The licensee shall provide armed security personnel, at a
minimum, but is not limited to, the following.
(1) Gas mask, full face.
(2) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest).
(3) Ammunition/equipment belt.
(4) Duress alarms.
(5) Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 2 channels minimum, 1
operating and 1 emergency.
c. Based upon the licensee protective strategy and the specific
duties and responsibilities assigned to each individual, the
licensee should provide, but is not limited to, the following.
(1) Flashlights and batteries.
(2) Baton or other non-lethal weapons.
(3) Handcuffs.
(4) Binoculars.
(5) Night vision aids (e.g., goggles, weapons sights).
(6) Hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent.
(7) Tear gas or other non-lethal gas.
3. Maintenance.
a. Firearms maintenance program. Each licensee shall implement a
firearms maintenance and accountability program in accordance with
the Commission regulations and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan. The program must include:
(1) Semiannual test firing for accuracy and functionality.
(2) Firearms maintenance procedures that include cleaning
schedules and cleaning requirements.
(3) Program activity documentation.
(4) Control and Accountability (Weapons and ammunition).
(5) Firearm storage requirements.
(6) Armorer certification.
H. Records
1. The licensee shall retain all reports, records, or other
documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.55(r).
2. The licensee shall retain each individual's initial
qualification record for three (3) years after termination of the
individual's employment and shall retain each re-qualification
record for three (3) years after it is superceded.
3. The licensee shall document data and test results from each
individual's suitability, physical, and psychological qualification
and shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from
the date of obtaining and recording these results.
I. Audits and Reviews
The licensee shall review the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan in accordance with the requirements of Sec.
73.55(n).
J. Definitions
Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of this chapter have the
same meaning when used in this appendix.
18. In appendix C to part 73, a heading for Section I and a new
introductory paragraph are added after the ``Introduction'' section and
before the heading ``Contents of the Plan,'' and a new Section II is
added at the end of the appendix to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 73--Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans
Section I: Safeguards contingency plans.
Introduction.
Licensee, applicants, and certificate holders, with the
exception of those who are subject to the requirements of Sec.
73.55 shall comply with the requirements of this section of this
appendix.
Section II: Nuclear power plant safeguards contingency plans.
(a) Introduction.
The safeguards contingency plan must describe how the criteria
set forth in this appendix will be satisfied through implementation
and must provide specific goals, objectives and general guidance to
licensee personnel to facilitate the initiation and completion of
predetermined and exercised responses to threats, up to and
including the design basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a)(1).
Contents of the plan.
(b) Each safeguards contingency plan must include the following
twelve (12) categories of information:
(1) Background.
(2) Generic Planning Base.
(3) Licensee Planning Base.
(4) Responsibility Matrix.
(5) Primary Security Functions.
(6) Response Capabilities.
(7) Protective Strategy.
(8) Integrated Response Plan.
(9) Threat Warning System.
(10) Performance Evaluation Program.
(11) Audits and Reviews.
(12) Implementing Procedures.
(c) Background.
(1) Consistent with the design basis threat specified in Sec.
73.1(a)(1), licensees shall identify and describe the perceived
dangers, threats, and incidents against which the safeguards
contingency plan is designed to protect.
(2) Licensees shall describe the general goals and operational
concepts underlying implementation of the approved safeguards
contingency plan, to include, but not limited to the following:
(i) The types of incidents covered.
(ii) The specific goals and objectives to be accomplished.
(iii) The different elements of the onsite physical protection
program that are used to provide at all times the capability to
detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats
up to and including the design basis threat relative to the
perceived dangers and incidents described in the Commission-approved
safeguards contingency plan.
(iv) How the onsite response effort is organized and coordinated
to ensure that licensees capability to prevent significant core
damage and spent fuel sabotage is maintained throughout each type of
incident covered.
(v) How the onsite response effort is integrated to include
specific procedures, guidance, and strategies to maintain or restore
core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
using existing
[[Page 62872]]
or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be
effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss
of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires.
(vi) A list of terms and their definitions used in describing
operational and technical aspects of the approved safeguards
contingency plan.
(d) Generic planning base.
(1) Licensees shall define the criteria for initiation and
termination of responses to threats to include the specific
decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to respond to
each type of incident covered by the approved safeguards contingency
plan.
(2) Licensees shall ensure early detection of unauthorized
activities and shall respond to all alarms or other indications of a
threat condition such as, tampering, bomb threats, unauthorized
barrier penetration (vehicle or personnel), missing or unaccounted
for nuclear material, escalating civil disturbances, imminent threat
notification, or other threat warnings.
(3) The safeguards contingency plan must:
(i) Identify the types of events that signal the beginning or
initiation of a safeguards contingency event.
(ii) Provide predetermined and structured responses to each type
of postulated event.
(iii) Define specific goals and objectives for response to each
postulated event.
(iv) Identify the predetermined decisions and actions which are
required to satisfy the written goals and objectives for each
postulated event.
(v) Identify the data, criteria, procedures, mechanisms and
logistical support necessary to implement the predetermined
decisions and actions.
(vi) Identify the individuals, groups, or organizational
entities responsible for each predetermined decision and action.
(vii) Define the command-and-control structure required to
coordinate each individual, group, or organizational entity carrying
out predetermined actions.
(viii) Describe how effectiveness will be measured and
demonstrated to include the effectiveness of the capability to
detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats
up to and including the design basis threat.
(e) Licensee planning base.
Licensees shall describe the site-specific factors affecting
contingency planning and shall develop plans for actions to be taken
in response to postulated threats. The following topics must be
addressed:
(1) Organizational Structure. The safeguards contingency plan
must describe the organization's chain of command and delegation of
authority during safeguards contingencies, to include a description
of how command-and-control functions will be coordinated and
maintained.
(2) Physical layout.
(i) The safeguards contingency plan must include a site
description, to include maps and drawings, of the physical
structures and their locations.
(A) Site Description. The site description must address the site
location in relation to nearby towns, transportation routes (e.g.,
rail, water, air, roads), pipelines, hazardous material facilities,
onsite independent spent fuel storage installations, and pertinent
environmental features that may have an effect upon coordination of
response operations.
(B) Approaches. Particular emphasis must be placed on main and
alternate entry routes for law-enforcement or other offsite support
agencies and the location of control points for marshaling and
coordinating response activities.
(ii) Licensees with co-located Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installations shall describe response procedures for both the
operating reactor and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation to include how onsite and offsite responders will be
coordinated and used for incidents occurring outside the protected
area.
(3) Safeguards Systems Hardware. The safeguards contingency plan
must contain a description of the physical security and material
accounting system hardware that influence how the licensee will
respond to an event.
(4) Law enforcement assistance.
(i) The safeguards contingency plan must contain a listing of
available local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and a
general description of response capabilities, to include number of
personnel, types of weapons, and estimated response time lines.
(ii) The safeguards contingency plan must contain a discussion
of working agreements with offsite law enforcement agencies to
include criteria for response, command and control protocols, and
communication procedures.
(5) Policy constraints and assumptions. The safeguards
contingency plan must contain a discussion of State laws, local
ordinances, and company policies and practices that govern licensee
response to incidents and must include, but is not limited to, the
following.
(i) Use of deadly force.
(ii) Recall of off-duty employees.
(iii) Site jurisdictional boundaries.
(iv) Use of enhanced weapons, if applicable.
(6) Administrative and logistical considerations. The safeguards
contingency plan must contain a description of licensee practices
which influence how the licensee responds to a threat to include,
but not limited to, a description of the procedures that will be
used for ensuring that all equipment needed to effect a successful
response will be readily accessible, in good working order, and in
sufficient supply to provide redundancy in case of equipment
failure.
(f) Responsibility matrix.
(1) The safeguards contingency plan must describe the
organizational entities that are responsible for each decision and
action associated with responses to threats.
(i) For each identified initiating event, a tabulation must be
made for each response depicting the assignment of responsibilities
for all decisions and actions to be taken.
(ii) The tabulations described in the responsibility matrix must
provide an overall description of response actions and
interrelationships.
(2) Licensees shall ensure that duties and responsibilities
required by the approved safeguards contingency plan do not conflict
with or prevent the execution of other site emergency plans.
(3) Licensees shall identify and discuss potential areas of
conflict between site plans in the integrated response plan required
by Section II(b)(8) of this appendix.
(4) Licensees shall address safety/security interface issues in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.58 to ensure activities
by the security organization, maintenance, operations, and other
onsite entities are coordinated in a manner that precludes conflict
during both normal and emergency conditions.
(g) Primary security functions.
(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain at all times, the
capability to detect, assess, and respond to all threats to the
facility up to and including the design basis threat.
(2) To facilitate initial response to a threat, licensees shall
ensure the capability to observe all areas of the facility in a
manner that ensures early detection of unauthorized activities and
limits exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
(3) Licensees shall generally describe how the primary security
functions are integrated to provide defense-in-depth and are
maintained despite the loss of any single element of the onsite
physical protection program.
(4) Licensees description must begin with physical protection
measures implemented in the outermost facility perimeter, and must
move inward through those measures implemented to protect vital and
target set equipment.
(h) Response capabilities.
(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain at all times the
capability to intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up
to and including the design basis threat.
(2) Licensees shall identify the personnel, equipment, and
resources necessary to perform the actions required to prevent
significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage in response to
postulated events.
(3) Licensees shall ensure that predetermined actions can be
completed under the postulated conditions.
(4) Licensees shall provide at all times an armed response team
comprised of trained and qualified personnel who possess the
knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment required to implement
the Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan and site
protective strategy. The plan must include a description of the
armed response team including the following:
(i) The authorized minimum number of armed responders, available
at all times inside the protected area.
(ii) The authorized minimum number of armed security officers,
available onsite at all times.
(5) The total number of armed responders and armed security
officers must be documented in the approved security plans and
documented as a component of the protective strategy.
(6) Licensees shall ensure that individuals assigned duties and
responsibilities to implement the Safeguards Contingency Plan
[[Page 62873]]
are trained and qualified in accordance with appendix B of this part
and the Commission-approved security plans.
(i) Protective strategy.
(1) Licensees shall develop, maintain, and implement a written
protective strategy that describes the deployment of the armed
response team relative to the general goals, operational concepts,
performance objectives, and specific actions to be accomplished by
each individual in response to postulated events.
(2) The protective strategy must:
(i) Be designed to prevent significant core damage and spent
fuel sabotage through the coordinated implementation of specific
actions and strategies required to intercept, challenge, delay, and
neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage.
(ii) Describe and consider site specific conditions, to include
but not limited to, facility layout, the location of target set
equipment and elements, target set equipment that is in maintenance
or out of service, and the potential effects that unauthorized
electronic access to safety and security systems may have on the
protective strategy capability to prevent significant core damage
and spent fuel sabotage.
(iii) Identify predetermined actions and time lines for the
deployment of armed personnel.
(iv) Provide bullet resisting protected positions with
appropriate fields of fire.
(v) Limit exposure of security personnel to possible attack.
(3) Licensees shall provide a command and control structure, to
include response by off-site law enforcement agencies, which ensures
that decisions and actions are coordinated and communicated in a
timely manner and that facilitates response in accordance with the
integrated response plan.
(j) Integrated Response Plan.
(1) Licensees shall document, maintain, and implement an
Integrated Response Plan which must identify, describe, and
coordinate actions to be taken by licensee personnel and offsite
agencies during a contingency event or other emergency situation.
(2) The Integrated Response Plan must:
(i) Be designed to integrate and coordinate all actions to be
taken in response to an emergency event in a manner that will ensure
that each site plan and procedure can be successfully implemented
without conflict from other plans and procedures.
(ii) Include specific procedures, guidance, and strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool
cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources
(equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under
the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant
due to explosions or fires.
(iii) Ensure that onsite staffing levels, facilities, and
equipment required for response to any identified event, are readily
available and capable of fulfilling their intended purpose.
(iv) Provide emergency action levels to ensure that threats
result in at least a notification of unusual event and implement
procedures for the assignment of a predetermined classification to
specific events.
(v) Include specific procedures, guidance, and strategies
describing cyber incident response and recovery.
(3) Licensees shall:
(i) Reconfirm on a annual basis, liaison with local, State, and
Federal law enforcement agencies, established in accordance with
Sec. 73.55(k)(8), to include communication protocols, command and
control structure, marshaling locations, estimated response times,
and anticipated response capabilities and specialized equipment.
(ii) Provide required training to include simulator training for
the operations response to security events (e.g., loss of ultimate
heat sink) for nuclear power reactor personnel in accordance with
site procedures to ensure the operational readiness of personnel
commensurate with assigned duties and responsibilities.
(iii) Periodically train personnel in accordance with site
procedures to respond to a hostage or duress situation.
(iv) Determine the possible effects that nearby hazardous
material facilities may have upon site response plans and modify
response plans, procedures, and equipment as necessary.
(v) Ensure that identified actions are achievable under
postulated conditions.
(k) Threat warning system.
(1) Licensees shall implement a ``Threat warning system'' which
identifies specific graduated protective measures and actions to be
taken to increase licensee preparedness against a heightened or
imminent threat of attack.
(2) Licensees shall ensure that the specific protective measures
and actions identified for each threat level are consistent with the
Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan, and other site
security, and emergency plans and procedures.
(3) Upon notification by an authorized representative of the
Commission, licensees shall implement the specific protective
measures assigned to the threat level indicated by the Commission
representative.
(l) Performance Evaluation Program.
(1) Licensees shall document and maintain a Performance
Evaluation Program that describes how the licensee will demonstrate
and assess the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection
program to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage,
and to include the capability of armed personnel to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities.
(2) The Performance Evaluation Program must include procedures
for the conduct of quarterly drills and annual force-on-force
exercises that are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
licensee's capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize a simulated threat.
(i) The scope of drills conducted for training purposes must be
determined by the licensee as needed, and can be limited to specific
portions of the site protective strategy.
(ii) Drills, exercises, and other training must be conducted
under conditions that simulate as closely as practical the site
specific conditions under which each member will, or may be,
required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
(iii) Licensees shall document each performance evaluation to
include, but not limited to, scenarios, participants, and critiques.
(iv) Each drill and exercise must include a documented post
exercise critique in which participants identify failures,
deficiencies, or other findings in performance, plans, equipment, or
strategies.
(v) Licensees shall enter all findings, deficiencies, and
failures identified by each performance evaluation into the
corrective action program to ensure that timely corrections are made
to the onsite physical protection program and necessary changes are
made to the approved security plans, licensee protective strategy,
and implementing procedures.
(vi) Licensees shall protect all findings, deficiencies, and
failures relative to the effectiveness of the onsite physical
protection program in accordance with the requirements of Sec.
73.21.
(3) For the purpose of drills and exercises, licensees shall:
(i) Use no more than the number of armed personnel specified in
the approved security plans to demonstrate effectiveness.
(ii) Minimize the number and effects of artificialities
associated with drills and exercises.
(iii) Implement the use of systems or methodologies that
simulate the realities of armed engagement through visual and
audible means, and reflects the capabilities of armed personnel to
neutralize a target through the use of firearms during drills and
exercises.
(iv) Ensure that each scenario used is capable of challenging
the ability of armed personnel to perform assigned duties and
implement required elements of the protective strategy.
(4) The Performance Evaluation Program must be designed to
ensure that:
(i) Each member of each shift who is assigned duties and
responsibilities required to implement the approved safeguards
contingency plan and licensee protective strategy participates in at
least one (1) drill on a quarterly basis and one (1) force on force
exercise on an annual basis.
(ii) The mock adversary force replicates, as closely as
possible, adversary characteristics and capabilities in the design
basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a)(1), and is capable of
exploiting and challenging the licensee protective strategy,
personnel, command and control, and implementing procedures.
(iii) Protective strategies are evaluated and challenged through
tabletop demonstrations.
(iv) Drill and exercise controllers are trained and qualified to
ensure each controller has the requisite knowledge and experience to
control and evaluate exercises.
(v) Drills and exercises are conducted safely in accordance with
site safety plans.
(5) Members of the mock adversary force used for NRC observed
exercises shall be independent of both the security program
management and personnel who have direct responsibility for
implementation of the
[[Page 62874]]
security program, including contractors, to avoid the possibility
for a conflict-of-interest.
(6) Scenarios.
(i) Licensees shall develop and document multiple scenarios for
use in conducting quarterly drills and annual force-on-force
exercises.
(ii) Licensee scenarios must be designed to test and challenge
any component or combination of components, of the onsite physical
protection program and protective strategy.
(iii) Each scenario must use a unique target set or target sets,
and varying combinations of adversary equipment, strategies, and
tactics, to ensure that the combination of all scenarios challenges
every component of the onsite physical protection program and
protective strategy to include, but not limited to, equipment,
implementing procedures, and personnel.
(iv) Licensees shall ensure that scenarios used for required
drills and exercises are not repeated within any twelve (12) month
period for drills and three (3) years for exercises.
(m) Records, audits, and reviews.
(1) Licensees shall review and audit the Commission-approved
safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the requirements
Sec. 73.55(n) of this part.
(2) The licensee shall make necessary adjustments to the
Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan to ensure successful
implementation of Commission regulations and the site protective
strategy.
(3) The safeguards contingency plan review must include an audit
of implementing procedures and practices, the site protective
strategy, and response agreements made by local, State, and Federal
law enforcement authorities.
(4) Licensees shall retain all reports, records, or other
documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.55(r).
(n) Implementing procedures.
(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain written implementing
procedures that provide specific guidance and operating details that
identify the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each
member of the security organization who is assigned duties and
responsibilities required for the effective implementation of the
Commission-approved security plans and the site protective strategy.
(2) Licensees shall ensure that implementing procedures
accurately reflect the information contained in the Responsibility
Matrix required by this appendix, the Commission-approved security
plans, the Integrated Response Plan, and other site plans.
(3) Implementing procedures need not be submitted to the
Commission for approval, but are subject to inspection.
19. 10 CFR part 73, appendix G, is revised to read as follows:
Appendix G to Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events
Under the provisions of Sec. 73.71(a), (d), and (f) of this
part, licensees subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.55 of this
part shall report or record, as appropriate, the following
safeguards events under paragraphs I, II, III, and IV of this
appendix. Under the provisions of Sec. 73.71(b), (c), and (f) of
this part, licensees subject to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.60, and 73.67 of this part shall report or record,
as appropriate, the following safeguards events under paragraphs II
and IV of this appendix. Licensees shall make such reports to the
Commission under the provisions of Sec. 73.71 of this part.
I. Events to be reported as soon as possible, but no later than
15 minutes after discovery, followed by a written report within
sixty (60) days.
(a) The initiation of a security response consistent with a
licensee's physical security plan, safeguards contingency plan, or
defensive strategy based on actual or imminent threat against a
nuclear power plant.
(b) The licensee is not required to report security responses
initiated as a result of information communicated to the licensee by
the Commission, such as the threat warning system addressed in
appendix C to this part.
II. Events to be reported within one (1) hour of discovery,
followed by a written report within sixty (60) days.
(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person
has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has
made a threat to commit or cause:
(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material;
or
(2) Significant physical damage to any NRC-licensed power
reactor or facility possessing strategic special nuclear material or
to carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear
fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel facility which is
possessed by a carrier; or
(3) Interruption of normal operation of any NRC licensed nuclear
power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its
components, or controls including the security system.
(b) An actual or attempted entry of an unauthorized person into
any area or transport for which the licensee is required by
Commission regulations to control access.
(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in
a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected
access to any area or transport for which the licensee is required
by Commission regulations to control access and for which
compensatory measures have not been employed.
(d) The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into any
area or transport for which the licensee is required by Commission
regulations to control access.
III. Events to be reported within four (4) hours of discovery.
No written followup report is required.
(a) Any other information received by the licensee of suspicious
surveillance activities or attempts at access, including:
(1) Any security-related incident involving suspicious activity
that may be indicative of potential pre-operational surveillance,
reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering activities directed
against the facility. Such activity may include, but is not limited
to, attempted surveillance or reconnaissance activity, elicitation
of information from security or other site personnel relating to the
security or safe operation of the plant, or challenges to security
systems (e.g., failure to stop for security checkpoints, possible
tests of security response and security screening equipment, or
suspicious entry of watercraft into posted off-limits areas).
(2) Any security-related incident involving suspicious aircraft
overflight activity. Commercial or military aircraft activity
considered routine by the licensee is not required to be reported.
(3) Incidents resulting in the notification of local, State or
national law enforcement, or law enforcement response to the site
not included in paragraphs I or II of this appendix;
(b) The unauthorized use of or tampering with the components or
controls, including the security system, of nuclear power reactors.
(c) Follow-up communications regarding events reported under
paragraph III of this appendix will be completed through the NRC
threat assessment process via the NRC Operations Center.\1\
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\1\ Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone numbers of the
NRC Operations Center are specified in appendix A of this part.
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IV. Events to be recorded within 24 hours of discovery in the
safeguards event log.
(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a
safeguards system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected
access to any area or transport in which the licensee is required by
Commission regulations to control access had compensatory measures
not been established.
(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not
previously defined in this appendix with the potential for reducing
the effectiveness of the physical protection program below that
described in a licensee physical security or safeguards contingency
plan, or the actual condition of such reduction in effectiveness.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of October 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 06-8678 Filed 10-25-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P